R. v. Howse

2024 BCSC 1204 R. v. Howse

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Howse, 2024 BCSC 1204 Date: 20240531 Docket: 55766-3 Registry: Vernon Rex v. Paige Courtney Howse Before: The Honourable Justice Donegan Oral Reasons for Sentence Counsel for the Crown: M. Cissell Counsel for the Accused: M.J. Swartz C. Paquette Place and Date of Trial/Hearing: Vernon, B.C. May 17, 2024 Place and Date of Judgment: Vernon, B.C. May 31, 2024 [1] These Reasons for Judgment were delivered orally. They have been very slightly edited for publication. Introduction [2] "A mother is without her daughter, a sister without a sister, and a family without a loved one". These words are used to describe the loss and tragic death of Alishia Lemp. They are not my words, they are the words of Paige Howse, the person who took her life, spoken during the course of her allocution. It was Ms. Howse that took that daughter from her mother, that sister from her sister, and that loved one from her family on February 27, 2020. Ms. Howse has accepted responsibility for her crime and is here to be sentenced for the offence of manslaughter. [3] The Crown seeks a sentence of seven to nine years imprisonment, less time served. The defence submits a four‑year sentence is proportionate and, with credit given for time served, a probationary period is available and appropriate. [4] To craft a proportionate sentence in accordance with the

purpose, principles, and objectives the law requires in each unique case is a very difficult task. Although this task is governed by s. 718 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Code] and although the objectives set out in those sections guide the court and are clearly defined, it nonetheless involves, by definition, the exercise of a broad discretion in balancing all of the relevant factors in order to meet the objectives being pursued in sentencing: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para.

1. Fundamental to this task is to ensure the sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Circumstances of the Offence [5] The parties have filed an extensive Agreed Statement of Facts which I will now review and summarize. While there is agreement on many of the facts, it is common ground that there are certain aspects of what occurred before, during, and after the events that led to Ms. Lemp's death that will never be known. Ms. Howse has a limited memory of what occurred. Much of what has been proven to have occurred has been pieced together by investigators through what witnesses saw, heard, and read in messages around the time of the events, through what can be seen on various surveillance video recordings around the time of the events, and examination of the crime scene. [6] Ms. Howse and Ms. Lemp, both what I would consider relatively young Indigenous women, were acquaintances at the time of the offence. They had worked together in the sex trade industry. At the time of the offence, Ms. Howse was living and working out of Room 206 of the Canada Best Value Inn and Suites in Vernon (the "Canada Inn"). She invited Ms. Lemp to stay and work with her. Ms. Lemp accepted the invitation. In Kelowna at the time, Ms. Lemp secured a ride to Vernon from her step-father, Lyle Poulin, on February 25, 2020. She expected to

stay with Ms. Howse for a period of one week. [7] After Mr. Poulin dropped her off in Vernon, Ms. Lemp went to a liquor store and purchased three items, one of which was a 1.5‑litre bottle of wine. This is believed to be the item Ms. Howse used during the late morning or early afternoon of February 27, 2022, to strike Ms. Lemp on more than one occasion and cause her death. After purchasing the alcohol, Ms. Lemp was later seen on the Canada Inn security video recording walking with her suitcases up to the second flight of rooms on an outside staircase to Room 206 on February 25, 2020. [8] The next evening, February 26, Ms. Lemp and Ms. Howse went to the Lake City Casino in Vernon together. They arrived via taxi at 10:19 p.m. They left ,again via taxi, at 11:40 p.m. Neither of them had any visible injuries when they left the casino. During the time they were inside the casino, Ms. Howse consumed a single alcoholic drink and Ms. Lemp consumed several alcoholic drinks. [9] The taxi ride back to the Canada Inn took only four minutes. When the two got out of the taxi, Ms. Howse walked briskly upstairs to Room 206. She appeared to be in an agitated state. Ms. Lemp followed behind, walking unsteadily up the stairs and into Room 206. Ms. Lemp did not leave Room 206 alive. [10] After midnight and in the early morning hours of February 27, 2020, Ms. Lemp and Ms. Howse had an argument that

involved yelling that other guests and residents staying at the Canada Inn could hear. Ms. More, who was staying in the adjacent Room 207, was unable to sleep because of the loud music, banging, and arguing coming from Room 206. Mr. Haworth, who lived in a lower unit in close proximity to Room 206, heard banging and what he described as "sex noises" and banging against the wall that lasted, he thought, about three hours. [11] Whatever caused the arguing, banging, and noises coming from Room 206 in those early morning hours of February 27, it appears that Ms. Lemp was still alive and planning to leave Vernon at 9:51 a.m. It was at this time that Ms. Lemp sent a text message to her step-father to pick her up from Vernon. Mr. Haworth heard banging starting at about 10:00 a.m. that morning, lasting about three hours. He said it sounded like someone hitting a wall. Another guest of the Canada Inn, Mr. Louis, was outside his room having a cigarette and also heard yelling and banging coming from Room 206 that morning. [12] Sometime between the hours of 11:24 a.m. and 12:17 p.m. on February 27, 2020, Ms. Howse struck the left side of Ms. Lemp's head more than once with what is believed to be the 1.5‑litre wine bottle while they were inside Room 206. Her strikes to Ms. Lemp continued, as Ms. Lemp's body elevation changed to the floor level in front of the door inside the room, causing

her death. In other words, Ms. Howse struck Ms. Lemp more than once, including when she was on her way down to the ground and/or on the ground. [13] A later autopsy revealed that Ms. Lemp's death was caused by a blunt‑force trauma to the head caused by multiple lacerations to her scalp and the inside of her mouth on the left side of her head, multiple linear skull fractures, and various hemorrhages to the left side of her brain. She also suffered fractures to her nasal bone and jaw, hemorrhages on the right side of her brain, a broken tooth, multiple bruises on the left side of her face, multiple bruises and abrasions on her arms and wrists, and an injury to her right hand and forearm, an injury to her left wrist, and a possible left‑foot injury. Ms. Lemp was 33 years old when she died. [14] Ms. Lemp had a very high blood alcohol content at the time of her death, later analyzed to be 420 milligrams in 100 millilitres of blood. This blood alcohol level would produce significant intoxication for a normal person, with symptoms of depressed respiration and unconsciousness, but a heavy drinker with more tolerance would experience fewer symptoms. Ms. Lemp struggled with alcoholism. When drinking alcohol, family members described her as having had "her fair share of fights" in the past with other women and that she "could hold her own." [15] Shortly after causing Ms. Lemp's death, Ms.

Howse messaged Mr. Louis and told him something "bad" happened. She also told him that she and her friend "got into a fight" and she did not think she was breathing. Mr. Louis told her to call 9‑1‑1 and Ms. Howse responded by asking if he had any liquor and asked that he come to her room. She did not call 9‑1‑1. [16] Mr. Louis went to Room 206 at 12:16 p.m. that day. Ms. Howse refused to open the door. She spoke to Mr. Louis through the closed door, asking him whether he knew how to do CPR. Mr. Louis told her that he did not. While he stood outside of the room, Mr. Louis could see into the room through the front window and saw a female lying face down on the floor. The Agreed Statement of Facts states that Mr. Louis called 9‑1‑1 about 45 minutes later, but there are no facts before me about whether emergency services attended the scene in response and, if they did, what happened. [17] At some point following Mr. Louis's observation of Ms. Lemp's body through the window, Ms. Howse dragged Ms. Lemp's body from the front of the room into the back of the room, into the bathroom. [18] At 12:34 p.m. that day, Ms. Howse sent Ms. More a text message asking her to come over. Ms. More did not review the message until later. Ms. Howse stayed in the room with Ms. Lemp's body. She did not call 9‑1‑1. She never did. [19] At 2:18 p.m., security video recording shows a person believed to be

Ms. Howse open the door to Room 206 and lift Ms. Lemp's suitcase from the hallway back inside and then close the door. The video recording then shows Ms. Howse leaving the room at 6:39 p.m., wearing tan boots and carrying a small red and black plaid handbag and a black backpack with white sequin spots on it. The next evidence pertaining to the movements of Ms. Howse comes from a 7‑Eleven store security video in Vernon roughly 11 hours later. [20] At 5:37 a.m. on February 28, 2020, Ms. Howse is seen on the 7-Eleven recording purchasing cigarettes. She is carrying the same backpack and handbag and wearing the same boots. At this time, she is visibly injured with two black eyes. She is missing four press‑on burgundy artificial nails. [21] Several minutes later, video from the Canada Inn shows Ms. Howse entering Room 206 through the front window of that room. [22] Ms. Lemp's body was still inside the room. Ms. Howse stayed in the room until 11:34 a.m. She contacted a prior acquaintance by text message looking for a ride. That person picked her up and drove her to the Tim Hortons parking lot in Lake Country where another friend, whom she had also called for a ride, came to pick her up. This friend noticed that Ms. Howse had two black eyes and appeared dishevelled. [23] Meanwhile, Ms. Lemp's step-father had travelled to Vernon to pick up Ms. Lemp. He arrived at the Canada Inn about

30 minutes after Ms. Howse left for the final time on February 28, 2020. Mr. Poulin knocked on the door to Room 206 at 12:10 p.m. Receiving no answer, he left a note on the door for Ms. Lemp or Ms. Howse to call him. [24] At about 4:30 p.m. that day, the manager of the Canada Inn tried to contact Ms. Howse on her cell phone, but received a recorded notice that the phone appeared not to be in service. Three hours later, at approximately 7:30 p.m., motel staff entered Room 206 with a master key. They discovered a trail of blood that led from the front door, across the kitchen, to the bathroom. They followed the trail and located the body of Ms. Lemp on the bathroom floor. They called 9‑1‑1 about 15 minutes later to report their discovery. [25] Police attended the scene shortly before 8:00 p.m. They found the room in a state of disarray ,with evidence of an altercation. Articles were strewn about. They found broken glass, broken computer parts, and articles piled in between the two queen beds in the room. Alcohol containers were strewn around the floor. The television was found face down on one of the beds with a scratched and damaged screen. They found Ms. Lemp's body, which was cold to the touch and visibly injured and discoloured, in the bathroom. Mr. Poulin came back to the Canada Inn a few hours later and identified his step-daughter's body. [26] Bloodstain pattern evidence

was found in many locations inside the room, including on the interior side of the entry door, table, chairs, walls, kitchen, and bathroom. It was also located on the exterior walkway leading east of the room. Subsequent scene examination by forensic identification specialists and a bloodstain pattern analyst revealed a very large number, hundreds upon hundreds, of spatter stains in various locations in the room and on items in the room, as well as various transfer stains, swipe patterns, and flow patterns. All of this is set out in detail at paragraphs 56 to 73 of the Agreed Statement of Facts. [27] Also seized from the floor at the foot of the bed, closest to the hotel room door, were four burgundy artificial nails matching the burgundy artificial nails worn by Ms. Howse. Ms. Howse was seen missing those four nails in the 7-Eleven security video following Ms. Lemp's death, and upon her detention by police on March 1, 2020. [28] Police located Ms. Howse on March 1, 2020. She was in Kelowna. They detained her at that time. They seized items she was carrying and wearing. She had a gold necklace and driver's licence belonging to Ms. Lemp in her possession. On the tan boots she was still wearing, police found droplets of Ms. Lemp's blood. Their tread was consistent with the bloodied impressions found in and around Room 206. [29] Police also photographed the face and hands of Ms.

Howse when she was detained that day. These photographs show bruising under her left eye and the four missing burgundy nails. Circumstances of the Offender [30] In addition to her counsel's submissions, I have information about the circumstances and background of Ms. Howse from several sources: 1. Forensic Psychiatrist, Dr. Nicola Hodelet, prepared a report addressing the offender's mental illness history, risk to re-offend, and treatment needs in the community; 2. Probation Officer, Ranita Kajla, prepared a pre-sentence report; 3. A Gladue report from a report writer identified as Karen. I have scoured the report and cannot see a last name, so I apologize for that. This report was prepared in 2022 for the purposes of Ms. Howse's application for judicial interim release, but it contains a great deal of helpful information about the background of Ms. Howse; 4. Forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Niti Bhatia, prepared a report addressing Ms. Howse's mental health history, how her mental illness may have been affected during her crime and in and around its commission, as well as treatment recommendations; and 5. Forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Barinder Singh, prepared a report in 2023 regarding Ms. Howse's fitness to stand trial. [31] Some of these reports contain expert opinion evidence. No objection has been taken to the admissibility of any of the opinions tendered in these reports. [32] Ms.

Howse is currently 30 years of age. She is Mi'kmaq and is a member of the Miawpukek First Nation, located on the southeast coast of Newfoundland. She has a 12-year-old child who lives with his father in Ontario. She is the middle child of three siblings. Her paternal grandparents attended residential schools in Newfoundland. Like her father and mother, Ms. Howse struggles with substance addictions. Like her mother, she has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. As a child, both of her parents ‑- her father is Indigenous, her mother is not ‑- were in and out of her life. [33] Ms. Howse was about seven or eight years old when her parents separated. From then, she moved a great deal, staying first with her father and grandparents and then her mother. Her mother left the family due to mental health and substance use issues. There is, I find, a likelihood that Ms. Howse was sexually abused as a child as well. Although she expressed to some uncertainty to some report writers, she expressed some certainty in other instances. I find there is a likelihood that she was sexually abused as a child. [34] Ms. Howse stayed in Edmonton from around age 16 until the age of 25, at which point she moved to British Columbia and lived transiently thereafter. She currently has some contact with her mother, who lives in British Columbia, but has limited or sporadic contact with her father and her two

siblings. Her maternal grandmother lives in Victoria and remains a support for her. [35] Ms. Howse had a difficult time in school. She was expelled in grade 8 or 9 for fighting and smoking. She dropped out of school, but later completed her high school education in her early twenties. She obtained her certificate in nursing attendance and worked as a care aide for a few years. Ms. Howse also studied psychology for a time at Athabasca University and worked as a waitress while studying. She later worked as an escort. When and how long she held this employment is difficult to determine, as Ms. Howse initially told Dr. Hodelet that she worked as an escort for less than a year while in college, but also acknowledged that she had been an escort around the time of the offence in 2020, and afterwards. She told Dr. Bhatia that she was working for an escort company in Kelowna for a few months before she met Ms. Lemp. In any event, it is clear from the materials that Ms. Howse has experienced extended periods of instability and homelessness. [36] Ms. Howse has experienced various psychiatric interventions and diagnoses over recent years. She has had periods of psychosis, some of which have been very short lived and in response to stimulant drugs. She has a significant history of substance use disorder dating back to about age 11. At the very least, the disorder has related to the use of

methamphetamine, cocaine, alcohol and cannabis. She has used other illicit substances as well, including ecstasy, crystal methamphetamines, heroin and fentanyl. [37] Dr. Hodelet observes that it has been difficult for various doctors to "tease out" whether Ms. Howse also has an underlying psychotic illness, such as schizophrenia, although she has now recently been diagnosed with this disorder. [38] Ms. Howse has been in and out of custody since her offence. She has also been in and out of hospitals, including for psychiatric holds. She has a very complicated and intertwined history of psychiatric and substance abuse-related symptoms. [39] Dr. Bhatia opines that when Ms. Howse was first detained by police in relation to this matter and interviewed in March 2020, that she was "floridly psychotic". For example, during the March 2, 2020 interview, Ms. Howse told police that someone was putting ideas in her head and that a friend was cloned into an RCMP officer. [40] Ms. Howse's first psychiatric hospitalization occurred in Alberta several months after this offence, in June 2020. She was discharged after two weeks with a diagnosis of "substance‑induced mood disorder; cannot rule out underlying bipolar disorder". Then, in August 2020, she was brought to the Vernon hospital by RCMP after she was found at an arson scene voicing psychotic symptoms and exhibiting violent behaviour. She

was certified under the Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 288 [MHA] at that time, and admitted for four days before she absconded from the psychiatric in‑patient unit and a director's warrant issued. Ms. Howse was found by RCMP in Hope two days later and admitted to hospital again with "schizophrenia and polysubstance abuse". She was discharged with medication. [41] It was not long until Ms. Howse was admitted to hospital again in October 2020, this time in Vernon, for "psychosis, NOS [not otherwise specified], and stimulant use disorder". Ms. Howse was discharged to a homeless shelter with medication, and referred to alcohol and drug services. Several days later, she arrived at the emergency department in Vernon, unable to give her name. [42] Then, from February to August 2021, Ms. Howse presented to a hospital in Surrey over a dozen times and was seen by psychiatry on five occasions. Her diagnoses included "substance‑induced psychosis", with referrals made to community mental health and substance use services. She tested positive for fentanyl and several other illicit substances on multiple drug screens. It was noted that Ms. Howse had a history of substance‑use‑induced psychosis (paranoia, agitation, hallucinations, recounting incidents of sexual assault she would later recant), an unwillingness to engage with addiction services, and a reluctance to take her prescribed

psychiatric medications. This all occurred during that 2021 timeframe. [43] Ms. Howse was arrested in Surrey for the murder of Ms. Lemp on September 24, 2021. She was homeless in the Lower Mainland at the time. Over the course of the next three days, September 24, 25 and 26, Ms. Howse was the subject of a warned custodial interview. [44] In the Agreed Statement of Facts, the parties have agreed that Ms. Howse told police that she was not responsible for the murder of Ms. Lemp and that she saw Ms. Lemp sleeping on the floor of the room on the morning of February 27, 2020. She told police that once Ms. Lemp woke up, they both travelled to Kelowna together with Ms. Lemp's mother, but that she had then broken off communication with Ms. Lemp. She said she remembered the night of February 26, 2020, when she and Ms. Lemp went to the casino. She also expressed certainty that someone had drugged her drink. She could not remember anything further. [45] On the last day of her police interview, Ms. Howse was shown an evidence presentation. She then amended her earlier statement, saying that she remembered Ms. Lemp sleeping by the door, and that she went back and forth, into and out of the room. She said she took Ms. Lemp's identification and necklace to prevent them from being stolen. [46] Dr. Bhatia later reviewed the transcripts of these police interviews. Noting that during the

September 25 interview, Ms. Howse expressed various psychotic delusions, similar in theme to what she had been expressing while in custody for two years, she opined that Ms. Howse was "floridly psychotic" at that time. [47] Ms. Howse was held in custody on this matter from the date of her arrest on September 24, 2021 until she was granted judicial interim release on June 29, 2022. [48] While in custody during this timeframe, Ms. Howse was admitted to the Forensic Psychiatric Hospital ("FPH") from November 19, 2021 to January 11, 2022. While there, she was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder with "atypical features". When she was released from custody on June 29, 2022, she went to VisionQuest, as required by her order. This is an addictions treatment facility. She was there under house arrest. [49] Ms. Howse remained at VisionQuest until she was discharged on December 13, 2022, and subsequently arrested. Ms. Howse was discharged because of an altercation with another resident. [50] While at VisionQuest for those nearly six months, Ms. Howse did quite well. She made significant efforts at rehabilitation, successfully completing several programs, including anger management, life skills, parenting, career pathways, relapse prevention, and first aid. As her counsel notes, her efforts were undermined by the symptoms of her then undiagnosed mental disorder of schizophrenia. She

did not turn her back on her efforts at rehabilitation during that time. [51] Ms. Howse has been in custody since her discharge from VisionQuest in December 2022. She was admitted, while in custody, to the FPH again from March 21, 2023 to March 28, 2023, and then again for the fitness assessment that I have referred to conducted by Dr. Singh in July 2023. [52] Dr. Singh found, based on his review of available records, that Ms. Howse suffers from substance use disorder and has a history of psychotic episodes which were likely influenced by substance use. He recommended that the court find Ms. Howse fit to stand trial. [53] Ms. Howse was admitted to FPH again on December 14, 2023. She was certified under the MHA and was presenting as acutely psychotic with multiple bizarre delusions. Of note, she had been abstinent from illicit substances for several months preceding this admission. Ms. Howse was placed on antipsychotics and antidepressants, and medication for opiate use disorder. She has continued to take these medications. [54] Overall, during the periods of time that Ms. Howse has been in custody since the offence, she has had periods of polite and good behaviour, but many other periods where she displayed bizarre, delusional behaviour as well. What comes through in all of the material is that Ms. Howse has had overt, consistent symptomology throughout her incarceration and

hospitalizations. She has displayed consistent themes in her delusions regarding sexual assaults, people coming in and out of her cell, someone touching her genitalia, being hypnotized, and many other things. She has experienced auditory, visual, and olfactory hallucinations as well. She now seems to be more stable over these last few months, now that she is taking prescribed antipsychotic medication. [55] Despite all of these mental health challenges while in custody, Ms. Howse has nevertheless completed various programs while at ACCW. She has been compliant with her medication regime. [56] Dr. Bhatia interviewed Ms. Howse on January 22, 2024. Regarding the events that led to Ms. Lemp's death, Ms. Howse said that she and Ms. Lemp drank and went to the casino together. She had no recollection of the assault and no memory of what happened between 11:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. She said she had some flashes of memory, of hitting Ms. Lemp, that she was "in and out" and recalled seeing Ms. Lemp on the floor and feeling "very frightened". She recalled the room being completely trashed. She denied being attacked, but recalled that her head was in "excruciating pain". Ms. Howse also told the doctor that after she had left the room, she was driven to the "reserve", where she was attacked by two females and then driven back to Room 206, where she went to sleep while Ms. Lemp's body was still

there. She was unsure if she was using methamphetamine before the victim died, but recalled using it after the fact. Ms. Howse also said that Ms. Lemp was attacked and killed, but she was not sure if she was the one that attacked her or whether it was someone else. [57] Dr. Bhatia noted that Ms. Howse has been diagnosed with a number of disorders (at the point of her interview), including schizoaffective disorder following the offence, substance‑induced psychosis multiple times, underlying cluster B personality traits, stimulant opiate use orders, and doctors have suspected malingering as well. I turn now to Dr. Bhatia's opinions. [58] In relation to non‑substance‑related psychosis, Dr. Bhatia opines that Ms. Howse suffers from schizophrenia and not schizoaffective disorder, as she has been previously diagnosed. Dr. Bhatia notes that schizoaffective disorder is associated with features of a mood disorder, such as depression or mania, but that she found no behaviours consistent with a mood disorder in the collateral information. Dr. Bhatia found Ms. Howse to fulfil all of the diagnostic criteria for a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Specifically, she found that Ms. Howse harbours delusions, experiences hallucinations, has a restricted affect, has experienced a deterioration in her functioning, and that her symptoms were present while sober of illicit substances for an extended

period of time. Dr. Bhatia agrees with another psychiatrist's opinion that Ms. Howse has cluster B personality traits, as evinced by the presence of borderline and antisocial characteristics. She also notes that Ms. Howse has a proclivity towards criminal behaviours, has turbulent relationships, a history of childhood trauma, dysregulated behaviours in the past, and a disregard for safety of self and others. She agrees with others' diagnoses of stimulant and opiate use disorders. [59] Dr. Bhatia offered several other opinions as well. At paragraphs 4 and 5 at page 11, she opines: 4. The use of illicit substances has complicated her clinical presentation and there is a distinct possibility that she was experiencing features of schizophrenic illness in conjunction with substance induced psychosis during the commission of the extant offence. Mostly subjects are more acutely psychotic after very recent ingestion of illicit substance and this to dissipate over a few days. However, this has not been the case with Ms. Howse, and she continued to be psychotic with themes of delusions similar to the ones she continues to experience. It is well known that the psychosis caused by substances [is] more severe when it occurs in the background of a primary nonsubstance related psychotic disorder. Also supporting the diagnosis of schizophrenia is her generic predisposition to the illness. According to collateral information, her mother suffers from schizophrenia.

5. In my opinion, Ms. Howse's presentation has been relatively consistent during prolonged periods of sobriety. She can vary from agitated florid psychosis and still display reasonably fair social behaviour while experiencing delusions. I believe this is not unlikely to be the case of Ms. Howse. She had reported bizarre delusions when I met with her although she was behaving appropriately. I noted that her facial expressions were restricted, and this is difficult to feign. She did not make any attempt to embellish her symptoms. These features are not consistent with malingering. [60] At paragraphs 10 and 11 of page 12, Dr. Bhatia opines about the possibility of Ms. Howse acting in self-defence. She wrote: 10. Pertaining to the day in question, that is when the murder occurred. Both she and the victim were in a casino and were intoxicated with alcohol. Ms. Howse could not recall if she was using illicit substances at the time. But on interviews by the police, she had talked about drugs being given to her by men who were apparently strangers to her. There was a disagreement between the two as the victim, who was staggering due to intoxication with alcohol wanted to stay longer at the casino. On the other hand, Ms. Howse wanted to leave as some men were rude to her. An argument between the two ensued when they were in the hotel room. There was loud screaming and yelling which was

noted by people in the adjacent rooms. Ms. Howse maintains that she had no recall of the fight except for some flashes of seeing the victim with wounds to the head on the floor and feeling frightened. It is uncertain if Ms. Howse acted in self-defense or it was the other way round. It is difficult to give a response with certainty about what exactly transpired during the fight. As per the account of individuals who knew the victim, she would get difficult when drunk. On the other end, Ms. Howse suffers from a psychotic disorder associated with paranoid delusions. There is a possibility that she acted impulsively and in a state of paranoia struck the victim in what she may have perceived as a physical attack on her person. Be that as it may, Ms. Howse too is known to be violent. She herself reported that she had been in several fights.

11. Deducing from the above, it is difficult to surmise whether Ms. Howse acted in self-defense. [61] Regarding her ability to discern the moral wrongfulness of the act, Dr. Bhatia opined at paragraph 12 of page 12: 12. Regarding her ability to discern the moral wrongfulness of the act, there is evidence that Ms. Howse was aware at the time of the offence that she had done something wrong. She had communicated with a guest in the hotel that she was in trouble and had done something bad. Besides, there was no clear evidence of psychosis preceding or during the time material to the commission of the index offence. That said, she had bizarre psychotic delusions during interview with RCMP shortly after the offence on 2 March 2020. The memory gaps that she has referred to are more likely attributable to substance induced intoxication on the background of schizophrenia. Despite of the two psychotic conditions, her exchange with neighbors in the hotel was not consistent with lack of understanding of the moral wrongfulness of her actions. [62] Dr. Bhatia makes recommendations at page 13 regarding managing Ms. Howse's mental health and the treatment that she requires. She wrote: To manage Ms. Howse's mental health, it is imperative that she be maintained on treatment for the psychotic disorder. If she were to be released in the community then option utilizing assertive treatment is

recommended. She also needs to undergo treatment for substance use disorders. For this, I agree with the suggestions made in the report relating to Gladue factors which give a variety of suggestions for Ms. Howse to seek treatment., These include successful completion of residential treatment programs and eventual engagement in community-based programs. Psychotherapy to address childhood trauma is also a key factor that needs to be actively addressed. [63] Dr. Bhatia's interview with Ms. Howse, for the purposes of this assessment, occurred on January 22. [64] Dr. Hodelet also interviewed Ms. Howse for the purposes of the court‑ordered assessment. This interview took place only four days later. [65] Speaking to Dr. Hodelet, Ms. Howse said again that her memory for the time around the offence is partial. To Dr. Hodelet, she recalled striking Ms. Lemp with the weapon on three occasions. She also recalled waking up and freaking out. She also said that she was intoxicated by alcohol prior to the offence, but could not recall using any substances at the time. She could not remember what happened prior to or after she assaulted Ms. Lemp, other than calling and telling someone she had killed the victim, and dragging Ms. Lemp's body to the bathroom. [66] Dr. Hodelet summarizes her opinion about risk at pages 8-9: Ms. Howse has most of the historical factors that do suggest an increased

risk of future violence and very few clinical and risk management items which will help to ameliorate that risk load. The lack of personal support, difficulty accessing substance use counselling, difficulty with borderline personality structure and the requirement for specialist mental health support, will mean that Ms. Howse's risk will be difficult to manage in the community in future. It does not appear that psychosis was a factor in the commission of the index offence. Nevertheless, remaining on antipsychotic medication and preventing relapse of psychotic symptoms will make her management and therefore her risk, more straightforward in the future. High risk situations for Ms. Howse will include a return to sex work, substance use leading to intoxication and homelessness. Disengagement with community supports from mental health or criminal justice or breaching conditions that have been agreed, should be acted upon assertively. Potential victims could include clients or other sex workers. [67] Dr. Hodelet then summarizes her opinions and recommendations at pages 9-10:

OPINION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Ms. Howse has attracted various psychiatric diagnoses over the years. She has undoubtedly had periods of psychosis. It appears that some of these have been very short-lived and in response to stimulant drugs, such as methamphetamines, but it has been difficult to tease out whether Ms. Howse also has an underlying psychotic illness such as schizophrenia. More recently schizophrenia has been diagnosed and appropriate treatment has started. However, her presentation does remain atypical, and it may be that time and close monitoring of symptoms will be required to definitively understand the cause of all her symptoms. Meantime, she should remain on her antipsychotic treatment.

2. Ms. Howse has a significant history of substance use disorder, dating back to her early teens. She is vague about the exact parameters of this, but at the very least, it appears that she has in the past had methamphetamine use disorder, cocaine use disorder, alcohol use disorder and cannabis use disorder. All of these may make psychotic symptoms worse. She also acknowledges opioid use disorder and was receiving the opioid agonist therapy, Suboxone until very recently. Ms. Howse will require ongoing substance use treatment to assist with relapse prevention and to help her build appropriate alternative coping strategies to deal with stress and difficulties in the future.

3. Ms. Howse appears to have a number of "cluster B" personality traits, mainly Borderline personality disorder with some antisocial personality traits. Such personality structures will increase her risk of re-offending but will also increase her risk of destabilization and use of maladaptive coping strategies in the community, such as substance use. It will make it difficult for her to form supportive and positive relationships and it will also likely affect her ability to engage with treatment and service providers. Psychological testing does suggest that her self-reporting can be unreliable and she uses positive impression management in her response style.

4. Ms. Howse will require a complex package of support In whichever setting she finds herself post-sentencing. She will likely require ongoing psychological support to help her develop insight and receive treatment for her personality issues, psychiatric support to help her deal with psychotic symptoms, as and when they emerge, and intensive counselling related to substance use disorder to help prevent relapse. Ms. Howse's risk of violent re-offending in the community is likely to remain moderate to high. Victim Impact [68] Ms. Lemp's mother, Brenda Poulin, also known as Dory, presented a victim impact statement on behalf of the family. As a mother, I cannot imagine anything more difficult than trying to articulate how this crime has impacted you and your family. We all have such respect for you and the courage that it must have taken for you to prepare and present that statement. [69] Dory eloquently expressed their family's profound grief, the trauma they experienced learning of the circumstances of Alishia's death, as well as the anguish, of not being able to provide comfort or protection for Alishia when it was needed. Dory expressed the incredible pain the family feels having to go on without Alishia here with them. [70] This crime was committed not only against Ms. Lemp, but against her whole family. No words will undo the pain, suffering, and heartbreak Alishia's family

has suffered, and will continue to suffer, nor will any sentence the court can impose bring Alishia back. This crime, I am satisfied, has caused not only profound harm to Ms. Lemp, of course, but has caused her family and the community profound harm as well. The Law General Principles of Sentencing [71] The determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise. It involves a careful balancing of a variety of factors in the context of a particular set of circumstances in respect of a very particular offender. This balancing occurs within a legislative framework set out in s. 718 of the Code. [72] Section 718 of the Code sets out the fundamental purpose of sentencing as follows: 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (f) to promote a sense of

responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [73] These objectives are given a sharper focus in s. 718.1, which mandates that a sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. This proportionality principle is fundamental in Canadian law. Thus, whatever weight I may wish to accord the objectives listed in s. 718 of the Code, the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality: R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 [Nasogaluak] at para. 40. [74] In R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, the Court explained the proportionality principle this way: [50] But sentencing must in all circumstances be guided by the cardinal principle of proportionality. The sentence must be severe enough to denounce the offence but must not exceed "what is just and appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the gravity of the offence" (R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 42; see also R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 3, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at para. 37). Proportionality in sentencing is considered to be an essential factor in maintaining public confidence in the fairness and rationality of the criminal justice system. The application of this principle assures the public that the offender deserves the punishment received (Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,

[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at p. 533, per Wilson J., concurring). [51] It follows that "a person cannot be made to suffer a grossly disproportionate punishment simply to send a message to discourage others from offending" (Nur, at para. 45). In a similar vein, Vauclair J.A. aptly stated that [translation] "striving for exemplarity to the detriment of evidence of the merit of rehabilitation objectives is incompatible with the principle of individualization" (Lacelle Belec v. R., 2019 QCCA 711, at para. 30 (CanLII), citing R. v. Paré, 2011 QCCA 2047, at para. 48 (CanLII), per Doyon J.A.). Proportionality has a restraining function, and in this sense serves to guarantee that a sentence is individualized, just and appropriate. [75] Section 718.2 of the Code provides a non-exhaustive list of secondary sentencing principles, including: the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, (subsection (a)); the principles of parity and totality (subsections (b) and (c)); the instruction that an offender should not be deprived of liberty if less‑restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances (subsection (d)); and to consider all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances (subsection (e)): Nasogaluak at para. 40. [76] Regarding the principle of parity found in s. 718.2(b), counsel have relied on a number of authorities, roughly

two dozen or so by my count. I am familiar with many of them and have reviewed them all. While I recognize the importance of the parity principle, I am also careful not to lose sight of the individualized nature of the assessment before me today, an assessment that requires me to weigh the objectives of sentencing in a manner that best reflects the circumstances of this particular case and this particular offender: Nasogaluak at para. 43. [77] Subsection 718.2(d) and (e) emphasize the need for me to exercise restraint in the use of imprisonment. These provisions require that an offender not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions are appropriate in the circumstances, and that all available sanctions other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or the community, should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Indigenous offenders. [78] Given Ms. Howse's Indigenous heritage, s. 718.2(e) of the Code has special importance. Justice Karakatsanis recently discussed this in R. v. Sharma, 2022 SCC 39 at para. 114: [114] The overrepresentation of Indigenous people in Canada's prisons is a present-day product of this country's colonial past. As Indigenous incarceration rates have climbed, and those of Indigenous women have soared, some have compared Canadian

correctional facilities to residential schools (see Truth and Reconciliation Commission, The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, vol. 5, The Legacy (2015), at p. 219). Like residential schools before it, this overincarceration is an ongoing source of intergenerational harm to families and communities. It is a striking sign of the discrimination that Indigenous peoples experience in "all parts of the criminal justice system" (Ewert v. Canada, 2018 SCC 30, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 165, at para. 57). And it remains a poignant obstacle to realizing the constitutional imperative of reconciliation. [79] Parliament took an important step toward addressing the longstanding gross over‑representation of Indigenous Canadians in the prison population when it enacted s. 718.2(e) of the Code in 1996: R. v. Townsend, 2020 BCSC 63 at para. 90. [80] In R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, and then again in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that s. 718.2(e) is remedial and is intended to deal with this continuing crisis, a crisis driven by alienation, poverty, substance use, lower educational attainment, lower rates of employment and prejudice experienced by Indigenous people in Canada: R. v. Kehoe, 2023 BCCA 2 at para. 36. [81] Justice Marchand, now Chief Justice of British Columbia, discussed the principles that animate the application of s. 718.2(e) and how Gladue and Ipeelee transformed the approach to sentencing Indigenous offenders recently in Kehoe: [37] Sentencing judges are to take judicial notice of how Canada's colonial history and post-colonial assimilationist policies have translated into these terrible outcomes: Gladue at para. 83; Ipeelee at para.

60. These systemic and background factors do not excuse or justify criminal conduct. Rather, they provide the necessary context for understanding and evaluating case‑specific information during the sentencing exercise: Ipeelee at para. 83. [38] Systemic and background factors affect the incidence of crime and recidivism for all offenders. However, as the Supreme Court recognized, the circumstances of Indigenous offenders are different from other offenders because many Indigenous people are "victims of systemic and direct discrimination" and "dislocation" and are "substantially affected by poor social and economic conditions": Gladue at para. 68. [39] The over‑representation of Indigenous people in Canada's prison population is tied to broad societal issues. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Gladue and Ipeelee recognized that culturally attuned sentencing for Indigenous offenders has a role to play in addressing this crisis: Gladue at para. 65; Ipeelee at paras. 64-70; R. v. Mero, 2021 BCCA 399 at para. 68. [40] Accordingly, Gladue and Ipeelee transformed the approach to sentencing Indigenous offenders. As with all offenders, a judge sentencing an Indigenous offender must take a holistic approach to imposing a fit sentence that is proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender: Ipeelee at para.

37. However, since the circumstances of Indigenous offenders are "significantly different" from those of non-Indigenous offenders, the judge must pay particular attention to two factors: 1. The unique systemic or background factors that may have played a part in bringing the particular Indigenous offender before the courts; and 2. The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions that may be appropriate for the offender in the circumstances given their particular Indigenous heritage or connection. See Gladue at para. 66; Ipeelee at para. 59. [41 In considering systemic and background factors, the judge must take account of all the surrounding circumstances, including "the unique circumstances of the offender as an aboriginal person," and display sensitivity to and understanding of the "difficulties aboriginal people have faced with both the criminal justice system and society at large": Gladue at para. 81; Ipeelee at paras. 59-60, 75. [42] It is not necessary to establish a direct causal link between systemic and background factors and the offence at issue. How the complex interplay of historical factors impacted a particular Indigenous offender may be difficult or impossible to establish. Nevertheless, the specific systemic or background factors at play are critically important. They may help the court assess the moral blameworthiness of the offender or identify appropriate sentencing objectives: Ipeelee at paras. 81-83; Hamer at para. 98. [43] As for the appropriate sanctions, while restorative sentences may be more appropriate for Indigenous offenders, applying Gladue principles will not necessarily lead to a reduced sentence. There is no automatic heritage-based discount: Gladue at para. 88; Ipeelee at paras. 71, 75; Mero at para.

73. Generally, the more serious or violent the crime, the more likely it will be, as a practical matter, that the terms of imprisonment will be the same for an Indigenous and a non‑Indigenous offender: Gladue at para. 33; R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10 at paras. 42-44; Ipeelee at paras. 84-85; Mero at para. 73. [44] That said, no offence is so serious that it negates the need for a sentencing judge to consider s. 718.2(e) of the Code and Gladue principles: Ipeelee at paras. 84-85. In fact, absent an informed waiver, sentencing judges have a duty to consider s. 718.2(e) and Gladue principles in every case involving an Indigenous offender: Gladue at para.

82. As the Court explained in Ipeelee at para. 87, a failure to do so constitutes an error in principle justifying appellate intervention: [87] The sentencing judge has a statutory duty, imposed by s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, to consider the unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. Failure to apply Gladue in any case involving an Aboriginal offender runs afoul of this statutory obligation. As these reasons have explained, such a failure would also result in a sentence that was not fit and was not consistent with the fundamental principle of proportionality. Therefore, application of the Gladue principles is required in every case involving an Aboriginal offender, including breach of an LTSO, and a failure to do so constitutes an error justifying appellate intervention. [82] In this case, I must also consider that Ms. Howse was living with a substance use disorder and mental illness, now diagnosed as schizophrenia, around the time of the offence. [83] The Court of Appeal provided guidance on these issues in R. v. Badhesa, 2019 BCCA 70, when the Court reduced a manslaughter sentence for Mr. Badhesa from ten to seven years. In that case, the offender had no history of violence, but was living with depression. By all accounts, he was a loving family man, not only in relation to his wife but also his mother. Quite out-of-character, he began a binge alcohol consumption,

leading to anger, culminating with the assault of his wife and the beating death of his mother. His state, therefore, was one of intoxication and living with mental illness. On this issue, the Court wrote:, in part: [40] However, an offender's volitional and decision-making capacity in connection with self-induced intoxication and related violence may stem, at least in part, from mental illness or other cognitive disability. Depending on the circumstances, both the mental illness and related self-induced intoxication may reduce the offender's moral culpability. The criminal law views individuals as autonomous and rational beings and seeks to impose criminal liability solely on those who are responsible for the state they were in when an offence is committed: R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, 2011 SCC 58 at paras. 48, 68. Similar concerns animate the determination of a fit sentence: R. v. Friesen, 2016 MBCA 50 at para.

18. Impaired reasoning, delusional disorders and other compromised mental conditions distinguish those afflicted from ordinary, fully accountable offenders for sentencing purposes: R. v. Ayorech, 2012 ABCA 82 at para.

12. Where an offender is found to be criminally responsible, but suffering from a serious mental illness or disability, a more lenient disposition than would otherwise be called for may well be appropriate to reflect a diminished level of criminal responsibility: R. v. Ramsay, 2012 ABCA 257 at para. 21. [ ] [44] When assessing a fit sentence, the judge should attribute a degree of moral culpability to the offender commensurate with the magnitude of the mental illness and its overall role in the commission of the offence: Ramsay at para.

25. Where mental illness played a central role, the importance of deterrence and punishment should be given less weight and treatment and public protection concerns should be increased: Batisse at para.

38. This decreased emphasis on deterrence and punishment is consistent with the proportionality principle, which is the sine qua non of a just sanction: R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2016 SCC 14 at para. 70; Ellis at para. 183. [Emphasis in original.] [84] To wrap up the general principles, I return again to the proportionality principle in s. 718.1 which is fundamental to all of this. Here, I refer to the Court's remarks in Ipeelee again, and as well as in Lacasse, where the Court instructs me that proportionality is to be determined both on an individual basis, that is in relation to this offender herself, and to the offence committed by her, and by comparison with sentences imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. The concepts of "individualization and parity of sentence must be reconciled for a sentence to be proportionate": Lacasse at para.

53. Principles of Sentencing Applied to Manslaughter [85] The seriousness with which Parliament views the offence of manslaughter is reflected by the maximum penalty of life imprisonment set out in the Code. As this offence carries no minimum sentence, the range of available sentences is very broad. [86] As many courts have recognized, manslaughter is an offence that can encompass very different factual matrixes, leading to a wide variance in sentences that are imposed. My challenge in this case is to locate Ms. Howse and her offence somewhere within that broad range. [87] The Court in Badhesa explained this at paras. 24-26: [24] The offence of manslaughter encompasses conduct which has caused the death of another person and falls short of intentional killing. It covers a wide range of cases extending from "near accident" to "near murder" and different degrees of moral culpability attach along a continuum within that spectrum. A sentencing judge assesses moral culpability for manslaughter by considering the offender's mental state in the context of the unlawful act itself and the offender's personal characteristics, blending and balancing all in combination. Factors that weigh in the balance include intentional risk-taking, the harm caused, the normative character of the offender's conduct, the degree of deliberation involved, the existence of provocation and the element of

chance involved in the resulting death: R. v. Plowman, 2015 BCCA 423 at para. 40, citing R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 at para. 80; R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 at para. 247. [25] The purpose of the balancing exercise is to ensure that the sentence fits the degree of the offender's moral fault for the harm done by the unlawful act underlying the offence of manslaughter. The measure of the fitness of a sentence lies in the principle of proportionality: a sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. If a sentence for manslaughter passes this fundamental test it is a fit sentence. If it does not, it is unfit: Stone at para. 233; R. v. LaBerge, 1995 ABCA 196 at paras. 6-11; R. v. Draper, 2010 MBCA 35 at para. 7. [26] Sentences imposed for manslaughter range from a suspended sentence to life imprisonment. Given that wide range, the judge must carefully determine the degree of an individual offender's moral culpability and craft a sentence that accounts adequately for the unique constellation of relevant factors present in a case. The task is complex and sometimes factors unrelated to where the unlawful act falls on the "near accident" to "near murder" spectrum nonetheless bear on the degree of the offender's moral culpability. Where an offender falls on the spectrum of individual moral culpability is a

question of fact. Absent palpable and overriding error, that finding is entitled to deference: Plowman at paras. 39, 44-45, citing R. v. Richer, 2005 BCCA 3; R. v. Engebretsen, 2016 BCCA 182 at paras. 9-12, 17. [88] In R. v. Engebretsen, 2016 BCCA 182, the Court reiterated the general range of sentence for manslaughter is four to 15 years imprisonment. The Court wrote that it would probably be only in unusual circumstances that a sentence would be below or above this range. In addition to this range, I am also mindful of the range of sentences for young Indigenous offenders without prior criminal records who commit manslaughter in aggravated circumstances set out by the Court of Appeal as well in R. v. Pop, 2013 BCCA 160, as between three and eight years' imprisonment, with one and ten years imprisonment at the outer limits. [89] Of course, the Supreme Court of Canada has instructed me in R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, Lacasse, and other decisions, that these sentencing ranges are guidelines, not hard‑and‑fast rules. An individualized analysis must be conducted. The sentence must reflect the gravity of the offence, the offender's degree of responsibility, and the offender's unique profile. Position of the Parties [90] The Crown and defence take very different positions with respect to an appropriate sentence. They take these divergent positions largely as a result of their

conflicting views about the weight to be given to the sentencing objectives, the role that provocation and/or self‑defence may have played in determining the gravity of the offence, the role of self-induced intoxication and mental illness in determining the moral responsibility of this offender, and the impact of systemic and background factors unique to Ms. Howse as an Indigenous person. [91] The Crown seeks a sentence in the range of seven to nine years imprisonment, less time served, emphasizing the gravity of this offence and the high moral culpability of Ms. Howse in committing it. The Crown submits that the most important sentencing principles in this case are deterrence and denunciation, as well as the promotion of responsibility and the recognition of harm done to Ms. Lemp, her family, and the community. Rehabilitation, the Crown argues, remains relevant but of lesser importance. [92] Ms. Cissell argues that the court can draw no conclusions and make no findings about provocation and/or self‑defence as potential features in my assessment of the gravity of the offence. She further submits that this case falls closer to the near‑murder end of the manslaughter spectrum. Ms. Cissell argues that in assessing moral blameworthiness of Ms. Howse, I should find no attenuation for her mental health conditions, as they did not play a central role in this offence. Ms. Cissell makes

a similar submission with respect to intoxication, arguing that there is no evidence from which the court can infer Ms. Howse was under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the offence. [93] The Crown identifies, by my count, 13 authorities that may assist me in crafting a fit sentence in this case. They are: Badhesa; R. v. Plowman, 2015 BCCA 423;R. v. Green, 2001 BCCA 672; R. v. Yabarow, 2023 ONCA 400; R. v. Laberge, 1995 ABCA 196; R. v. Kalsi, 2018 BCSC 777; R. v. Golar, 2018 BCSC 2329; R. v. Reid, 2015 BCSC 967; R. v. Rothgordt, 2014 BCSC 1215; R. v. Grenier, 2013 BCSC 1894; R. v. Bosch, 2010 BCSC 984; R. v. McKenzie, 2009 BCSC 1820 and R. v. Labbe, 2001 BCSC 123. [94] The defence acknowledges that denunciation and deterrence are of primary importance here, but emphasizes that rehabilitation and restraint are also very important given Ms. Howse's background and the circumstances present during this offence. Mr. Swartz emphasizes the mitigating factors that are present in this case, the need to take into account the presence of substance use and major mental health disorders, and Gladue factors that featured in Ms. Howse's life at the time of the offence in my assessment of her moral culpability, which the defence argues should be considered low. [95] Mr. Swartz submits that an appropriate sentence would be four years imprisonment, less time served. This would allow

for what he submits is an appropriate two‑year probationary period where Ms. Howse could be supervised and her rehabilitation continue in the community. [96] The defence also relies on many authorities. They are: R. v. Ellis, 2022 BCCA 278; Kehoe; R. v. Ladue, 2011 BCCA 101; R. v. Peters, 2014 BCSC 1009; R. v. Laberge, 1995 ABCA 196; Pop; R. v. Willness, 2024 BCSC 238; R. v. Sanford, 2023 BCSC 1956; R. v. Harry, 2023 BCSC 999; R. v. Maulen, 2022 BCSC 468; R. v. Golar, 2018 BCSC 2329; R. v. Taniskishayinew, 2018 BCSC 296; R. v. Johnson, 2017 BCSC 1240; R. v. Engebretsen, 2015 BCSC 1752; R. v. Brisson, 2009 BCSC 1606; and R. v. McGoran, 2004 BCSC 1737. [97] I have carefully reviewed all of these authorities and do not feel it necessary to summarize them here. Counsel summarized them thoroughly in their submissions. While I find them helpful for their general principles, I find all of the authorities have distinguishing features, of course, some more than others. However, those authorities tendered by the Crown have, to my mind, the most distinguishing features. Application of the Law to this Case [98] I will begin with the aggravating factors, which I find the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Aggravating Factors [99] First, there is the significant harm done to the victim and her family. Ms. Lemp, of course, suffered the most devastating harm, she lost her life. Her

family has suffered and will continue to suffer with not only the terrible grief of losing her, but with the trauma arising from the terrible circumstances of her death. [100] The circumstances of the offence itself are aggravating, which of course relates to the gravity of the offence which I will discuss in a moment. [101] Ms. Howse's conduct following her beating Ms. Lemp is aggravating as well. Ms. Howse did not make any efforts to assist her or call for help, even when encouraged to do so by another resident. Instead, she dragged Ms. Lemp's body from the front of the room to the bathroom, away from the window and door. She tried to clean up a little bit, as evidenced by the blood‑spattered identification and bank cards found inside Ms. Lemp's purse. After Ms. Lemp had been deceased for over 24 hours, Ms. Howse ultimately left the city, leaving Ms. Lemp behind, taking one of her credit cards and her driver's licence with her. [102] Dr. Hodelet has provided a risk assessment that proves Ms. Howse is currently a high risk to re-offend. I have already outlined her opinion in that regard. Mitigating Factors [103] I am satisfied there are several mitigating factors in this case. [104] Ms. Howse entered a guilty plea to this offence several months ago. I consider this to be a significant mitigating factor for both of the reasons that underlie the treatment of a guilty plea as such. Namely, her guilty plea demonstrates that she acknowledges responsibility for her conduct, a good sign of remorse and indicative of good rehabilitation prospects. It has also saved court resources and spares the victim's family, in particular, from testifying about very difficult and traumatic matters as explained by counsel at the hearing.: R. v. R.M., 2019 BCCA 409 at para.

6. I find Ms. Howse's remorse is genuine and includes an understanding of the profound harm that she has caused. It motivates her to focus on her rehabilitation. [105] Related to this, I accept that Ms. Howse has remained free of substances while incarcerated and remains motivated, as she was when she was on bail in 2022, to address her longstanding substance use disorder and addictions issues. I also accept that she has now been diagnosed with a serious mental disorder, schizophrenia, for which she receives treatment, that she is motivated to continue with her medication and treatment. [106] Ms. Howse was relatively youthful and had no criminal record at the time of the offence. These are also mitigating factors. [107] Ms. Howse's background is mitigating as well. It is mitigating in the sense that it attenuates her moral blameworthiness, and I will discuss this a bit more in a moment. [108] Focusing as I must on the fundamental principle of sentencing, proportionality, I will turn now to first address the gravity of the offence. Gravity of the Offence [109] The gravity of the offence includes both subjective gravity, namely the circumstances that surround the commission of the offence, and objective gravity. The maximum sentence the Code provides for offences "determines objective gravity by indicating the relative severity of each crime": R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para.

96. That manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment reflects its objective gravity. [110] There really is no question here that Ms. Howse's offence is both subjectively and objectively grave. [111] There is a large body of admitted facts from which I can conclude that Ms. Lemp and Ms. Howse had a physical altercation, a fight, in that room. While there is no evidence about what the altercation was about or who initiated it, there is ample evidence for me to conclude that they fought physically - there is the state of the room as it was found, the noises heard by other residents, the blood‑spatter evidence, the injuries suffered by Ms. Lemp, the black eyes and broken nails of Ms. Howse, and the admission made by Ms. Howse in her message to Mr. Louis very shortly after the offence occurred that she and Ms. Lemp "got into a fight". I also note that both women had a history of being involved in fights before. [112] During the course of this altercation, Ms. Howse brutally beat Ms. Lemp with a weapon, likely the wine bottle that was nearby. I accept the weapon was more gratuitous than deliberate. Ms. Howse was injured in the altercation. She had two black eyes. Ms. Lemp was struck by Ms. Howse multiple times. Ms. Lemp suffered multiple injuries to many areas of her body, but primarily her face and head. One or more of the blows to her face and skull occurred while

she was prone and vulnerable. Ms. Lemp was grossly intoxicated at the time, making her even more vulnerable. From the injuries suffered to Ms. Lemp and the blood spatter present throughout the room, I easily infer that Ms. Howse used a significant amount of force when she struck those blows. [113] The defence submits that I ought to find that there are features of provocation and/or self‑defence in this case, but I find the evidence does not allow me to draw any conclusions in that regard. While Ms. Lemp was physically bigger than Ms. Howse and it is admitted that Ms. Lemp had her fair share of fights with other women in the past and could hold her own, and that she had been drinking, Ms. Howse was known to get into fights as well. The evidence establishes only that the two women had a physical fight in that room over what appears to be a lengthy period of time. Property was destroyed in the room. Ms. Howse sustained black eyes from the fight and lost some press‑on nails. Ms. Lemp was beaten with a large bottle about her face and head and sustained injuries that tragically proved to be fatal. [114] There is an absence of evidence about Ms. Howse's drug and/or alcohol consumption prior to the offence as well. I recognize that Ms. Howse told one of the assessors recently that she was intoxicated by alcohol at the time, but this is inconsistent with her other accounts and too

unreliable to give any credit. [115] In the end, Ms. Howse struck Ms. Lemp in the face and head, likely with a large wine bottle, on more than one occasion, causing her death in circumstances where the two had been having a physical fight and Ms. Lemp was, in the end, vulnerable. Ms. Howse failed to render any assistance or call for help. Ms. Lemp suffered severe and fatal injuries. There can be no doubt the gravity of this offence is very high. [116] Assessing Ms. Howse's moral culpability for the offence is much more challenging. Moral Culpability [117] Within the continuum, I find Ms. Howse's moral culpability does not fall on the "near‑accident" end of the spectrum of manslaughter cases. Nor does it fall in the "near‑murder" end either. Rather, I would situate it near the middle, perhaps slightly closer to the "near‑murder" end than the "near‑accident". [118] The unlawful act itself, as I have described, was a brutal beating over a period of time. There was, however, no deliberation involved and the use of the weapon was gratuitous rather than planned. With the manner and location of the blows, there was very little element of chance involved in the resulting death. [119] I am satisfied, however, that Gladue principles have a meaningful role to play in sentencing Ms. Howse. I have no difficulty concluding that her unique systemic and background factors and their complex

interplay played a part in bringing her before the court. This reduces her otherwise high level of moral blameworthiness. [120] There are a number of Gladue factors impacting Ms. Howse and her family. They include: · the impacts of colonialism, including that her paternal grandparents attended residential schools; · the lack of opportunity; · the isolation from community; · victimization; · feelings of loneliness, abandonment, dislocation from culture, community, and family,; and · significant alcohol and substance misuse. [121] While I am sure her family did their best in her formative years to provide a supportive and stable home, Ms. Howse was unfortunately in an environment marred by substance use, abandonment, disconnection, and likely abuse. Her extended family were suffering with their own trauma arising from Canada's colonial history and assimilationist policies. She was deprived of stable and consistent parenting and connection with her community, which in turn contributed to very early substance misuse and many of her other struggles. She did not have the support or resources to recognize signs of mental illness and get appropriate and early help. [122] I am convinced in this case, to borrow some of the words of Chief Justice Marchand at paragraph 69 in Kehoe, that " in the absence of policies specifically designed to disconnect Indigenous people from their

communities, cultures, and supports", that Ms. Howse's parents would have stood a "much better chance of raising her in a stable and functional environment where her heritage was celebrated" and where she would have experienced much greater stability, connection, positive role modeling and support. [123] Although the evidence does not go so far to allow me to conclude that Ms. Howse was suffering from a psychosis or other symptoms related to her substance use disorder or schizophrenia, or that they played a major role in the offence, it cannot be ignored that these things form part of the fabric of Ms. Howse's troubled life at the time of the offence. I include them in the many challenges that she faced at the time, challenges for which she was ill-equipped to handle and her family was ill-equipped to support as a result of her background. Although a direct causal relationship is not required, I find there is a very strong relationship between all of the challenges Ms. Howse faced in her upbringing and then into her young adult life and the offence which brings her to court. I conclude that Ms. Howse's moral blameworthiness is substantially reduced as a result, although it remains significant. [124] Again, quoting from Keyhoe, the "hardest sentencing decisions involve offenders who have committed serious offences but have a reduced level of moral blameworthiness": para.

72. This is clearly the case here. Objectives of Sentencing [125] In light of the seriousness of Ms. Howse's offence and the aggravating factors, denunciation and general deterrence are critically important objectives in determining a fit sentence here. This type of violence and the extreme harm it caused must be denounced and deterred. [126] I am satisfied the objectives of specific deterrence and accepting responsibility, while still important, are less so here. Ms. Howse does not have a criminal record for violence prior to this offence. While still struggling to understand why she did what she did, Ms. Howse has accepted responsibility for what she has done and is genuinely remorseful. [127] While emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, I cannot lose sight of Ms. Howse's personal circumstances, including all of the mitigating factors in this case. Ms. Howse is relatively young, has now received a diagnosis that she suffers from schizophrenia along with other mental disorders, substance use disorder. She is amenable to continuing treatment that has been prescribed and recommended, so rehabilitation must also play an important role here. I find that restraint, of course, is also important, particularly in light of the fact that I find her level of moral blameworthiness is reduced. [128] Applying the parity principle and consistent with the individualized nature of

the sentencing process, the authorities provided by counsel contain similarities and differences with this case. Overall, though, I find the decisions relied on by the Crown involve primarily non‑Indigenous offenders with higher degrees of moral blameworthiness, with more aggravating factors. I find that those relied upon by the defence, while bearing more similarities to the case at bar, involve different offenders with different circumstances, different degrees of moral blameworthiness, and some with more or less mitigating circumstances. Among all of those cases, I would consider Harry and Willness the most similar to the case at bar, though they too have distinguishing features. [129] Ms. Howse, I am going to ask you to please stand. Decision [130] Based upon all I have discussed - the gravity of your offence, your substantial but attenuated moral blameworthiness, the aggravating and mitigating factors, the primary objectives of denunciation and general deterrence, comparing your case to others, and giving as much weight as can be justified to the objective of rehabilitation and the principle of restraint - I find a proportionate sentence in this difficult case is five years imprisonment. [131] From this, I give you credit for a total of 813 days of pre-sentence custody at a rate of 1.5 to one, or the equivalent of 1,220 days. Five years' imprisonment is the equivalent of

1,825 days, so the remaining time for you to serve is 605 days. [132] I agree with your counsel that a lengthy period of probation to follow your period of imprisonment is necessary. There will be a probationary term to follow for a period of three years. That length of time is necessary. I will impose a number of conditions, which I find are desirable for protecting society and facilitating the offender's successful reintegration into the community. [133] You can have a seat for a moment. I intend to impose a number of probationary conditions. They will take some time. I also have to review the conditions under which you can apply to vary those. I also have to impose ancillary orders, so that will take some time and I would like to take about a ten-minute break before we do that. [134] Counsel, I intend to canvass with Ms. Howse her consent for certain probationary terms. I know, Mr. Swartz, you had indicated at the hearing that she was agreeable to terms about attending to forensics and other terms, but I am considering, with her consent, imposing terms that she take medication and all of those standard terms. I will be canvassing whether she consents to those terms or not. Is that something you want to have a moment to speak to your client about or have you done that already? [135] CNSL M. SWARTZ: Ms. Paquette can confer with her, but I anticipate it is agreeable. [136] THE

COURT: We will take a ten-minute break. Thank you. (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AND RECONVENED) [137] THE CLERK: Justice, for the record, recalling Court File 55766‑3, His Majesty the King versus Paige Howse. [138] THE COURT: Ms. Paquette, you have had time with your client? [139] CNSL C. PAQUETTE: Yes, Justice. She consents to both the forensics condition and the Rogers orders conditions. [140] THE COURT: Thank you. You can remain seated while I outline the conditions of your probation order, and if I did not indicate earlier, it is a three‑year term: · You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour; · You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court; · You must notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or the officer of any change of employment or occupation; [DISCUSSION ABOUT WHERE MS. HOWSE SHOULD REPORT] · You must report in person to a probation officer at Surrey, British Columbia, at Surrey Community Corrections, within two business days after your release from custody, unless you have obtained, before your release from custody, written permission from the probation officer to report elsewhere or within a different timeframe. After that, you must report as directed by your probation officer; · You must have no contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with Brenda Doris

Poulin; Lucas Friedel; Lisa Poulin; Charity Osinga; and Hope Lemp; · You must not be any place where those same persons that were just read out, Brenda Doris Poulin; Lucas Friedel; Lisa Poulin; Charity Osinga; and Hope Lemp happens to be. If you see them, you must leave the place immediately without any words or gestures. Do you understand that? · When first reporting to your probation officer, you must provide them with the address where you will live and your phone number; · You must not change your address or phone number without notifying your probation officer in writing at least seven days in advance of any change; · You must attend, participate in, and complete any intake, assessment, counselling, or education program as directed by your probation officer. This may include but is not limited to counselling or programming for anger management, violence prevention, alcohol or drug addiction, and mental health. [141] I am going to be imposing some conditions that require your consent, so I am going to read the condition to you, each one, and then ask you if you understand it, Ms. Howse. With respect to all of these conditions, you are not required to consent or agree to them. I understand through your counsel that you are consenting to them, but I have to ask you about this personally. I will read each one to you. · Having consented in court, you must attend, participate

in, and complete any intake, assessment, program, treatment, or a full-time live-in treatment program as directed by your probation officer. This may include programming or treatment for alcohol or drug addiction and psychiatric and psychological health. [142] Do you understand that condition, Ms. Howse? [143] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [144] THE COURT: And do you consent to it here in court today? [145] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [146] THE COURT: · Having consented in court, you must attend for a psychiatric intake, assessment, or treatment program through Forensic Psychiatric Services as directed by your probation officer. Do you understand that condition? [147] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [148] THE COURT: And do you consent? [149] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [150] THE COURT: If you are expelled or remove yourself from the treatment centre, program, or recovery home to which you are directed, you must tell the probation officer immediately. If the probation officer's office is closed, you must contact your officer immediately when the office opens on the next business day. [151] Do you understand that condition? [152] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [153] THE COURT: Do you consent to it? [154] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [155] THE COURT: · Having consented in court, you must do the following: Report to Forensic Psychiatric Services or elsewhere for any intake, assessment, counselling, or treatment as directed by your probation officer.

Attend all scheduled appointments with the professionals in charge of your mental health care. Take all medications and medical treatment prescribed to you by those professionals. Provide your probation officer with the names, addresses, and phone numbers of those professionals. Give those professionals a copy of this probation order. If you decide not to follow these directions, you must immediately report that fact to your probation officer, having consented in court to those professionals notifying your probation officer if you fail to attend for an appointment or refuse to take the prescribed treatment or medication. [156] There was a lot there. Do you understand that condition or would you like me to break it down for you? [157] THE ACCUSED: No, I understand. If I don't take my medication anymore, I need to inform my probation officer right away. [158] THE COURT: That is right, that is among other things. You are also to report to Forensic Psychiatric Services or elsewhere for any intake, assessment, counselling, or treatment ‑- [159] THE ACCUSED: Okay. [160] THE COURT: ‑- as directed by your probation officer. Do you consent to that? [161] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [162] THE COURT: You are required to attend all scheduled appointments with the professionals in charge of your mental health care. Do you consent to that? [163] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [164] THE COURT: As you have

indicated, you are required to ‑- you understand that you are required to take all medications and medical treatment prescribed to you by those professionals. Do you consent to that? [165] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [166] THE COURT: You are required to provide your probation officer with the names, addresses, and phone numbers of those professionals. Those are the ones that are in charge of your mental health care. Do you understand that? [167] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [168] THE COURT: And you are required to give those professionals in charge of your mental health care a copy of this probation order. Do you understand that? [169] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [170] THE COURT: Okay, and you are also ‑- and I think you have indicated your understanding to this as well and your consent ‑- if you decide not to follow these directions, that is all of those things that I have just outlined, you must immediately report that fact to your probation officer. You understand that? [171] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [172] THE COURT: Are you also consenting to have those professionals in charge of your mental health care notify your probation officer if you fail to attend for an appointment or if you refuse to take the prescribed treatment or medication? [173] THE ACCUSED: Yes, they can contact each other. [174] THE COURT: Okay. [175] THE ACCUSED: Yeah. [176] THE COURT: Very good, thank you. [177] I do not know if this is

required, but out of abundance of caution, I will ask you if you consent to this as well: You must sign any document that is necessary for your probation officer, counsellors, or treatment providers to check your attendance and completion of any intake, assessment, counselling, or treatment program. Do you consent to that? [178] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [179] THE COURT: Also, if asked by your probation officer, you must provide proof of your attendance and completion of any assessment, counselling, or treatment program. Do you consent to that? [180] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [181] THE COURT: I will also impose firearms and weapons prohibitions: · You must not possess, directly or indirectly, any weapon as defined by the Criminal Code, including: firearms and ammunition; cross-bows, prohibited or restricted weapons or devices, or explosive substances; anything used, designed to be used or intended for use in causing death or injury to any person, or to threaten or intimidate any person; any imitation of all of the above, including any compressed air guns or BB/pellet guns; or any related authorizations, licences, and registration certificates, and you must not apply for any of these. [DISCUSSION ABOUT MS. HOWSE NOT POSSESSING ANY FIREARMS AND THE LIKE] [182] CNSL C. PAQUETTE: She doesn't possess any of the items. [183] THE COURT: Are there any other terms that either counsel would submit are

desirable for protecting society and for facilitating Ms. Howse's successful reintegration into the community? I will start with the Crown. [184] CNSL M. CISSELL: Given the significant period of time which she has been in the institution, the Crown would ask for no consumption of intoxicating substances, and that would include the consumption of cannabis. I think that it should be fair by this point in time. [185] THE COURT: Are you also referring to alcohol? [186] CNSL M. CISSELL: I am. [187] THE COURT: Ms. Paquette, do you need a moment with your client? [188] CNSL M. SWARTZ: Justice, I would like to address that ‑- [189] THE COURT: Yes. [190] CNSL M. SWARTZ: ‑- point. I would ask the court not to impose that. Ms. Howse has a longstanding history of addictions and while she is on a positive path, I think it is well known to the courts that individuals that have addiction struggles, it is a lifelong battle that sometimes does result in relapses, even ‑- and significant in nature, and I don't want the court to be effectively punishing her should she have a relapse and be incarcerated for that sole purpose. [191] THE COURT: Yes. Ms. Cissell? [192] CNSL M. CISSELL: I think the specific concern there the Crown would have was noted by Dr. Hodelet, as well as the other professionals, which is while under the influence of illicit substances, her psychosis is dramatically increased

and puts her at much higher risk of committing harm against others. That would be the balance. [193] THE COURT: Ms. Howse, as I have found, has committed a very serious crime. There is expert evidence relating to the risk that she poses. She is a high risk to re-offend under certain circumstances, including when she is under the influence of intoxicants. In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that it is desirable for protecting society and also for facilitating Ms. Howse's successful reintegration into the community to impose the condition the Crown seeks. [194] I am, counsel, very, very alive to the concern about setting Ms. Howse up for failure here, but I think on balance, considering all of the circumstances, including her high risk to re-offend, that such a condition is desirable. · You must not possess or consume alcohol or controlled substances as defined in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act or any other intoxicating substance, except with a medical prescription. [195] Anything from the defence perspective, either additional terms or variations to the terms that I have imposed? [196] CNSL C. PAQUETTE: No, Justice. [197] THE COURT: Ms. Howse, is anything unclear in any of the terms that I have imposed. Do you have any questions, and if you do, you can certainly talk to your counsel before addressing me. [198] THE ACCUSED: Okay. No, I have no questions. [199]

THE COURT: Under the Code, I am obligated to advise you how to apply to vary the conditions that I have just imposed and the consequences if you breach any of the orders or are convicted of another offence while you are on probation, so I will do that now. [200] Either you or your probation officer or the prosecutor may apply to the court to make changes to your probation conditions. If that happens, a hearing will be set. You will be entitled to make submissions at the hearing, and after the hearing, the court can make changes to your conditions, relieve you of your conditions, or shorten your probation order. [201] If you are convicted of any offence while on probation, the court has the authority to revoke the order and impose a jail sentence or make changes to conditions. If you breach or fail to comply with a probation order, you can be charged with an offence, a separate criminal offence. If the Crown proceeds by indictment and you are convicted, you could face a number of years in custody. If the Crown proceeds summarily and you are convicted, you could face up to 18 months in jail and a fine or both. Do you understand all of what I have told you? [202] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [203] THE COURT: If there are any applications to be made down the road for variations of the probation conditions or an application to reduce the probationary period or any of those sort of

applications, I will be seized of such an application. If circumstances are such that I am not available readily available, any judge can hear the application, but I, for now, would like to remain seized of any such applications. [204] All right, there are some ancillary orders that I also must impose. [205] The first is a DNA order. Manslaughter is a primary designated offence pursuant to s. 487.04(a) of the Code. I make an order pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Code in Form 5.03 that you provide a sample of your DNA for inclusion in the National DNA Data Bank. That sample will be taken from you while you are in custody. [206] There is also the firearms prohibition pursuant to s. 109(a) of the Code. I make an order prohibiting you from possessing any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition, and explosive substance for ten years after your release from custody. I also prohibit you from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, and prohibited ammunition for life. [207] Under the authority of s. 743.21(1) of the Code, while serving the custodial part of your sentence, you are prohibited from communicating, directly or indirectly, with Brenda Doris Poulin; Lucas Friedel; Lisa Poulin; Charity Osinga; and Hope Lemp. [208] Further, I order that a transcript of my

reasons for sentence be prepared. I further order, pursuant to s. 743.2 of the Code, that the reasons for sentence be forwarded to the Correctional Service of Canada for sentence management. [209] The victim fine surcharge was not addressed. [210] CNSL C. PAQUETTE: We would be asking it be waived given the length of time Ms. Howse has remaining in custody. She will be unable to pay that. [211] THE COURT: Any opposition? [212] CNSL M. CISSELL: Crown is not opposed. [213] THE COURT: In the circumstances, I will waive the victim fine surcharge that is applicable to this offence. [214] I know that counsel wanted additional time to consider the matter of forfeiture or return, perhaps, of exhibits. Would you prefer to deal with that matter by way of a desk order or are you ready today? [215] CNSL M. CISSELL: We have provided Madam Clerk with two copies of a forfeiture order that includes ‑- we have redacted out the items that will be returned to Ms. Howse, for your signature. [216] THE COURT: Sorry, you have what? [217] CNSL M. CISSELL: We have ‑- you will note the redactions that occur in the ‑- you will see them in the major exhibit flowchart. We have literally redacted out the items that will be returned to Ms. Howse. [218] THE COURT: Oh, I see. And both counsel have signed or all counsel have signed? [219] CNSL M. CISSELL: All counsel have signed. [220] THE COURT: I will then

date and endorse this draft form of order. [221] CNSL M. CISSELL: Thank you, Justice. [222] THE COURT: Thank you. I will sign those copies. Madam Registrar, there you go. Good. That concludes my reasons for judgment. Is there anything that I have overlooked or requires clarification before we break for the day? [223] CNSL M. CISSELL: Crown is content, Justice. Thank you. [224] CNSL C. PAQUETTE: Nothing from us, Justice. [225] THE COURT: Thank you all very much for attending. I wish you well Ms. Howse. Thank you. "S.A. Donegan J." DONEGAN J.