ariel glaser pediatric aids health care imitiativeagpahi vs amos haki nsheha 2 others 2022 tzhcld 96 18 march 2022

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA LABOUR DIVISION AT DAR ES SALAAM REVISION NO. 245 OF 2020 (Arising from Labour Dispute No. CMA/DSM/ILA/R.982/16/1011) BETWEEN ARIEL GLASER PEDIATRIC AIDS HEALTH CARE INITIATIVE (AGPAH1)............................................ .^APPLICANT VERSUS AMOS HAKI NSHEHA ls% RESPONDENT JOHN BUSUNGU ...2nd respondent NAOMI NYTTAMBE ^3FD RESPONDENT JUDGMENT Date of Last Order: 1st December, Date ofJudgement: 18P1 March, 2022 I. Arufani, J, The respondehts^injthis application were employed by the applicant onNdifferent^ates to work on fixed term contract intended to«last up toR29™^September, 2016. While the first respondent (Amos Haki Nsheha) was employed from 30th October 2014 to 29th September 2016, the second respondent (John Busungu) was employed from 30th September 2014 to 29th September 2016 and the third respondent (Naomi Nyitambe) was employed from 26th April 2015 to 29th September 2016. i On 4th August, 2016 the applicant served all the respondents with one month notice sent to them through email indicating the applicant's intention of not renewing their respective contracts upon expiration of their fixed term contract on 29th September, 2016. The respondents were aggrieved by the termination of their contract of employment and lodged their complaints before thj# Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (hereinafter referred afth^GMA)^werring that, termination of their contract of emplovmeri^was unfair as they had reasonable expectation of renewal^of^their contracts of employment. The respondents^omplaintxyvas^ registered by the CMA as Labour Dispute No. CMA/DWILA/K982/16/1011. After hearing the evidence from both sides, Hon. Ng'washi, Y, the triaL Arbitrator Xound termination of employment of the respondents was both substantively and procedurally unfair and on 5thXJune, 202^he ordered the applicant to pay the respondents the sum of&SD 297,900 being compensation for salaries of contract of two years the respondents were expecting would have been renewed plus one month salary for each respondent in lieu of notice. As the applicant was dissatisfied by the award of the CMA, they filed the application at hand in this court. 2 The applicant is beseeching the court to call and examine the proceedings and award issued by the CMA so as to satisfy itself as to the correctness and rationality of the finding of the CMA. The applicant is also urging the court to revise, quash and set aside the proceedings and findings in the award issued by the CMA. The application is supported by the affidavit sworn by/Sekela^Mwakyusa, an Executive Director of the applicant and it was rebutted by the counter affidavit sworn by Deusidedit pfniel^^deleke Luteja, advocate for the respondent. The legal^s^&^hich the applicant is urging the court to use to revise the^proceedings and award of the CMA are listed at paragra^^^^ the affidavit supporting the application and they areTelding as follows:- a. Whether iP^s^proper for the trial arbitrator to make such^a^findm$ and deciare existence of reasonable expectati^of renewal of the fixed term of employment \con^^^of respondents and ordered employer to pay dSDi 297,900 even after the proof of service of 28 days' notice from employer regarding its intention of non­ renewal of the employment contracts of respondents. b. Whether it was in law valid for the trial arbitrator to ignore the guidance in Rule 4 (5) of the Employment and Labour Relations (Code of Good practice) GN. 42 in ordering employer to firstly discharge the burden of proof 3 in a case that demanded proof of existence ofreasonabie expectation of renewal of fixed term of contract by employee. a Whether the trial arbitrator properly guided by relevant provisions of law in admitting all disputed evidence. d. Whether the trial arbitrator properly evaluated the evidence presented before her in deciding the matter in favour of the respondents. While the applicant was represented in ^Application by Kariwa & Co. Advocates, the respondents were^^^^nted By Ndurumah Keya Majembe, Advocates. TJe&co(^e^rbrJne parties prayed and allowed to argue the application b^Jftaf of written submissions. I commend both sides for complying with the time frame given to them by the court to fi letl^ii^wri^en submission in the court. The applicant prayed to adopt the affidavit supportinOite application and started with the fourth issue which presented before the CMA in deciding the matter in favour of the respondents. The counsel for the applicant stated that, the Arbitrator misdirected herself by holding that the termination was unfair as the employer never issued 28 days' notice of termination of the 4 respondents' employment contracts as required by paragraph 18.1 and 19.1 of their employment agreements. The counsel for the applicant stated that, the applicant disagreed with the finding of the Arbitrator as the requirement of 28 days' notice is not applicable in the respondents' employment agreements because the period of their fixed term agreemepts^had expired. To support his submission, he referred the court\to>the caslbof I. O. T. (Travelling Bags) V. Thomas Soko & Others^Labour Revision No. 131 of 2015 where it was stated^haW^notice of informing the employees their fixed term contractWjojd have not been renewed was not a notice of termihatioWoMheir contracts but a notice of informing them their<confe^^yould have not been renewed as their contract would ha^^minated automatically after the expiration of its period.^/^j % f that an employment contract may be terminated by either side giving the other side one month notice. He contended that, though the 28 days' notice was not mandatory in the instant case but the applicant did go far out of her legitimate way by notifying all the respondents about their intention of not renewing their respective contracts upon its expiration on 29th September, 5 2016. He argued that, the said notice was communicated to the respondent on 4th August, 2016 and the respondents acknowledged in the evidence they adduced before the CMA to have received the email relating to the said notice. The applicant's counsel argued that, although the respondents acknowledged in their evidence to have receivedjjthe said notice but the Arbitrator was of the opinion that the noti6es>were nbfeacceptable as they were issued by way of email and nptAiy wayJof letters as per of the respondents' employment^ agreprhents the applicant never allowed the respondents ^^ntinOexo work without a new contract. He argued that, if the^^ppndents would have been allowed to work for even a singletdayWter expiration of their contract, they would have plead^presumption of doctrine of reasonable expectation of re^wal of^^p employment contract. He submitted that, in a fixed term contract of employment a clause in the contract signed by the parties by itself is a formal notice advising the parties about their final working date. He argued that the respondents were required to abide with the terms of their contract of employment which contained a specific recital which strict 6 them from rely on speculative notions including the legal presumption of renewal of the contract. He referred the court to recital 22 (3) and (4) of their employment contracts which alerted the respondents that, no reasonable expectation of new contract unless parties agreed and signed the same. He also referred the court to Rule 4 (5) of the GN. No. 42 of 2007 which states a fixed term contract? of/employjnent terminate automatically when the agreed period expires He argued in relation to the second legal issiJe raised in the affidavit of the applicant that, the^^^^^erred in law and fact when she ordered the applicant (er^gjgyer) to prove existence of reasonable expectation of1 ne^edntract of employment of the respondents. He argueo^thatb on 22nd March, 2017 the Arbitrator framed ti^i^^^^^efermination in the matter and ordered the respond|n^i^^^t proving their case. However, when the matter came. for fj^ing on 17th May, 2017 the Arbitrator overturned its previouj>orcler and ordered the applicant to start proving existence of reasonable expectation of renewal of the respondents' contract of employment. He argued that, the turnaround of the proceedings amounted to a miscarriage of justice and added the Arbitrator was functus officio 7 and had no power to reverse her previous order. He referred the court to Rule 4 (5) of GN. No. 42 of 2007 and stated that it makes clear that if employee alleges reasonable expectation of renewal of his contract the burden to prove the said allegation lies on the employee. He submitted that, the Arbitrator failed to properly guide herself on the correct imoortation of the cited rul^an^Wiifted the He argued that, in a situation like thattfiaemplo^er cannot enter into the minds of the employees an^stablfeh factors which make them to believe existence omeasonabjgf expectation of renewal of their contracts of employq^t. i^afgued further that, it is a general rule that when thexl^k Ggurt realize any defect in a court's proceedings, the^^^^^/ailable is to remit the matter back for retrial de^^^^^ure the procedural irregularities noted. To support his^ar^Tie^^ie referred the court to the case of Fataheli Manji V. R, [1966^A 344 where it was stated under what circumstances retrial of a case may be ordered. The counsel for the applicant argued in relation to the third legal issues raised in the affidavit of the applicant which asks whether the trial Arbitrator properly guided by relevant provision of the law in 8 admitting all disputed evidence. He argued that, the respondents tendered 23 exhibits and all of them were admitted only because they were listed as annexures served to the applicant. He cited exhibit H14 which he said was prepared after the termination of the employment of the respondent and it does not show the maker, addressee, and it bears neither stamp nor signatur^of^Fie ap^cant but it was admitted in the case as an exhibit. He argued that, the said problem exte^^^oWhibit H17 which was admitted in the case without followi'qg^me conditions stipulated under section 18 of the ElectfSc Transaction Act, 2015. At the end the counsel for the appljccint prayecAhe court to quash the award issued by the CMA^^^cl^clare the respondents were fairly terminated after ^^^^pifation of their contract of employment and there wgs^^^^^sonable expectation for the renewal of their contracts oCg^ployment as it was not proved by the respondents. In his reply, the counsel for the Respondents prayed to adopt the whole of his counter affidavit as part of his submission. The counsel for the respondents stated that, he will move the court by demonstrating that, firstly; the respondents managed to establish by evidence the objective basis as sufficient reasons or grounds for the 9 Arbitrator to invoke the doctrine of reasonable expectation of renewal of their contract, secondly; it is an established principle in our labour law that the employer has the burden to prove termination was fair, thirdly; there was no illegalities on the part of the Arbitrator in the admission of exhibits and fourthly, the requirement of 28 days' notice in fixed term contract does not vitiate the invocation of^the doctrine of reasonable expectation of renewal of the contracts of^espondents and the Arbitrator cannot be faulted in the ptj^^t>case. He decided to argue the first ip^bur^legal issues raised by the applicant jointly and argued the^^e^of the grounds separately. He stated in relation to tl^^rs^andffourth issues that, section 36 (a) (iii) of the Employmerrt^andU-abour Relations Act No. 6 of 2004 (hereinafter will be referred as the ELRA) read together with rule 4 /F v\ which reasonable expectation for renewal of a fixed term contract of employment may arises. He submitted that, reasonable expectation for renewal of a fixed term contract may arise where there is a fixed term contract and where there is a reasonable expectation of renewal of the contract by an employee. io The counsel for the respondent argued that, the respondent tendered exhibits Hl, H2, H3, H10, Hll and H16 which were admitted in the case to prove the respondents' previous and last employment agreements with the applicant which were renewed time after time. He stated the said evidence were not challenged. He went on stating that, the respondents' credentials were used ^soliciUfor a new project for five years which was awarded by tt^COntre for Decease Control and Prevention (CDC) as^pearing in exhibit H14 attached in the respondents' counter afflji^/itZ^ It was the respondents' counsersiu^ission that, the respondent tendered exhibit H8 before th^feMA^ which shows on 29th August, 2016 the applicant ^ar^t^e^country representative for the CDC resolved that, those whose credentials were used to bid for the new project incl^^^he respondents would be included in the new project. He^^mitted that, the involvement of the respondents in the bid for the new project for the CDC which was awarded to the applicant, sufficiently established the basis upon which the respondents could have higher their expectation of renewal of their contract of employment in the form of undertakings made by the applicant. 11 He argued that there was much compelling undertaking on the part of the first respondent (Amos Haki Nsheha) by the applicant through a letter dated 1st May, 2015 admitted in the case as exhibit H13. He stated the said undertaking is in consonance with Rule 4 (5) of the GN. No. 42 of 2007. He went on submitting that, the applicant has not disputed the previous renewal of the respondents' contract on similar term basis given the nature of the'^respondents' employment. He argued further that, the respondentojexpectation of renewal of their contracts was very much puraliyejby the applicants failure to issue a 28 days' notice tothe^responfents as per the requirement of clause 19.1 or theirx contract He stated the said clause clearly provides for the^nnanner rrTwhich the same is to be effected to either party whoKlvishes^ to exercise the right which is by letter. He submitted thatfthe email dated 4th August, 2016 (exhibit A2) was not a 28 days' notice to the respondents as it was not issued in compliance with the requirement of clause 19.1 of the contracts. He stated that, use of the respondents' credentials, skills to secure the new project was supporting the conclusion that, the respondent had 12 reasonable expectation of renewal of their contract basing on the undertaking of renewal as provided in their employment agreements. He distinguished the case of I. 0. T. Traveling Bags (supra) with the present matter by stating that, in the cited case the notice was issued two days before expiration of the contract and notice was found properly issued basing on the circumstances^^e c^^ While in the present case, there is a clear clause <ingthe contracts of the parties which requires the applicant to issue\28 da^s' notice in the case of termination of the contract^ndxthesaid notice to be issued in the prescribed manner. H^submittedjhat, the purported notice in J the present case was issued contra^ to the mandatory provision of the agreements hence.tHer^ was no notice issued to the respondents by the ap^tant He that, they are refuting the invitation by the counsej^^^the applicant that clause 22 (3) and (4) of the respondents' contract constitutes a waiver on the applicability of the doctrine of reasonable expectation of renewal of the contract. He said the law is very clear on the conditions to be applied in applying the said doctrine. He submitted that, by involving the respondents in the initial stages of procuring the project in CDC and by letters dully 13 confirmed that there was an intention on the part of the applicant to renew the respondents' employment agreements to the intended project, it established a reasonable expectation of renewal of the respondents' employment agreements. He argued in relation to the second issue that, it is a trite law that in any proceedings concerning the claim of unfair tern^na^n of an employment by the employer, the employer has aXduty under section 39 of the ELRA to prove that ^minafioi^ was fair. The counsel for the respondents submitte^Wha^,^ as the respondents leir^mployment in the CMA Form no. i tne outy was on inetappncanfet^ prove termination was fair and not unfair. He cited his^submission Rule 24 (3) of GN. No. 42 of 2007 and^^^^^wjdes for two options. He stated that, the first option is^tnBk ayparty who makes opening statement ought to present his^case first and secondly, if the dispute is hinged on allegation^ unfair termination the employer is required to start adducing its evidence. He referred the court to the case of CSI Electrical Limited V. Sadick Devid Mponda, Revision No. 904 of 2019, HCLD at DSM (unreported) where the court was faced with the similar issue. He 14 argued that, though the reason for termination of the respondents' contract was not purely on termination perse, but under the circumstances of the present matter the root of the dispute was termination. He submitted that, under that circumstance there is no illegality committed by the Arbitrator in its ruling which ordered the applicant to start adducing evidence before the GMA.<^ therefore refuted the invitation of the counsel for the applicant^raying the court to order retrial of the matter. The counsel for the respondenjsji^mhed in relation to the third issue that, on admittingvexhibits^i^ourt, three conditions must be established that is to^say relevance of evidence, authenticity or credibility of evidenceKahd^competence of evidence. He argued that, iTVwr4’ the stated position onthe^law can be seeing in the case of Arusha City Councilkanch Another, V. MS/ (T) Limited, High Court of A rw Pirbakhshi @ Hadji & 3 others Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam in Criminal Appeal No. 493 of 2016 where it was stated that, when the evidence is original, relevant and the person sought to 15 tender the same has knowledge on the exhibits is sufficient to make the evidence admissible in court. He submitted that, if the counsel of the applicant is challenging originality of the documents admitted in the case as exhibits the right time to challenge the same was during cross examination. He went on submitting that, as there is no proof that the applicant w^s^nied the chance to challenge the documents through cro^examination the said argument must fail. At the ,ai^^eh^ounsel for the respondent prayed the court to^find^n^jnerits in the present application for revision and^nd no^ga*son to interfere with the finding of the Arbitrator. After going thppgktt^ival submission from the counsel for the parties, tffe^oEirt^^bund the centre of dispute in this application is whether^tnere^was reasonable expectation for renewal of the respondents^employment agreements. In determining the said issue, the court will be guided by the legal issues raised by the applicant and argued in the submission filed in this court by the counsel for the parties. I will start with the second issue, then I will proceed to deal with the first and fourth issues jointly and thereafter I will deal with the third issue and lastly will be the reliefs' parties are entitled. 16 Starting with the second issue the court has found it states whether the Arbitrator ignored guidance provided under Rule 4 (5) of the GN. No. 42 of 2007 in ordering the applicant to start adducing evidence to prove existence of reasonable expectation of renewal of the fixed term contracts of the respondents. The court has found the cited provision of the law states clearly that, /fher^Ixed^term contract is not renewed and the employee claims^M^reasonable expectation of renewal of the employment .a^^i^^t the employee is required to demonstrate ^ere basis for the expectation such as previous^ehev^^^ employer's undertaking to renew. The court has considerecijthe argument by the counsel for the applicant Jhat theVArbitratdr misguided by ordering the applicant to start adducing^evldence in the matter and find that, although it is trumhat tnejtelaims of the respondents were based on reasonable expectation of renewal of their contracts and the Arbitrator ordered the applicant to start adducing evidence in the matter but there is nothing showing the Arbitrator ignored the guidance provided in the above cited provision of the law. 17 The court has arrived to the above view after seeing that, the cited provision of the law does not state in demonstrating reasonable expectation of renewal of a fixed term contract of employment an employee is required to start adducing his or her evidence in a case. The issue as to who is required to start adducing evidence in a case as rightly argued by the counsel for the responden^is/g^OTied by Rule 24 (3) of the GN. No 67 of 2007 which states as follows^ "The first person to make an openi^jst^^nent shall present his case first throughout^the^p^edings. If the parties do not agree about wj^shall^tart, the Arbitrator shall be required to make^ruiing^nj^is regard. Provided that, in a dispute hover an alleged unfair termination ofempl^n^f the employer will be required to start as it has to^prpve-that the termination was fair." The wo^^g^%th.e above quoted provision of the law is very cle^^th^^^p^the parties disagreed about who shall start to adduce^evidence in a case the Arbitrator is required to make a ruling as to who is required to start adducing the evidence before the CMA. Since the issue as to who was supposed to start adducing evidence was raised by the parties as they failed to agree as to who was required to start adducing the evidence the Arbitrator was right under 18 the above quoted provision of the law to make a ruling as to who was supposed to start to adduce their evidence. The court has also found that, the Arbitrator was right in finding the applicant was required to start adducing its evidence because the claims of the respondent was hinged on unfair termination of their contracts of employment. That is because the abQve\quoted^ovision of the law read together with section 39 of <the ELRA states clearly that in a claim of unfair termination of ernp^^eht<bf an employee, the employer is required to stafeadducing evidence to prove termination of employment ql^an e^^ree was both substantively and procedurally fair. The argumenU^^^counsel for the applicant that, it would have not^ten^easy^for the applicant to read the minds of the respond^nfe^wnoewere alleging they had reasonable expectation of renewahD^heir contracts has been found by the court has no merit. The court has come to the stated finding after seeing the applicant was not required to read the minds of the respondents but to prove whether the respondents were terminated from their employment or not and if were terminated termination was both substantively and procedurally fair. 19 Therefore, although it is true that Rule 4 (5) of the GN. No. 42 of 2007 states the employee who is claiming reasonable expectation of renewal of his or her fixed term contract of employment is required to demonstrate that, there was an objective basis for the said expectation but that does not mean the employee must be required to start adducing evidence to establish the said clairfL T^i^igw of this court the claimed expectation is required tcH^seeihg in the evidence adduced by the employee notwitfet^n^mg the employee was the first to adduce evidence or Aw^tt^iast to adduce the evidence in the case. The abc^vie^rf^his court is getting support from the case of Abdallah K^unda|& Seven Another V. CM CO Ltd., [2014] LCCD HO^^e^it was held that, the burden of proof depends on what^teing^laimed and where the claim is on unfair terminati^tl^&^en^s on employer. has considered another argument raised by the counsel for^the applicant that, as the Arbitrator had already framed the issue and decided who was to start to adduce the evidence, he was functus officio to overturn its earlier decision and ordered the applicant to start adducing its evidence but failed to see any merit in the said argument. The court has come to the stated finding after 20 seeing that, although it is true that the Arbitrator had already ordered the respondents to start adducing their evidence but that decision could have not rendered the Arbitrator functus officio to vacate his previous order, which was made without complying with the requirement of the law as to who was required to start adducing evidence in a claim of unfair termination. I now return to the first and fourth issues^ which^states, the Arbitrator failed to evaluate the evidence acM.ced^before the CMA as a result he erred in declaring there.wa^a^asonable expectation of renewal of the respondentsWixed^er^contracts of employment, X % while there was proof ofJssuance<oP28 days' notice of non-renewal of the contracts of er^plo^menjt of the respondents and also erred in ordering ^ap^^^^^pay the respondents the sum of USD 297,900^^^X has found the provision of the law governing expectation of renewal of fixed term contract of employment is section 36 (a) (iii) of the ELRA which states that, termination of employment includes failure to renew a fixed term contract on the same or similar terms if there was a reasonable expectation of renew. The above provision of the law is required to be read together with 21 Rule 4 of the GN. No. 42 of 2007 which deals with termination of employment by agreement. While being guided by what is provided in the above cited provision of the law the court has found the argument by the counsel for the applicant in the present application that, the Arbitrator misdirected himself in finding the fixed term contracts of employment of the respondents were unfairly terminated as/they wefemot served with 28 days' notice as provided under recita^^BVlfond 19.1 of the parties' contracts of employment. Th^aj^^has found it is true as argued by the counsel for thelapplicanwat, the Arbitrator stated at page 24 of the impugned* awardsthat the respondents were not issued with notices at^^&e notices issued to them were issued by way of email andnbt by letter as provided under clause 19 of the VSM parties' employment agreements. Ttj£M^irc las found that, as rightly argued by the counsel for the applicant the cited recitals does not relate to the renewal or non­ renewal of the contracts of employment of the respondents but relates to the termination of agreements which are in existence. The court has found the recital in the agreements that relate to the renewal or non-renewal of the agreement is recital 1.2 which states 22 the contracts of the respondents might have been renewed on similar or different terms at the mutual consent of both parties. Therefore, the finding by the Arbitrator that the respondents were not issued with 28 days' notice provided under recitals 18 and 19 of the employment agreements of the parties was arrived erroneously as there was no such a requirement in the parties' agreements. To the view of this court and as rightly arg^^^^fejcounsel for the applicant even the notice of no|i4^ewate?of the parties' employment agreements issued to thejes[3opdents by way of email was issued out of courtesy as^ere wa^np such a requirement in the employment agreementsjof the^parties. The court has found as stated in the case of^I. O,\n^(Travelling Bags) (supra) the notice issued b^^^^^^nf^as a notice of non-renewal of the respondents'xemployment agreements and not the notice for termj^o^^^their employment agreements. The court has also found thMssue of termination of a fixed term contract of employment as provided under Rule 4 (1) of the GN. No. 42 of 2007 is governed by the parties' agreement itself. In addition to that Rule 4 (2) of the GN. No. 42 of 2007 states clearly that a fixed term contract shall 23 terminate automatically when the agreed period expires, unless the contract provided otherwise. The court has found clause 1.2 of the contracts entered by the parties in the present matter shows that, the parties' agreement would have ended on 29th September, 2016. Although the said clause states the agreements might have been extended/by. mutual consent of the parties but there was no mutual consentzmade b^the parties. That being the position of the matter,^t^court^has found the Arbitrator erred in finding the respondents were not issued with 28 days' notice provided under recitals ^^^id 19.1 of the respondents' employment agreements^the'saitKnotice was inapplicable in the circumstances of the<matter ahhand. here is |whethqJthe Arbitrator erred in declaring there was a reasonabl^expectation of renewal of the respondents' fixed term contracts of employment. The court has found that as stated earlier in this judgment, reasonable expectation of renewal of a fixed term contract of employment as provided under section 36 (a) (iii) of the ELRA read together with Rule 4 (5) of the GN. No. 42 of 2007 is looked into the previous renewals of the employment contract and 24 employer's undertaking to renew the contract. The issue here is whether the respondents managed to demonstrate the stated requirements. The court has found that, as rightly argued by the counsel for the respondents there is no dispute that there were previous fixed term contracts of employment of the respondents wl^h^^vere renewed by the applicant. The stated finding^of the court is getting support from the proceedings of the/^A which shows the respondents stated in their testimonies^iat, their previous fixed term contracts were renewed timelafter lim^OThey also supported their testimony with their previous contracts which were admitted in the case as exhibits Hl, Hll and H16. applicant issued emails to the respondents intimating its intension of non-renewal of the employment agreement, but the court has found there was undertaking made by the applicant which established reasonable expectation of renewal of the employment agreements entered by the parties. 25 The court has found that, as rightly argued by the counsel for the respondents, though the project upon which the respondents were working came to an end but the evidence adduced at the CMA by the respondents as appearing in exhibit H22 shows the respondents' names and their CVs were used to solicit for the new project from Centres for Disease Control and Prevention fCDCk The said project was obtained as indicated in exhibit H23AThe court has also found that exhibit H19 shows the naq^s/tijtles and salaries of the staffs who were working in the previous project including the respondents, for the budget details the solicited project for Simiyu Region. That shows^hep^ was expectation that the respondents' employment agreements would have been renewed for the solicited proje®^^^ In addition toethat, the court has also found there was a letter written by&jb* applicant to the Branch Manager of Stanbic Bank TanzaniaWmited which was admitted in the case as exhibit H13 which shows the applicant was promising the Branch Manager the employment of the first respondent would have continued after expiration of the fixed term contract which was in existence. Some 26 part of the said letter states:- "... Despite the fact that his renewable contract will come to an end on 29h September 2016, it is the wish of the organization to continue working with Amos thereafter and renew his contract. With that information, we confirm that Amos can proceed with his loan application for 36 months and will continue to channel his salary through/your^Stanbic Bank account No...." It is the view of this court that, all>ofe.the above stated undertaking made by the applicant, established that, despite the fact that the ajpplica^^^d^i^sued an email to all respondents intimating itsKintension of not renewing their employment agreements^# the respondents had already formed reasonable expectatiorfe^o^enewal of their employment agreements. That caused^the^6urt<tb find that, failure to renew the employment ag^OTien^^^Mhi respondents who had formed a reasonable expectatw^f renew of their agreements was unfair termination of their agreements and that is as provided under Rule 4 (4) of the GN. No. 42 of 2007 which states as follows:- "... the failure to renew a fixed term contract in circumstances where the employee reasonably expects a renewal of the contract may be considered to be an unfair termination." In the premises, the court has found the Arbitrator was right in finding the employment agreements of the respondents were unfairly terminated as they had formed a reasonable expectation of renewal of their employment agreements. The court has fpund^the: applicant stated in relation to the third issue that, the Art^atoiMrred in admitting all disputed evidence without being properly governed by the relevant laws. The counsel for the ap^tanVargued that, some of the evidences were admitted/pnly Ca^se were listed as annexures served to the applicant and stated^ good example is exhibit H14 which was prepared aftei the termination of the employment of the respondents and fit had^np^name of the maker, addressee, stamp or signature ofWi^applicant. He also stated the same is applying to exhibit ^^^^tiich was admitted without following conditions stipu^^dhder section 18 of the Electronic Transaction Act, 2015. After going through the proceedings of the CMA and the exhibits alleged were admitted without following the conditions stipulated under the law, the court has failed to see any reason which can make it to fault the finding of the Arbitrator. The court has come 28 to the stated finding after seeing that the said exhibits were admitted in the matter after considering the rival arguments from both sides and the counsel for the applicant has not stated in his submission as to which provision of the law were violated in admission of the said exhibits in the case as evidence. The court has found that, as rightly argued^byjthe coupsel for the respondents the position of the law in relation to admissibility of exhibit in court as stated in the case of^^ysha^City Counsel & Another (supra) is its relevancy, aujhentjcity^and credibility. Other condition for admissibility of e^ence^n^urt as stated in the case of the DPP V. Mirzai Pirbakhshi'^(supra) is who is competent to failed see^any reason which can make it to fault the finding of the Arbitrator. Coming to the last issue relating to the reliefs the parties are entitled the court has found that, after the Arbitrator found the respondents had proved they had formed reasonable expectation of 29 renewal of their employment agreements he ordered the applicant to pay the respondents the sum of USD 297,900 being the salaries they would have get for two years if their employment agreements would have been renewed and found the rest of the claims of the respondents were not proved. As the court has found the applicant has not managed to satisfy it that the Arbitrator erred <in\finding the respondents managed to establish their employmenKagreements were terminated while they had formed reasonable expectation of its renewal the court has found the applicati^^^the applicant cannot succeed. In the final analysisjthe a^licafjon for the applicant is hereby dismissed in its entirety fbrxbeiipg devoid of merit. It is so ordered. Dat&dat^Da^esSalaam this 18th day of March, 2022 I. Arufani JUDGE 18/03/2022 Court: Judgment delivered today 18th day of March, 2022 in the present of Mr. Michael Kariwa, Advocate for the applicant and in the presence of the third respondent in person who is also ready to notify 30 the first and second respondents who are absent about the judgment of the court. Right of appeal to the Court of Appeal is fully explained. 31