19860329 TZCA Dar es Salaam

. . . . ·.{' ,; . ." :1,'t . . I •1•-:, ~- i' ' , . -~: .. ./ .. - y .. ~ /.-~"'·'\ / \ . VERSUS ... \. ' ,, i . ,; · TANZANIA-ZAMBIA RAILWAY, AUTHORITY •• RESPONDEN'r. .,... :': - . - ·~ ·,.. . .; . ._; .;·. ' . . ( . ·. ·( ~ ' ' .' . '. . '. . '. . ' . -.. "'· · (Appeal· from the· Order· and Decision of· the . · ,. •·. ·· ,., High· Court Of; Tanzania at Dar· es Salaam) · -[ '•;;._< ·" . ·:(Lubuva,'· _J.) cia'ted the 26th day of October,, -:.,'·'.:..: . \ .- :()_?_9_:J_._._:.~ / ;;':- ,,, ,· .- ;.. ,.,_. .J. tn ' Misc. Civi"l .Cause No. 7 of 1985 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT -:;\1' f ~.: • • . ~':' .. ~ .. The appellants in this appeal, HAMISI ALLY RUHONDO AND . l:.: -'.·~,~ 115 OTHERS, were. employed by. the respondent_, TANZANIA ZAMBIA RAILWAY AUTHORITY, popularly known as Tazara. Their services were terminated by the respondent, allegedly because -of redund~ncy caused by the respondent's declining business as a result of a numb 7r· of al_l~ge~ factor·s the details of which it is not imme,0el.y nec:essary to go fnto. · The apnellants were di satisfied· so they , went to the Permqnent Labo':1r Tribunal, via the Commissioner fer Labour, in terms O_f Section 9A(1) Of the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act, 1967t as·.a·mended by Act No. 18 of 1977. The Tribunal duly ', inquired i~to the matter and accordingly made a report to th~ Minister for Labour and Manpower Development. On 7th Nov~rnber, f 1984 th.e, said ·Minister made a decision, reversing the s~ep taken ·by the respondent of terminating the appellants' services. The ~inister ordered the reinstatement of the appellants, ·... \ · without any loss of'· benefits, and directed that the purporte~ &edurid anc::y payments should be treated as intere s':' : ~ de'bt.s • . Thirteen days la.1ter the d".lcision was registered by the· Tribunal as· an award, in accordance with Section 9B ( 1) of the Act as amended • .. •.• .... . /2. \ , •1 i·:; · . ., f-,;,· ~-The:: r~ ~P~~-d~~t~w~~ • nul··~~ti sf 1~d··~ith . l f ' .. : 1 '..; •·'. '-?- • ~ ~i r<,..~;, ~ ...... ~; ,.'.I i \- • •1.' t·,. ' l •. • • 1:~f -~~ni£te~• a d~ion •} .;. so in February, 1985,.through their advbcate, ·Mr. Tarimo, they '.~~pi1~d·'j~~: ~h~,~id-~{~r-~ert1~rar! to remo~e 'the Ministe~,-~-v- 1 .b~~ak+~1~lp; th~ High" t~~rt·rrani·h:~~~ i t ~~ash~d: and set' aside: ; ,. ' ,:. .J) i-.~;~,~ -.··; .( ,-.. ~--~.to,:. ~-.i- ~-·, ::i· ·1J~•:.. ;,. ,.: ;, .. ~--~~ ~ ,.-,·.,,·· :. 1_ ;' • .,, : ·._ ·_ .... The··. application ·was· ·heard by Lubuva, · J. on 2nd October, 1985 1•; •:, .) ~.: • ~ -:• : Sf: ., -~ • • '. \ i• , ', ; i •• -~ :••; • : '\. "I ••:a ~: .: •.'• : •~ ) • ,,.. ;;, ... • and On 26th OctC)Qer, 19_8.5 the learned Jupge delivar,ed his 'f~.uii~~:··,which':·'w?~~ :i.h:--f;~o~r; of~- the< 'a'~pii~an~~\ T~zara • . 'Hk ·wae t_...i-.~:-:. >-; ~-:-.! ~ · ~- ·, · i.?: '\ .•.... -. \ := • r.:'.~-- ._ ._ ·~- · ·).~- ~~ · ,~ ·.:.•. _· ·: -~.? , .. :: .. r:·~~ .•. ,:_ .s-.tisfied that_ }:he. procaedings 1:>efor~ _1:he_ Tribu_nal 1 were ultra {:.;..:1P""~"i-.-~l-·1_-[·,·:;· :. .-,~~11,r\:tt' t;/\i~-1~.~~~;t•~ti: . · • . . , · ·~ .. ·, . , , ~. .... . ,.= •:,~'! .vir,f?,S; so,:h~i·.,) ._qiia,$h~,d the ~kt.n.~ster,' ,s-or,dE3r be.sed on them and .i:.r·••·· .......... , .. · . _:. ·;• .... 'r· .• ·--~ :"··• ,· .... i;· ., ; . · •. , • ;, . . . . . · . • • .· ~ ,- • ••r-,, ~~~'_j._t;~ ,f ,... ..s~-~.-r,.'.Jtl~,- ',l-•~. ;· -~ ,;.' f'~P~+J..aA~''' t •,~ • •• df~i-f::~{#PH3-~!ing to. this cOur~, ~ -.•4 \I " ~-.••:,; • • •·•. ·• • and''Prof. ·shivji"of 'the Un:lversity'·of bar es Salaam Legal Aid Cc;>mrni ttee; ~}\'(If, na·s .represent~d-'t:hern>all along,:~ is'.- ap~~ar11'lg 1 -" J·;: ·• '.:. • :, ·~ ..,.. , • ~ .. . •.• ·~. .• '· ' . ► . \.".. :· - . ~-.· \ . ' ·. -· '... 'f~t-•j~hem~ ··t<:rrepr'~sent: ·it~e ~eal!>Ondent. '.>'Mr~~ ¥~rifn!:>."-tontihue•s· 1 ~ 1fff'at'~s:ifn1bFier ,r: ·1:s~tl'\~~ b~~¥~t&t:inf6 fo,·,.th"i.s'.; ~pp·ea'l ~ , - I { • • - ., ·}. '· •.; • ◄,;._,: ' : ·::, ~ ._, l ' ' . ~'.';" i: .'. •j Before going'. into the substance of the appeal we • wish . ;, tit rema.rk that we were i.-nc:·~n1reni11bced by the record f1J.rni shed to us and TY'!hi~h 3~~~,,~~l.Yv:~~rti~ia~tl::>Y, ~1;he q,pp~l l:f\Tltlil!. n~c:lV?C~ ~e ?,. t::: L"\J '\:..-i ~fit'!y,e~: g~W~:·~~ ~Jl~5~aq~~f;.,q,1 ~f ':.t:~!r·typ~d,:i::~~C?r9.;:-~ \afh?l~-:.l?ag.~,-8f tn~ 1~;~giQ.~l ,.f:e~9-~d 1...i~ rl\!ftt.i\!~,,r.\fhJ:~ .:~a.~ij~ ~tt. app~,ai.; ::t??a f only . ~-9f-'.!: ~\l,~y:,j :l::r., aa~.,~ot:,-:,11;:.-::, 1~1:'.i!J\a.'-, ,s.,_¥,.l q~ny:~ing .1;~t ~{:l~l !~'!.:P?fe . . . . . . )f~j.n~,_:,~ "..cQJe~ ?~d ,.1-q~c~, ..J,98~,· Ltl\~Q:,~ t ;J:;~g~ l~dne~.{l-y; ~~n rn~ge s q~,,tl-1.~ ~;~9.i0elr.r-..eCr<;r~ c;a~;:c d~mi ~ te<ji.: ,P ~g.e. , 7_4 (:sl}.qw s :·t.-1:-{rl :tt :+c. "l:-te ~-~li9~~n't{\g,:-~o\ ~W'~~,l .t-~~.~,t~e ciCO'l@J-:t 9.:f.0-rlP:~?\l- :s_"1ga·i~~\; . ?4ubuva,,: ~~.• ' s .Ji~l¼l'l<:i :.1ti~i~6:\ .-/~ha.. -,8~+-:i,ng ,.i ~$.'P.\t ~,ta.r:t~ i:.t'.~m 11?-i,~~ ~~i~ ! ·. ·, lAJ~ wt~ , ..1. - 1 ;, • %f~rq_~.s~'.~,9.r:;~ .. . . 9 teri,P/'l.ti~r'¢l~n~-!3}~rtlfyin,g ·. . .. . . \ ... f~Q~d~•;al'lld . ~-~ •would:r: L. j ;~8-P~!r~l}liY:.~ ,..q~al{l;fh~~. a 1;~E1,nt~I') tyO ·,th~ :)~ul,.~s -~:f •,tRte :.Cout~t _qf; (\;pp.8<!,:\:t+~~a~ini,-,~:i<-S:pJJla~~.JE'.• th_,;,: •'. '_ -:: ·w :, .'c·,· ·•:·•':· -, ! .~:.) In a lengthy Memorandum of Appeal the appellants ui:~ged seve-ral -ground~·- fr:s8 gi .tea ~p'pf'edlat,e· :tlie J·'&\~lfy rfidmeritc'11s' 1ories j~ t '•-tt-: n&.isia-Ff io ie2eptt'1-.{1aiEt-r.1:~· ...m;:!'!\K"grou~d-s t'faztrr~-;hh :Cfor\~a'fa· 1 t':; I - beftSr~- t11J('.Hi'gli"-C'oll'J.f: ±Wl'$'uppo.f'.~ ~(jf "its-'piayJ/.'¥-o~ '.a~~v~fJJ r ~of''--~< . ,. c~oraf:t f ~a;i ?wa~'l:. '~~ 1 rf~dfng }.:-'tin 'wlfich' 't1f.;' ··fea'rn~\r L_fudg1, d s ;J~· -- 3 -- based himself in granting the prayer. The present respond~rtt•s main grounds were as follows: (1) There was no Trade Dispute in existence when the Permanent Labour Tribunal was directed to conduct an 11quiry so both the order to the Tribunal and the purported inquiry offended ~he provisions of Section 9A(1) of the Act. Th~ said Section 9A(1) reads: Subject to subsection,!) - (which is irrelevant here) where any trade dispute exists or is apprehended, the Labour Commissioner may inquire into the causes and circumstances of the trade dispute and, with the approval of the Minister, refer ariy matters appearing to him to be connected with or relevant to that trade dispute to the Tribunal and the Tribunal shall inquire into the matters referred to i t and report on them tn the Minister. (11) The inquiry on whicl; the Minister relied on was in any case null because the proceedings were conducted without the authority and or knowledge of Juwa ta. In such inquiry proceedings the employees must be represented by Juwata which is a necessary party to any such proceedings. There must be, and here there was not, a report from the Juwata Secretary General on which the Labour Commissioner could have initiated the inquiry. and (iv) The Minister's order and decision breached the rules . 1 of natural justice in that Tazara were not given an opportunity to be heard befo~e the Minister made the said decision and order ·.! against themo The present appellants urged a number of grounds to counter 1razara's assertions. The main ones were that the purported -!terminations were void ab initio because there had been no prior consultation with Juwata Field Branches before the decision of declaring the workers redundant. Th8 present appellants protested •••••••••• 0 4/ against the terminations and approached the Labour Commissioner who in turn enquired with the Juwata Secretary Genera1, which set .in motion the other steps which followed. The appellants were obviously disatisfiect, hence the steps they took, to resolve a trade dispute, and there was no obligation on their part, or on anyone's part, to involve Juwata in the inquiry proceedings. It was not obligatory for the Labour commissioner to get a report from the Juwata Secretary General before he could initiate an· inquiry o The appellants further contended that the respondent had in any event unduly delayed in asking the court to exercise its discretion and granting an order of certiorari. In issuing the order for certiorari the learned High Court judge was satisfied that, among other things; (~· There was no trade dispute. The issue of,reducing the number of workers h~d been amicably "settled or compromised between Tazara the employer, the applicants in this matter and l Juwata. Juwata was fully involved in this". 11 •• o • • Juwata as a trade union had been sufficiently involved at various staqes pertaining to the redundancy issue of Tazara employees, some of whom were the respondents". Specifically the learned judge observed, in the course of his judgment: 11 I am satisfied and find it as a fact that by the ......... time the matter was referred to the Minister, such matter had already been determined and duly settled. The determination and settlement on the issue had been effected between Juwata on behalf of the employees,the respondents and Tazara, the employer, the applicants. There was no more dispute in existence. +he Minister therefore assl113ed jurisdiction over a non-existent trade dispute. The learned judge said he appreci~ted the provision of section 6(1)(g) of the Security of Employment Act, which provides; 6 (1) (g) - The function of the field branch, and in relation to the business for which it is estnblished, 1 3 to consult with the employer concerning any impending redundancies and application of any joint agreement on redundancies. • •••••• /5. It was the le~rned judge's view however, that in the prese~t case the redundancies did not become impending until the Council of Ministers had decided on the redundancies·. · It will here be rec•lled that the Tribunal and the Minister were of a different view. They were .. · ·. of the view that once Super Mac ( Super Management and Administration Committee) felt the necessity of reducing the number of worker~; the employer should have consulted with Juwata Field branches before making recommendations to the Board of Directors (which in turn took the recommendations to the Council of Ministers). ~twas basically because of the foregoing that th~ learned H~gh Court Judge issued the order of certiorari quashing and setti~ aside the Minister's order. Prof. Shivji made a number of spirited submissions attacking the learned judge's decision and urging us to r~verse the High Court ruling. We are most grateful to bOth learned counsel for tlheir Obvious industry in preparing for the anpeal and arguing i·t before us.. We propose to separate the grain from the chaff and utilize only such inputs as we find necessary and enough for the disposal of the matters before us. Prof. 5 hivji urged that when· the matter W':1S referred to the Tribunal for inquiry and subsequently the Minister made a decision tihere ~ still in existence a Trade. Dispute. He submitted that a p.roper construction of the Secretary General's letter would nnt permit the conclusion that the Trade Dispute had been settled. Rather, the letter says that there was no Trade Dispute in e:xistence. Further Juwata does not have to be involved in every T~ade Dispute. ·Juwata has to report to the Labour Commissioner a Trade Dispute, and so be involved, only if the action is under S,ection 4 ( 1) of _the Act. If, he contends, as in the present c,ase, the employees act under section 9 (A) ( 1), Juwata does .!22! 'E"l>-ave to report and does not have to be inv.olved: It is not a nrecessary party. Section 4 (1) of the Juwata Act 1979 indeed pi:rovides: "Juwata shall be th8 sole body representative of all employees within the United Republic". . ..... /6. 6 Prof. Shivji submitted that this merely meant that there cannot l:?e any other Trade Union in Tanzania. The appellants' advocate also addressed us on what he said was the real meaning of Section 6(1) (g) of the Security of Employment Act, Cap 574. He supported the view of the Tribunal that the intended consultation should have been held before declaring the redundancies. He in other vPrds.asked .,• us to fault the view that there were in this case no impending redundancies before the time the Council of Ministers approved the recommendation put to them by the Board of· Directors. Prof. Shivji also reiterated his earlier submission before the learned judge that the High Court should have refrained from exercising its discretion in favour of the respondent because of their delay of over two months after the award before applying for the order of certiorari. Mr. Tarimo submitted that Lubuva, J. acted quite proprly in granting the order of certiorari and that his decision should not be reversed. The High Court was entitled to rely on the Secretary General's letter to found the view that the Trade Dispute had been settled. The appellants had accepted their terminal dues and left. They cannot later be heard t~: say t.~1at they were unhappy. Juwata 1 had been involved and settled the Dispute which no longer therefore ex:isted.. The employees had consented to the · settlement, as ev~denced by the letter from the Secretary General. Mr& Tarimo ma:intained that Juwata is a necessary party to a Trade Dispute, even if the proceedings are under Section 9A- The basis of the High Court decision was ~&ily the issue of jurisdiction. The High Court was of the view that the Tribunal and tJh,e Minis,ter had no jurisdiction as there was no Trade Dispute. Under the Law Reform Act, Act 55 of 1968, an application for aim order of certiorari should normally be made within six months of.' the event, in 'th is case of the High Court ruling. This one was c].,early well within the six months and the learned j udgP. heard and ........ /7. considered the argument that· the applicants had been unduly long in moving . the High Court for the order: He took into account what the learned author Wade said on the issue, as well as the views in ALFRED LUKARU' s case. Having done so, he was satisfied that the delay of seventy days or so, was satisfactorily explained and reasonable. We are of t~e view that the learned judge was· perfectly entitled in his discretion to hold that view and we are not at all persuaded to hold that he erred in doing so. We do not think that the appellants' complaint on.this has any merit. We have to consider the rival submissions whether or not Juwata must be involved whenever the;:::? is a Trade Dispute which it is sought to resolve. Quite clearly under Section 4(1) of the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act, the general secretary of a registered trade union of which the employees are members must be involved. Since Juwata is the only possible Trade Union in Tanzania this would refer to the Secretary General of Juwata. But then (i) The employees would have to be members of Juwata; and there is no proof in the instant case that the appellants are; and (ii) The provision relates to process under Section 4(1). Taking into acc9unt the available evidence on the history 0£ the matter and considerir,g the submissions by learned counsel. it is clear to us that the appellants chose to proceed under section 9A which was added some ten years after the principal Act and which in our view,is significantly different from the earlier section and for a different purpose. Section 9A makes n'o mention of any 'general secretary' or Secretary General. Section 9A provides "9A.-(1) Subject to subsection (2), where any trade dispute exists or is apprehended, the Labour Commissioner may inquire into thP. causes and circumstances of the trade dispute and, with the approval of the Minister, refer any matters appearing to him to be connected with or relevant to that trade dispute to the Tribunal and the Tribunal shall inquire into the matters referred to it and· report on them to the Minister". •e•o•o•e/8. In view of the sequence . of events, the appellants probably . '' did not have any cf10! ·.:e but to proceed under Section 9A which we are satisfied gives leeway to the Labour Commissioner and the Minister, as well as the Tribunal... to go about the matter without nee,egsar±l:y involving any par.ticular party or 1nst1 tution. They need not involve Juwata in the exercise. In the present case, in view of the Secretary General's letter, Annexure A, i t is difficult to see how Juwata could have enthused on the matter. Incidentally the appellants' advpcate informed the High Court that the Tribunal had. taken the trouble to send out Summons to Juwata but the latter did not botaer to appear. We ace of the view that Juwata need lj ·j . I not necessarily be involved if proceedings were under Section 9A I as the present oneswere. The Tribunal did hear Tazara and the 1 Minister made his decision on the ba~is of the report submitted to him by the Tribunal. We do not think that the complaint that the Minister did not hear Tazara has any merit. Next is the question as to whether there was a Trade Dispute at all. The learned judge was Of course satisfied that there was none i:-1 ey:; stence. Ile w;=is satisfied that the Secretary General's letter showed the view that the issue of redur.dancy had been amicably .settled "to the satisfac;tion of either party on the issue. I can see no reason whatsoever for n~t believing the Juwata Chief Ex-::cutive Officer on the matter"~ Mr. Tarimo of course supports thi::; view, which Prof. Shivji is quarrelling with. The Secretary General's letter was written or\ 9th March, 1983 in response to the Labour Commissioner's letter written two days earliero Some seven months later and despite the Secretary General's assurances the Labour Commissioner is writin~_ to his Labour C)fficersr MbP.ya and Dar es Salaam, telling them that the appe. mts were complaining and directing ~••o•••e•/9. I j I them to inquire intO·the matter in accordance with Section·9A. · It 1s ·evident that a Trade Dispute was there, brewing and· simmertng all that ·time. Indeed this is hardly · surpc1sing, in view of the contents of the Secretary GP.neral's letter. According to the letter, among other things: (1) some workQrs had been to Juwata as long ago as September the pi;evious year, that is 1982, to complnin on their own behalf and on behalf of their componions that they were not satisfied with the way the redundancies were effectP.d etc. The /'' Secretary General sent a repre&entative to the employer where following a discussion, the termination terms were improved. (ii) Despite the foregoing the workers still complained that they had been ill-treated (iii) 'Very unfortunately' , the Secretary General's office could dO nothing, Juwat':l. could not declare a trade dispute, .x '. as· they found nothing wrong with the employers' action • The 'pande zote mbili' referred to in the panaultimate paragraph must, in the context, be a reference to Juwata and Tazara, to the exclusion of the employees. In other words Juwata desisted from proc~eding under Sec;to- 4(1). In our view what efforts were expended to resolve the matter had failed. The dispute was existing and persistent a,d the matter was proceeded with under Section 9A, which was an alternative route, which did not necessarily required Juwata involvement and participation. We find it difficult to agree \o,Jith the learned judge's view that there ·was no Trade Dispute ~ existence.·• The premise for holding that the Tribunal and the ••••••••• /10. Minister. had no jurisdiction, ·and had therefore acted ultra vires, has therefore crurnl,led. We are satisfied that a Trade Dispute c id exist and therefore there was no want of jurisdiction. The Tribunal ahd the Minister opined that the consu~tation needed Uhder thE:! Security of Employment Act should have been done (1) with the Juwata Field Brahchbs (ii) When Super Mac had decided to recommend redundancies to the Board of Directors and not after the decision had come down from the Council of Ministers. Because that was not done - as MAYNARD NYAGAWA ~he Tazara Workshop Juwata Chairman was found to have concedeq - the exercise by the Council of Ministers was void ab inttio. We think the requirement uf prior consultation with Juwata es Field Branctlshould be beyond controversy. Some con~ultation was done but the issue debatP.d is whether i t was done with the right partiP.s and, more espP.cially, at the right juncture. Juwata District Heads were informed by REUBEN SWEBE the Regional Manager about the Council of Ministers' decision. 'I'his was to inform them of the decision and if there 11as any consul~tion at all i t must have been with n~garq to implementation~ Once the Council of Ministers had made the decision i t was,in our view, beyond the province of consultation, meaningful consui"tation, in terms of section 6(1)(g) of the Security of Employment Act. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary to-consult is to take counsel with a person or to seek information or adv~ce from· him • • • • • •• 1 ./11. 11. ... We mention this because the learned judge dealt with the issue :f and his opinion on it was one of his bases for holding that the Tribunal and the Minister had erred. This involved the correctness or otherwise of the interpretation of a statutory provision and we are satisfied that the one made by the Tribunal was the correct one• As noted, there was also sotne arguemt as to when a redundancy becomes 'impending'. In the pre sent matter the Permanent I,apour "Tribunal held that the redundancy became 'impending' at the Super Mac stage. - Th~ interpretation by the Tribunal was not open to ehallengebefore a Court of Law. It was one of the bases of a finding in an award and it is final and conclusive in terms of Section 27(1) of the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act, See South East Asia Fire Bricks v. Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Ernpl,oyees Union And others: (1981) i}.~. - 36J. It was also canvassed by Mr. Tarimo that it was in any event no appropriate occasion for the Minister to order reinstatement of the Workers: The Permanent Labour Tribunal Act confers no such powers. The Minister acted under Section 9(B){1) which reads: "Upon receipt of a report made by the Tribunal in respect of any matter rP.ferrP.d to it under Section 9A the Minister shall makP. a decision in relation to the matters contained in thP report, and that decision shall be final". It is Mro Tarimc's submission that the Minister could 0 :nly make a decision and not an order under that section and that, in any event, he could not order reinstatem~nt. Prof. Shi~ji thought that view ridiculouB and preposterous. WP. only think i t urntenableo We can see no distinction between a decision and an order in the circumstances, once it is incorporated in the award. No where in the Act do we find that the Minister is precluded ••••oo~e/12. from ordering reinstatement: The de·ci sion by the Minister ~ d " be based on )the report. made to him by _the Tribunal after the Tribunal had ~onducted an inquiry .in ~egard to the Trade Dispute. I t is as wide a~ that. In the. instant case tne· Trade Dispute was about redimdancies and termination. A Minister's decision under the section \>ecomes an. 9y,ard if regis'!:ered, as this one was. The very essence of. this Trade Dispute was jobs, tontiqued working • by· the appellents. · Mr. 'I'arimo submit.'ted that the Minister is only empowered to order ~einstatement undet Section 27 of the Security of EmploymeQi: Act bu\ not under Section 9B of the Permanent Labour . ' Tribunal !\ct... . As we have already said, we are of the view that ·the Minj.ster has the power to order reinstatem~nt under Section 98. In the result we a~e satisfied that the learhed judge erred in isscing the order of certiorari quashing the Minister's decision. We accordingly reversi'! the High Cour-ts Ruling and uphold the decision of the Minister for Labour and Manpower Development. As regards costs, as we observed earlier, a number of pages were missing and sC,me were interposed. v~e award the costs -of the appeal_ to the appe!lants excepting the costs of preparat1on of the record. Befoi:e WEI end we wish to put it on recorq that neither in the proceedings in the High Court, nor during argusnents before u~, did we find any evidence or persuasion to support Ground 8 of the Memoranduitl of Appeal, that "the Honourable Judge mi.sdirected himself by taking into actcount irrelevant political and policy factors in ,. the evaluation of evidence and drawing inferences o-1 law". We are satisfiea that the learned judge strictly and properly restri~ted • himself to matters before him. To differ with him i$ a different matt-er. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 29th day of March, ;; i 1986. I li :} . .. -}. -1· ..._ I . ·~ . A. MU$-'l'AFA •. I ;iJ JUSTICE Op:- APPEAL j :)0:i :·f---·- ···:"'. L. M. MAKAME •··; ~·,'. . JUSTICE Op APPEAL ,,;·~ ::... . ' ' :~ ·: . R.H. KISJ\.NGA /1 JUSTICE OF APPEAL ·1 I certify ·that this is a true.copy of the original. . ; •'·· ' .· ,' ! / ·l•.. / · /?. (JO H. MS0FFE) DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL Op Th.NZANIA.