Joint Venture Between Aveng (Africa) Pty Ltd and Strabag International GmbH v South African National Roads Agency Soc Ltd and Another (8331/19) [2019] ZAGPPHC 286 (17 May 2019)
- Citation
- [2019] ZAGPPHC 286
- Status
- Order
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- TAN Makhuvele
- Case number
- 8331/19
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- TAN Makhuvele
- Case number
- 8331/19
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that, while it maintains its view that the approach adopted in the initial judgment was correct, there is substance in the applicant's argument that the prima facie right to relief was the legal question regarding the autonomy of construction guarantees. The court acknowledges that, if its approach was incorrect, the application would have succeeded based on the legal pronouncements made. The arguments advanced by the applicant meet the threshold for granting leave to appeal, and the matter warrants consideration by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The first respondent does not oppose the granting of leave in these circumstances.
Court disposition
Leave to appeal granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Orders
- The applicant is granted leave to appeal the whole of the judgment and order to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
- The costs of this application shall be costs in the appeal.
02
Material facts
Parties
Joint Venture Between Aveng (Africa) Pty Ltd and Strabag International GmbH
Applicant Counsel: JG Wasserman SCSouth African National Roads Agency SOC Ltd
Respondent Counsel: CE Watt-Pringle SCLombard Insurance Company Limited
Respondent03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Following Dismissal of Initial Relief.
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the applicant has a prima facie right to protect the proper implementation of the contract terms.
- 02
Whether the court erred in making findings of fact regarding the existence of a dispute and force majeure.
- 03
Whether the legal question regarding the autonomy of construction guarantees was dispositive of the application.
- 04
Whether leave to appeal should be granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant contends that the court should not have made findings of fact regarding the existence of a dispute or force majeure, as the application was aimed at protecting a prima facie right to proper implementation of contract terms. The applicant argues that the legal question of the independence of construction guarantees was answered in its favour, and that this should have been dispositive. The applicant submits that the approach adopted by the court was incorrect and that leave to appeal is justified.
- Respondent
- The first respondent maintains that the court's approach was correct and that the findings regarding the existence of force majeure were necessary. However, counsel for the first respondent concedes that, should the application for leave to appeal be successful, leave should be granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The respondent does not oppose the granting of leave in these circumstances.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act, No 10 of 2013
Leave to appeal may only be granted where there is a reasonable prospect of success or some other compelling reason, such as conflicting judgments, and where the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the real issues.
- 02
Section 16(2)(a) of the Superior Courts Act, No 10 of 2013
Issues that have no practical effect or result at the time of hearing of the appeal do not qualify for leave to appeal.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that, while it maintains its view that the approach adopted in the initial judgment was correct, there is substance in the applicant's argument that the prima facie right to relief was the legal question regarding the autonomy of construction guarantees. The court acknowledges that, if its approach was incorrect, the application would have succeeded based on the legal pronouncements made. The arguments advanced by the applicant meet the threshold for granting leave to appeal, and the matter warrants consideration by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The first respondent does not oppose the granting of leave in these circumstances.
Obiter and limits
- The legal question arising from the 'lacuna' left open in the judgment of Cloete JA in Kwikspace Modular Buildings Ltd v Sobodala Mining Co SARL and Another 2010 (6) SA 477 (SCA) is significant and deserves appellate attention.
- At this stage, the court is not required to justify or interpret its judgment, but only to consider whether the arguments for leave to appeal have substance.
Court disposition
Leave to appeal granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
- The applicant is granted leave to appeal the whole of the judgment and order to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
- The costs of this application shall be costs in the appeal.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Order
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
(1) Reportable: No
(2) Of interest to other judges: Yes
(3) Date heard: 14/05/19
(4) Date delivered: 17/05/19
CASE NO: 8331/19
In the matter between:
JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN AVENG (AFRICA) PTY LTD
AND STRABAG INTERNATIONAL GmbH
Applicant
and
SOUTH
AFRICAN NATIONAL ROADS
AGENCY
SOC LTD
First RespondentLOMBARD
INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
ON LEAVE TO APPEAL
MAKHUVELE J
[1] After making positive findings on the question as to whether SANRAL is bound to comply with the terms of the building contract before it can present the construction guarantees for payment, I nevertheless proceeded to dismiss the relief sought in the Notice of Motion on the basis that the applicant was unlikely to succeed in the intended dispute resolution proceedings with regard to its right to cancel the contract on the basis that there was a state of force
majeure.
[2] This application for leave to appeal is mainly based on the approach that I adopted in reaching my decision to dismiss the application. The main Issue is that I should not have made findings of fact with
regard to the existence of the dispute beca1,1se the prima facie right that the applicant sought to protect was the proper implementation of the terms of the contract.
[3] In essence, the argument in this application for leave to appeal is that I should not have gone beyond answering the legal question with regard to the independence or autonomy of the construction guarantees.
[4] This being an application for leave to appeal, I am not required, at this stage, to justify my judgment or offer an interpretation thereof but only to consider whether there is substance in the arguments advanced by the applicants that would justify granting leave to appeal.
[5] Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act, No 10 of 2013 reads as follows:
" Leave to appeal may only be given where the Judge or Judges concerned are of the opinion that-
(a)(i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) there Is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting Judgments on the matter under consideration;
(b)the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section 16(2)(a);and
(c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the Issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a Just and prompt resolution of the real issues between the parties”
[6] Section 16(2)(a) referred to in section 17(1)(b) refers to the issues that would have no practical effect or result at the time of hearing of the appeal. The issues arising from this matter do not fall in the ambit of this subsection.
[7] Whilst I continue to believe that the approach that I adopted was correct, I am also of the view that there is substance in the argument that the prima facie right that would have entitled the applicant to the relief sought is the very legal question that I have answered in its favour, but decided that it was not disposive of the application because of the difficulties relating to existence of the state of force majeure.
[8] Should the approach that I have adopted in reaching my decision be incorrect as contended for by the applicant, it means that the application would have succeeded on the basis of the pronouncements that I made on the legal questions arising from what is referred to as the 'lacuna' that has been left open in the judgment of Cloete JA in the matter of Kwikspace Modular Buildings Ltd v Sobodala Mining Co SARL and Another 2010 (6) SA 477 (SCA).
[9] I am therefore satisfied that the arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant have substance and are important and do meet the threshold for granting of leave to appeal. Furthermore, I agree with the submissions that they deserve the attention of the Supreme Court of Appeal. The first respondent's counsel also agreed that should the application be successful, leave to appeal should be granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[10] Under the circumstances, I make the following order;
[10.1] Th e applicant is granted leave to appeal the whole of the judgment and order to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[10.2] The costs of this application shall be costs in the appeal.
TAN Makhuvele
Judge of the High Court
APPEARANCES
Appearances:
Applicant:
Advocate JG Wasserman SC
Instructed by:
Pinsent Masons South Africa Inc
Sandton
JOHANNESBURG
First Respondent:
Advocate CE Watt-Pringle SC
Advocate A Glendinnlng
Advocate S Tshiklla
Instructed by:
Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc
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