R. v. D. (S.)
- Citation
- [1992] 2 SCR 161
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Court
- Supreme Court of Canada
- Decision
- 4 June 1992
- Posture
- Criminal Appeal Under the Young Offenders Act to the Supreme Court of Canada / Appeal From the Ontario Court of Appeal; Judgment on Appeal and Remittal to Court of Appeal
- Language
- English
More details
- Court
- Supreme Court of Canada
- Decision
- 4 June 1992
- Posture
- Criminal Appeal Under the Young Offenders Act to the Supreme Court of Canada / Appeal From the Ontario Court of Appeal; Judgment on Appeal and Remittal to Court of Appeal
- Language
- English
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The Morin balancing framework applies to Young Offenders Act proceedings; delay attributable to reasonably pursued transfer-to-adult-court applications is part of inherent time and does not automatically make delay unreasonable — applying these principles the trial judge’s finding that the delay was not unreasonable should not be disturbed.
Court disposition
Appeal allowed; judgment of the Court of Appeal set aside; matter remitted to the Court of Appeal for disposition of remaining issues.
Orders
- Appeal allowed
- Judgment of the Court of Appeal set aside
- Case remitted to the Court of Appeal for disposition of other issues
02
Material facts
Parties
Her Majesty The Queen
Appellant Counsel: C. Jane ArnupStephen D.
Respondent Counsel: Timothy E. BreenPaul C.
Respondent Counsel: Peter J. ConnellyWayne B.
Respondent Counsel: Michelle K. FuerstWayne S.
Respondent Counsel: Michelle K. FuerstWayne H.
Respondent Counsel: Carolyn L. MacDonaldOtis R.
Respondent Counsel: Thomas J. P. CareyAmounts and remedies
- Case Number: 22,563
03
Procedural history
Posture
Criminal Appeal Under the Young Offenders Act to the Supreme Court of Canada / Appeal From the Ontario Court of Appeal; Judgment on Appeal and Remittal to Court of Appeal
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the Morin framework for assessing unreasonable delay applies to proceedings under the Young Offenders Act
- 02
Whether delay caused by applications for transfer to adult court and related appeals is inherently part of the time required under the Young Offenders Act
- 03
Whether the delay in this case amounted to an unreasonable delay requiring a stay of proceedings
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The Crown argued that the Morin framework applies to Young Offenders Act proceedings, that societal interest in prompt disposition is one factor among many, and that time reasonably required for transfer applications to adult court is part of the inherent time of a case and did not render the delay unreasonable here.
- Respondent
- The respondents argued that the delay violated their right to a trial within a reasonable time and that the convictions should be stayed; they challenged inclusion of transfer-application time as inherent and contended the delay was not justified.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 and R. v. D. (S.), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 161
The Morin factors for assessing unreasonable delay apply to Young Offenders Act proceedings.
- 02
R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199; R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771
Societal interest in prompt proceedings is an important factor but is only one element to be balanced with others.
- 03
Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. Y-1; R. v. D. (S.), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 161
Time required for an application for transfer to adult court and related appeals is part of the inherent time requirements of a case under the Young Offenders Act, provided the application is made within a reasonable time and pursued meritoriously and in good faith.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The Morin balancing framework applies to Young Offenders Act proceedings; delay attributable to reasonably pursued transfer-to-adult-court applications is part of inherent time and does not automatically make delay unreasonable — applying these principles the trial judge’s finding that the delay was not unreasonable should not be disturbed.
Obiter and limits
- Societal interest in prompt proceedings against young offenders is merely one factor to be balanced.
- Transfer applications must be made within a reasonable time and pursued in good faith and meritoriously.
- No reason to disturb the trial judge’s factual finding that the transfer application could not reasonably have proceeded faster.
Court disposition
Appeal allowed; judgment of the Court of Appeal set aside; matter remitted to the Court of Appeal for disposition of remaining issues.
- Appeal allowed
- Judgment of the Court of Appeal set aside
- Case remitted to the Court of Appeal for disposition of other issues
Source and reliance status
Supreme Court of Canada · 4 June 1992
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Supreme Court of Canada
Judgment· 4 June 1992
R. v. D. (S.) Collection Supreme Court Judgments Date 1992-06-04 Report [1992] 2 SCR 161 Case number 22563 Judges Lamer, Antonio; L'Heureux-Dubé, Claire; Sopinka, John; Gonthier, Charles Doherty; McLachlin, Beverley; Iacobucci, Frank On appeal from Ontario Subjects Constitutional law Notes SCC Case Information: 22563 Decision Content R. v. D. (S.), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 161 Her Majesty The Queen Appellant v. Stephen D., Paul C., Wayne B., Wayne S., Wayne H. and Otis R. Respondents Indexed as: R. v. D. (S.) File No.: 22563. 1992: June 4. Present: Lamer C.J. and L'Heureux‑Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ. on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario Constitutional law ‑‑ Charter of Rights ‑‑ Trial within a reasonable time ‑‑ Young offenders ‑‑ Societal interest in prompt proceedings against young offenders merely one of factors to be balanced ‑‑ Time required for application for transfer to adult court part of inherent time requirements under Young Offenders Act ‑‑ Transfer application must be made within reasonable time ‑‑ Delay in this case not unreasonable. Cases Cited Applied: R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771; referred to: R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R.
1199. Statutes and Regulations Cited Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. Y‑1 . APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 225, 48 O.A.C. 1, 66 C.C.C. (3d) 173, 6 C.R. (4th) 96, setting aside convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement and entering stays. Appeal allowed. C. Jane Arnup, for the appellant. Timothy E. Breen, for the respondent Stephen D. Peter J. Connelly, for the respondent Paul C. Michelle K. Fuerst, for the respondents Wayne B. and Wayne S. Carolyn L. MacDonald, for the respondent Wayne H. Thomas J. P. Carey, for the respondent Otis R. //Lamer C.J.// The judgment of the Court was delivered orally by Lamer C.J. ‑‑ The Court is ready to hand down judgment. The judgment will be pronounced by Mr. Justice Sopinka. //Sopinka J.// Sopinka J. ‑‑ This appeal as of right raises the issue of the application to proceedings under the Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. Y‑1 , of the principles recently expressed by this Court in R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, released March 26, 1992. While the societal interest recognized in R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, and affirmed in R. v. Morin, requires that account be taken of the fact that charges against young offenders be proceeded with promptly, it is merely one of the factors to be balanced with others in the manner set out in R. v. Morin. Applying those factors, we agree with
the conclusion of the trial judge that the delay complained of was not unreasonable. We agree with the conclusion of Catzman J.A. in the Court of Appeal that the time required for an application for transfer to adult court and appeals relating thereto is part of the inherent time requirements of a case under the Young Offenders Act. The application for transfer must, however, be made within a reasonable time and pursued meritoriously and in good faith. In this case, the trial judge found that the application could not have reasonably proceeded faster. As did Catzman J.A., we see no reason to disturb this finding. The respondents quite properly conceded that the delay from January 12, 1989 to June 5, 1989 was not unreasonable. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Ontario is set aside and the case is remitted to the Court of Appeal for disposition of the other issues. Judgment accordingly. Solicitor for the appellant: The Attorney General for Ontario, Toronto. Solicitors for the respondent Stephen D.: Rosen, Fleming, Toronto. Solicitors for the respondent Paul C.: Danson & Zucker, Toronto. Solicitors for the respondents Wayne B. and Wayne S.: Gold & Fuerst, Toronto. Solicitor for the respondent Wayne H.: Carolyn L. MacDonald, Newmarket. Solicitors for the respondent Otis R.: Carey & Froud, Mississauga.
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