samson s s rumende vs chief justice of tanznaia another 2007 tzhc 53 18 july 2007

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM CORAM: S.A. MASSATI. A.F. SHANGWA. T.B. MIHAYO, JJ3 MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL CAUSE NO. 75 OF 2005 SAMSON S.S. RUM ENDE.....................APPLICANT VERSUS 1. CHIEF JUSTICE OF TANZANIA! 2. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL f . .. . RESPONDENTS Date of final Submission - 26/4/2006 Date of Judgment on notice - 18/7/2007 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT SHANGWA, J. This is a petition against the violation of some Basic Rights and Duties which are guaranteed under the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. It has been brought by the Petitioner Samson S.S. Rumende 3 on grounds that he was found guilty of corruption by his disciplinary body. His dismissal was made under Reg. C. 3 (3) (a) of the Police Force Regulations, 1995. On 27.9.2002, he was interviewed by the Council of Legal Education under Rule 2 of the Advocate (Professional Requirements) Regulation of 1963 (G.N.39 of 1963) Advocates Ordinance Cap. 341. He passed the interview. However, the Hon. the Chief Justice (1st Respondent) refused to admit him as advocate on grounds that he was found guilty of corruption by a disciplinary body. The refusal of the Hon. the Chief Justice was communicated to him by the Senior Deputy Registrar of the High Court through a letter with ref. No.H CC/T.40/2/v/22 dated 29.10.2003. Sometimes in 2005, he engaged the services of MS Hekima Advocates and Marando Myele and Co. Advocates who drew and filed this petition on his behalf. This petition was filed 4 on 9.5.2005. In his petition, the petitioner is calling upon this Court to determine the following issues: 1. Whether His Lordship the Chief Justice did violate Articles 22 (1) (2) and 23 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania by refusing to admit the petitioner to the bar without granting him an opportunity to be heard. 2. Whether the provisions of the Advocates Act [Cap 341 R.E 2002] particularly S. 8 (3) in empowering the Chief Justice to admit the petitioner or not, is not violative of the petitioner's constitutional right to work as a profession and right to live as human being as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended). While the Petitioner is compulsorily made not to practice or work by the Hon. the Chief Justice (1st Respondent) under the Advocates Act, [Cap 341 R.E 2002] under S. 8 (3) without option to do so, whether S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap 341 R.E. 2002] which is giving the Hon. the Chief Justice (1st Respondent) the power to refuse to admit the petitioner, is not violative and discriminatory to the petitioner contrary to the Provisions of Article 13 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended). Whether S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap. 341 R.E. 2002] is not violative of Articles 22 (1) (2) and 23 of the Constitution by empowering His Lordship Hon. Chief Justice to refuse to admit the professional to the Bar so as to practice as an Advocate of the High Court and Courts Subordinate thereto. Whether R.C. 3 (3) (a) of the Police Service Regulations the provision(s) which empowers the Inspector General of Police to try/inquire disciplinary authority to try twice before or after the trial in courts of law with competent jurisdiction an accused person is not violative of the petitioner's rights as enshrined in the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended). Whether R.C. 21 (i), (2) of the Police Force and Prison Services Commission Act [Cap 241 R.E. 2002] which empowers the disciplinary authority to proceed to institute a charge against a 7 junior/senior Police Officer already tried by Court of competent jurisdiction is not violative of the petitioner's rights as enshrined in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended). Upon determination of the above mentioned issues, the petitioner is seeking for the following declarations and orders: 1. That S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap 341 R.E. 2002 is violative of, and abolishes the Basic Rights Specified hereinabove in Articles 13, 14, 22 (1) and (2) and 23 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended) and therefore invalid and/or unconstitutional. 8 2. That S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap. 341 R.E. 2002] be struck out of the statute book or in the alternative be suspended until the Parliament corrects the defect. 3. That if the court suspends S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap. 341 R.E. 2002] for being unconstitutional, an order be made that the said defects be corrected within three months and that while awaiting such corrections, the petitioner be regulated by the Hon. Chief Justice (1st Respondent) as if the provision is not existing. 4. All such orders as shall be necessary and appropriate to secure the enjoyment by the petitioner/applicant of the Basic Rights under 10 United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. In support of the above contention, they cited the case of LEE vs SHOWMENS GUILD OF GREAT BRITAIN [1952] 2 QB 329 and the case of AUGUSTINE MASSATU vs MWANZA TEXTILES LTD Civil Case No. 3 of 1986 at Mwanza High Court Registry (unreported). Furthermore, Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Petitioner was not informed that the Hon. the Chief Justice (1st Respondent) was intending to make an adverse decision against him, and that he was surprised to get a letter informing him of the 'ready made decision' by the 1st Respondent refusing him admission. It was further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the 1st Respondent arrived at his decision without according the petitioner the right to be heard in a sense that the petitioner was not called by the 1st Respondent to defend himself against the 11 intended accusation and the subsequent punishment. In addition to that, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the 1st Respondent's act of denying the petitioner the right to be heard has breached Article 13 (b) (a) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. In support of the above submission, counsel for the petitioner cited four cases namely:- 1. JIMMY DAVID NGONYANI VS NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (1994) TLR 28 page 31 2. ATTORNEY GENERAL VS MAALIM KADAU &16 OTHERS (1997) TLR 69 at page 76. 3. GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL VS SPACKMAN (1943) A.C. 627 at page 644. 12 4. PATMAN GARMENTS INDUSTRIES LTD VS TANZANIA MANUFACTURERS LTD. (1981) TLR 303. In reply, the learned State Attorney for the Respondents submitted that the allegation by the petitioner that the 1st Respondent denied him the right to work and the opportunity to be heard has no merit. The learned State Attorney contended that the 1st Respondent did not prohibit the petitioner to work but simply was of the view that the petitioner was unfit to be admitted to the roll of Advocates due to having been found guilty by a disciplinary body of corruption. He said that the 1st Respondent acted reasonably and that the petitioner was given the reason by the 1st Respondent for not admitting him to the roll of Advocates and that therefore, he cannot say, that he was not given a right to be heard. 13 On our part, we are of the view that the petitioner was neither denied the right to work nor was he denied the right to be heard by the 1st Respondent the Hon. the Chief Justice. Before admitting any person who qualifies to be admitted as an Advocate and who has been interviewed successfully by the Council of Legal Education, the Hon. the Chief Justice (1st Respondent) has a discretion to admit or not to admit such person. In the exercise of his discretion, he has to be satisfied that the Applicant is qualified and suitable to be admitted as an Advocate and that he possesses adequate knowledge of the language of the Court and that he is of good character. This is in accordance with S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap 341 R.E. 2002]. In this particular case, we find that the Hon. the Chief Justice was not satisfied that the petitioner is of good character to be admitted as an 14 Advocate. That is why he refused his application for being so admitted. The Hon. the Chief justice was of the view that the petitioner is not suitable to be admitted as an Advocate because he was found guilty by a disciplinary body of corruption. We find that the Hon. the Chief Justice did exercise his discretion judiciously and quite properly when he refused to admit the petitioner as Advocate. In our opinion, when a person applies to the Hon. the Chief Justice to be admitted as an Advocate, the Hon. the Chief Justice is not required to call such person for hearing. He is required only to consider his suitability. We think therefore that as the Hon. the Chief Justice was only required by law to consider the suitability of the petitioner who applied to be admitted as an Advocate, and after looking at his testimonial, he found him to be unsuitable, the petitioner's argument that the Hon. the Chief Justice violated Articles 13 (b) (a), 22 (1) (2) and 23 of the Constitution of the United 15 Republic of Tanzania, 1977 for not affording him an opportunity to be heard before refusing his application is untenable. Thus, the cases cited by Counsel for the petitioner to support their argument that the petitioner was denied a right to be heard by the Hon. the Chief Justice are irrelevant. On issue number two, counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Hon. the Chief Justice's refusal to admit the petitioner as an Advocate breached his constitutional right to work as enshrined in Article 22 (1) of the Constitution. They contended that the right to work goes hand in hand with the right to life and that therefore, the Hon. the Chief Justice's refusal to admit the petitioner as an Advocate violated his right to life as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 16 In reply, the learned State Attorney for the Respondents submitted that the 1st Respondent (the Hon. the Chief Justice) never prohibited the petitioner to work but simply stated that he was unfit to be admitted to the roll of Advocates for having been found guilty by a disciplinary body of corruption. They further submitted that S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap 341 R.E. 2002] which empowers the Hon. the Chief Justices to admit the petitioner or not is not violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights to live as a human being and to work as a profession which are respectively guaranteed under Articles 14 & 22 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic [Cap 2 R.E. 2002]. They contended that the petitioner is unfit to be enrolled as an advocate as he stands guilty of corruption through the findings of the disciplinary authority. 17 For us, we think that S.8 (3) of the Advocates Act [Cap 341 R.E. 2002] which empowers the Hon. the Chief Justice to admit the petitioner or not, is not at all violative of the petitioner's right to work as a profession nor is it violative of his right to life. We think so because the Hon. the Chief Justice's refusal to admit him as an Advocate does not amount to a denial of his constitutional rights to work and live. Although, the Hon. the Chief Justice refused to admit him as an Advocate, he retained his constitutional rights to work and live. He can therefore apply for employment as a lawyer in some other organizations requiring the services of a lawyer. On the third issue, counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Hon. the Chief Justice's (1st Respondent's) act of refusing to admit the petitioner as an Advocate on ground that he was found guilty of corruption by a disciplinary body 18 is discriminatory. They gave two reasons for their submission First, that there are persons such as MPS who may be convicted of an offence but do qualify for posts as MPS after a certain period of time. They referred the Court to Article 67 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. Second, that punishment is reformative and that the petitioner was not given a chance to be reformed. They contended that since the petitioner has not been given an opportunity to reform just like the MPS, then he has been discriminated. In reply to this issue, the learned State Attorney for the Respondents submitted that the Hon. the Chief Justice (1st Respondent) has not violated any constitutional principle and that in his decision to refuse to admit the petitioner as an Advocate he complied with the provisions of S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act [Cap 341 R.E. of 2002]. They contended inter alia that the Legislation governing the election and 19 appointment of MPS is different from the legislation governing the admission of Advocates to the Bar and that one Legislation will not be able to cater for issues meant for other Legislations. In our view, S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap 341 R.E. 2002] which empowers the Hon. the Chief Justice to refuse to admit the petitioner as an Advocate is neither violative of Article 13 (4) of the Constitution of the United Republic which prohibits discrimination in general nor is it discriminatory to the petitioner in particular within the meaning of Article 13 (5) of the same Constitution. Article 13 (4) and (5) of the Constitution provides as follows and we quote: 20 "Article 13 (4)- No person shall be discriminated against by any person or any authority acting under any law or in the discharge of the functions or business of any state office." "Article 13 (5)- For the purposes of this Article the expression " discriminate' means to satisfy the needs, rights or other requirements of different persons on the basis of their nationality, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion or station in life such that certain categories of people are regarded as weak or inferior and are subjected to restrictions or conditions whereas 21 persons of other categories are treated differently or are accorded opportunities or advantage outside the specified conditions or the prescribed necessary qualifications." We have closely examined the provisions of S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act [Cap 341 R.E 2002] but we have not found anything which permits the Hon. the Chief Justice (1st Respondent) to give different opportunities or treatment to persons who want to become Advocates basing on their tribe, place of origin, political opinion, religion or station of life. The provisions of S. 8 (3) of the said Act only require the Hon. the Chief Justice to be satisfied that any person who applies to be admitted as an Advocate irrespective of his tribe, religion, colour, political opinion etc is of good character and has integrity. 22 We would like to mention here that a refusal by the Hon. the Chief Justice to admit the Petitioner as an Advocate is not a punishment to the petitioner which is intended to reform him and is not discrimination against him. We think that had the petitioner been found to be with no bad record of corruption, he would have been admitted as an Advocate. The argument by Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not given a chance to reform has no basis and we think that the example given by Counsel for the petitioner that under Article 67 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, MPs who have been convicted of an offence are given opportunity to reform as they may be elected or appointed as MPs is not relevant. This is because the functions of MPs are different from the functions of Advocates and the nature of their work is different. 23 We understand that under Article 13 of the Constitution, all persons are equal before the Law and have to be treated equally before the law. However, we do not think that lawyers and MPS are treated differently before the Law Contrary to Article 13 of the Constitution. Both of them are treated equally before the law. As we shall soon demonstrate the argument by Counsel for the petitioner that the refusal by the Hon. the Chief Justice to admit the petitioner as an Advocate for having been found guilty of corruption by a disciplinary body is discriminatory to the petitioner vis a vis MPs who after having been convicted of an offence may be elected as MPs has no merit. Similarly, their argument that since MPs who have been convicted of an offence can be elected or appointed as MPs, the refusal by the Hon. the Chief Justice to admit the petitioner who was found guilty of corruption by a disciplinary body is contrary to Article 13 of the Constitution which guarantees 24 equality of all persons before the law has no merit. We say that there is no merit in both arguments because the procedure and the qualifications for one to be admitted as an Advocate cannot be the same with the procedure and qualifications for one be elected or appointed as an MP. Also, Advocates and MPs are not in an equal situation so as to be treated in the like manner while considering their fate. What is of paramount importance here is that under Article 13 of the Constitution, it is required that both of them have to be treated equally before the law and not to be discriminated by the Authorities on grounds of tribe, religion, colour or political opinion etc while they are being considered for their respective positions with persons who are in an equal situation with them. There are certain cases which are different from this one in which the Courts in Tanzania have on different 25 occasions declared certain provisions of some written Laws to be unconstitutional on grounds of different treatment of persons before the law and on grounds of being discriminatory. For instance in the case of JULIUS I.F. NDYANABO vs THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CIVIL- APPEAL NO 64 OF 2001 (unreported), their Lordships the Justices of Appeal held inter- alia that S . l l l (2) & (3) of the Elections Act, 1985 is unconstifiitional for being violative of Article 13 (1) & ft (2) of the Constitution of the United Republic. The reason they gave for so holding is that the said provisions of the Act deny equal access to the High Court because a Private election Petitioner and the Attorney General are not put on an unequal footing on the matter of depositing a sum of money as security for costs in an election petition. 26 In a recent case of the LEGAL & HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE & 3 OTHERS vs ATTORNEY GENERAL - MISC. CIVIL CAUSE NO. 77 OF 2005 (unreported), the Provisions of Section 98 (2) & (3) of the Elections Act, 1985 as amended by the Electoral Law (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act No. 4 of 2000 that were referred to by this court as the 'takrima' provisions were found to be violative of Article 13 (1) & (2 of the Constitution which prohibits discrimination and enactment of discriminatory Laws. So, they were declared unconstitutional. In so declaring, the full bench of this court Kimaro, J. as she then was, Massati, J. and Mihayo, J. said that those provisions discriminated between a high income political candidate who is capable of offering 'takrima'/hospitality to the voters and a low income political candidate who is not capable of doing so. 27 As far as the third issue is concerned, we firmly hold that S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap. 341 R.E 2002] which gives the Hon. the Chief Justice (1st Respondent) the power to refuse to admit the petitioner to the roll of Advocates does not have the effect of violating Article 13 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before the law and it does not have the effect of being discriminatory to the petitioner in any way. We now proceed to the fourth issue which is whether S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap 341 R.E. 2002] is violative of Articles 22 (1) (2) & 23 (1) of the Constitution by empowering the Hon. the Chief Justice (1st Respondent) to refuse to admit the professional to the Bar so as to practice as an Advocate of the High Court and Courts subordinate thereto. 28 On this issue, Counsel for the petitioner adopted the submission made on the 2nd & 3rd issues for stating that S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap 341 R.E of 2002] is violative of Articles 22 (1) (2) and 23 (1) of the Constitution. On top of doing so, they submitted that S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act [Cap 341 R.E. of 2002] is unconstitutional as it does not put the criteria for the Chief Justice to follow when determining the suitability for admission of the petitioners to the Bar. On the other side, the learned State Attorney for the Respondents did not say anything on this issue. All the same, his reply submission to the second issue clearly shows his stand that S.8 (3) of the Advocates Act is not violative of Articles 22 (1) (2) and 23 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic. 29 The forementioned Articles read as follows: "Article 22 (1) Every person has the right to work. (2) Every citizen is entitled to equal opportunity and right on equal terms to hold any office or discharge any function under the State Authority" "Article 23 (1) Every person, without discrimination of any kind, is entitled to remuneration commensurate with his work, and remunerated according to the measure and nature of the work done." As we have already declared while resolving issue number two and three; S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act, [Cap. 30 341 R.E of 2002] is not violative of Articles 22 (1) (2) and 23 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of whose provisions have been quoted above. For avoidance of being repetitive we adopt our reasoning on issue number two and three. We do not agree with counsel for the petitioner's submission that S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act does not put the criteria for the Chief Justice to follow when determining the suitability for admitting the petitioners to the Bar. In fact, it does. Before the Hon. the Chief Justice admits any person as an Advocate, S. 8 (3) of the Advocates Act requires him to be satisfied with the following matters: (1) The applicant's qualifications. (2) The applicant's character. (3) The applicant's knowledge of the language of the Court. 31 We now proceed to the fifth and sixth issues which were submitted on by counsel for the parties together. The fifth issue is whether Regulation C. 3 (3) (a) of the Police Service Regulations, 1995 the provision(s) which empowers the IGP to try/inquire disciplinary authority to try twice before or after the trial in Court(s) of law, court of competent jurisdiction is not violative of the petitioner's rights as enshrined in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended). The sixth issue is whether Regulation 21 (2) of the Police Force and Prison Services Commission Act, [Cap 241 R.E of 2002] which empowers the Police disciplinary authority to proceed to institute a charge against Junior/Senior Police Officer already tried by Court of competent jurisdiction is not violative of the petitioner's rights as enshrined in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended). 32 Counsel for the petitioner submitted among other things that Regulation C. 3 (3) (a) of the Police Service Regulations, 1995 Contravenes Article 13 (1), (2) and (4) of the Constitution of the United Republic which prohibits discriminatory treatment of persons. With regard to Regulation 21 (2) of the Police Force and Prison Services Commission Act, Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the said Section contravenes Article 12 (2) of the Constitution as it lowers a person's dignity. In addition to that, Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that both Regulations violates the rule or principle of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict or double jeopardy and that both Regulation contravene the rule that Subsidiary Legislation must not override the Principal Legislation in this case the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985. 33 The learned State Attorney for the Respondents replied that the provisions of the Police Force and Prison Services Commission Act, [Cap. 241 of R.E. 2002] and its Regulations are saved by Article 30 (2) of the Constitution of the United Republic and that Economic Crime Case No. 49 of 1995 against the Petitioner was dismissed by the Court of the Resident Magistrate at Kisutu before the evidence of the case could be heard, and that he was not cleared of the charge which was preferred against him hence disciplinary proceedings which found him guilty of the offence of corruption upon which he was dismissed from employment and that the law requires that where a police officer is acquitted from the criminal charge such acquittal is not a bar to a subsequent disciplinary proceedings against him on the same charge. 34 Regulation C. 3 (3) (a) of the Police Service Regulations, 1995 which Counsel for the petitioner says is discriminatory to the petitioner provides as follows: "Regulation C. 3 (3) (a) where the Inspector General is of the opinion that the gravity of any charge which is found to have been proved warrants the infliction of any of the following punishment (a) dismissal; o r . . . (b) ... (c) ... (d) ... he shall not determine the punishment to be inflicted but shall submit to the Principal Secretary a report on the 35 Investigation of the charge together with details of any matters which in his opinion aggravates or alleviates the gravity of the case." Regulation 21 (2) of the Police Force and Prison Services Commission Act, [Cap 241 R.E. 2002] which Counsel for the Petitioner says it lowers a person's dignity provides as follows: "Regulation 21 (2) if a Senior or Junior Police Officer is acquitted of the Criminal charge such acquittal shall not be a bar to disciplinary proceedings against the accused officer on the same charge or on a charge based on the same facts being 36 continued or instituted against the accused officer, and such disciplinary proceedings may be continued or instituted against the officer and such officer may be punished therefore as if no Criminal Proceedings had been instituted against him." First of all, we are of the view that Reg. C.3 (3) (a) of the Police Service Regulations, 1995 which empowers the IGP to inquire into the charge against discipline or misconduct of any Police Officer and which directs him to submit a report to the Principal Secretary on the investigation of the charge for the purposes of determining the punishment to be inflicted on the accused officer, does not contravene Article 13 (1) (2) and (4) of the Constitution which prohibits among other things enactment of any law 37 which is directly discriminatory or discriminatory in effect. There is nothing in Regulation C. 3 (3) (a) of the Police Service Regulations, 1995 which requires police officers of the rank mentioned therein to be treated differently on grounds of their tribe, colour or religion when they are charged or upon being charged with any offence against discipline or for misconduct. The said Regulation provides for the same procedure of dealing with any police officer of the same rank who is charged with any offence against discipline or for misconduct. The submission made by counsel for the petitioner that Reg. C. 3 (3) (a) is discriminatory as it covers policemen only and not other employees has no merit because other employees are not policemen and are governed by different Regulations of Service other than the Police Force Service Regulations. Secondly, we are of the view that Regulation 21 (2) of the Police Force and Prison Services Commission Act, [Cap. 38 241 R.E. 2002] does not lower the person's dignity. Therefore, it does not contravene Article 12 (2) of the Constitution. It has to be reckoned that, subjecting a Police Officer or any other employee who has been acquitted of any offence to disciplinary proceedings does not amount to lowering his or her dignity. The reason for this is very simple. A person may be acquitted of an offence without having been tried of the same. This is what happened in this case. The petitioner was acquitted by the court without having been tried. As an accused officer may be acquitted of the offence charged without being tried, common sense would require that in order to safeguard such officer's dignity, disciplinary proceedings have to be conducted in order to find out the truth. If such officer is not found guilty of the offence charged after conducting disciplinary proceedings, his or her dignity would be preserved. If he or she is found guilty, his or her dignity will be lost and he or 39 she may be dismissed from employment by his or her employer as it was done against the petitioner. On our part, we do not think that Regulation C. 3 (3) (a) of the Police Service Regulations, 1995 and Regulation 21 (2) of the Police Force and Prison Services Commission Act, [Cap 241 R.E 2002] violate in any way the rule of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict or the rule against double jeopardy as contended by Counsel for the petitioner at page 14 of their written submissions. The rule of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict is a Criminal Procedure rule that a person who has been charged with an offence and acquitted of the same should not be charged with the same once again and that a person who has been charged and convicted of an offence should not be convicted of the same once again. Similarly, it is a principle of law that a person should not be charged twice with a certain offence and punished twice for 40 the same. In this case, the petitioner's argument that he was convicted three times and sentenced three times is not correct. This did not happen to him. He was charged with corruption in a court of law i.e Kisutu Court of the Resident Magistrate and acquitted without having been tried. Disciplinary proceedings were conducted by his employer i.e Ministry of Home Affairs. He was found guilty of corruption by his Ministry's Disciplinary body and dismissed from employment. When he applied to be admitted to the Bar, the Hon. the Chief Justice (1st Respondent) refused to admit him because of having been found guilty of corruption by his disciplinary body. The Hon. the Chief Justice did not say in his refusal to admit him as an Advocate that he cannot re­ apply for being re-considered for admission as an Advocate sometimes in the future if he undertakes by affidavit that once he is admitted as an Advocate he will never demand bribes from his clients for any purpose at all. 41 We are of the view also that both Regulations mentioned above do not violate the rule that subsidiary Legislation must not override the Principal Legislation. There is no provision in both Regulations which overrides the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 or the Police Force Ordinance. A difference must be made between Criminal Proceedings and disciplinary proceedings. Criminal Proceedings are governed by the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 and disciplinary Proceedings are governed by the Police Service Regulations, 1995. In Criminal Proceedings, once an accused officer is found guilty of an offence charged, by a Court of law, he gets convicted and sentenced to either a fine or imprisonment. But in disciplinary proceedings once a person is found guilty of the offence charged, by a disciplinary body, he may be dismissed from employment or his rank or salary may be reduced by his 42 employer. In this case, the petitioner was dismissed from employment by his employer after being found guilty of corruption by his disciplinary body. For the reasons we have given in this judgment, we hereby dismiss this petition. Taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner was trying to enforce his Constitutional rights we order that each party should bear its own costs. c=r= S.A. MASSATI JUDGE A. SHANGWA JUDGE