RULING

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (DAR ES SALAAM SUB-REGISTRY)

AT DAR ES SALAAM MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL CAUSE NO. 18385 OF 2024 CASE REF. NO. 202407301000018385. HON. LUHAGA JOELSON MPINA................................................PETITIONER

VERSUS HON. MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE................................1ST RESPONDENT SUGAR BOARD OF TANZANIA...........................................2ND RESPONDENT ITEL EAST AFRICA LIMITED.............................................3RD RESPONDENT YASSER PROVISION STORE LIMITED.............................4TH RESPONDENT

ZENJ GENERAL MERCHANDIZE COMPANY LIMITED.......................................................... 5TH RESPONDENT HON. MINISTER FOR FINANCE......................................... 6TH RESPONDENT

THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY.................................... 7TH RESPONDENT HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL................................................8TH RESPONDENT RULING: 15th & 25th Oct 2024, KIREKIANO J: The petitioner is a member of the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania, representing the Kisesa Constituency. The third, fourth, and fifth respondents are corporate bodies. In 2024, the second respondent issued them with Sugar importation 1 approvals and permits to import diverse quantities of Sugar in Tanzania to cover what is stated to be the country's Sugar Gap. The whole exercise of dealing with the sugar gap prompted the petitioner to file this petition. As discerned from the petition and supporting affidavit, the petitioner's grievance is that the first respondent did not take steps to prevent the grant of sugar import licenses above the National Gap Sugar. He also protests that the first respondent had no powers to waive payment of sugar levies and thus wrongly waived payment of levies by the third, fourth, and fifth respondents, causing a substantial loss of government revenue. The petitioner also complains that the 6th respondent waived payment of Value Added Tax by the third, fourth, and fifth respondents, while the 7th respondent stood idly breaching its obligations in respect of tax revenue collection and management. He also

protests that there was an abuse of tendering process, giving an unfair advantage to the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents, contravention of various provisions of the Sugar Industry Act, Cap 251, as amended by section 91 Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No.2 of 2020 and Sugar Industry Regulations GN No 419 of 2010 but also the Public Procurement Act, 2023. 2 It is the petitioner's cause that the respondent's contravention of the laws and the whole exercise affected the local sugar producers and local communities and culminated in a breach of their rights to fair treatment, right to life, right to work, and own property protected under articles 13 (1) and 13 (4), 22 (1) and 23 (1) and (2) and 24(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) The petitioner is mindful of the right under Article 26 (2) to take legal action in accordance with the procedure provided by law to ensure the protection of this Constitution and the laws of the land. Under Articles 26 (2) and 27 (2) of the Constitution of URT and Sections 4 and 5 of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, [Cap 3 R.E 2019] (BRADEA) as Amended by Act no 3 of 2020, he has preferred this petition praying for several reliefs seeking to this court declaration that the respondent's actions were illegal and unconstitutional and, in particular, prays for the following orders thus; 1. THAT the

5th Respondent surrender and return the sugar import license extended illegally by the 2nd Respondent forthwith; 2. THAT, the 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents to surrender and return tax exemption extended to them illegally by 1st, 6th and 7th respondents forthwith; 3 3. THAT, the 3rd, 4th and and 5th Respondents be required to return each and every revenue they obtained from their illegal transactions of importing and selling sugar in the United Republic of Tanzania between January 2024 and December 2024 out of the permits and licenses given to them by the 2nd Respondent and exemptions and waivers by the 2nd and 6th Respondents.

4. THAT the 7th Respondent be ordered to demand and collect within one month all the taxes that were illegally exempted by him to the 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents between January and December 2024 within one month and report back to the Court within one month thereafter showing the evidence of the collection thereof.

5. THAT the 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents be required to pay all levies that they were exempted to pay when the imported sugar in the country between January and December 2024. 6.THAT the 3rd, 4lh and 5lh Respondents and their affiliates, subsidiaries and assignees be barred from importing and selling sugar in the United Republic of Tanzania.

7. THAT the 1st, and 2nd Respondents be barred from issuing licenses to non-sugar manufacturers in the country on one hand and the 1st 2nd, 6th and 7th Respondents be barred from giving levies and tax exemption to all sugar 4 importers as the said exemption is not in accord with the principle of assiduous management of our country’s economy espoused by Article 27 (2) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania.

8. Such other orders and reliefs that the Court may deem just and equitable to grant. Upon being served with the petitioner's originating summons and affidavit, the respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits and replies to the petition. For different reasons, all respondents objected to the petition's competence and thus posed preliminary objections. It is noted here that the counsels for the 1st, 2nd ,6th, 7th and 8th respondents posed two points of objection thus; 1. The Petition is untenable and bad in law for contravening Section 4 (2) of the Basic Rights Duties Enforcement Act Cap. 3 R.E 2019, as the Petitioner has not shown the extent to which the contravention of the provisions of Articles 12 to 29 of the Constitution has affected him personally.

2. The Petition is untenable and bad in law for contravening Sections 4 (5) and 8 (2) of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act Cap. 3 R.E 2019 since Petitioner has not exhausted all available remedies under other written laws. 5 It is noted here that the 4th respondent also raised the first point above. On the part of the 3rd and 5th respondents, ten points were raised thus; 1. That the Petition is incompetent for failure to exhaust the alternative remedies available under section 4 (5) of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, Cap. 3 R.E 2019, as amended by Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No.

3) Act, 2020.

2. That the Petition is bad in law for contravening the mandatory provision of section 4 (2) of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, Cap. 3 R.E 2019; as amended by Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No.

3) Act, 2020.

3. That the Petition is bad in law for contravening the mandatory provision of section 8 (2) of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, Cap. 3 R.E 2019; as amended.

4. That the reliefs sought by the Petitioner are untenable for contravening the provisions of section 13 of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, Cap. 3 R.E 2019; as amended.

5. That, the Petition is incompetent for being supported by an incurably defective affidavit containing Legal arguments, hearsay evidence, opinions offending Order 6 XIX Rule (1) of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap.

33. R.E 2019.

6. That the Petition is untenable for being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process.

7. That, the Petition is incurably defective for offending the provisions of Section 84 (1) of the Interpretation of Laws Act, Cap. 1 R.E 2019 and The Interpretation of Laws (Use of English Language in Courts) (Circumstances and Conditions) Rules 2022, G.N. Number 4/2/2022.

8. That the Petition is bad in law for failure to join necessary party to wit, the sugar farmers, and producers, namely, TPC Limited, Kilombero Sugar, Mtibwa Sugar, Kagera Sugar, Bagamoyo Sugar Limited.

9. That the Petitioner does not possess requisite Locus standi to sue and speak for and on behalf of sugar producers. 10 . That the constitutional courts’ jurisdiction on the tax decision to exempt levy cannot be challenged in the constitutional court as the court of first instance. When this cause came for hearing of the objection on the points raised and determination of the competence of the petition, the petitioner had service of Dr Rugemeleza Nshala, Mr John Seka, Mr Edson Kilatu and Mr Ferdinand Makore and Mr Fredrick Msacky learned advocates. 7 The 1st, 2nd,6th, 7th and 8th respondents, had service of Mr Hangi Changa PSA, Mr Obadia Kamea PSA, Miss Maria Mlugu SSA, Miss Consolatha Andrew S/A, and Mr Edwein Webiro SA. The 3rd and 5th respondents were represented by Miss. Dyness Simkoko and Miss Grace Joakim and Mr Rajab Bakari learned advocates. The 4th respondent was represented by Mr Thobias Laizer, Miss Oliva Mark, and Mr Sabasi Shayo, learned advocates. I prefer to start with the objection under section 8(2) BRADEA on exhaustion of available remedies posed by the second point of objection raised by the 1st, 2nd,6th, 7th and 8th respondents but also the 3rd and 5th respondent in the third but also the 4th respondents. Both parties are on common ground that under section 8 (2) BRADEA this court will not exercise its powers of constitutional review if satisfied that

adequate means of redress of the alleged contravention are available under other laws. The parties' point of departure is whether the petitioner’s complaints in this petition are purely constitutional or can be remedied in other avenues at the petitioner’s disposal. Mr Edwin Webiro learned state attorney rose first to make his case by taking a stance that looking at the petition, the petitioner challenges the violation of statutory provision in issue of sugar import permits, 8 arguing that the process contravened sections 14 (1) (3), section 14 (I) and (3) (a), (b) (i) (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) section 26(1) (4) and section 26 of the Sugar Industry Act, Cap 251 as amended by section 91 Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2020 (Act No.2) of 2020. That is whether the VAT exemptions granted to the 3rd, 4th, and 5th by the 6th respondents violated the VAT Act and whether it was proper for the 1st respondent to exempt payment of levies by the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondent to import sugar while not registered by the second respondent. It was Webiro’s submission that if the petitioner’s complaint were to be merited, it could be argued that the said public officers or bodies contravened statutory provisions. Thus, it may be argued that public officers abused their powers, making their actions illegal or ultra vires. It that state of affair argued Mr Webiro, the same will be

subject to judicial review. He cited the decision in James Funke Gwagilo vs The Attorney General (Civil Appeal 67 of 2001) [2003] TZCA 24 (4 February 2003) to buttress his point that when a public officer's action or decision is considered illegal, such illegality is a pure ground for judicial review. 9 The learned state attorney also submitted that the reliefs sought by the petitioner may be granted in judicial review. Thus, if this court entertains this petition, it will be as equally as exercising its judicial review powers in a constitutional petition. Mr Webiro cited the decisions in Tanzania Cigarette Company Limited Vs. The Fair Competition Commission and Another, Misc. Civil Cause No. 31 of 2010, High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam but also a decision in Freeman Aikael Mbowe vs The Director of Public Prosecution & Others (Civil Appeal No. 382 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 836 (30 August 2024) to the effect that, constitutional review jurisdiction is a unique jurisdiction reserved for purely constitutional matters and not every breach of the law gives rise to a constitutional review, litigants should first exhaust other lawfully available remedies under statutory or case law before they can seek remedies under BRADEA. On her part, Miss. Dryness Simkoko learned advocate for the 3rd and 5th respondents in support of this, she argued the action of against the second respondent

could be remedied by appealing to the first respondent under section 36 of the Sugar Industry Act, as amended by 10 The Crops Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2009, to appeal to the first respondent She joined hands with Mr Webiro, arguing that the powers to determine a violation of a constitutional right are not absolute but limited under section 8(2) of BRADEA. She cited this court decision in Christopher Bagen vs Attorney General (Misc. Civil Cause 1 of 2021) [2021] TZHC 5535 (13 July 2021) Kulita J, which held that constitutional powers cannot be exercised when other laws provide other means of redress. Dr Nshalla, counsel for the petitioner, responded on this point, arguing that this court should be brave and make purposive interpretations when dealing with the fundamentals of the constitution, seeking to vindicate public interest and secure our country's economy. He cited the decision in Judge in Charge High Court at Arusha and the Attorney General v N.N Munuo Ng’uni [2004] TLR, at page 62; He argued that the very minister against whom the complaint would lie against the decision of the second respondent is the first respondent; he can not be a judge of his cause. As such, Dr Nshalla responded that the decision in Freman Mbowe is distinguishable, arguing that public bodies are for scrutiny by this court; 11 hence, the petitioner has taken the correct path to challenge

their decision in this forum. It was his view that Article 27 is an independent article and should be construed broadly. Concerning the position taken by this court in Tanzania Cigarette Company, case supra, he beseeched me to distinguish the same and, in any case, find it was persuasive. He also argued that the alternative remedy of judicial review argued by Mr Webiro is ineffective. On redress of actions of the public officer or public bodies, he argued this court to embrace the position in Zitto Zuberi Kabwe vs The President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Others (Misc. Civil Cause 1 of 2020) [2020] TZHC 72 (18 March 2020) at Pg 21 to the effect that actions of the government officers including the president can be measured against the Constitution, and that is the logic behind the enactment of Article 26 (2) of the Constitution. He argued that the argument on judicial review is not relevant here to the 3rd, 4th, and 5th respondents, who are not public bodies, given this court's decision in Halima James Mdee & Others vs Registered Trustees of Chama Cha Demokrasia Na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) & Others (Misc. Cause 27 of 2022) [2022] TZHC 10476 (8 July 2022) 12 Mr. Kilatu added that the suggested alternative remedy of judicial review would not be effective since the compensation remedy may not be available. Citing Abadiah, Selehe vs Dodoma Wine Company Limited [1990] TZHC 11

(28 August 1990), he argued that seeking remedy under judicial review may only be meaningful if the court can grant effective, convenient, and beneficial remedies. In rejoinder, Mr Obadia Kamea argued, reading from page 3 of the ruling in Zito Kabwe, that it dealt with the constitutionality of the Public Audit Act and is thus distinguishable. Mr Webiro insisted that paragraphs 3,4,5,6,9, 10,21, 22 and 32 of the petitions address contravention of statutory law, that is, abuse of power or ultra vires. He maintained that violating the statutory provisions mentioned above has been twisted as a violation of Constitutional rights. Even if so, the decision in Freeman Mbowe is still in the proper position because the complaint ought to be challenged by judicial review. On her part, Miss Simkoko, having noted the point in the case of Abadiah, Selehe vs Dodoma Wine, was of the view that still, since the remedies sought in this petition can be granted in judicial review, there is no point in arguing that they are inconvenient. A such the decision against the second respondent may be appealable to the minister under section 13 36 of the Sugar Industry Act as amended by The Crops Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2009, to appeal to the 1st respondent, and this jurisdiction relief is not ousted. On my part, as indicated above, the provision of section 8 (2) BRADEA clearly states that this

court will not exercise its constitutional review if the petitioner’s grievance can be addressed in another forum. Before I address the argument on other remedies, I wish to remark briefly on the point elevated by Dr Nshalla for the petitioner that Article 27 is an independent article not falling within the application of BRADEA. He invited this court to interpret this article broadly and allow the petitioner to be heard on how the respondent's actions are injurious to the country’ economy. Reading from the constitution, article 27 of the Constitution of the URT provides for the duty to safeguard public property. Having in mind the submission by Dr Nshalla refereeing Lord Nguni Munuo’s case on a broad approach to the constitution, it is to be noted here that the question of how the right under article 26 or 27 should be interpreted is not the duty of this court at this stage; What is at issue now is its relevance with the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act as amended (BRADEA). Under section 2 of the same provides thus; 14 (2) This Act shall apply to Tanzania Zanzibar as well as to Mainland Tanzania in relation to all suits the courses of action in which concern the provisions of Articles 12 to 29 of the Constitution. (emphasis supplied). On that note, I am unable to subscribe to the view by the petitioner's counsel that the petitioner's cause under Article 27 is outside

the scope of BRADEA. Now, whether the petition is cleared under section 8 (2) BRADEA, I have scanned the petitioners’ complaints. As rightly submitted by the counsels for the respondent, the allegations are against the actions of public officers and public bodies in the whole process of the grant of sugar permits. That is to say, there was alleged contravention of various provisions of the laws. I also note that, reading from the petition, the respondents' acts in alleged contravention are alleged to have culminated in infringement of the various basic rights provided by the constitution as indicated above. The petitioner's resolve to address the alleged contravention is in the realisation of the right under Article 26 (2) of the Constitution, which provides; 15 “Every person has the right, in accordance with the procedure provided by law, to take legal action to ensure the protection of this Constitution and the laws of the land. Can there be another way of dealing with this alleged contravention apart from a constitutional petition? Mr Webiro was of the stance that alternative remedy of judicial review can address the complaints, while Dr Nshalla, for the petitioner, disagrees with the remedy by way of judicial review as argued by the respondent's counsel. He asked me to find that the petitioner took the right path by preferring this petition. I have considered Dr Nshalla's

argument that the respondent's actions can be discussed in this constitutional petition. In the cited case of Zito Kabwe Vs The President of URT, the contentious issue leading to the court reasoning relied on by Dr Nshalla was whether the constitution under article 46 (2) set any restriction of constitutional petitions against the actions of the President. This court held that there was no such restriction, and actions of the government and the President could be measured against the constitution. 16 I have read the facts of the case, and the critical issue was the president's action on the appointment and removal of 3rd and 4th respondents in the constitutional post. In this petition, complaints are centred in contravention of the statutory provisions and regulations, thus the case in Zito Kabwe is distinguishable here. On petitioners’ complaints, for quick reference, I take liberty to highlight the actions complained by the petitioner thus; 1. The 1st and 2nd respondents violated Article 26 (1) and 27(1) of the Constitution of URT and Section 5(1) (2), 14(3) (a)- (b) (i)- (iii) of the Sugar Act of 2001 as amended by Act No. 2 of 2020 by issuing the sugar import permits and licenses to the 3rd 4th and 5th respondent 2. The second respondent violated Section 14 (3) of the Sugar Industry Act, Cap 251 of 2001, as amended by Section 91 of the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No.2 of 2020, by granting licenses to the third, fourth and fifth respondents who were not sugar manufacturers, which contravenes Article 27 (2) of the Constitution of the URT.

3. The 2nd respondent granting of an import licence to the 5th respondent, who is not a sugar manufacturer, without 17 granting similar treatment to local sugar producers and manufacturers contravened Articles 13(1) and 13(4) of the Constitution of URT 4. The 6th respondent granted VAT exemptions to the 3rd, 4th, and 5th respondents without granting similar treatment to local sugar producers and manufacturers, thus violating Articles 13(1) and 13(4) of the Constitution of the URT.

5. He claims the action of the 1st, 2nd, 6th, and 7th by issuing permits, licences, VAT, and other levies exemptions to the 3rd, 4th, and 5th respondent was contrary to Article 27(2) of the Constitution of the URT. The petitioner argues that he seeks to vindicate public interest and secure the country's economy. As indicated above, the alleged contraventions are also stated to have contravened constitutional rights. Much as the petitioner reserves the right to protect the constitution and laws of the land, he has to take the correct path to redress what he believes were the respondent's illegal actions. Clarifying the provision of section 8 (2) BRADEA in number of times, days and years, this court has emphasised that, the right to enforce right and duties in constitutional petition has its limitation. I wish to add that, while the application of BRADEA, is for the enforcement of the rights and 18 duties provided under the constitution, a calm reflection of section 8 (2) of the act is that the same seeks to protect the constitutional supremacy. Much as a person may wish to do a right thing in pursuit of constitutional right or duty, that should, in the first place be done in normal jurisdiction of courts. Constitutional review will remain a matter of necessity, special and last resort. In Tanzania Cigarette Company Limited Vs. The Fair Competition Commission and Another this

court Juma J (as he then was) citing Privy Council decision in Jaroo vs. Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago [2002] UKPC addressing section 14 (1) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago in pari materia with section 4 of BRADEA. The right to apply to the High Court under section 6 of the Constitution for redress when any human right or fundamental freedom is or is likely to be contravened, is an important safeguard of those rights and freedoms; but its value will be diminished if it is allowed to be misused as a general substitute for the normal procedures for invoking judicial control of administrative action. More recently in Kusekwa Melicki Kazimoto vs The Honourable Attorney General & 2 Others (Misc. Civil Cause No 19 7635 of 2024) [2024] TZHC 5899 (20 June 2024), Mtembwa J this court considered its powers in a judicial review application as alternative way of redress under section 8(2) of BRADEA and held at page 20 that; This involves reviewing governmental action in the form of laws or acts of the executive for consistency with the Constitution. Judicial review also establishes a clear nexus with the supremacy of the constitution, in addition to placing a grave duty and responsibility on the judiciary. Therefore, judicial review is both a power and duty given to the courts to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution. In exercise of judicial review powers this court

in its discretion may grant orders like; Injunction, Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition, Declaration to mention but few. This is in accordance with Law Reform (Fatal Accidents Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Cap 310, RE 2019 as amended and the Law Reform (Fatal Accident and Miscellaneous Provisions) Judicial Review Procedure and Fees) Rules, GN No. 324 of 2014. Mr. Kilatu, for the petitioner, made the point that judicial review will not give the petitioner an effective and beneficial remedy. I have considered this considering the decision cited, Masanche J. (as he then was) in Abadiah, Selehe vs. Dodoma Wine (supra). In that decision, this court noted that there was a contractual relationship between the 20 applicant and the respondent; thus, the sought prerogative order of mandamus would not be effective and beneficial to the applicant. Going by the petitioner counsel's contention, it would imply that generally, the reliefs in judicial review are not effective, convenient, and beneficial. With respect, that was not the spirit of that decision, and it is not the position of this court in this petition. I note that the decision in Abadiah, Selehe was delivered on 28th August 1990 before the enactment of BRADEA. No issues were deliberated on how to redress illegality and complaints of ultra vires, which are at issue in this petition. As such, Dr Nshalla argued that the 3rd, 4th,

and 5th respondents are private bodies, thus not subject to judicial review, as discussed in Halima James Mdee & Others. In that case, this court deliberated on whether private bodies may be subject to judicial review and observed that even private bodies exercising private function might be subject to judicial review. Reading from the petition, there is no stand-alone allegation of contravention of the law by said 3rd, 4th, and 5th respondents. instead, the complaints are what the 1st 2nd 6th and 7th did in their favor. On this point, I will end here and hold that this argument is not convincing to take a different position. 21 Having revisited the acts complained about in this petition, I have a settled mind that the same deals with the alleged respondent's contravention of the statutory laws and regulation cited, that is, alleged illegal actions and ultra vires decisions. In this petition, to make his case, the petitioner took his style to align the alleged violation with the constitutional provisions. With respect, this does not detract from the principle that acts or omissions (in this case) of government officials or public bodies may be addressed by the other remedy. This was the position by the Court of Appeal in the cited case of Freeman Aikael Mbowe vs The Director of Public Prosecution at page 13 that; “As long as what are alleged to have been committed or omitted

are prohibited by statutory laws, they would, if proved, amount to abuses of powers by the respective government authorities to the extent that they are ultra vires the law. Such an illegal conduct can effectively be addressed by way of ordinary judicial review whose primary purpose is to supervise the legislature and executive branches where they exceed their statutory powers. (Emphasis supplied) The above CAT decision binds this court; I am also of settled mind that the same is relevant in this case, thus, I am persuaded by Mr Webiro's 22 submission that the respondent’ actions can be challenged in judicial review thus there is an alternative remedy to address the respondents' alleged contravention. In passing I also wish to say briefly on the right of appeal against the decision of the second respondent as provided under section 36 of the Sugar Industry Act as amended by The Crops Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2009, The same provides; “Appeals 36. Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Board on matters which are regulatory in nature. May, within sixty days after the date of the decision, appeal in writing to the Minister” I have considered the argument that the very minister against whom the appeal would lie against the decision of the second respondent is the first respondent in this petition. It is this court remark that subject to locus stand on the right to

appeal by those who were aggrieved in the decision of the second respondent could still pursue their cause according to procedure set; grievance against the Minister responsible on his action does not oust the powers to address the complaints against the powers of the second respondent. 23 Given the foregoing, this court holds that the respondent's alleged contravention of the law (if any) can be remedied by pursuing this court's powers in judicial review. Consequently, I find merit in the second point of objection raised by the 1st, 2nd,6th, 7th, and 8th respondents, as well as the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents. The same is sustained. Having sustained this point which touches the competence of the petition, I find that it is sufficient to determine this petition. I will end here and refrain from indulging in the other points of objection. In the upshot, under section 5(2) and 8 (2) of the BRADEA, the petitioners’ petition is incompetent for failure to exhaust all available alternative remedies. The same is struck out. This being a public interest litigation, I make no order as to costs.

A J KIREKIANO

JUDGE 25.10.2024. 24

COURT Ruling delivered in the presence of the petitioner and in the presence of Mr Ferdinand Makore, Mr Edson Kilatu, and Mr Fredrick Msacky, learned advocates for the petitioner. On the other side, Mr Hangi Chang’a (PSA) and Mr Obadia Kamea (PSA) for the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th and 8th respondents, and Miss Dayness Simkoko for the 3rd and 5th respondents, and Miss Oliva Mark for the 4th respondent.

A J KIREKIANO

JUDGE 25.10.2024. 25