ROGERS

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA DODOMA SUB REGISTRY AT DODOMA MISC. LABOUR REVISION NO 4 OF 2023 (Originating from Labour Dispute No. CMA/DOM/DOM/10/2023) BETWEEN ROGERS ADRIAN............... .........APPLICANT VERSUS FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF TANZANIA.........RESPONDENT RULING Date of the fast order. 09/04/2024 Date of the Ruling'. 13/05/2024 LONGOPA, J.: This revision arises out of the decision of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA) for Dodoma at Dodoma issued on 14th September 2023. It is preferred under Section 91(1), 91(2) (b), (c), 91(4) (a) and Section 94(l)(b)(i) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, Cap 366 R.E. 2019, Section 51 of the Labour Institutions Act, Cap 300 R.E. 2019and Rule 24(1), 24(2)(a),(b)(c)(d)(e ) (f) and 24(3) and Rule 28 (l)(c), (d) and (e) and 28(2) of the High Court Labour Rules, GN No. 106 of 2007. 1 | Page In the notice of application, the applicant prays that: (a) this Honourable Court be pleased to call for records, revise and set aside the whole Ruling of the CMA on Labour Dispute No. CMA/ DOM/DOM/10/2023 by Hon J.R. Katto, Arbitrator issued on 14th September 2023 on the reasons and grounds set forth in the affidavit in support of the application and on further grounds which may be adduced on the hearing date; and (b) this honourable court be pleased to determine the dispute in the manner it considers appropriate; and (c) that this Honourable court give any other relief it deem fit and just to grant. On 9th April 2024, the parties appeared before me for oral submission of the application. The applicant appeared in person fending for himself while the respondent enjoyed the legal services of Heri Emmanuel, learned advocate. The applicant argued that this application originates from a Labour Dispute CMA/DOM/DOM/10/2023 before the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration where the applicant was seeking an extension of time i.e. condonation so that he could be able to file a Labour dispute against the respondent, his former employer, on basis of unfair termination. The applicant submitted that he has filed this revision application against the decision of J.R. KATTO, Arbitrator for this Court to satisfy itself on legality, procedural irregularities, and propriety of the proceedings before the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA). The major 2 | Page reasons for questioning the legality of the ruling are based on existing irregularities as follows: First, the Arbitrator erred to decide that the applicant had no reasons for condonation. It was his version that he had informed the CMA that failure to act timely resulted from applicant's sickness. The applicant avers that he informed CMA that from 1st April 2023 to 2nd May 2023, the applicant was negotiating with the respondent and on 29/05/2023 the applicant wrote a letter to the respondent to grant the applicant's entitlements after termination of my employment contract. It was admitted that though the letter does not answer the issue that CMA asked the applicant about his absence from 1st April 2023. He reiterated to have been in negotiation with the respondent from the date of termination to 29/05/2023. The applicant recounted that time from 31/03/2023 to 28/4/2023 should not be delay as that was within the time he was rightfully entitled to file the application as of right. According to the applicant, from 29th to 30th April 2023, it was weekend while the 1st May 2023 was a public holiday thus those days ought to have been excluded. Regarding the second ground on the error of the Arbitrator in law and fact, it was submitted that solid reasons to fail to institute Labour Dispute existed namely waiting for the employer to respond to the letter dated 29/05/2023. He argued that in the circumstances the arbitrator failed to use his discretionary powers judiciously as there was a good reason for the delays to file the labour dispute. 3| Page On the third ground, it was submitted that the applicant had informed the CMA that he was sick as an Outpatient (OPD) thus his health was not stable to be able to institute the proceedings. Indeed, according to the applicant, this was a good ground to fail to institute labour dispute thus fit for condonation. On the fourth ground, it was submitted that the application for condonation was backed up with solid and sufficient grounds. The reason of sickness and that of response from employer were beyond the applicants control. Regarding the fifth ground, it was submitted that arbitrator's decision was marred with technicalities without considering substantive justice. This is despite all the grounds revealing good cause that applicant had stated and submitted before the CMA. On 6th and last ground, it was submitted that the decision of the Arbitrator was not in accordance with the law governing the matter, thus causing injustice as the decision was illegal, and irrational. The applicant argues that he was not heard on the mention date. The applicant reiterated that the act of the respondent to terminate his employment affected applicant's life completely. It is applicant's prayer that this application be granted. The respondent cannot suffer irreparable loss as the applicant is suffering. It was applicant's prayer for this Court to revise the decision of the CMA. 4 | Page Mr. Heri Emmanuel learned advocate took up the matter to counter the arguments on behalf of the respondent. He adopted the contents of the counter affidavit of Revocatus Kiteka, the principal officer of the respondent as the basis of the response. The respondent submitted that Paragraph 5 of the Counter affidavit, reveals that that this application has no merits as the grounds have nothing significant to warrant the Court's interference with the decision of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration. Regarding the existence of sufficient cause to warrant extension i.e. condonation, it was submitted that there was no sufficient cause to allow the applicant to be granted condonation. The main reason was that CMA Form No 2 (CMA F2) application for condonation indicated to be hospitalization. However, nothing was tendered at the CMA to substantiate existence of sickness. The only document the applicant tendered was a Letter showing that he was attended an Outpatient. It was argued that the sickness was not proved to have prevented the applicant to fail to take initiatives to institute the Labour dispute before the CMA timely. The applicant failed to demonstrate that he was uncapable of acting as he was not hospitalized as alleged in the condonation form. On the second ground that there were ongoing negotiations, it was submitted that there were no negotiations at all after the termination of the applicant's employment. At CMA, the applicant had not stated and 5| Page explained about existence of negotiation aspect between the applicant and respondent that would have prevented the applicant from acting timeously to challenge the action of the respondent to terminate the employment. It was argued that this aspect is raised at this stage. It is a new thing. Regarding failure to respond to the applicant's letter dated 29/05/2023, it was submitted that judicial bodies are always open and do accept the initiated proceedings even where there is no response timely from employers. The respondent argued that nonresponse is not at any rate a good ground because it does not demonstrate that there was anything to estop applicant from accessing the CMA pending the alleged untimely response to his letter. On third ground, it was submitted that accounting for each and every day of delay is a legal requirement and there are no reasons or good cause of generality in nature. There must be records or evidence for the delay for a good cause to be established. The respondent reiterated that on page 5 of the Award of the CMA, the Arbitrator noted inconsistencies between CMA Form No 2 that reckoned 126 days and oral testimony of 98 days. CMA failed to reconcile the applicant's failure to account for each day of delay either for 126 days or 98 days as revealed in analysis in page 6 of the CMA's Award. 6 | Page On the 4th ground, it was submitted that there was no good cause for condonation to be granted. CMA would have granted the condonation if a good cause was demonstrated. On the fifth ground, respondent argued that there were no technicalities. The main issue/ ingredient of the matter was failure to institute a labour dispute timely and the applicant was duty bound to bring sufficient reason to prove the length of delay, reasons for delay and whether the delay was permissible/condonable. There was no proof of all those reasons. According to the respondent, absence of proof is what made the Arbitrator to decide against the applicant for failure to demonstrate sufficient cause. In the last ground, it was submitted that ruling stated categorically law and grounds related to condonation and circumstances where condonation may be granted. On page 5 of the ruling, the arbitrator deliberated on the applicability of the condonation on sickness ground. It is the respondent's prayer that there were no good reasons advanced by the applicant for the condonation thus arbitrator was right to refuse to grant the same. It was the respondent's submission that this application be dismissed for lack of merits without costs. In a brief rejoinder, the applicant reiterated that: First, that from 03/05/2023 to 29/05/2023, the applicant had been attending medical 7| Page treatment. Sickness was a solid ground for the delay. It amounted to a good and sufficient cause to warrant grant of the condonation so applied before the CMA. Second, though there was nothing on record, the applicant did communicate with respondent's leadership from 31/03/2023. The only document tendered is letter dated 29/05/2023 that finalised the negotiations. Third, the applicant stated that he was not aware of timelines for institution of the case and the difference arose out of deduction of 30 days of right to challenge the decision thus the remaining days of delay would have been 96 days. Indeed, there was lucid and adequate explanation at the CMA on this aspect. Having heard the rival submissions from the parties, I have dispassionately perused on the application and supporting affidavit as well as counter affidavit, record of the CMA that are the basis of this revision application and legal framework governing the aspect of condonation to be able to appreciate the validity or otherwise of this application. The first aspect to address is the nature of the labour disputes and timeliness in resolving the disputes. I am aware that time is of essence is all labour related disputes owing to their nature. It goes to the root of the matter in case the same has not been adhered to. The time allowed to institute proceedings of labour nature is covered by the provision of Rule 10(1) and 10(2) of the Labour Institutions (Mediation and Arbitration) Rules GN No. 64 of 2007. The provision requires disputes about unfair termination of employment to be instituted within 30 days of the alleged 8 | Page termination of the employment contract while any other disputes must be filed within 60 days of the occurrence of the dispute. This was the position in Barclays Bank Tanzania Limited vs Phylisiah Hussein Mcheni (Civil Appeal 19 of 2016) [2021] TZCA 202 (17 May 2021), at page 9, it was held that: Back to the case at hand, we shall proceed from the premise that there are time limits for initiating labour matters. Inspired by Rule 10 (1) and (2) of the Labour Institutions (Mediation and Arbitration) Rules, 2007, G.N. No. 64 of 2007, the learned High Court Judge in Dr. Noordin Je/la (supra) set the time limits as 30 days for a matter involving fairness of an employee's termination, and 60 days for any other dispute. It is expected that any person intending to initiate any labour dispute shall adhere to time set in order to exercise such right. Otherwise, such litigant should face surmountable task to convince the CMA that he was prevented by a sufficient cause from acting timely. To have a gist of the pertinent reasons for challenging the ruling of the arbitrator, I found it pertinent to thoroughly peruse the affidavit. The contents of the affidavit are hereby reproduced for easy of reference. 9| Page 1. That, I am applicant in this instant application and I was also the applicant in the Labour Dispute No. CMA/DOM/DOM/10/2023 and now I do in this application hence conversant with the facts am about to depose hereunder. 2. That, I was employed by the respondent and worked as Project Nurse in the project that was known: "Wish2action" from 1st day of June 2021 to 3CP March 2023 when I was terminated on misconduct and dishonesty 3. That I preferred an application or extension of time before the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA) on 4h August 2023. 4. Unfortunately, my application was dismissed for lack of merits because the Arbitrator found that both grounds lacked foundation(merit) which will amount to sufficient reasons for the delay A copy of the said Ruling dated 14* September 2023 is hereby annexed as "A" to form part of this Affidavit. 5. That, the Arbitrator decided in favour of the respondent on the reasoning given in the Ruling. 6. That, being aggrieved by the whole of the Ruling, the applicant hereby seeks revision of the said Ruling on the following grounds:- 10 | P a g e (a) That the honourable arbitrator erred by finding that I failed to establish sufficient cause to warrant grant of extension of time. (b) That the honourable arbitrator erred In fact and In law to dismiss the application for condonation, despite material explanation from my side on the delay That I was not alone responsible for the delay the respondent also contributed for the delay when kept silence to reply to my later requesting for my terminal benefits dated 20* May 2023. Therefore, the learned Arbitrator failed to exercise his powers Judiciously to grant application because waiting for the reply of my terminal benefit from the respondent suffices to accounting for each day of delay (c) That, the arbitrator erred to hold that I failed to account for each day of the delay to file the application while the same was clearly stated In the supporting affidavit that since the day of termination my condition went unfit until on the day of filing the condonation application. Moreover, my lateness was almost 126 days but 30 days were within my right to exercise from the day of termination and thus my lateness was about 98 days. (d) That, the Arbitrator erred in law and in fact when refused to extend time, this is because the application 11 | Page for condonation was raised with sufficient reasons, that, the lateness to file complaint timely was rendered by reasons of beyond human capacity thus sickness. (e) In alternative, the Arbitrator failed to fulfill the demands of justice to dismiss my application for condonation on technically instead of proceeding to decide the matter in merits. (f) That, the arbitrator failed to direct property his mind on the facts, and the law governing the application, Commission consequently arriving to an erroneous, irrational, illogical and ultimately defective ruling occasioning injustice and untold misery to the applicant. 7. That, the respondent's unjustifiable termination of the applicant's employment affected and paralysed the livelihood of the applicant thus it is in the interest ofJustice that the applicant's prayer be granted. 8. That, this affidavit is sworn in support of the prayers sought in the Chamber Summons and Notice of Application. The main reasons for challenging the Ruling are contained in Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit, The main question is whether the applicant managed to sufficiently demonstrate before CMA that sufficient cause existed. According to the applicant two main aspects constituted sufficient 12 | Page cause, namely sickness as he termed it hospitalization in the CMA Application for condonation, and existence of ongoing negotiations between the applicant and the respondent prior to institution of the application for condonation. Failure to act promptly in institution of the labour matters has been subject of determination by the Court of Appeal. In the case of Nyanza Roads Works Limited vs Giovanni Guidon (Civil Appeal 75 of 2020) [2021] TZCA 396 (20 August 2021) (TANZLII), at pages 12-14, the Court of Appeal stated that: Firstly, it is long settled that the court's discretion must be exercised judiciously as opposed to capriciousness on the basis of material placed before it for consideration. While there is no dispute on the respondent's heart complications which would ordinarily constitute good cause, the respondent did not satisfy the CMA that the delay was solely due to sickness. Unfortunately, the learned Judge directed his attention to the respondent's illness in the absence of evidence how was it material to not only the delay but also failure to lodge his application for condonation immediately after the lapse of 30 days. Secondly, white we agree with the learned Judge on the expeditious resolution of disputes, we think that expeditiousness must be subject to the dictates of the law and Justice. We appreciate that in 13 | Page terms of rule 3(1) of the Labour Court Rules, G.N. No. 106 of2007, the High Court exercising Jurisdiction as a Labour Court Is a court of law and equity which ought to have regard to the fact that the duty to act promptly is not a mere technical aspect without any consequences in case of failure by a litigant to exercise his remedy as it were. We have no doubt that had the High Court have regard to the above, it should not have exercised its discretion in the respondent's favour and quashed the decision of the CMA as it did. It is lucid from the decision of the superior court of the land that a party who relies on sickness as a good cause for failure to institute a labour dispute timely he should be able to demonstrate with evidence how that sickness prevented him from instituting the dispute. The Arbitrator in pages 4 and 5 of the Ruling categorically analysed the sickness as a good cause for delay in filing the labour dispute and the CMA was satisfied that applicant failed to substantiate how the sickness prevented him from acting promptly. The delay was for about 126 days from the date when the cause of action arose. Though the applicant has recounted that first 30 days from 30/03/2023 when the employment contract was terminated should not form part of the delay, it is true that he failed to account for all the 96 14 | Page remaining days. As the Condonation Form stated that reason for application for condonation was hospitalization, the applicant was duty bound to produce before the CMA evidence to the effect that alleged sickness had impact of preventing the applicant from acting promptly. That proof would ordinarily include evidence of being hospitalized as an in patient or even Exempt from Duty (ED) to indicate serious of the alleged sickness to prevent him from acting. Without tangible evidence that the applicant was serious ill to the extent that he could not act renders the ground of sickness to lack strengths thus making it weak and unsubstantiated. It is a position of the law in this jurisdiction that every day of delay must be accounted for a sufficient cause to be established. The Court or Tribunal can assess from the accuracy of the applicant's account of each day of delay to conclude that such applicant was not sloppy, nor negligent in taking appropriate action regarding the matter in question. In the case of Ludger Bemad Nyoni vs National Housing Corporation (Civil Application 372 of 2018) [2019] TZCA 154 (6 May 2019)(TANZLII), at page 7, the Court of Appeal restated the need to account for every day of delay. It stated that: It is settled that in an application for enlargement of time, the applicant has to account for every day of the 15 | P a g e A delay Involved and that failure to do so would result In the dismissal of the application. Perhaps, I should add that beyond our borders, the Supreme Court of South Africa stated, in a similar vein, in Ultenhage Transitional Local Council v. South African Revenue Service, 2004 (1) SA 292 that: 'Condonation is not to be had merely for the asking; a full detailed and accurate account of the causes of the delay and its effects must be furnished so as to enable the Court to understand clearly the reasons and to assess the responsibility. "[Emphasis added]. A similar position was taken in the case of Karibu Textiles Mills Limited vs Commissioner General Tanzania Revenue Authority (Civil Reference 21 of 2017) [2021] TZCA 261 (10 June 2021) (TANZLII), at pages 10 &17, where the Court of Appeal reiterated that: We have examined the material on record and given a careful consideration to the written and oral submissions of the learned counsel for the parties on whether good cause was given in terms of Rule 10 of the Rules to warrant the enlargement of time sought. It is settled that extension of time is a matter of discretion on the part of the Court and that such discretion must be exercised judiciously and flexibly with regard to the relevant 16 | P a g e A facts of the particular case. Admittedly, it has not been possible to lay down an invariable definition of good cause so as to guide the exercise of the Court's discretion. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently looked at a number of factors such as the reasons for the delay, the length of the delay, whether the applicant was diligent, the degree ofprejudice to the respondent if time is extended: With respect, we think that despite the phrase “good cause" under Rule 10 of the Rules requiring a lesser degree of proof it is too plain for argument that an applicant for enlargement of time under the aforesaid rule must account for each day of the delay involved so as to allow the Court to determine the degree of the delay involved, the party's diligence in the pursuit of the matter, the soundness of the reason for the delay as well as whether the applicant acted expeditiously. I subscribe to this legal position of supreme court of the land that in exercise of the discretion to grant or otherwise extension of time i.e. condonation, the Court must be afforded all the material evidence that applicant had a sufficient cause that prevented him to act on each day of delay. Doing otherwise would be tantamount to condoning inaction, negligence, or sloppiness of the applicant to act as he wishes. As it was indicated, there was nothing tangible placed before the Arbitrator to 17 | Page validate that the applicant was serious sick thus could not have ably acted in institution of the labour dispute before the Commission. It is my settled view that on account of foregoing analysis, the Arbitrator was quite correct to find out that there was no sufficient material evidence before him based on sickness of the applicant to warrant granting the application for condonation. Thus, the arbitrator was correct and acted within the legal boundaries to refuse granting the application as nothing tangible was placed before him to decide in favour of the applicant. The second aspect of the grounds seems to focus on the contribution of the respondent to fail to respond timely to the letter dated 29/05/2023 and existing negotiations between the parties. This aspect should not detain this Court to determine instant application. Two reasons are pertinent to this view. First, there is no evidence tendered before CMA or in the affidavit supporting this application which shows that existed any negotiations between applicant and respondent after the termination of employment contract of the applicant on 30/03/2023. Absence of such evidence makes the assertion a clear afterthought. Second, negotiations have not been a good cause for not initiating court proceedings unless that was a pre-requisite of the agreement between the parties. Such position on inapplicability of pre-court negotiations to stop time expiration was discussed in the case of M/s. P & O International Ltd vs The Trustees of Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) (Civil Appeal 265 18 | P a g e of 2020) [2021] TZCA 248 (9 June 2021) (TANZLII), at pages 10-11, where the Court of Appeal stated that: It is trite that pre-court action negotiations have never been a ground for stopping the running of time. Our decision in Consolidated Holding Corporation v. Rajani Industries Ltd & Another, Civil Appeal No, 2 of 2003 (unreported) cannot be more relevant in this appeal for the proposition that negotiation do not check the time from running. The Court sought inspiration from a book by J.K Rustomji on the Law of Limitation, 5th edition to the effect that the statute of limitation is not defeated, or its operation retarded by negotiations for a settlement pending between the parties. We draw a similar inspiration from a decision of the High Court at Dar es salaam in Makamba Klgome & Another v. Ubungo Farm Implements Limited & PRSC, Civil Case No. 109 of 2005 (unreported) whereby Kalegeya, J (as he then was) made the following pertinent statement: 'Negotiations or communications between parties since 1998 did not impact on limitation of time. An intending litigant, however honest and genuine, who allows himself to be lured into futile negotiations by a shrewd wrong doer, plunging him beyond the period provided by law within which to mount an action for the actionable wring, does so at his own risk and 19 | P a g e cannot front the situation as defence when it comes to limitation of time. As there is no evidence of existence of any negotiations post termination of the applicant's employment and that even though such negotiations were there could not have act as time-stopper, this aspect of negotiations lacks merits. At this juncture, I concur with the submission made by the respondent that at no point in time had negotiations between parties have acted as a bar for institution of the matter to Court of law or tribunal. That is a correct exposition of the law and I entirely subscribe to it. Thus, failure to respond to the letter dated 29/05/2023 and alleged existence of the negotiations between the parties have no impact in preventing the applicant to act timely to challenge the respondent's action to terminate applicant's employment. The last aspect of grounds raised in this application is that Arbitrator acted on technicality instead of substantive justice by dismissing the application for condonation. It is true that adhering to substantive justice is one of the cornerstones of the administration of justice. Article 107A(2)(e) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, Cap 2 which requires that judiciary to dispense justice without being tied up with technicalities 20 | P a g e provisions which may obstruct dispensation of justice. It is a settled position of the law that not every rule of procedure amounts to technicality. The Court had ably demonstrated the need to adhere to prescribed rules. In the case of Mohamed Enterprises T. Limited vs Masoud Mohamed Nasser (Civil Application 33 of 2012) [2012] TZCA 219 (27 August 2012) (TANZLII), the Court of Appeal stated that: In our considered view, that Articie as weii as the Rule (supra} do not, in an/ way, subjugate the power and intention of reievant provisions of laws and rules of procedure duly enacted. In fact, the latter obtained their validity from the very provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, it is not the intention of the Constitution to command departure from those provisions of Cap 33 or the Rules of this Court in order to advance what may be termed as substantive Justice. If it were the intention of the Constitution to do so, then in our humble opinion, the affected provisions of the law or Rules would have been deleted from our statute books for being ultra vires the Constitution. Which is why Art. 107 A (2) (e) uses the words "technical provisions which may obstruct justice". Those words are carefully crafted in our view, meaning that not all technicalities obstruct Justice. Laws and Rules are intended to promote and guarantee consistency in the dispensation ofjustice in society. 21 | Page They imply fairness to parties who seek justice before the courts of law. It will therefore, be improper and dangerous to the settled tenets of our judicial system to ignore them for the so called "interest of justice" or "substantive justice" Some of those norms and rules are so fundamental to the cause ofjustice that they go to the very roots ofjustice itself. To ignore them therefore will cause greater injustice to the parties. Justice implies fairness to all parties to a case (Emphasis added). It is the settled view of this Court that the provisions prescribing timelines in institution of labour disputes are fundamental in administration of labour justice. Allowing the applicant to institute the matter at his wish without adhering to the prescribed timelines, would be doing injustice. Indeed, the applicant failed to substantiate that there was a sufficient cause for his failure to institute the labour dispute within prescribed time. In Hamis Paschal vs Sisi Kwa Sisi Panel Beating & Enterprises Ltd (Civil Appeal 165 of 2018) [2020] TZCA 1899 (17 December 2020) (TANZLII), at page 13, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania noted that: Relying inter alia on the case of Martin Kumalija & 117 Others v. Iron and Steel Ltd, Civil Application No. 70/18 of 2018 (unreported}, the Court held that the overriding 22 | P a g e objective principle could not be invoked to condone the inaction. In that case, the Court underscored the need to apply the overriding objective principle without offending mandatory provisions of the law. It observed as foiiows:- "Whiie this principle is a vehicle for attaining substantive justice, it will not help a party to circumvent the mandatory rules of the Court." We wish to emphasize that, since in this case, by virtue of the provisions of Rule 84(1) of the Rules, compliance with the requirement of serving a notice of appeal has a timeline, in our considered view, the appeal cannot be salvaged by invocation of the oxygen principle. This is because the question of limitation is synonym with jurisdiction. It is lucid that limitation of time goes to the root of the case thus adhering to the prescribed timelines in institution of labour matters is necessary for administration of justice. Failure to do so without adducing any tangible grounds for exemption/exclusion of the time that had lapsed is not acceptable. The applicant's inability to adduce evidence that he was prevented by a good cause is what made the Arbitrator to rule against the applicant. In the upshot, this application has been preferred without any merits whatsoever. It deserves dismissal for lack of cogent reasons to interfere 23 | P a g e with sound and legally acceptable ruling of the arbitrator. It is therefore clear that Ruling of the arbitrator in Labour Dispute No. CMA/ DOM/DOM/10/2023 reflects the correct disposition of the issues before it. The Ruling had been issued within proper ambits of the law. It is this Court's view that ruling was correct, legally sound, and properly procured after the thorough and full analysis of the available evidence before the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration. This Court finds that there is nothing that may be regarded as legal shortfalls warranting this Court to revise the proceedings or interfere with such ruling of the CMA. I shall uphold the CMA's ruling dated 14th September 2023 for being correct and legally sound decision. The application for revision therefore stands dismissed in its entirety for being destitute of merits. There are no orders as to costs. It is so ordered. DATED at DODOMA this 13th day of May 2024. E.E. LONGOPA JUDGE 13/05/2024. 24 | P a g e 3