SAID HALIFA MAHUNGU VERSUS ABUTWALIB HAMAD KIJUU JUDGMENT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA DODOMA SUB REGISTRY AT DODOMA LAND APPEAL NO. 10888 OF 2024 (Arising from the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Kondoa in Land Application No 07 of 2023 dated 04/04/2024) BETWEEN SAIDI HALIFA MAYINGU…………………………………………………..APPELLANT VERSUS ABTWALIBU HAMADI KIJUU…………………………..……………... RESPONDENT JUDGMENT Date of the last order: 10/09/2024 Date of the Judgment: 24/09/2024 LONGOPA, J.: The appellant and respondent were parties before the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Kondoa whereby the applicant was claiming against the respondent for trespass to 6 acres of land located at Mihembeti Hamlet in Mitati Village in Kondoa District. The source of ownership of land by the respondent was claimed to be gift inter vivos 1|Page from his father in 2016 while the appellant alleged to have bought the land from owners who are said to have been allocated the land by Village Council in 2017. The trial Tribunal entered judgment and decree in favour of the respondent herein with costs. It is that decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Kondoa that made the appellant herein aggrieved thus on 13th May 2024 preferred this appeal on the following grounds of appeal, namely: 1. That, the Honourable Chairman of the District Land and Housing Tribunal erroneously erred in law and fact to hold in favour of the respondent whilst relying on contradictory evidence adduced by respondent's side. 2. That, the Honourable Chairman of the District Land and Housing Tribunal erroneously erred in law and fact for holding in favour of the Respondent whilst failed to proof his claims on balance of probability. 2|Page 3. That, the Honourable chairman of the District Land and Housing Tribunal erred in law and fact to hold in favour of the respondent whilst disregarding the strong evidence adduced by the appellant's side. The appeal came for viva voce hearing on 10th September 2024 whereas the appellant enjoyed the legal services of Mr. Benedict Kalisti, advocate while the respondent had legal services of Hussein Assery, an advocate. Mr. Benedict Kalisti, advocate argued that the appeal has three grounds of appeal arising from Land Application No. 07 of 2023 before the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Kondoa at Kondoa which made its decision on 04/04/2024 that aggrieved the appellant. On the first ground of appeal, it was submitted that evidence of the respondent herein (applicant before Tribunal) was contradictory. The proceedings in pages 15-16 reveals evidence of SM 3 (PW 3) that is contradicting on disputed land. He stated that the land in question was 3|Page given to the respondent. But he was not there when the disposition was made to the respondent. It would appear that PW 3 evidence is hearsay evidence. The Tribunal erred to find out that the PW3 was corroborating other witnesses of the then applicant. The father of the respondent was not called as one of the witnesses for the respondent. For the second ground of appeal, it was submitted that a principle in the case of Hemed Said versus Mohamed Mbilu [1984] TLR 113, the Court observed that where there is failure to call material witness, the adverse inference may be drawn against the party who fails to do so. The applicant/ respondent was required to call his father as a witness or party to the case who would have stated the mode of acquisition of the land in dispute. It is further stated on this 2 nd ground that the respondent did not prove the case to the required standard of balance of probability as per the requirements of section 3(2) and section 110(1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 6 RE. 2022. The respondent was 4|Page required to prove the case by leading the evidence to the Tribunal on the mode of acquisition of the land. The appellant's evidence was that he purchased land in question from one Hamis Athumani and Others in 2022. The sellers were called as witnesses as they testified on the mode of acquisition. On the third ground, the appellant had sufficient evidence to prove that he was a rightful owner of the land in question. The appellant is the one who proved to be the owner of the land in question. In the case of the Lulu Victor Kayombo versus Oceanic Bay and Mchinga Bay Limited, Consolidated Civil Case No 22 of 2022 (TANZLII), the High Court stated that where there are terms of the contract on grant or disposition of land reduced into writing, then oral agreement or evidence cannot be allowed to vary the contents of the agreement. It is submitted that appellant had sufficient evidence than that of the respondent. It is obvious that the District Land and Housing Tribunal was in err to decide that the respondent was the rightful owner of the 5|Page land in question. Thus, it was the appellant’s prayer that this appeal be allowed by quashing the judgment and order of the trial Tribunal with costs. On the other hand, Mr. Hussein Assery, advocate responded by adopting all contents of the reply to the petition of the appeal to form part of this submission in opposition to the appeal. It was the respondent’s submission on the first ground that the respondent who was the applicant before the Tribunal had evidence that lucid and not contradictory as claimed. It was sufficient to warrant the Tribunal to enter decision in favour of the respondent/applicant. The proceedings reveal that the respondent got the land as gift inter vivos from his father in 2016. At page 11, SM 2(PW 2) corroborated that the respondent was given that land inter vivos and that PW 2 was present at the time the land was given as a gift inter vivos. 6|Page Also, SM 3 (PW3) evidence is not contradictory as there is nowhere, he stated about a different the mode of acquisition of land apart from the same being grant/ given a gift inter vivos by the respondent's father. On size of the land, the respondent stated that land was 6 acres and all the witnesses, PW 2 and PW 3 reiterated that the land in dispute is 6 acres that the respondent was given as gift inter vivos by his father. It is the same land in terms of size for all the three witnesses of the respondent. Another important aspect is on boundaries of the land in dispute, at page 7 of the proceedings it is revealed that SM 1 (PW 1) stated the boundaries of the land in question in all the four directions. The same was corroborated vividly by the PW 2 as reflected on page 11 of the proceedings. On the use of land, the evidence of the respondent was to the effect that at all times from 2016 when the land was given to the respondent to year 2022 when trespass occurred the respondent has 7|Page been in use of the land for agricultural activities. This is reflected on pages 6,11 and 13 where the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3 respectively is recorded. Regarding location of the land in question, it was described by all the three witnesses of the respondent. Pages 8,9 and 11 of the proceedings reflected that the location of the land was the same for all the witnesses especially for both PW 1 and PW 2. On the other hand, the appellant had contradictory evidence. There are two main reasons for so observing. The mode of acquisition, the sellers stated that they were six while the appellant as purchaser stated to have purchased the land from five sellers. At pages 19 and 25 of the proceedings, there is mention of different number of sellers. It was the respondent’s prayer that the first ground of appeal lacks merits on account of these submission as there is nothing to indicate any strengths on the appellant's evidence. 8|Page On the 2nd and 3rd grounds argued jointly, it was submitted that section 3(2) and 110(1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 6 R.E. 2022 there is a settled principle that who alleges must prove. The sellers of the land are different in terms of numbers as somewhere they stated to be five while on the other hand it is stated that they were 6. Also, there is evidence from sellers that the said land belonged to eight (8) persons but on page 22 the appellant acknowledged that he is puzzled that only five are the one who sold the land to him despite the same being owned by all the eight persons. Also, the sellers had nothing to state about the boundaries of the land in dispute. There is nothing indicating that any of the seller remained with any portion of land as only six acres are said to have been sold to the appellant. The main an unanswered question is why neither of the sellers as witnesses was able to describe the boundaries of the land remaining and who borders the 6 acres sold to the appellant. 9|Page At page 26, DW 2 stated categorically that he does not know the boundaries of the land sold to the appellant. Further, the source of ownership of the sellers stated that they had nothing to substantiate that they are the owners of the land. Further, the signed sale agreement was not signed by SU 4/DW 4 who stated categorically that he did not sign the Sale Agreement relating to that land. Neither the purchase price was not stated in the alleged Sale Agreement as revealed page 21 of the proceedings. The questions that can simply be asked are that there are contradictory statements whether the land was owned collectively or individually. DW 2 stated that the land was owned collectively while others said that they owned individually. Issues are that if the same was owned collectively why others did not sign the sale agreement. The validity of the sale agreement in absence of some of the owners of the land was questioned. More so if land was owned individually, there were no cogent reasons for failure to have sale agreement for each plot as the 10 | P a g e same were not collectively owned. Also, failure of sale agreement to state the boundaries at all regarding the land sold made the location and validity of sale questionable. The principle in Hemed Said Case [1984] TLR 113 cited to reiterate the position taken by the court stated that the party with heavier evidence is entitled to win the case. It is lucid therefore that decision in favour of the respondent/applicant was arrived at on strengths of the evidence. The respondent prayed that this appeal be dismissed for want of merits. In so doing, the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal be upheld for being correct and legally acceptable decision of the Tribunal. In rejoinder, the counsel for appellant stated that evidence of SM 3 was contradictory compared to that of SM 1 and SM 2. SM 3 had not mentioned the boundaries at all. He said he does not know the boundaries. He ought to have stated about the boundaries. 11 | P a g e Also, regarding the sellers, at pages 26-29 it was stated that the sellers obtained the land from being allocated by the Village Government Authority in 2017 before selling the same to the appellant. But, it is correct that there was none from the Village Government authority called to testify on the mode of acquisition of the sellers of land to the appellant nor they tendered any evidence of documentary nature that they were given the land by village authorities. At page 32, DW 3 stated that each of the sellers was given five acres of land by the village authorities. At page 19, DW 1, the appellant stated to have purchased 3 acres from Hamis, 1½ acres from Kalinga, 1 acre from Athumani Ayub, ¼ acre from Shafii, and ¼ acre from Yassin thus totaling 6 acres. That is all. It was the prayer of the Counsel for the appellant that the appellant’s evidence was strong and sufficient to warrant judgment and decree in his favour. Thus, reiterated the prayers made in submission in chief be granted. Having heard rival submission of the parties, I have dispassionately considered the records of the trial Tribunal including proceedings, 12 | P a g e judgment and decree in light of the grounds of appeal to ascertain the validity of the appeal. The basis of the respondent’s ownership on disputed land is that he obtained the same as gift inter vivos from his father. The evidence of the respondent is to the effect that the land belonged to his father and the family have been using that land since the respondent’s childhood as they assisted their parents to cultivate on that land. It was testified that respondent was given to him by his father in 2016. PW 1 stated about the size of land to be six acres, described all its boundaries and location of the land. It was PW 1 evidence that since 2016, the respondent has been in full occupation and use of the land by cultivating different crops until 2022 when the appellant herein trespassed to that land. This testimony was corroborated PW 2 one Adamu Hussein Kijuu. PW 2 provided categorically the same description of land in terms of size, location and boundaries/ neighbourhood of the disputed land as already described by PW 1. It was PW 2 that he was present when the 13 | P a g e respondent was given that land as gift inter vivos in 2016. PW 3 cemented the evidence by stating that respondent herein has been using that land throughout since 2016 as they are neighbours at their respective farming lands. The main question is whether this evidence of the respondent is contradictory as the first ground of appeal asserts? The answer is in the negative. There is nothing contradictory on the respondent’s evidence on record. The evidence of PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3 tally squarely. First, that respondent was given that land by his father as gift inter vivos in 2016 as per evidence of both PW 1 and PW 2 which is not controverted. Second, that respondent has been in full occupation and use of that land for cultivation since 2016 to the time of trespass in 2022. This is evidence by all three witnesses PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3. Third, that location, size and neighbourhood/ boundaries of the land in dispute were categorically described by PW 1 and PW 2. Both witnesses testified and described these aspects without any iota of contradiction. 14 | P a g e In the case of Victorino Fidelis Masika vs Oliver Fidelis Masika & Another (Civil Appeal No. 246 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 429 (11 June 2024) (TANZLII), at pages 10-11, the Court of Appeal emphasized that gift inter vivos applies to transfer of title between two living individuals. It stated that: After evaluating its contents, we concur with the perspective that the parties involved intended it to be a deed of gift inter vivos, rather than a testamentary instrument. The tribunal's interpretation of Clause 4 of that document, which we previously excerpted, serves as the foundation for this perspective. Furthermore, Clause 3 confirms the same perspective, namely that the donation or grant was to be implemented prior to the donor's or grantor's demise, indicating that it involved a transfer of title between two living individuals. 15 | P a g e Indeed, the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 pointed lucidly that respondent was given the land by his father in 2016 while both donor and donee are still alive thus squarely falling within this principle that gift inter vivos that it must be between two living individuals. For the grant of land vide a gift inter vivos to be valid and uncontroverted, there are few mandatory conditions that must be proved, namely: First, intention to give the land. Second, acceptance of the same by the recipient. Third, the effective occupation of the land by the recipient or donee. These aspects fall within the principle in the case of Hamis Sultan Mwinyigoha vs Zainabu Sultan Mwinyigoha (Civil Appeal No. 447 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 150 (29 February 2024) (TANZLII). At pp. 5-6, the Court stated that: We have therefore underscored in the context of this case that; validity of a gift essentially lies on the intention to give and acts incidental to that intention which may include the physical handing over of the gift. See Micky 16 | P a g e Woodley, Osborn's concise Law Dictionary (supra) at pages 200-201. It is also essential and paramount for the gift to be voluntary on the part of the donor and without any element of consideration on the part of the donee. As per the commentaries contained in Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, P Ramanatha Aiya Concise Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, page 493; love, affection, spiritual benefit and many others may enter into the intention of the donor to give or make a gift. In the law of property therefore, three elements must exist for a gift to be legally valid. One is, as alluded to above, intent to give by the donor, two, delivery of the gift to the recipient, the donee and three, is the acceptance of that gift by the donee. These three elements, by any standard, are exhibited by way of evidence, no more no less. It is to say, in the instant appeal, there must be evidence 17 | P a g e proven on balance of probabilities that the late Sultan Mwinyigoha granted the suit property to the appellant by way of a gift. All the three witnesses of the respondents have categorically demonstrated that all these three aspects exist in the instant appeal with regard to acquisition of disputed land by the respondent. At this juncture, it can safely be concluded that the first ground of appeal lacks merits as the evidence of the respondent is clear, consistent and points to only one direction that respondent acquired the land via gift inter vivos from his father in 2016 and respondent has been in use of such land throughout that time until when dispute arose in 2022. The first ground of appeal is therefore destitute of merits and it is hereby overruled. The 2nd and 3rd grounds can be analysed jointly. To address these two grounds of appeal, I shall be guided by the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in Amos Njile Lili vs Nyanza Cooperative Union 18 | P a g e (1994) Ltd & Others (Civil Appeal No. 126 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 13 (31 January 2024), pages 15-16, where the Court observed that: In our determination of the complaints before us, we shall be guided by the following principles of law. One, is that in civil cases, the burden of proof lies on the person who alleges anything in his favour founded on section 110 of the Evidence Act. Two, is that the burden of proof envisaged above is on the balance of probabilities as stated in various decisions of this Court, including Anthony Masanga v. Penina Mama Mgesi and Another, Civil Appeal No. 118 of 2014 and Hamza Byarumshengo v. Fulgencia Manya and 4 Others, Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2017 (both unreported). Three, under section 10 of the Law of Contract Act, parties are bound by the agreements they freely entered into. The cardinal principle of the law of contract being the sanctity of the contract as expounded in numerous cases 19 | P a g e including Abualy Alibhai Azizi v. Bhatia Brothers Ltd [2000] T.L.R. 288 and Unilever Tanzania Ltd v. Benedict Mkasa t/a Bema Enterprises, Civil Appeal No. 41 of 2009 (unreported). First aspect is on source of ownership to the disputed land by the appellant is Exhibit D 1 which is the sale agreement. The purported sale agreement indicates that the sale agreement was entered into on 28 th August 2022 between the appellant one Said Halifa Mahungu as the Purchaser and the Vendors were five namely Hamis Athumani Huta, Ali Abdilahi Karinga, Yasin Ayub Salimu, Shafi Bakari Kusa, Athumani Ayubu Salimu. It is evident that Exhibit D.1 lacks an important element of the binding agreement. Lawful consideration of the sale agreement is conspicuously lacking. There is nowhere the purchase price which is consideration is stated in the written document purporting to be sale agreement. 20 | P a g e In law an agreement without consideration is void thus null and void. This is per provisions of sections 10 and 25(1) of the Law of Contract which provide in effect that agreement without consideration is void. Simply stated, an agreement without lawful consideration is no contract at all. Indeed, there was no sale agreement between the appellant and the purported vendors in law. The elements of valid contract were analysed in in the case of Amos Njile Lili vs Nyanza Cooperative Union (1994) Ltd & Others (Civil Appeal No. 126 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 13 (31 January 2024), pages 17, the Court of Appeal observed that: To determine this, we are guided by the provision of section 10 of the Law of Contract Act which provides: - "10. All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object; and are not hereby expressly declared to be void: Provided 21 | P a g e that nothing herein contained shall affect any law in force, and not hereby expressly repealed or disapplied, by which any contract is required to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses, or any law relating to the registration of documents.” (Emphasis added). Indeed, section 10 of the Contract Act outlines the fact that free consent of parties competent to contract for a lawful consideration and object are essential components in establishing a valid contract. Further, exhibit D 1 was not signed by some of those who are purported to be sellers. Indeed, it was the evidence of appellant before the Tribunal that some of the sellers did not participate nor signed the sale agreement. For instance, DW 3 lucidly stated he did not sign the sale agreement. Thus, at this stage, it is settled that in law the purported sale agreement which was exhibit D. 1 has no evidential value in eyes of the law for it is void. 22 | P a g e Secondly, in absence of documentary evidence on sale of the land then remaining oral evidence of the appellant must be evaluated to establish if the same suffices for the court to enter judgment and decree in favour of the appellant. I must admit at the outset that the remaining oral evidence on record does not seem to support the appellant’s case. The evidence is so contradictory in nature that makes the same disjointed, inconsistent and lack clarity to warrant entering decision in favour of the appellant. One, it is on record that DW 2 one Hamis Athumani Huta stated that categorically that he does not know the description of the boundaries of the piece of land sold to the appellant thus does not know even neighbours to that land. That is clear on page 26 of the proceedings. This witness is the one who allegedly sold 3 acres of land to the appellant. Half of the whole sold land came from a person who does not know the boundaries of the land sold. Two, all the defence witnesses save for the appellant stated that the sellers were allocated the land by the Village Government. They 23 | P a g e tendered no any documentary evidence to prove that source of land they sold was grant by the village authority in 2017. The sellers also admitted that they have never used the land at any time since alleged allocation in 2017 to 2022 when the dispute arose. They called none from the existing leadership of the village nor any former village leader to prove that they had a good title over the land. It is settled law that none can transfer a title that he does not have in the first place. There was nothing on the appellant’s evidence to establish that there existed a clean title over the disputed land for the sellers to transfer to the appellant. In Abdallah Irunde vs Msunga Mtunda and Another (Misc. Land Appeal 38 of 2019) [2021] TZHC 2488 (5 March 2021), at pages 5- 6, Siyani, J.:-(as then he was) succinctly held that: In this case, it is undisputed that the original owner of the land is Msunga Ntunda who never transferred its ownership to seller. Therefore, even though the land was 24 | P a g e sold in the presence of the village leaders that alone does not make Abeid Msunga the owner of the suit land. Abeid Msunga did not have a good title to pass it over to the appellant. The Appellant took the risk of buying the land from a person who does not own it. This is where the doctrine of caveat emptor applies. Caveat Emptor means "buyer beware." It basically conveys the message that the buyer must protect his or her own interests when making a purchase or transaction. The appellant ought to have obtained all available information before he finalizes the purchases. Failure to do so presupposes that purchased the land from a person who did not own it at his own risk, and he cannot demand for ownership of the land from the real owner. It was his responsibility as the buyer to investigate about the title of the land before he purchased the land. 25 | P a g e Therefore, the buyer purchased the land at his own risk. Ultimately, he bought the land from a person who did not own it, he must take the risks and thus there is nobody else to blame. The buyer must deal with the consequences of his selection. As the sellers had not established the title of the land in question as they failed to prove mode of acquisition, it is law that they had nothing to transfer to the buyer, the appellant herein. Three, contradictions on nature of ownership on the land by witnesses of the appellant. SU 2 (DW 2) stated that total land of 40 acres was granted to 8 persons who owned it commonly/jointly. SM 3(DW 3) stated that each of the 8 persons was allocated 5 acres thus making total of the same 40 acres. The same is evidence of SM 4 (DW 4) that each of the 8 persons was allocated 5 acres separately and not jointly. This evidence of DW 2 is very contradictory to DW 3 and 4 as the former testified that the land is owned as a whole jointly while the latter two witnesses stated that each one has his own five acres. Either of the 26 | P a g e two sets of evidence does not support the Exhibit D.1. Neither of the witnesses for appellant testified as to how each of the five sellers extracted his portion from his five acres in order to get six acres that appellant is said to have purchased. The evidence leaves a lot to be desired as in the purported sale agreement the portion of each of the five/six is stated but at the end the sold land is not bordering any of the sellers’ allegedly remaining land. That alone makes the whole evidence some form of unproved concoction. Further, if the same belong to all of them jointly the manner in which different sizes of the portions of land sold to appellant was arrived at. The answers are not on records. Additionally, none of the appellant’s witness, SU 2(DW 2), SU 3 (DW3) and SU 4 (DW 4) who stated to be peasants had used or cultivated any portion of the land alleged to have been allocated to them between 2017 to 2022 when the current dispute arose. There were no reasons whatsoever adduced to explain the reasons for not using the same in case there existed a grant as some of the witnesses stated to own no any other land. 27 | P a g e From this analysis, it is lucid that appellant’s evidence was so weak to warrant the Tribunal to enter judgment and decree in favour of the appellant. The failure to call material witness is one of the important aspects in determining strengths of the evidence for both parties in respect of proof of the case. It is settled law that failure to call material witness without justification entitles the court to draw adverse inference against the party who fails to bring such witness. In the instant appeal, the ownership of the land in question needed strong evidence to be adduced. Each party as the claims for source of ownership was different for each party it was expected evidence would be adduced to establish the same. In the case of Jackson s/o Hakiel Msuya vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 138 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 430 (11 June 2024) (TANZLII) at page 10, the Court of Appeal observed that: In our recent decision in George Jonas Lesilwa v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 374 of 2020) [2024] 28 | P a g e TZCA 269 (16 April 2024) the definition of "material witness" was also well described as: a witness who can testify about matters having some logical connection with the consequential facts especially if few others, if any, know about these matters, (See Black's Law Dictionary 8th Ed. page 1634). Generally, the information the material witness possesses has a strong probative value and, very few, if any witness, possess the same information. It should be needless to say, at this juncture that, probative value is the probability of evidence to reach its proof purpose of the fact in issue. It is on record that respondent called SM 2 (PW 2) one Adamu Hussein Kijuu who testified that he was present and witnessed the donation of the land in dispute to the respondent by respondent’s father. This was direct evidence in accordance with section 62(1) (a) and (b) that requires oral evidence to be direct from the person who saw or heard. 29 | P a g e The presence of PW 2 watered down the need for the respondent to call his father to court to establish the gift inter vivos. However, on the appellant side, as there was no documentary proof that Village Government had allocated land to sellers who sold it to the appellant, it was pertinent for the appellant’s side to call any of the current or former leaders of the Village government to establish title over land on the part of the sellers which would have in turn transferred to the appellant. Without such evidence, it is was pertinent that oral evidence from a person who had participated in allocating the land to the sellers. Taking into consideration the evidence of appellant and that of the respondent, one would be inclined to the direction that evidence on record support finding in favour of the respondent. The respondent had adduced evidence that was more lucid, consistent and strong. This evidence was in line with requirements of sections 3(2) (b) and 110(1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 6 R.E. 2022 that cater for standard of proof and the burden of proof. 30 | P a g e The principle laid down by the Court of Appeal has reiterated in Agatha Mshote vs Edson Emmanuel & Others (Civil Appeal No. 121 of 2019) [2021] TZCA 323 (20 July 2021) (TANZLII), at page 19, is illustrative that: We are aware that it is trite law that he who alleges has a burden of proof in terms of section 110 of the Evidence Act [CAP 6 RE 2002] (the Evidence Act). Thus, in civil cases, the standard of proof is on balance of probabilities which is to the effect that the Court will sustain such evidence which is more credible than the other on a particular fact to be proved. Having analysed the whole evidence found on record of trial Tribunal for Kondoa, it is certain that evidence of the respondent is lucid, consistent and weightier than that of the appellant which is contradictory in nature without any coherence. As the respondent was having weightier evidence than that of the appellant, in law that party was entitled to the decision of the Court. Therefore, I am of the view that 31 | P a g e both 2nd and 3rd grounds of appeal must collapse naturally for being preferred without solid reasons. They are both dismissed. It is my final analysis and finding that the trial Tribunal for Kondoa in Land Application No 7 of 2023 acted properly in accordance with the established jurisprudence in this country relating to proof of cases. I shall therefore uphold the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Kondoa and dismiss this appeal in its entirety for lack of cogent merits with costs. It is so ordered. DATED at DODOMA this 24th day of September 2024. E.E. LONGOPA JUDGE 24/09/2024. 32 | P a g e