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South Africa Judgment

Western Cape High Court, Cape Town

Witbooi v S (A376/2008) [2008] ZAWCHC 289 (7 November 2008)

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01

Holding and result

The court found that the appellant's constitutional right to legal representation was violated when the magistrate compelled him to proceed with the trial without his attorney, despite his clear indication that he wished to be represented and had made efforts to secure legal assistance. The magistrate failed to properly investigate the reasons for the absence of the appellant's attorney and did not afford him a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation. This procedural irregularity resulted in a denial of the appellant's right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Constitution. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the State was granted leave to reinstitute proceedings if it so wished.

Court disposition

Conviction and sentence set aside due to procedural irregularity; State may reinstitute proceedings.

Orders

  • The appellant's conviction for contravening section 14 of Act 23 of 1957 and the sentence imposed are set aside.
  • The State is entitled, in terms of section 324(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act, to reinstitute proceedings against the appellant.

02

Material facts

Parties

Morne Witbooi

Appellant Counsel: Advocate Kahn; later Mr Van der Merwe

The State

Respondent Counsel: Mr Theron

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Criminal Appeal / Appeal Against Conviction and Sentence From the Mitchell's Plain Regional Court

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The appellant argued that he was not treated fairly in court and did not wish to conduct his own defence. He asserted that his right to legal representation was denied when the magistrate compelled him to proceed without his attorney, despite his efforts to secure legal assistance. He maintained that this denial infringed his constitutional right to a fair trial.
Respondent
The State, represented by Mr Theron, contended that the appellant was using requests for legal representation to delay the proceedings. The magistrate believed the appellant was manipulating the process and that he had been given sufficient opportunity to secure legal representation. The State argued that the trial was conducted fairly and that the conviction and sentence should stand.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Section 35(3)(f) of the Constitution; Section 73(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977

    An accused's right to legal representation is protected by section 35(3)(f) of the Constitution and section 73(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Denial of a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice constitutes a violation of the right to a fair trial.

  2. 02

    HIEMSTRA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 11-4

    If a reasonable request for time to obtain legal advice is refused, any conviction which follows will almost invariably be set aside on appeal or review.

  3. 03

    S v Shabangu 1976 (3) SA 555 (A)

    The presiding officer must investigate the reasons for the absence of legal representation before compelling an accused to proceed unrepresented.

  4. 04

    S v Lusu 2005 (2) SACR 538 (EC)

    Withholding the right to legal representation and the resulting violation of the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial requires that the conviction and sentence be set aside.

  5. 05

    Section 324(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act; S v Makhandela 2007 (2) SACR 620 (W)

    The State is entitled to reinstitute proceedings if the conviction and sentence are set aside for procedural irregularity.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court found that the appellant's constitutional right to legal representation was violated when the magistrate compelled him to proceed with the trial without his attorney, despite his clear indication that he wished to be represented and had made efforts to secure legal assistance. The magistrate failed to properly investigate the reasons for the absence of the appellant's attorney and did not afford him a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation. This procedural irregularity resulted in a denial of the appellant's right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Constitution. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the State was granted leave to reinstitute proceedings if it so wished.

Obiter and limits

  • The appellant's conduct may have tested the patience of the magistrate, but this did not justify depriving him of his constitutional right to legal representation.
  • It is impossible to speculate on the influence legal representation might have had on the outcome of the case, but the denial of this right necessarily prejudiced the fairness of the trial.
  • In circumstances where the right to a fair trial is at stake, the inconvenience of further delay cannot outweigh the accused's constitutional rights.

Court disposition

Conviction and sentence set aside due to procedural irregularity; State may reinstitute proceedings.

  • The appellant's conviction for contravening section 14 of Act 23 of 1957 and the sentence imposed are set aside.
  • The State is entitled, in terms of section 324(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act, to reinstitute proceedings against the appellant.

Source and reliance status

Western Cape High Court, Cape Town

This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.

Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

Western Cape High Court, Cape Town

Judgment

[2008] ZAWCHC 289

IN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA

(KAAP DIE GOEIE HOOP PROVINSIALE AFDELING)

SAAKNOMMER: A376/2008

DATUM: 7 NOVEMBER 2008

In die saak tussen:

MORNE WITBOOl Appellanten

DIE STAAT Respondent

UITSPRAAK

FOURIE. R:

Die appellant net in die streekhof te Mitchell's Plain op fa aanklag van onsedelike aanranding verskyn. Hy het onskuldig gepfeit maar na die aanhoor van getuienis, is hy skuldig bevind aan die oortreding van artikel 14 van Wet 23 van 1957, en gevonnis tot ses jaar gevangenisstraf waarvan twee jaar voorwaardelik opgeskort is. Hy het daarna fa aansoek gebring vir verlof om te appelfeer en dit is deur die Streeklanddros toegestaan.

Hoewel die Streeklanddros nie spesifiek vermeld het of verlof verieen word teen beide skuldigbevinding en vonnis nie, aanvaar ek dat dit wel die geval is, aangesien die trant van die aansoek gemik was teen beide skuldigbevinding en vonnis.

Ten aanvang is dit egter nodig om aandag te skenk aan die vraag of appellant 'n biilike verhoor gehad het. Hierdie aspek is ten regte en op 'n biilike wyse deur mnr Theron. namens die Staat, in sy betoogshoofde en weer vandag voor ons geopper. Dit is nodig om kortliks te verwys na die verloop van die

gebeure wat aanleiding gegee het tot die vraag of appellant n biilike verhoor gehad het.

Appellant het met sy verskyning in die streekhof op 4 Desember 2007, aangedui dat hy nie regsverteenwoordiging benodig nie en self sy verdediging sou behartig. Na verdere uitstelle is die saak op 26 Februarie 2008 ter rolle geplaas vir verhoor. By hterdie geleentheid het appellant in persoon verskyn en aanvanklik weer bevesttg dat hy nie regsverteenwoordiging benodig nie.

Alvorens hy egter op die aanklag teen horn gepleit het, het hy die streeklanddros daarop attent gemaak dat die Staat nog nie sekere

dokumentasie aan hom verskaf het nie. Tydens die debat wat toe plaasgevind het, het appellant aangedui dat hy by heroorweging besluit het dat hy wel die dienste van Yi regsverteenwoordiger benodig. Die relevante deel van die notule van die verrigtinge in die Hof a quo lees as volg:

"Appellant: So in die geval, ek dink ek gaan maar Viewer aansoek doen vir n staatsJawyer om myself te protect.

Landdros: Okay, I must look at the record because if you were informed of your fights properly, I think I am going to refuse that application, you are wasting now, you are delaying the trial. Appellant: Soos ek gese het, ek wil nie die Hof se tyd mors nie, maar ek voel net nou dat - want ek het gedog ek is geregtig op aIIe dokumentasie. Landdros: Do you want the prosecutor to put the charge or what?

Appellant: Ja, ek weet ek het vir die Hof gese ek gaan my eie verdediging doen en dit is nie om die Hof se tyd te mors nie, maar ek voel in hierdie opsie gaan ek maar liewer van regshulp gebruik maak, nie dat ek nie die magistraat vertrou of enigeen nie, maar ek voel ek wil maar Hewer ..."

Die streeklanddros verwys in haar uitspraak ook na hierdie voorval en beskryf dit as volg:

"In explaining to the accused that the Court was not for the State, it was for the interest of justice and therefore it will help the accused, he refused to plead and going on and on and on about his rights including his right to legal representation. He insisted that he wanted to apply for legal aid."

Die streeklanddros het toe wel vir appellant die gefeentheid gebied om hn regsverteenwoordiger te bekom. Ene advokaat Kahn het op dieselfde dag namens appellant verskyn en 'n nuwe verhoordatum, naamlik Vrydag 7 Maart 2008, is met horn gereel.

Op 7 Maart 2008 deel appellant egter die Hof mee dat hy advokaat Kahn se mandaat beeindig het. Hy het toe blykbaar reeds 'n ander prokureur, ene mnr Van der Merwe, se dienste bekom. Die streeklanddros het toe vir appellant gel as om 10:00 voormiddag dieselfde dag weer in die hof te verskyn met sy prokureur. Tydens die latere verskyning op 7 Maart 2008 het appellant die streeklanddros meegedeel dat sy prokureur blykbaar uttstedig te George was. Die streeklanddros het egter vir appellant gelas om sonder regsverteenwoordiging met die verhoor voort te gaan. In haar uitspraak motiveer die landdros hierdie besluit, onder andere, as voig:

"The Court was satisfied beyond any doubt that the accused was using legal representation to delay the proceedings, something that has been confirmed through the trial because at every opportunity he was given, the accused was going on and on about his rights. So, the Court suspects that he planned the whole thing so that the Court will proceed without an attorney and that he will go on another (indistinct). In fact, it has already been said but the Court would like to say this again, that from the very word go, the accused represented himself as somebody who knows the law and who wanted to manipulate the law."

Na die aanhoor van die staatsaak, is die verrigtinge toe verdaag tot Maandag, 10 Maart 2008. Op die datum het appellant toe getuienis

afgele, maar alvorens hy met die meriete van sy saak gehandel het, het die volgende bespreking tussen horn en die streeklanddros

plaasgevind:

"Landdros: Yes Mr Witbooi, what do you want to tell us?

Appellant: Net voor ek gaan begin praat oor die saak, wil ek dit duideEik aan die Hof ste! ... (tussenbeide)

Landdros: Mr Witbooi, please let's - you have being doing this since day one not speaking to what you want to, let's just stick to the case. I do not want your addresses.

Appellant: Wat ek wil se is maar deel van my regter ek wou nooit die saak sonder 'n prokureur gedoen het nie.

Landdros: We will pass that, that is on record, so proceed. If you still say you want an attorney, you were supposed to bring an attorney today. You still do not have an attorney and you say you did not want to proceed with an attorney. Appellant: Vrydag toe wil hulle my nie 'n geleentheid gee hoekom die prokureur nie hier is nie.

Landdros: I did explain, you said he was in George, let's get on with the case, Mr Witbooi, please. You did explain, I do not know what.''

Na skuldigbevinding en vonnis het appellant, bygestaan deur 'n regsverteenwoordlger, op 12 Junie 2008 aansoek gedoen vir borg hangende appel. Appellant het tydens die borgverrigtinge weer die kwessie van sy regsverteenwoordiging tydens die verhoor, in die volgende woorde geopper:

“I was not been treated fairly in court especially and the fact that I did not want to conduct my own defence."

Die reg van 'n beskuldigde in 'n kriminele saak op verteenwoordiging deur 'n regspraktisyn van sy keuse, word verskans in artikel 35{3)(f) van ons Grondwet. Die reg word ook bevestig in artikel 73(2) van die Strafproseswet, nr. 51 van 1977. Endien 'n beskuldigde hierdie reg ontneem sou word, sal dit feitlik sonder uitsondering 'n skending van die beskuldigde se reg op n biilike verhoor tot gevolg he. In HIEMSTRA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, word dit as volg geste! te 11-4:

"The accused's right to legal representation is of course worthless if he or she is not given a reasonable opportunity to use it. When a reasonable request for time to obtain legal advice is refused, any conviction which follows will almost invariably be set aside on appeal or review. After a 11P it is virtually impossible to determine afterwards how the trial would have proceeded had iegal representation not been irreguEarly

refused."

Hierdie beginsel is reeds voor die inwerktreding van ons huidige grond wetlike bes tel deur die destydse Appelhof bevestig in S v SHABANGU 1976(3) SA 555. Sien verder ook die onlangse beslissing van S v LUSU 2005(2) SASV 538 (OK), waar beslis is dat die weerhouding van die reg op regsverteenwoordiging en die gevolglike skending van die

grondwetfike reg van die beskuldigde op 'n biilike verhoor, tot gevolg het dat die skuldigbevinding en vonnis wat daarop gevolg het, tersyde gestel behoort te word.

in die onderhawige gevat het die streeklanddros, na my mening, fouteer deur nie, toe sy meegedeei is dat appellant prokureur Van der Merwe se dienste bekom het, maar dat hy blykbaar in George was, die geleentheid aan appellant te bied om hierdie prokureur se bystand te verkry, desnoods by wyse van Vi uitstel van die saak.

Ek aanvaar dat appellant se optrede in die hof die streeklanddros se geduld op die proef gestel het maar het dit na my mening steeds nie as regverdigrng gedien vir die ontneming van appellant se grondwetUke reg op regsverteenwoordiging nie. Soos gemeld in S v SHABANGU

(supra), behoort die voorsittende beampte in h geval soos hierdie minstens ondersoek in te stel ten einde te bepaal waarom die prokureur nie in die hof teenwoordig is nie. Dit mag selfs geblyk het dat sy afwesigheid nie aan enige versuim van appellant toegeskryf kon word nie.

Ek is verder ook van mening dat die streeklanddros nie, op die feite voor haar, kon bevind, soos sy wel gedoen het, dat dit doelbewuste

optrede van die appellant was om die verrigtinge te vertraag met die oog daarop om die gevolge van die daad wat hy na bewering gepleeg het, te vermy nie.

Dtt is ook in hierdie gevat onmoontlik om te bespiegel oor watter invloed regsverteenwoordiging op die uitslag van die saak kon gehad het. Die feit van die saak is egter dat appellant se grondwetlike reg op regsverteenwoordiging in die omstandighede geskend is en dat die gevolgtrekking noodwendig moet wees dat dit 'n nadeUge invloed op sy reg op h billike verhoor gehad het.

Ek is van oordeel dat in die onderhawige omstandighede appellant se reg op n biltike verhoor voorrang moes geniet het bo die ongerief wat moontJik sou gevolg het indien daar 'n verdere vertraging in die afhandeling van die verhoor was. Ek is gevolglik van mening dat die verrigtinge in die streekhof wat tot die skuldigbevinding en vonnis van appellant aanleiding gegee het, onreelmatig was en tersyde gestel behoort te word.

Aangesien dit nie 'n uitspraak op die meriete tot gevolg sal he nie, is die Staat geregtig om uit hoofde van artikel 324(c) van die St raf proses wet weereens geregtelike stappe teen die appellant in te stel. Sien in hierdie verband ook S v MAKHANDELA 2007(2) SASV 620 (W).

Bygevolg sou ek gelas dat appellant se skuldigbevinding aan die oortreding van artikel 14 van Wet 23 van 1957, asook die vonnis wat hom opgele is, tersyde gestel word.

ROUX. WnR: Ek stem saam.

ROUX, WnR

FOURIE. R: Dit word so gelas.

FOURIE. R

Source wording is retained. Consult the source document for its original formatting and pagination.

Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

S v Shabangu 1976 (3) SA 555 (A)

Case cited

S v Lusu 2005 (2) SACR 538 (EC)

Case cited

S v Makhandela 2007 (2) SACR 620 (W)

Case cited

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 35(3)(f)

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 73(2)

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 324(c)

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Act 23 of 1957, section 14

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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