ULTIMATE SECURITY AND ANOTH Vs

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA (LABOUR DIVISION) AT DODOMA REVISION APPLICATION NO. 28150 OF 2023 (Arising from the Award of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration in its decision in Labour Dispute No. CMA/DOM/36/2023/09 dated 24/11/2023) ULTIMATE SECURITY TANZANIA LIMITED…….…………………..…1ST APPLICANT GARDAWORLD………………………….……….………………………..…2ND APPLICANT Versus ALINANUSWE GODWIN MWAKALINDILE…..…..…….……………1ST RESPONDENT CHARLES JOHN NKALANGOO….…….………..…..…….……………2ND RESPONDENT EZEKIEL ONESMO MWILAWI………….…………..…….……………3RD RESPONDENT JOHN PETER MNZAJILA………..……….…………..…….……………4TH RESPONDENT JOPHERY JOHNSON MUSHI..………….…………..…….……………5TH RESPONDENT MIKAEL GABRIEL CHAWALA.………….…………..…….……………6TH RESPONDENT BEATRICE MAURUCE KILAMBO……….…………..…….……………7TH RESPONDENT RAINELY ALEX MAPUNDA..…………….…………..…….……………8TH RESPONDENT JOHN MASELE MSABILA………………………..…….…………………9THRESPONDENT JUDGMENT Date of last order: 23rd July, 2024. Date of Ruling: 13th September, 2024. E.E. KAKOLAKI, J. In this revision application the Court is invited by the applicants to revise the Arbitration proceedings and award issued by the Arbitrator against them, before the Commission for Medication and Arbitration (the CMA) in Labour Dispute No. CMA/DOM/36/2023/09 issued on 24/11/2023 by quashing and setting aside the said impugned arbitral award allegedly procured improperly or any other reliefs it deems fit and just to grant. The application is preferred under sections 91(1)(a),(b), 91(2)(a,)(b), 91(4)(a),(b) and 94(1)(b)(i) of the 1 Employment and Labour Relations Act,[Cap. 366 R.E 2019] and Rules 24(1), 24(2)(a),(b),(c),(d),(e) and (f) and 24(3)(a),(b),(c),(d) and 28(1)(a),(b),(c),(d) and (e) of the Labour Court Rules G.N No. 106 of 2007 supported by the affidavit dully sworn by Tatu Elias, a principal officer to the applicants stating the grounds as to why the impugned proceedings and award should be revised and this application be granted. In the said affidavit four grounds have been fronted by them going thus: 1. That, the trial Arbitrator erred in law and fact for holding that the applicant had no valid reason for conducting retrenchment. 2. That, the trial Arbitrator erred in law and fact by failing to evaluate the evidence on record. 3. That, the trial Arbitrator erred in law and fact by holding that the procedure for retrenchment were not followed. 4. That, the trial Arbitrator erred in law and facts for awarding reliefs which were not justified. In opposition the respondents through the appointed representative John Mbingo filed their counter affidavit strenuously contesting the grounds raised by the applicants. Briefly as discerned from the CMA records and the impugned decision, the respondents herein who featured as complainants before the Arbitrator in Labour Dispute No. CMA/DOM/36/2023/09 sued their employers (applicants) 2 for unfair termination from their employment as security guards of different ranks allegedly for unknown reasons as the procedures for retrenchment were not followed, after mediation sessions had failed before the same CMA. Their dissatisfaction came as a result of the retrenchment exercise executed by the applicants in the year 2023, allegedly without following the procedure and violation of payment of all their entitlements. They were thus claiming for payment of 120 months salaries, severance pay, Notice, Leave days accrued, Tshs. 100,000,000/- as general damages, certificate of service, salary arrears from the date of termination of employment to the date of award and any other reliefs in which the Commission would be pleased to grant. The respondents’ claims were vehemently contested by the applicants the result of which the matter went for full trial as the respondents appeared represented by Mr. John Mbingo (private representative) and paraded two witnesses while relying on six (6) exhibits. As for the applicants fended themselves through guidance of Mr. Liberate Msacky principal officer to the 1st applicant by calling in two witnesses and paid reliance on twelve (12) exhibits. For avoidance of doubt and confusion respondents’ employer is the 1st respondent a company running business of provisions of security services among other objectives also using a brand or business name of Gardaworld (the 2nd applicant). It was applicants’ defence that, all necessary legal procedures were following before retrenchment exercised as implement to the respondents as the reasons for such retrenchment were valid hence the 3 respondents had no any genuine claims against them. Do dissolve parties’ dispute the Arbitrator framed three issued going thus: 1. Whether there were justifiable reasons for the applicants to retrenchment the respondents. 2. Whether retrenchment was legally conducted. 3. To what reliefs are the parties entitled to. At the conclusion of hearing the arbitrator was satisfied that, there was no justification by the applicants to retrench the respondents and that, the procedures for retrenchment were not followed as respondents were not sufficiently engaged in consultative meetings before retrenchment exercise and further, that the method used for selection of the employees to be retrenched were not complied with the law as dictated in section 38(1)(c)(i)- (iv) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, [Cap. 366 R.E 2019], hence proceeded award the respondents a total amount of Tshs. 23,976,000/- as compensation for twelve months salaries at the rate of Tshs. 222,000/- per month. It is this decision that seem to have irritated the applicants hence the present application moving the Court to revise the CMA arbitral award as alluded to above and proceed to quash and set it aside allegedly being improperly procured on four grounds as stated in the affidavit of Ms. Tatu Elias in support of the application going thus: 4 1. That, the trial Arbitrator erred in law and fact for holding that the applicant had no valid reason for conducting retrenchment. 2. That, the trial Arbitrator erred in law and fact by failing ot evaluate the evidence on record. 3. That, the trial Arbitrator erred in law and fact by holding that the procedure for retrenchment were not followed. 4. That, the trial Arbitrator erred in law and facts for awarding reliefs which were not justified. When the matter came for hearing both parties appeared represented and were heard viva voce. The applicants hired the services of Mr. Elipidius Philemoni while the respondents enjoying the services of Ms. Neema Ahmed, both learned counsel. In his address to the Court on the merit of the application Mr. Philemon having adopted the affidavit duly sworn by Tatu Elias sought leave of the court to argue jointly the 1st and 2nd grounds for the application on the issue as to whether the Arbitrator was legally justified after evaluating the evidence properly to hold that applicants had no valid reason for conducting retrenchment. In answer to the issue he argued that, in the present matter respondents’ employment was terminated on the reasons of operational requirements as defined under Rule 23(1) of the Employment and Labour Relations (Code of Good Practice) Rules GN No. 42 of 2007, providing that, operational requirement is based on economic, technological, structural or 5 similar needs of the employer. He averred that, rule 23(2)(a) of GN No. 42 of 2007 provides for circumstances that might legitimately form the basis of termination under operational requirement, one of them being economic needs that relates to financial management of the enterprise in which the applicants in this matter were facing at that time as expressed in the 2nd paragraph of page 3 of the award which are also explained at length in exhibit D3 (a Notice of retrenchment). According to him, exhibit D3 is elaborate in the 2nd paragraph that, respondents’ retrenchment was due to applicants’ failure to increase their salary due to lack of financial capacity as its clients were not prepared to accommodate the raised service costs following the Government’s issue of new wage order as testified by DW1, the order that increased minimum wage from Tshs. 150,000 to Tshs. 200,000 something that forced all employees under the applicants to have their wages increased. This fact according to Mr. Philemon’s submission was never contested by the respondents at the CMA nor before this Court as the fact is also noted by them in paragraph 6 of their Counter affidavit in response to paragraph 5 of the applicant’s affidavit. He added that, even PW1 at the CMA appreciated as seen in the 1st paragraph of the CMA award at page 6 that respondents’ salaries (wages) had increased to Tshs. 222,000/. It was his submission that, the trial arbitrator misdirected himself when found that, the applicants ought to prove economic hardship by financial statement without consideration of 6 the circumstances that led her to that situation as it is that legal requirement of wages rate increase that put the applicants under economic hardship. The learned counsel went on arguing that, in combating that financial crisis the applicants opted to increase the service charges and consequently some of the clients dropped some services while others terminating their contracts. The termination of contracts by clients he contended, were not contested during the trial as seen in the 1st paragraph of page 7 of the award when the Arbitrator noted that PW2 stated that no contracts were terminated in Dodoma, meaning in other operational areas of the applicants the same were terminated. Basing on that evidence he argued, the issue of financial crisis was not new to the respondents as also seen in item 5.2.2 and 5.2.4 of exhibit D7. It is from that evidence the learned counsel submitted, there was good or sound reason for the applicants to conduct retrenchment hence the Arbitrator erred to find otherwise. In response to the 1st and 2nd grounds of appeal having adopted the Counter affidavit sword by Mr. John Mbingo (representative) Ms. Ahmed for Respondents referred the court to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the counter affidavit where respondents challenged the assertion by the applicants that, in combating the problem of increased expenditures due to increase of wage rate had to increase bill to their clients that led them into drop of some services. While taking note of economic reasons as one of the grounds for 7 retrenchment as per Rule 23(1) of GN. No. 42 of 2007 it was her submission that, the applicant(s) totally failed to prove that they suffered economic crisis that could lead them to consider retrenching the respondents as the last option. She contended, apart from exhibit D3 relied on by the applicants during hearing of the matter at CMA, the same relied on exhibits D1 and D2, exhibit D1 being the clients’ list before January 2023 and D2 being the list of clients who terminated their contracts after increased service provision charges. It is was her submission that, those were mere list of clients without substantiated proof that the names listed therein were indeed applicant’s clients. Further to that she expounded, there was no proof by contractual agreements to show that, the alleged clients were existing and that after the salaries increment (wages) hence increased operational costs, the list of clients decreased. As to exhibit D3 referred (the notice of retrenchment) by the applicants she submitted, the same does not prove existence of economic hardship rather mere alleged reasons. She emphatically argued that, the fact that there was consultation meeting with the trade union as indicated in exhibit D7 in itself is not a proof that applicants suffered economic crisis as stated in paragraph 8 of the CMA award since it was not discussed in details on how the increased operational costs would have led to termination of applicant clients’ contracts. She therefore held a view and submitted that, the trial arbitrator was justified to rule that there was no reasons for the applicant to retrench the respondents for want of evidence to substantiate her action. 8 Thus it as her submission that, the two grounds are unmerited hence the application is bound to fail. In rejoinder to the two grounds Mr. Philemon while reiterating his submission in chief took the view that, it was a total misdirection by the respondents to submit that exhibits D1 and D2 were used to determine whether applicants were suffering from economic crisis as the financial crisis was caused by the Government’s new wage order based on the fact that, the source of income and clients remained the same while the salary had increased. He therefore maintained and submitted that, the trial arbitrator failed to appreciate what was the source of applicants’ financial crisis as the notice issued to the respondents we aimed at enabling them to be aware of the reasons for their retrenchment. He thus pressed for the application to be allowed. I have closely followed the rival submissions by the parties, examined the adduced evidence on record and consulted the relevant law in a bid to answer the issue as to whether the Arbitrator was legally justified after evaluating the evidence properly to hold that the applicants had no valid reason for conducting retrenchment. Mr. Philemon is of the argument that, he was not justified to so find as respondents’ retrenchment or termination of their employment for operational requirements was based on economic need related to applicants’ hardship in financial management after increase of company’s wage bill following issuance of Government’s Minimum Wage 9 Order of 2022 that increased respondents’ salaries coupled with the clients’ incapacity to accommodate the increased service charges by the company to arrest the situation, the circumstances which are well spelt in rule 23(2) of GN No. 42 of 2007 and elaborated in the Notice of retrenchment exhibit D3. Contrary view is aired by Ms. Ahmed in that, apart from the fact that the Minimum wage Order increased respondents’ salaries, no any other evidence was ever tendered by the applicants proving that they tried to combat the alleged financial hardship, hence the arbitrator was justified to find no valid reason for retrenchment was advanced by them. In this matter as alluded to above there is no dispute that respondents were 1st applicant’s employees as also exhibited in their employment contracts exhibit P1 collectively. It is also uncontroverted fact that, one of the ground for retrenchment is economic hardship of the enterprise as coorectly spelt in rule 23(2) of GN No. 42 of 2007. It is further settled fact as admitted by PW1 Alinanuswe Godwin Mwakalindile and exhibited through exhibit P5 (Notice of retrenchment) that, all respondents were served with the same before the retrenchment exercise took off, the notice which no doubt explained the reasons as to why retrenchment exercise was to be conducted. It is the same notice which the applicants relied on when tendered by DW1 as exhibit D3 to prove to the Commission that parties were aware of the reasons for retrenchment exercise. Parties also are at one that, there was salary increase to all employees including the respondents from Tshs. 150,000/- to Tshs. 10 220,000/- which no doubt escalated applicants running costs as the company. The sub issue here is whether such evidence was sufficient to prove that applicants had valid reasons for conducting retrenchment. The law under section 3(2)(b) of the Evidence Act, [Cap. 6 R.E 2022] provides that a fact is said to be proved in civil matters when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability as the principle always is that, he who alleges must prove and the onus of so proving lies on the person who wants the Court to believe its existence as per the dictates of sections 110(1) and (2) and 112 of the Evidence Act. See also the cases of Abdul Karim Haji Vs. Raymond Nchimbi Alois and Another, Civil Appeal No. 99 of 2004, Paulina Samson Ndawavya Vs. Theresia Thomasi Madaha, Civil Appeal No. 53 of 2017 (CAT-unreported) and Dar es salaam Water and Sewarage Authority Vs. Didas Kameka & Others (Civil Appeal 233 of 2019([2021] TZCA 596(18 October 2021);www.tanzlii.org. In the case of Paulina Samson Ndawavya (supra) on burden of proof and the standard applicable in civil matters the Court of Appeal had the following to say: ’’It is trite law and indeed elementary that he who alleges has a burden of proof as per section 110 of the Evidence act, Cap. 6 [R.E 2002]. It is equally elementary that since the dispute was in civil case, the standard of proof was on a balance of probabilities which simply means that the Court will sustain such evidence which is more credible that the other…’’ 11 In the case of Mathias Erasto Manga Vs. M/S Simon Group (T) Limited, Civil Appeal No. 43 of 2013 (CAT-unreported) on what amounts for balance of probability the Court of Appeal made reference to the case of Re Minor (1996) AC 563 where it was held that: ’’The balance of probability standard means a court is satisfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence the occurrence of the event was more likely than not.’’ From the above principles governing proof of cases in civil matters it is evident that, for this Court to arrive to the conclusion that, applicants had valid reasons to conduct retrenchment the same must be satisfied that indeed there was increase of salary rates by the Government and that, applicants suffered economic hardship which is the base for retrenchment as specified under Rule 23(2) of GN. No. 42 of 2007. It is gathered from the evidence of DW1 that, following minimum salary rates increase by the Government, the charges to clients receiving appellants’ services were increased too but most of them could not accommodate the new charges/bills the result of which some of them dropped the services while others reducing the size or extent of services rendered to them to mitigate the hiked charges. And that, that was the reason for the applicants to opt for retrenchment exercise since operational costs had increased while a number of clients and the service rendered to them decreasing. In support of that version DW1 tendered before the Commission a list of clients before and after the increase of service charges due to raise 12 of operational costs as exhibits D1 and D2 were received without respondents’ objection. This Court takes note that, no evidence came from the respondents to counter the alleged decreased number of clients. The fact that there was salary increase by the applicants to the employees which caused raise of service charges to the clients hence some of them dropped the services while others reducing the size of services rendered to them coupled with the fact that, the respondents were aware of the reasons for retrenchment vide the notices served to them, on balance of probability this Court is satisfied that, applicants evidence is heavier than that of respondents as appellants’ chance of suffering from economic crisis after issue of new Minimum Wages Order was more likely to occur than not. I do not therefore embrace Ms. Ahmed’s proposition that, the applicants ought to have brought more evidence to prove their financial incapability and the way they combated it through their clients as that demand will be going far than the requirement of proof in civil matters which is on the balance of probabilities. With the above findings I am at one with Mr. Philemon that, the arbitrator was in error to hold the applicants had no valid reason to conduct retrenchment, hence the issue in relation to the 1st and 2nd ground is answered in negative. Next for determination is on the 3rd and 4th grounds related to the procedure adopted by the applicants in terminating respondents employment and the award issued to them by the arbitrator, which in the course of argument Mr. Philemon combined them. Submitting in favour of the application Mr. 13 Philemon faulted the Arbitrator’s findings on the procedure adopted to identify the subjects of retrenchment when held that, there was no application of FIFO in selection of employees to be retrenched for want of proof that respondents were the last persons to be employed as that fact was not contested by them before CMA hence trial arbitrator’s own findings. He emphatically argued, the procedure of selection of employees for retrenchment purposes was followed as provided under rule 24(3) of the GN. No. 42 of 2007. Since there was valid reasons for retrenchment he submitted, the relief awarded to the respondents was not properly entered as they were entitled to the reliefs agreed as per the terms of exhibit D3 since at page 6 of the award it is noted they admitted to be paid their entitlements. It is from that background the learned counsel submitted that, the respondents’ act of receiving benefits and entitlements agreed in the meeting without objection, their matter filed before the CMA was an afterthought as they ought to have uemployed section 38(2) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, [Cap. 366 R.E 2019] (the ELRA), before accepting the said entitlements. He therefore prayed the Court to find merit in these two grounds and set aside CMA’s award as the same was wrongly arrived at. Countering applicants’ submission in respect of the 3rd and 4th grounds of appeal Ms. Ahmed argued that, the trial arbitrator was justified to find that the retrenchment procedures were not followed as even by assuming representatives of the trade unions were consulted and attended the 14 consultation meetings it is not shown on record as to where and when did they go back and consult the respondents and other employees. She noted that, exhibit D5 is the invitation letter to TUPSE to hold a meeting with the applicants between Gardaworld and representatives of TUPSE, CHODAWU and TUICO but there is no evidence that after that meeting employees including the respondents were consulted. Further to that she explained, there are some employees who were not members to these trade unions hence no proof of consultation to the respondents. It is from those submission she took a view that, trial arbitrator was justified to find the retrenchment procedures were not followed for want of consultations with the respondents hence prayed the Court to find the two grounds are wanting in merit and dismiss them as what was awarded to the respondents was their entitlements. Having dispassionately considered the conflicting submissions by the parties and revisited the evidence adduced by both parties the issue for determination is whether the procedures for retrenchment as provided under section 38(2) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, [Cap. 366 R.E 2019] were followed. If not whether the respondents were entitled to the award issued to them. While Mr. Philemon is trying to fault the trial arbitrator on his findings related to selection of employees for retrenchment as one of the requirement in the procedures for retrenchment Ms. Ahmed is going further in that, there was also no consultation done to the respondents hence infraction of the law in the procedure to be adopted. In addressing the above raised issued this 15 being the first appellate court there is no dispute that it is clothed with powers to rehear the matter and come up with its own findings as the duty of superior courts is to ensure proper application of the laws by the courts subordinate. See the cases of Marwa Mahende Vs. R [1998] T.L.R. 249, Peters Vs. Sunday Post Ltd. (1958) E.A. 424 and Demaay Daati Vs. R, Criminal Appeal No. 80 of 1994 (CAT-unreported). To start with, the law under section 38(1) of ELRA sets some principles to be followed by any employer who wishes to terminate his/her employees’ employment under operational requirement. The said section 38(1) of the ELRA reads: 38.-(1) In any termination for operational requirements (retrenchment), the employer shall comply with the following principles, that is to say, he shall- (a) give notice of any intention to retrench as soon as it is contemplated; (b) disclose all relevant information on the intended retrenchment for the purpose of proper consultation; (c) consult prior to retrenchment or redundancy on – (i) the reasons for the intended retrenchment; (ii) any measures to avoid or minimize the intended retrenchment; (iii) the method of selection of the employees to be retrenched’ (iv) the timing of the retrenchments; and (v) severance pay in respect of the retrenchments, (d) give the notice, make the disclosure and consult, in terms of this subsection, with- 16 (i) any trade union recognized in terms of section 67; (ii) any registered trade union which members in the workplace not represented by a recognised trade union; (iii) any employees not represented by a recognized or registered trade union. Now to start with the requirement of notice there is no dispute as per evidence of DW1 and PW1 through exhibits D3 and P5 that, the notice to conduct retrenchment exercise dated 16/01/2023 was issued to the employees including the respondents as admitted by PW1 in his testimony and the notice in exhibit D3 issued by Goodluck Charles Lukumay, Director to Gardaworld West Security Limited as per the official stamp appended therein. In other words the said Notice was issued by Gardaworld West Security Limited and not Gardaworld in which DW1 informed the Commission that, it is the brand name for the 1st applicant - Ultimate Security Tanzania. The glaring issue here is whether the said Notice to the respondents was issued by their employer as required by the law under section 38(1)(a) of the ELRA? Without mincing words the answer obviously is no since there is no dispute as also exhibited in exhibit P1 collectively that, all respondents were employed by the 1st applicant. Since the said notice was not issued by the respondents’ employer it cannot be said the principle of the employer issuing the notice of intention to retrench respondents as specified by section 38(1)(a) of the ELRA was complied with and I so hold. 17 Next for determination is the second principle of disclosing all relevant information on the intended retrenchment for the purpose of proper consultation in terms of section 38(1)(b) of the ELRA. Again it is in the findings of this Court after travelling through the evidence adduced before the Commission that, no disclosure of relevant information in the said retrenchment were made by the applicants to the respondents to enable them attend the consultation meeting if any conducted, to fully equip them with necessary information on the reasons for the intended retrenchment, measures to be employed to avoid and minimize the intended retrenchment, selection of employees to be retrenched, timing of the exercise and severance pay to made, for effective consultation when time is due. What is garnered from DW1’s evidence at page 17 of the Commission’s typed proceedings is the fact that the said information was provided to the participants at consultation meeting held on 26/01/2023 while already in the meeting room and not prior to that, hence violation of the second principle. As to the third principle of conducting consultation in terms of section 38(1)(c) of the ELRA on reasons for the intended retrenchment, measures to be employed to avoid and minimize the intended retrenchment, selection of employees to be retrenched, timing of the exercise and severance pay to made had to be offered to the respondents herein, the rationale being to negotiate with the employees on the terms of retrenchment. Again it was DW1’s evidence at pages 6 and 7 of the Commission’s typed proceedings that 18 consultation meeting was conducted on 26/01/2023 and the minutes recorded (exhibit D7) after all the employees and workers trade unions were invited as per exhibits D6 (employees), D4 (CHODAWU), D5 (TUPSE) and TUICO. Again like the Notice of the intention to conduct retrenchment exercise, the invitation to attend the consultation meeting on 26/01/2023 held at the company’s head office – Mikocheni Dar es salaam allegedly extended all employees was issued by Goodluck Charles Lukumay – Director General to Gordaworld West Security Limited as per exhibit D6 who is not the respondents’ employer. The Commission was not notified by any witness be it DW1 or DW2 that, the said director of Gardaworld when issuing the said notice was acting on behalf of the respondent. In view of that glaring fact it cannot be concluded that, respondents were invited to the consultation meeting by their employer before were subjected to retrenchment exercise hence violation of the third principle. What is appearing to have been complied with is the invitation of the trade unions and disclosure to them of them of the reasons for the intended retrenchment, measures to be employed to avoid and minimize the intended retrenchment, selection of employees to be retrenched, timing of the exercise and severance pay to made as exhibited by exhibit D7 (the minutes of the consultation meeting). However, as rightly submitted by Ms. Ahmed the submission which I endorse there is no evidence that, the said trade unions consulted back the employees who were unable to attend and further that, none trade union members or employees were also 19 engaged before the decision to retrench them was entered. This again I find was in violation of section 38(1)(d)(iii) of the ELRA. As the principles provided under section 38(1) of the ELRA were violated save for consultation meeting with trade unions in which no evidence of feedback to their respective members as adduced before the Commission it is the findings of this Court that, the employer (1st applicant) failed to comply with the principles of termination of respondents’ employment on operational requirement (retrenchment). Termination by respondents was therefore unfair substantively and procedurally. In view of the above the issue is answered in affirmative as this Court is runs barren of any reason to fault the trial arbitrator’s findings. With regard to the award of monthly salaries for twelve month each made to the respondents, I find the same was justified for being premised on unfair termination both substantively and procedurally. All said and done, I find the application wanting in merits as the same is hereby ordered dismissed. I order each party to bear own costs given the nature of this matter. It is so ordered. Dated at Dodoma this 13th of September, 2024. E. E. KAKOLAKI JUGDE 13/09/2024. 20 Court: The Judgment has been delivered at Dodoma today on 13th day of September, 2024, in the presence of the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 7th and 8th Respondents in person and Ms. Veradina Matikila, Court clerk and in the absence of the applicant, 3rd,5th, 6th and 9th Respondents. Right of appeal explained. E. E. KAKOLAKI JUGDE 13/09/2024. 21