Viva Engineering Projects CC and Another v Minister of Water Affairs and Others (64340/13) [2015] ZAGPPHC 443 (5 June 2015)
- Citation
- [2015] ZAGPPHC 443
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- AB Rossouwa
- Case number
- 64340/13
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- AB Rossouwa
- Case number
- 64340/13
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the second applicant, being a non-existent joint venture, lacked locus standi and could not assert constitutional rights. The court held that a bidder disqualified in the first phase of a phased evaluation bidding process does not have standing to challenge decisions made in subsequent phases, as such interests are not real but hypothetical or academic. The court further determined that the terms of SDB9 were reasonable and necessary to prevent bid rigging, and there was no reasonable prospect that another court would find them unreasonable, immaterial, or unconstitutional. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal had no reasonable prospect of success and was dismissed with costs, including costs of senior counsel.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs, including costs of senior counsel.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs, including costs of senior counsel.
02
Material facts
Parties
Viva Engineering Projects CC
Applicant Counsel: MM SnymanViva Engineering Project CC and Corro-Wear Joint Venture
Applicant Counsel: MM SnymanMinister of Water Affairs
Respondent Counsel: Z Z MatebeseMrs Z Mathe No
Respondent Counsel: Z Z MatebeseMethabica Consulting
RespondentStelenbosch Naco
RespondentBelta Services
Respondent Counsel: A G SouthPro-Electro Services
Respondent03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Following Judgment Delivered on 17 March 2015.
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the second applicant, as a non-existent joint venture, had locus standi to bring the application.
- 02
Whether a bidder disqualified in the first phase of a phased evaluation bidding process has standing to challenge decisions in subsequent phases.
- 03
Whether the terms of SDB9 were unreasonable, immaterial, or unconstitutional, or caused unfair treatment.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicants contended that an unsuccessful bidder acquires locus standi by virtue of submitting a bid, challenging the finding that the second applicant lacked standing. They argued that a bidder disqualified in the first phase retains the right to challenge decisions made in subsequent phases. They further submitted that the terms of SDB9 were unreasonable, immaterial, or unconstitutional, and that the Committee was not entitled to rely on them.
- Respondent
- The respondents maintained that the second applicant, as a non-existent joint venture, lacked legal standing. They argued that a bidder disqualified in the first phase cannot challenge decisions in subsequent phases, as such interests are hypothetical or academic. They further asserted that the terms of SDB9 were reasonable and necessary to prevent bid rigging, and that no unfair treatment occurred.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Judgment of AB Rossouwa J
A non-existent entity cannot possess legal standing or constitutional rights.
- 02
Giant Concerts CC v Renafdo Investments (Pty) Ltd and others 2013 (3) BCLR 251 (CC)
Standing in phased evaluation bidding processes requires a real, direct interest, not hypothetical or academic interests.
- 03
Judgment of AB Rossouwa J
SDB9 aims to prevent bid rigging and collusive dealings between constituent firms, and its terms are broader than the Competition Act but not unreasonable or unconstitutional.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the second applicant, being a non-existent joint venture, lacked locus standi and could not assert constitutional rights. The court held that a bidder disqualified in the first phase of a phased evaluation bidding process does not have standing to challenge decisions made in subsequent phases, as such interests are not real but hypothetical or academic. The court further determined that the terms of SDB9 were reasonable and necessary to prevent bid rigging, and there was no reasonable prospect that another court would find them unreasonable, immaterial, or unconstitutional. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal had no reasonable prospect of success and was dismissed with costs, including costs of senior counsel.
Obiter and limits
- The court noted the absence of reported judgments dealing specifically with locus standi in the context of phased evaluation bidding processes.
- From a pragmatic perspective, allowing a disqualified bidder to contest decisions in subsequent phases would be illogical and burdensome to the court and opposing parties.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs, including costs of senior counsel.
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs, including costs of senior counsel.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 64340/13
DATE: 5 JUNE 2015
In the matter between:
VIVA
ENGINEERING PROJECT CC..........................................................................First Applicant
VIVA
ENGINEERING PROJECT.............................................................................Second Applicant
CC AND CORRO-WEAR JOINT VENTURE
And
MINISTER
OF WATER AFFAIRS.............................................................................First Respondent
MRS
Z MATHE NO.................................................................................................Second Respondent
METHABICA CONSULTING..................................................................................Third Respondent
STELENBOSCH NACO..........................................................................................Fourth Respondent
BELTA SERVICES......................................................................................................Fifth Respondent
PRO-ELECTRO SERVICES.........................................................................................Six Respondent
JUDGMENT
(1) This is an application for leave to appeal against the order that I made on 17 March 2015.
(2) The application for leave to appeal was brought to my attention about two weeks ago. I immediately requested the registrar to facilitate the hearing of this application.
(3) The applicants raised eleven grounds for leave to appeal. These grounds are set out in the applicant’s notice of application for leave to appeal, which I find unnecessary to repeat.
(4) The applicants argued that an unsuccessful bidder has locus standi simply by virtue of its having submitted a bid. This submission was made in respect of my finding that the second applicant lacked locus standi. It must be borne in mind that the issue of standing is divorced from the substance of the case. Thus, I had to decide this issue on the assumption that the seconds defendant’s challenge was justified. I found that the second applicant, ie Viva and Corro-Wear, in their capacity as partners or associates in a joint-venture, did not have a standing because the alleged joint-venture never existed for the reasons set out in my judgment. A non-existent entity does not have any standing, let alone constitutional rights and I am not aware of any authority proclaiming
that each constituent member of an alleged entity with locus standi is rendered with legal standing by a finding that the entity has never existed. I am of the opinion that there is no reasonable prospect that my finding in this regard would be overturned on appeal.
The applicants further argued that my finding of an absence of irregular conduct in the first phase did not dispose of the whole case. If there was no irregularity committed in the administrative phase, then the question is whether a bidder who was duly disqualified in the first phase has any locus standi to challenge a decision made in any subsequent phase. Counsel submitted that such a disqualified bidder does have that right. I could not find any reported judgment dealing with locus standi in the context of a phased evaluation bidding
process. If the broader principles of constitutional own-interest standing as set out in Giant Concerts CC v Renafdo Investments (Pty) Ltd and others 2013 (3) BCLR 251 (CC) are applied to the facts of this case, I have difficulty to see how a decision taken in any subsequent phase can directly affect the said bidder’s rights or interests or potential rights or interests, or how such an interest can be real and not merely hypothetical or academic or on what basis such a person is entitled to claim the court’s time and put the opposing party to trouble. Even from a purely pragmatic point of view, it would make no sense to grant such a bidder the opportunity to contest a decision made in any subsequent phase. In the light hereof, I am of the view that there is no reasonable prospect that
another court would find that a duly disqualified bidder in a phased evaluation bidding process has locus standi to challenge any decision in any subsequent phase.
(6) Regarding the applicant’s grounds relating to SDB9, the following: I found that the purpose of SDB9 was to prevent any form of bid rigging, which included collusive dealings between constituent firms and the prevention of more than one (alternative) bid per bidder with a view to preventing any form of bid rigging. It is true that the terms of SDB9 had a wider scope than the Competition
Act, but in my opinion there is no reasonable prospect that another court would find that the terms were unreasonable, immaterial or unconstitutional or that the Committee was entitled to ignore them or that the terms were the cause of any form of unfair treatment for the reasons set out in my judgment.
(7) Regarding the remaining grounds for leave to appeal and mindful of the factual findings and my reasons contained in my judgment, I am likewise of the opinion that the appeal would have no reasonable prospect of success.
(8) I therefor make the following order:
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs, including costs of senior counsel.
AB
ROSSOUWA J
DATE: 05/06/2015
DATE OF HEARING: 3 JUNE 2015 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 5 JUNE 2015
FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND APPLICANTS:
ADVOCATES: MM SNYMAN (With him ND DE LANGE) ATTORNEYS: NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (INCORPORATED AS DENEYS REITZ INC), UMHLANGA C/O MARITZ
SMITH VAN EEDEN INC, PRETORIA
FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND RESPONDENTS.
ADVOCATE:
Z Z MATEBESE
ATTORNEYS: THE STATE ATTORNEY, PRETORIA
FOR THE THIRD RESPONDENT: NO APPEARANCE
FOR THE FIFTH RESPONDENT: ADVOCATE: A G SOUTH MACROBERT INC, PRETORIA
Case-aware research
Ask AI about this case
The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.