Chaplin v. Sun Life Assurance
- Citation
- 2000 BCSC 90
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Court
- Supreme Court of British Columbia
- Decision
- 18 January 2000
- Posture
- Civil Application to Set Aside or Vary Interlocutory Order; Leave to Amend Pleadings / Interlocutory Application Pending Appeal and Trial on Admissibility of Similar Fact Evidence
- Language
- English
More details
- Court
- Supreme Court of British Columbia
- Decision
- 18 January 2000
- Posture
- Civil Application to Set Aside or Vary Interlocutory Order; Leave to Amend Pleadings / Interlocutory Application Pending Appeal and Trial on Admissibility of Similar Fact Evidence
- Language
- English
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The application to set aside or vary the July 15, 1999 order is dismissed: there is no basis under Rule 2(2) or Rule 41(24) to disturb the order, the proper remedy is appeal, and issues concerning further amendments and confidentiality/waiver must be addressed by agreement or formal application.
Court disposition
Application dismissed
Orders
- Application to set aside or vary the order dated July 15, 1999 dismissed
- No order made regarding alleged counsel agreement or waiver of confidentiality; parties may agree or bring a formal application
- Costs of this application to be in the cause
02
Material facts
Parties
Dawn Chaplin
Plaintiff Counsel: Lawrence E. PierceSun Life Assurance Company of Canada (doing business as Sun Life Assurance Company)
Defendant Counsel: Vincent R.K. OrchardRoyal Bank of Canada
Defendant03
Procedural history
Posture
Civil Application to Set Aside or Vary Interlocutory Order; Leave to Amend Pleadings / Interlocutory Application Pending Appeal and Trial on Admissibility of Similar Fact Evidence
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the July 15, 1999 order granting leave to amend should be set aside or varied
- 02
Whether an alleged private agreement between counsel can operate to prevent entry of the court order
- 03
Whether Rule 2(2) or Rule 41(24) provide grounds to set aside the order
- 04
Whether confidentiality/waiver issues can be decided on this application rather than by formal application or agreement
- 05
Whether appeal is the appropriate remedy for challenging the order
Party arguments
- Applicant
- Plaintiff sought to set aside or vary the July 15, 1999 order on the basis that opposing counsel wrongfully caused the order to be entered contrary to an alleged agreement between counsel and on grounds under Rule 2(2) or Rule 41(24).
- Respondent
- Defendant submitted the court should not entertain allegations of breach of a private agreement between counsel, the appropriate remedy is appeal of the interlocutory order, and confidentiality/waiver issues and admissibility of similar fact evidence are not properly determined on this application.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Reasons for Judgment (Holmes J.)
Alleged private agreements or undertakings between counsel are not adjudicated by the court in the absence of a formal application
- 02
Reasons for Judgment; Supreme Court Civil Rules (referenced Rule 2(2) and Rule 41(24))
Interlocutory orders are appropriately reviewed by appeal rather than by collateral applications where an appeal is available
- 03
Reasons for Judgment
Leave to further amend pleadings is discretionary and must be sought by formal application when contested
- 04
Reasons for Judgment
Issues of admissibility of similar fact evidence should be determined by evidentiary application or at trial, not by pleading alone
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The application to set aside or vary the July 15, 1999 order is dismissed: there is no basis under Rule 2(2) or Rule 41(24) to disturb the order, the proper remedy is appeal, and issues concerning further amendments and confidentiality/waiver must be addressed by agreement or formal application.
Obiter and limits
- Court will not involve itself in allegations of counsel misconduct or breach of private undertakings absent a proper application
- Counsel should formalize any agreements between themselves or bring the matter before the court by formal application
- Adjournments to await determination of admissibility of similar fact evidence are appropriate to avoid inconsistent decisions
- Costs to follow in the cause
Court disposition
Application dismissed
- Application to set aside or vary the order dated July 15, 1999 dismissed
- No order made regarding alleged counsel agreement or waiver of confidentiality; parties may agree or bring a formal application
- Costs of this application to be in the cause
Source and reliance status
Supreme Court of British Columbia · 18 January 2000
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Supreme Court of British Columbia
Judgment· 18 January 2000
2000 BCSC 90 Citation: Chaplin v. Sun Life et al 2000 BCSC 90 Date: 20000118 Docket No: C961849 Registry: Vancouver
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BETWEEN:
DAWN CHAPLIN
PLAINTIFF AND:
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA
DOING BUSINESS AS SUN LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY AND ROYAL BANK OF CANADA
DEFENDANTS
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HOLMES Counsel for the Plaintiff: Lawrence E. Pierce Counsel for the Defendant, Sun Life Assurance Company: Vincent R.K. Orchard Date and Place of Hearing/Trial: January 6, 2000 Vancouver, B.C. [1] The plaintiff seeks to set aside, vary or amend the order made in this matter July 15, 1999 giving leave to amend the Statement of Claim to raise an issue of proposed similar fact relative to a claim for punitive damages. [2] It is alleged "... counsel for the plaintiff has wrongfully caused the Order to be entered in breach of his agreement with counsel for Sun Life Assurance that the Order would not be entered pending the outcome of this application." [3] The alleged agreement is not one involving the court and I advised counsel I did not intend to become involved in trying allegations of breach of undertaking, misconduct, or sharp practice. [4] I am advised by counsel the Order in issue is the subject of appeal with a hearing date imminent. An appeal is the appropriate method for the review the defendant seeks. [5] Following the ruling of the court in this matter allowing the plaintiff to amend, counsel for the plaintiff amended the Statements of Claim in two other actions against Sun Life Assurance in which he represents claimants and applied for leave to amend the Statement of Claim in a third action. All amendments are essentially identical to the
similar fact issue raised here. [6] Counsel with a view to avoiding inconsistent decisions of the court brought on applications in respect of the amendment in these other three actions before me. Those applications were heard concurrent with this application and now stand adjourned. [See separate explanatory reasons dated January 18, 2000 in Thompson (Vancouver Action C983979), Bongalis (Vancouver Action C991436) and Kriegel (Vancouver Action C974574). [7] Those adjournments were made pending determination of issues regarding the admissibility of the impugned similar fact evidence (as opposed to raising the issue by pleading) in this action which is to commence March 13, 2000. [8] I find no basis on the present application to set aside or vary the order of July 15, 1999 in this matter either on the suggested ground of Rule 2(2) or Rule 41(24). [9] Any issue as to the plaintiff's ability to further amend the Statement of Claim must be dealt with on further application. There was no "overlooked intention" that it was to be an included term of the Order of July 15, 1999. [10] Counsel in the course of this application discussed their apparent agreement in respect of waiver of confidentiality between counsel in the Chaplin, Thompson, Bongalis and Kreiger actions regarding the "similar fact" evidence, and in regard to the production of documents by the plaintiff relating to the
"similar fact" evidence. [11] There is no application before the Court in respect of those matters and I make no order in respect of them. Counsel should either agree to these matters between themselves, and confirm it in conventional fashion, or if necessary, make a formal application. [12] The plaintiff's application to set aside or vary is dismissed. [13] The costs of this application will be in the cause. "R.R. HOLMES J."
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