19870731 TZHC Dar es Salaam

j f. IN THE HIGH COU..itT OF TA.t-12.ANIA ,, ' l AT DAH ES. &ALAA.M APP~LLAT~ . JUHISDICTION . .. H.IGH CvU1'tT CiUMINAL. AP;i;AL NO. 68/87 U.i:<H.iThAL Cl-lIMINAL GA.:;B No .533 OF 1987 :.,, ."i UF Tlili DISTHICT CuUHT UF ILALA DISTRICT AT-KLSUTU .·.·.....~·' b~FUh~ L• HOSEA Lb~., K~iNT MAGTI:iTHATt . :. DPP. • ••••••••••••• · •• , ••••••• , •••••••• • A..PPELLANT (Original Prosecutor) .. versu.s YU&Ul!'U M~i:;L ••••••••• I, • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • •-lli!:.oPONDENT · (Origirta1 Accused) KYA}mo,J. i >i.::· The issues raised by this appeal are purely iegai i.e. (1) .. . ,:Q""~ ~ whether a decision by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) ··':": ., in the exercise of powers conferred upon him by Section 90(1)(c) '5{ ')·~ of the criminal Procedur~aAct (CPA), No'-° 9 of a.985, to discontinue ~:.. crimin;i~proceedings institutad by a private ~~osecutor~ can be challenged and rejected py courts, and (2) whether the DPF in deciding to discountinhe such prbc·eedings is bound to explain in his deci~ion what _factor o~ factors among the three stipulated in the second' sub-section (3) of l:iecti·on 90 · of the. Criminal Proc.edure Act he has ha·d regard to, or even give reasons for his decision. The respondent Yusufu Mzee had instituted criminal proceedings against one Vedastus Musimizya warioba consisting of five counts of libel contrary to oections 38 and 47 of the Newspapers Act, 1976. ·1 I lie instituted the proceedings .in the District Court of I_lala ·at Kivukon~ and· instituted them as a private prosecutor. By a Notice •(wnich the lower court termed a c•ertificate) dated 23rd May, ,1, 1987 to the court and c9pie1f to the respondent, the V:PP. discontinued those proceedings, 'rhe Notice states-:- "IN THE DISTHICT CvURT AT KIVUKONI . C.HIMINAL . . . . ,5)3 OF 1987 CA81!;•NO. ' YUbUFU MZ.t!:.!!; ••· •••••••••••• PHIVATE PHUSECUTOR V.ti:DA& TUS MSIMIZYA wARIOBA: •. ~ ·•••,••••• ACCU&ED DThCUNTINUATiuN OF CHIMINAL PHUC.l!,;,t;DINGS UNDER SECT.ION 90(1) OF THE CRIMINAL PH0CLUURI!; ACT, 1985 ~ ~ ·I1 LiN~oT LAiARO K~MBBLA ·MWIPOPO, the Acting Director of Public ·, Prosecutions in the Unit~d 1-<epubli-c of Tanzania, having become aware i~ ! '· . I ... \ of the proceedings instituted in respect of the above-mentioned case ·/ by wa'{ Jr Private Prosecutions by Mr. Yu.sufu ~zee and having considered. •;' . !: the ciFcumstances do hereby in terms of .S~ction 90(1-)(c) ! I r ·/ . : ~. ·- ., ,0 • • • •• ;2 . ---·--··--·· .=!::...-.·. f --------·'--''-'-'..:...->.--'--'--............. ·- 2 ... of the Ctimin~l -Procedure A.ct,, 1985 1 discontinue the said l proceedings. 1 Signed at bar es balaam this 23rd day. of May., E. ~. K,.,_ ~WI-POPO ., ; ACTING DIREG:il'OR.QF.PUBLIC.l?ROSli:CUTIONS Copy:- Mr. i11'.{Mzee 1 c/o Ea D. Kisusi, Adyoqate, P. o.-Box.55149, DAR ES SALAAM. When the hearing.of the case wais about-to commence on 25th Mr. Kisusi whn has been repres'ent.J.nq May, 198'Q' the iiespondent here and in the court below, informed the trial Magistrate that he had received the above Notice from the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions, but wanted to know if he (the'Ag~ lJirector of Public !Jxio~ecutiot1s) had in fact been appointed to be Ag. l..iirecto,r of Public Prosecutions. The arguments on. this point continuetl. 1 with Mr. Maira-; for the .accused Mr. ~arioba, replyi~g, and in the end ~he trial kesident Magistrate (Hoseah HM.) made a ruling~ · In that rliling, the magistrate upheld Mr. t-1aira' s arguments_, that the Notice quoted above had issued from a properly apvointed officer\ i.e. the ag. Director of Public Prosecutions. He rejected M~. Kisusi's arguments that the Ag. Director of Public· Prosecutions had to produce an instrument appointing him as as such in order for the Notice he had isbued to be valid. Howeve·r, in the course of the ruling, the learned Resident Magistrate considered the merits of the Notice itself. After a lengthy discu~sibn about the Notice he concluded that it did not reflect the factors stipulated in Section 90(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, The secbnd sub-section (3) of Section ·,, 90 (there are two sub-sections (3) of tha.t section) provides:- 11 • • 90(3) In the exercise of his powers under this Act the Lirector of ~ublic Prosecutions shall have regard to the public int~rest, the interests of justice and the need to prevent abuse of the legal process~ ( underlinii.ng added). '.l.'he learned ±<esident Magistr"'te held that the Director of · -~ Public :Prosecutions' s Notice did not comply with these provisions <! of the law. ~his is how he expressed his view on the point:- It••• o/3• i •j 1 '· 3 - •. _.In const_ruing those words, I am of the considered 11 view-that three elements as stipulated in sub-section (3) (supra) must be reflected in the certificat~ (sic)· itself. Because the sub-section points out those three elements, it means tha~ the Director of Public Pro- secution when discqntinuing such proceedings those elements must be seen or even one of them must be reflected in the certificate. I r In this case, I fail to comprehend what eleme~t the Ag. Director of Public P~osecutions had in mind. Is it " :, , for public int ere.st'.? or The interest of justice or the need to prevent abuse of the legal process or all of them? I am at a loss which is which. . • .i' •. 1i-.~:"! It seems to me the Ag. Director of Public Pro- '. ;,,. ~1 -·. secutions ho.s not complied with tha:c requirement under subsection (3) o! Section 90 of Criminal Procedure Act, 1985." ·Then he went on to consid~r whether courts are precluded from inquiring into the contents of the 11 certificate." For the ' . reasons which he gave, he held they were not 1 • He thereupon concluded:-· '' •• I therefote, and ~~cordingly remand back the certificate ., which the ~irector of Public Prosecutions has issued for comp'.].iance with that sub-secti.on (supra) so that the. ambiguity app~rent on the face of the certificate itself, ' . cart be cur~d and therefore, the interest of justice can be achieved as the law requires thereof." He also maue the following order. " ~ : _ Meanwhile the Ag. Director of Public Prosecutions issue a .fresh certificate, which will reflect the spirit of sub-section (3) of ~ection 90 of Criminal Procedure Act and be presen~ed to this court on mention date." From the learned Magistrate's ruling and order the liirector of Public ~rosecutions has preferred this appeal. He has stated only on.e ground of appeal in his Petition of Appeal, which is that:,:- 11 ••• '.l.'he learned iesident Mag:'s"!:cate misdirected himself in law in rejecting the ce~tificate is~ued by the Acting Director of Public Pro- secut.ions under /:iection 90 (1) (c) of the Criminal P~ocedure ~ct, on the ground that sub-sec~ton (3) of Section 90 of the same Act was not complied. w_t t~~ 11 . •-• .... /4. - 4 - .' ' ~ Mr. bhio, btate Attorney, appeared before me to argue the appeal· on behalf of the Director of Jublic Prosecutions. Mr. Kisusi, as alre?-dy indicated, ;appeared f<?r. the respondent. t bubmitting Mr. ohio argued that in the first p],ace th;e -. exercise of the powers .of t.he iii rector of Public. Prosecutions unde:r Criminal Procedure Act cannot be ·questioned by courts. He said the only one who can question such exercise of powers by the Director of Public Prosecutions is the.President, by virtue of the provisions of bection 90 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Act. .Sub_; section 5 of bection 90 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides:- It 90(5) In the exercise of the powers conferred on him by this section, the Director of Public Prosecutions shall have and exercise his own dis- I. cretion and shall not be subject to the directions or control of any person except the President." · Mr. bhi_o argued _that _the words "any person" in sub-secti9n l . . supra· include.'. the courts, i.e. that th,~ Dirgetor of Public i I Prosecutions is- not subject to directions or control of any tj ~- person, including the courts, in the exercise of the powers as provided in l:iectio_n 90 of the Criminal Procedure Act. l:iecondly, Mr. bhio submitted that in making the decision to discontinue the proceedings in this case the DPP had had regardi.' to the public interest, the interests of justice, and the need to prevent abuse of the legal process. He submitted that but the law does not require him to state in his decision that he has had regard to these. He said when in the Notice quoted-supra he states:- "having considered the circumstances of the case 1 11 it means that he had had regard to all that is stipulated in bection 90(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In support cf both of these p~ints Mr. bhio referred me to Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers (1977) 3&1.:·. .l!;.1<. 70 in which at page 88, Viscount 0 Dilh9rne, discussing the duties and powers of the Attorney General powers of ~ngland, which duties andLin Criminal matters appear to be analogous to the duties _and powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions in this country, stated:- 110.The Attorney - General hb.S many powers and duties. He may stop a~y prosecution on indictment by entering a nolle prosequi. He merely h~s to sign a piece of paper saying.that he does not wish the prosecution to continue. He need not give any re&sons~ He·cbn direct the institution of a prosecution·and direct the Director of .Public· Prosecutions ·to take over the conctuct of any .___.__.._.__L,_·i._.L,___..,_._ _ _ ~. criminal procu,dings and he niay tell him.to offer no evidence~. In the exercise of ihese powers he ls no~ subject i~ direction by his ministe~ial colieagues or t_o controiand supervision of t"he courts. If thecourts, can review his re.fusai of consent to a relator action, J r I it is an exc.eption to the _geheral rule~ No aut_hority wac c:: 'I cited which supper.ts the conclusion that the courts can ' '. I ••• i·• • ••• ti.; O . 0 0 . O O O O O . • • ■ 0. 0 0 • • 0 :0 •• d O. 0 G Cl. Cl ■ C l . i, ij •, . C, •• I 1· ·,. . . . •• ·~ .·~';i. •••• and in my opihion the view, that refusal of co~egt to a relator acfion is ~n exception to the general rule and is subject to review by the courts must be rejecte.d. It is because I think it undesirable I that any jucticial observantions s:-ig6esting 'that the l exercise by the ~ttorney lienral ot these functions and j uuties is subje'ct to control,. supervision and review by the courts should be left unanswered that I ventured to make these observatiohs. 11 -~ 1 Mr. bhio argued ~hat, in view of these observations of · Viscount Dilhorne, the trial mugistrate had erred in rejecting and remanding the Noti~e for the discountinuation of the I criminal procee_dings inst:ituted by the respondent in this cas'e., r he prayed that 1 allow ~he appeal and declare the Director of Public Prose~ution 1 s deeision as it is v~lid. In reply, Mr. Kisusii although he did not have the opportunity to argue the point in the Distri<'t Court as this particular point seems to have been raised by the magistrate himself during the couroe of his ruling on the quer,tion whether the Ag. Director of Public ~rosecutions had been properly appointed,supported the Huling of the learned magistrate and submittad that there is no provision under Section 90(l)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act which makes it mandatory for the c·.· court to diicontinu~ proceedings up6n receipt of a decision from the llirector of Public Prosecutions discontinuing them,.. He argued that Section 90 of ~he Criminal Procedure Act was different from tiection 91 where it is provided that upon receipt of a nolle prosequi 1 entered by the Director.of Public _.!:'roseo.utions 1 the court shall discharge the accused:. Here; he sumitted,the provisions are mandatory and courts have no choice. Mr. ·Kis.usi submitted further that the· court was entitled to , make its own uecision upon receipt of the Director of Public l-'rosecutions' s decision especially as that decision was not going to afiect the Director of Public Prosecutions himself, . ..... /6 .. - 6 - but another person, the Private Prosecutor. As to whether courts can review the decision of the DPP to discontinue private prosecutions as was done in this case, 1 he submitted that co~rts have inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate ! ! on matters brought b"'fore them. He said it has for a long time .been held that unless the jurisdiction of courts is specifically ousted courts /..Lllave jurisctiction in all matters. He· said Section 90 of the Criminal 1'rocedure Act has no provision excluding the jurisdiction of the courts from looking at the decision of the Director of Public l'rosecution and deciding _whether to accept it or not. He submitted that the words "any person" in .Section 90(5) Criminal Procedure Act mean "any other personu other than the courts. ~r. Kisusi also ·submitted that the F'-wers exercised by the Uirector of Public Prosecutions under Section 90 (1) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Act are discretionary powers. Citing ,_ Patman Garments Industries Limited, VS. Tanzania Manufacturers Ltd., (CA) Civ.App. No.15 of 1981 (unreported) he argued that · courts have always exercised powers of review over administrative decisions and{s\i\ decisions can always be impugl';led either uirectly through certiorari orders or through any appropriate collateral proceedings. un the words "lic1.ving consdered the t>ircu:cistances of the ease" in the li,irector of Public Prosecutions's Notice, he contended that they do not satisfy the requi-rements of Section 90(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act. ~nd on the authority cited by his learned friend, i.e. Gouriet. V. Union of Post -. Office Wnckers lsupra) he argued that the observations of Viscount lJill!Lorne ware.i:- only obiter and are not authority for the proposition they made. He also argued that the issue discussed in those observations was that of/golle prosequi and not disco~inuc:.tion of private prosecutions. He submitted that the case is irrelevant to the instant case and should not be followedo He prayed that I confirm the ~uling of the Resident Magistrate and permit the Private Prosecutor to continue with his case. Before considering the issues raised by this appeal it is I think necessary to make general observations on one or two points. The first point to note is that all criminal proceedings in our country are under the· general control and directions of the lJirector of Public Prosecutions. This is evident from bection 90 of the Criminal Procedure Act which provides:- 11 •• 90(1) the Director of Public Prosecutions shall huve powers in any ca::,e in which he considers it desirable so-to do r ,_ - 7 - (a) to ·institute and ·undea·talce criminal proceedings agai.nst an,y person bef.ore any court ( other than a _. court-ma~tial) in •l'espect of any offence alleged to have been committed by that petson; (b) to tuke o'v-1::r ahtl continue any ·such criminal pro- . ceedings, . thc:lt .-have been ins.tituted or undertaken by any other person or authority; and i (c) to discontinue any such criminal proceedings ins- tituted or undertaken by him or any other authority I t j ' or person. The ·effect of these .provisions is thc:.t whoevtr institutes .or undertake's criminal proceedings in courts in this country he does ' so s·ubject to the overall control anu dir.ections of the DPP. t \, '.l'he second point is th&.t I sub-section (3) of oection 90 of .the Criminal l-'rocedur_e Act talks about the exercise of powers by the ~irector of Public Prosecutions under the entire Criminal ~rocedure Act, and not under section 90 alone. It states:- 1190(3) In the exercise of his powers under this Act the µirector of Public Prosecutions shall have regard ....................... "(emphasis supplied). bo whenever the Director of Public Prosecutions exercises any powers under the Criminal Procedure Act he has to have regard to the factors 1:iection 90(3) stipulates • .l now turn to. the consideration and cletermin&tion on the twin issues of the appeal and the ones I have endeavoured to set out at t the beginning of this juugment. I must state at the outsetithat in considering and determining these is .. ues I will have regard to the observations of Viscount D1lhorne in Gouriet V. Union of Post Office Worke~s (s~pra). As stated earlier on, Mr •. Kisusi urged me ·· t~ disregard those views as they are obiter and were on c:. 1.point not in isi.ue in th.e instant case •. With great respect to l>'ir .. · Kisusi, those observ<'.ltions by Viscount Dilhorne might 'have been obiter, but they are nevertheles.s so persuasive and so powerfully expressed that it wouid be totally unwise to altogether disregard them. As to the argument that they were made · in relation to a different issue from the ones raised by this appeal, I will advert to it later in the course of this judgment, albeit inferentially .. ~eeondly, I will !:\ave regard to. the two points I have just set out ab9v:e,, ,i.e. that ·( '; ' the liirector of <Public Prosecutions .has ._overalrcontrol ··t:ver,·:~lil..::crt~inal prosecutions in the country and . . . .. ' . . . .·tha,t . Section 90(3) . of .. , the ··'-Grimirial Procedure. Act applies to the powers of the liirector of Public ~rosec.utions under the entire ,,' •••,.o•/8. .,;. 8 CriminaJ. Proce~re Act~ Now, stari;.ing 1t1ith the questfon whether a decision .by the DPP: to discontinue c~jminai Proceedings instituted or undertaken by a1 private· pros~cut~.; can tie impugned ·in· cnurts or can be a subject for review and ac~ept~nce or rejectioi;i_by the c-.:urts, the iearned Resident ' ' ~ . Magistrate, as. no:ted already, rule~!\h/ af;i'rmative, Visc-:un~ oiilhorne ·.. in Gour let v. uni ~n of Post Office Workers, . discussing the powers· arid duties of the English Attorney General, one -:,f the.m being that . 4 entering a n,-11e. prosequis, says the. exercise of such p.-,wers aI?d duties can not l,e reviewed in courts·:.. With respect, I agree with this' view rif vi.scount oilhc-rne- for the reasons he has given· and which are apparent frcm the passage of his observati·,ris I have repr:.,,duce6 ab•-,ve- and for other reasons· which will, bec--me apparent pre·sentli in this judgment. considering the powers of the DPP to c,ntr,:-,],. criminal prl1.secutions and the fact that section 90( 3) of the CPA applies to the entire CPA, one has to draw fr·,m the experience in relation to the excercise of powers by the DPP under other sections of the CPA• .Especially, one·· has to look at what happens when the DPP enters ar n~lle prosequi'-~nd.er . section 91 of the CPA~ on this Mr. Kisusi argued that the exerd:se 0~ powers under secti-,,n 91 of the.,CPA is different frnm that under s.oo-~ rn rep'iy to thjs, ...Mr• Shio submitt~d that what applies to s.91 CPA also applies to s~90, because, he said, ·t~e spirit }nf these sectfons is the ,, same; to enter a n ... 11e pros~qtii and to disc-,ntknue proceedings ·amc,'i.mt to I I I the same thing. wtth respect, I agree that there is no distinction in principle between the powers of the DPP under secti0n 90(1)(c) and ' ' . those under sectj,n 91 of the CPA• The ~nly difference is ~hat under section 90{1)(c) he discontinues private prrisecution whereas under s.91 he enters a n"lle p·rosequi to disc".lnttne public pr..,secuti-,ns. But in general, the c ·nsequences are the same: terrninati~n nf proceedings. Now, when the DPP en'::ers a 1;1~11e pr,...sequi under s.91 'lf· the OJ:'.A, . courts do not review it. Nor is• there a challenge t:-i ite I cann.-,t there-.'. 1 i. fore see why a decision by the DPP t-, discontinue private pr~secutions . ' l sh~uid be impugned· 0r challeged., In my --pini0n, onee the court receives · 1 a notice·that under s.90(1)(c) of the CPA, the DPP has disc-ntjnued the proce~dings:, · as :jn the case of a nolle ·pr-:,se~i, the proceedings·_~d. theire · . and there i~ n- r ,rn for argumeri.t''-or :disputing as t.-, whether t,.., accept the DPP•s decisi,n -:,r not. ...' ,, For these reas-.ns, I hold that ·., the decisi0n 'lf the OPP under s. 90{ 1) (c) _CPA to disc,..ntinue private ciiminal pr-,ceedings cann;.,t be challe~ged, rior can it be a s.ubject foi· revi~w by criurts. - 9- I now turn to a consideration of whether t!.1e DPP, must state what factor among those stipulated UJJ.der Section 90(3) Criminal Procedure Act he has had regard to in regard to in discontinuing proceeclings instituted by a private prosecutor, or whether he is bound to give aey reasons at all for his decision. As I have stated already, Section90(3) of the Criminal Procedur~ Act . app 1 ies t o t',.1~ e.,"'{ercise · by the DPP of po•rnrs , and duties unde_ r th.e whole of the Criminal Procedure Acto This means that when he, for example, enters a nolle prosequi under Section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Act he has to have regard i;o public interest, the interests of justice and the need to prevent abuse of the legal process. Yhen he exercises these powers of entering a nolle prosequi, r1oes he have to explain that he has had regard to these fac·~ors or give any reasons? Viscount Dilhorne in Gouriets V Union of Post Office Workers •- 0 ; says no., If' I may repeat .:.1is words g- ", •• Ile merely has to sign a piece of paper saying that he does not wish the prosecution to continue. He need not give any reasons" (emphasis added.). In this country too, the Dpp does not assign reasons for entering nolle prosequis, I have picked the example of nolle prose~s under the Criminal Procedure Act in this judgment because r~elJlwe have private prosectrtions in subordinate courts and. in the High Court in this country. As a:result there is a paucity of occassions on which the DPP has exercised hi"s powers under Section 90(1)(0) of' the CPA~ But he frequently enters nolle prosequis and in doing so he does not state on or in them that he has had regard to some or one of the facto:r:s stipulated in Section 90(3) of the CPA. Ile simply produces the nolle prosequi and once the court is satisfied that it is from the DPP 1 s Office it accepts it without question. If this is the cace with nolle prosequis, I do not see why the position should be different with discontinuation of proceedings under Section 90(1)(0) of the CPA. What I thinlc caused the confusion in this whole matter was the misconstruction of Section 90(3) of the CPA. It is apparent that -tl10 learned trial magistrate, together with l\'!r. Kisusi, learned Advocate for the respondent herein, thought that sub-section (3) of Section 90 of the CPA applied to powers exercised by the DPP under Section 90 alone 1 1-Ti th respect, that is not the case. The sub-section itself refers to exercise of powers by the DPP "under this Act," io. the CPA, and. not 11under this ea:riion., 11 The factors stipulated in Section 90(3) are there in my view, only for the guidance of the DPP himself in exercising his powers under the CPf•• _Ile does not have to state them in any instrument he issues under the Act and he is not bound to explain that he has had regard. to one or the other of the factors stipulated in Section,90(3) CPA in such instruments. If he ignores to have regard to the stipil.ated factors, it is not for the courts to intervene, it would go, ooH/10 - 10 - I think, to the conduct of his office and that is when probably the President might question the DPP in terms of Section 90(5) of tho CPA. For the above reasons, therefore, I hold. th2,t the DPP 1 in deciding to discoutinue criminal proceedings instit-uted by a private prosecutoi; does not have to ·indicate in the decision when it is communicated to the court what factor among those provided for in sub-seqtion (3) of Section 90 of the CPA he has had regard to or state any reasons for his I' decision. I have considered the Patman Garments Industries Ltd. v. i Tanzania Manufacturers Ltd, case ., a case a , · which, by. the iay, has acquired inm1ense popularity amongst our lawiJcrs in this country considering the frequency with ·which it is cited in courts, but with respect, I find that it has no application to the situation in this I l case. So are the arguments by ~ir. Kisusi baced upon it. II In tho final result then 9 I hold that the learned Resident I Magistrate erred in reviewing the DPF 1 s decision in this case to i: . discontinue Mr., Yusufu Mzoe 1 s prosecution of Vedti.stus Wa;rioba and .i in remanding and rejecrling the notice of such discontinuation to him •. Those proceedings have been validly discontinued and they cannot·be ressurrected. Mr. Kisusi made a rather star1i!P,.ng proposition that Mr. Yusufu Mzee can re-institute the proceedings evon if validly terminated I bsJ tho DP?. With respect, that would be an abuse of the process of ,,,I lt the law~ Also once the court has accepted the discontinuation upon b~ing satisfied that it has been ma.de by the DFP, it would be contemptuous, I in rrry view, to the court to re-institute them after the DPP has I r. i discontinued them. But I am not saying that the doors to the corridors of justice aro totally closed to I-fr. Yusufu Mzee even though the DPP has discontinued the criminal proceedings ho had instituted. He 1 Mr. Yusufu Mzee, can still have recourse to a civil action against l- r-ir. 1farioba, based upon the same facts on which he insti tutcd the ' criminai proceedings. I allow the appeal by the DPP 9 reVt:rse the Ruling of the Resident Magistrate and declare the Notice sent to the court below disccLt~g the proceedings in this case valid. 1 J, ,, '! I - 0 1!1. ( .lj ""'--.:b Lo A. A. r; Cd_,'\ KYANDO J JUDGE 31/7/1987 I / Coram: L. A. A. Kyando,. J. For'the Appellant - Shio 9 State Attorney, For the Rospondentg Kisusi Courtg~ Jup.gment delivered today the 31st JtUy, 1987 in the ,. I. - 11 ~ presence of learned counsel for both sides. l.1 <,;Uv. S?o, 1 L. A. Ac KYill{DO JUDGE DAR· ES SALJ\JtM 31st July:2 1987e r I •• . ,.... • ·.- i i -1 . I .. . . ' . .. . . . ; ~ .. . •• - ' t ....•