Zana v Gwanzura (Leave to Appeal) (2025-068106) [2025] ZAGPPHC 710 (17 July 2025)
- Citation
- [2025] ZAGPPHC 710
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- S. Potterill
- Case number
- 2025-068106
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- S. Potterill
- Case number
- 2025-068106
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that none of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant met the threshold for granting leave to appeal. On urgency and lis pendens, no other court would reasonably come to a different conclusion. The respondent's permanent employment was proven, and the relocation was reasonable. The absence of a family advocate report did not prejudice the applicant, as both parents were fit and the applicant had not shown recent contact with the child. The child's age and maturity did not warrant a view being presented. The Plascon-Evans rule was not applied rigidly, and there was no compelling reason for leave to appeal under section 17(1)(2). The application was brought under a misdirection and was dismissed with costs.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
02
Material facts
Parties
Yolanda Charlotte Zana
Applicant Counsel: Adv. I. MpofuMunyaradzi Justin Gwanzura
Respondent Counsel: Adv. L. Grobler03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal After Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the grounds of appeal regarding urgency and lis pendens warrant leave to appeal.
- 02
Whether the court erred in finding the relocation reasonable based on respondent's employment.
- 03
Whether a family advocate report was necessary before making a decision.
- 04
Whether the Plascon-Evans rule was applied rigidly.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant argued that the matter was urgent and that the issue of lis pendens was not properly considered. She contended that the court erred in finding the relocation reasonable, asserting that the respondent's employment status was not sufficiently proven. The applicant further argued that a family advocate report was necessary before a decision could be made, and that the child's view should have been presented through the family advocate. She also claimed that the Plascon-Evans rule should not have been applied rigidly.
- Respondent
- The respondent maintained that the urgency and lis pendens grounds were correctly dismissed. He provided proof of permanent employment and argued that the relocation was reasonable. The respondent asserted that both parents are fit and that primary care was agreed to be with him. He submitted that the applicant had not provided evidence of contact with the child for the past seven months and that the child, being 4½ years old, was not mature enough to express a view. He argued that the Plascon-Evans rule was not applied rigidly and that there was no compelling reason for leave to appeal.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 17(1) Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
Leave to appeal will only be granted if another court could reasonably come to a different conclusion.
- 02
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A)
The Plascon-Evans rule governs the approach to factual disputes in motion proceedings, but should not be applied rigidly.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that none of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant met the threshold for granting leave to appeal. On urgency and lis pendens, no other court would reasonably come to a different conclusion. The respondent's permanent employment was proven, and the relocation was reasonable. The absence of a family advocate report did not prejudice the applicant, as both parents were fit and the applicant had not shown recent contact with the child. The child's age and maturity did not warrant a view being presented. The Plascon-Evans rule was not applied rigidly, and there was no compelling reason for leave to appeal under section 17(1)(2). The application was brought under a misdirection and was dismissed with costs.
Obiter and limits
- A 4½ year old child is not of sufficient age or maturity for their view to be determinative in relocation matters.
- If the application of the Plascon-Evans rule results in conflicting judgments, the proper route for appeal is under section 17(1)(2) for compelling reasons.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case Number: 2025-068106
(1) REPORTABLE: NO.
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO.
(3) REVISED.
DATE 2025-07-17
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
YOLANDA
CHARLOTTE
ZANA
Applicant
and
MUNYARADZI
JUSTIN GWANZURA
Respondent
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The date for handing down is deemed to be 17 July 2025.
JUDGMENT:
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
POTTERILL J
[1] On the grounds of appeal relating to the urgency of the matter and lis pendens no other court would reasonably come to another conclusion and the application for leave to appeal on these grounds are dismissed.
[2] On the ground raised that the Court erred in finding that the relocation was reasonable because the respondent had permanent employment the leave to appeal is dismissed. The proof of employment was proven and there was no evidence to the contrary. No other Court will come to another conclusion.
[3] The ground that the Court could not make a decision without a family advocate report is dismissed as no other court would reasonably come to another conclusion. Both parents are fit parents, the primary care was by agreement between the parties with the respondent. The applicant had put no evidence before the Court as to what contact she had with the child for the last 7 months. The main contention that the view of the child should have been presented through the family advocate was dismissed. A 41/2 year old is not of the age and maturity to give a view.
[4] The fact that the Court applied the Plascon-Evans rule is dismissed. The applicant’s own contention in the heads of argument is that the test must not be applied “rigidly”.
The test was not applied rigidly. No other Court will come to another conclusion. If the application of the Plascon-Evans rule has resulted in conflicting judgments then the appeal should have been brought in terms of section 17(1)(2) “there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration.”
It was however brought under a misdirection by the Court.
[5] The following order is made:
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
S.
POTTERILL
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
CASE NO: 2025-068106
HEARD ON: 16 July 2025
FOR THE APPLICANT: ADV. I. MPOFU
INSTRUCTED BY: Marumoagae Attorneys
FOR THE RESPONDENT: ADV. L. GROBLER
INSTRUCTED BY: Swart Weil Van der Merwe Greenberg Incorporated
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17 July 2025
Case-aware research
Ask AI about this case
The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.