R. v. Purewal

2025 BCSC 2275 R. v. Purewal

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Purewal, 2025 BCSC 2275 Date: 20251118 Docket: 35759 Registry: Vancouver Rex v. Parmveer Singh Paul Purewal Restriction on publication: A publication ban has been mandatorily imposed under s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, restricting the publication, broadcasting or transmission in any way of evidence that could identify a complainant or witness. This publication ban applies indefinitely unless otherwise ordered. Before: The Honourable Justice Shergill Oral Reasons for Sentence Crown Counsel: S. Gillespie Counsel for Accused: K. Westell J. Sicotte Place and Date of Trial: Vancouver, B.C. February 18-20, 2025 July 4 and October 3, 2025 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. November 18, 2025 Table of Contents I. Overview.. 3 II. The Public Interest Test. 3 A. The Guilty Plea. 5 B. Circumstances of the Offence. 7 C. Basis for Joint Submission. 10 D. Proposed Sentence and Concerns. 11 1. Availability of CSO.. 13 2. Other Concerns. 16 3. SOIRA. 17 III. Conclusion.. 21 IV. Sentence. 23 I. Overview [1] On February 20, 2025, Mr. Purewal pled guilty to sexually assaulting C.R. on March 18, 2018, contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, [Criminal Code]. He is before the Court for sentencing. [2] The Crown and Defence jointly submit that Mr. Purewal should receive a Conditional Sentence Order ("CSO") of 2

years less a day, followed by a 2-year term of probation. They also agree that a mandatory DNA order and firearms prohibition should be imposed on Mr. Purewal, but that he should be exempt from compliance with the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 [SOIRA]. [3] The key issue I must decide is whether the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest. II. The Public Interest Test [4] In R. v. Anthony‑Cook, 2016 SCC 43, the Supreme Court of Canada provided guidance to sentencing judges about the appropriate test to be applied in circumstances where the court receives joint submissions on sentence. The Court held at para. 32 that, "a trial judge should not depart from a joint submission on sentence unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to public interest". [5] The public interest test that is applied when considering joint submissions is very stringent for a good reason. The test recognizes the immense value of guilty pleas to the overall operation of the justice system. [6] As the Court noted in Anthony-Cook, a properly conducted plea resolution benefits not only the accused, "but also the victims, witnesses, counsel, and the administration of justice generally": Anthony-Cook at para. 35, citing Martin

Committee Report, at p. 281. [7] Further, "[I]n addition to the many benefits that joint submissions offer to participants in the criminal justice system, they play a vital role in contributing to the administration of justice at large. Without them, our justice system would be brought to its knees and eventually collapse under its own weight": Anthony-Cook at para. 40. [8] Consequently, a judge should not reject a joint submission on sentence lightly. The Court explained that: [34] Rejection denotes a submission so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons, aware of all the relevant circumstances, including the importance of promoting certainty in resolution discussions, to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down. ... [9] Guilty pleas provide certainty of outcome for all participants in the justice system and avoid the emotional and financial costs of a trial. When an accused person enters into a guilty plea, they are foregoing their right to a trial on its merits with all the procedural safeguards that would normally be available to them. As such, the parties must have a high degree of confidence that the plea agreement they arrive at will, in most circumstances, be honoured by the trial judge: Anthony-Cook at paras. 37, 40-41. [10] Nevertheless, joint

submissions are not sacrosanct. A judge may depart from a jointly proposed sentence which is unduly lenient or unduly harsh: R. v. Cheema, 2019 BCCA 268 at para. 24. [11] Importantly, the desire for certainty of outcome must be balanced against the overall effect of the proposed sentence on the administration of justice and public interest. As the Court noted in R. v. DeSousa, 2012 ONCA 254 at para. 22, "[C]ertainty must yield where the harm caused by accepting the joint submission is beyond the value gained by promoting certainty of result": cited in Anthony-Cook at para. 43. [12] It is this balancing exercise which I must concern myself with when considering the joint submission on sentence before me. [13] To properly apply the public interest test, I must use a different approach than what I would do in a conventional sentencing hearing. This was explained by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Cheema. After she explained the benefits of joint submissions on sentence, Justice Dickson provided the following guidance on the approach I must take when considering what sentence to impose on Mr. Purewal: [22] Given the foregoing, a judge presented with a joint submission must approach the sentencing task differently than on a conventional sentence hearing. Under the conventional approach, the judge focuses on the circumstances of the offender and the offence, and the applicable

sentencing principles. However, when assessing a joint submission, the judge must consider factors beyond the typical sentencing principles and should not "reverse engineer" a joint submission by determining the sentence that would have been imposed after a trial and comparing it to the jointly proposed sentence. Rather, the analysis should begin with the basis for the joint submission, including the important benefits to the administration of justice, and ask whether there is something apart from the length of the sentence that engages the public interest or repute of the justice system: Anthony-Cook at paras. 32, 42, 44, 48; R. v. Belakziz, 2018 ABCA 370 at para.

18. This approach enables a full appreciation of the basis and justification of the jointly proposed sentence: R. v. McInnis, 2019 PECA 3 at para. 78. [Emphasis added.] [14] Before applying the public interest test, I will explain the circumstances in which the guilty plea arose, and the circumstances of the offence. A. The Guilty Plea [15] Mr. Purewal was charged with two counts of sexual assault, both stemming from an incident on March 18, 2018. These related to alleged offences against two complainants who I will refer to as C.R. and A.M. [16] Mr. Purewal initially pled not guilty to the charges. The trial was set for seven days and commenced before me on February 18, 2025. [17] At the start of the trial, the Crown indicated that they would be calling both complainants as well as three police witnesses. Both the complainants testified during the first two days of the trial. They were thoroughly cross-examined on their evidence. [18] The Crown's remaining witnesses were scheduled to testify on February 20, 2025. At the start of court on February 20, 2025, Mr. Purewal indicated that he wished to plead guilty to Count 2 (sexual assault of C.R.) on the basis of C.R.'s evidence at trial. [19] I was satisfied that the guilty plea should be accepted. Accordingly, Mr. Purewal entered a guilty plea to Count 2 of the Indictment and the trial in relation to Count 1 was adjourned. I

then adjourned the sentencing hearing so that a psychological and risk assessment report could be prepared. [20] The Risk Assessment Report was completed by Dr. Patrick Bartel and is dated June 24, 2025. Dr. Bartel opines that Mr. Purewal is at low risk to sexually reoffend. He makes the following recommendations at paras. 35-37 of his report: [35] Given Mr. Purewal's risk level, I believe that his risk can be managed in the community with a minimal number of conditions, the most important of which will be a no contact order, preventing him from contacting the victim. [36] Again, given Mr. Purewal's low risk, his good functioning since that time and the relatively minor offending that did occur, I do not believe he or the community will benefit from his being placed on the National Sex Offender Registry. [37] Regarding intervention, Mr. Purewal low-risk status suggests that he does not require and will not necessarily benefit from sex offender treatment. The absence of psychological disorders also indicates little need for intervention as does his current insight into the wrongfulness of his actions surrounding the index offence and the importance of consent. [21] The Sentencing Hearing began on July 4, 2025. I heard submissions from both the Crown and the Defence about the appropriateness of the proposed sentence. The Crown also provided a victim impact statement from

C.R. [22] During the course of the Sentencing Hearing, I expressed concerns about the proposed sentence, including: (a) there was no Agreed Statement of Facts or submissions about how to treat Mr. Purewal's version of events set out in the Risk Assessment Report with C.R.'s trial testimony that was uncontroverted; (b) how reliable the Risk Assessment Report was given some of Dr. Bartel's testing on Mr. Purewal; (c) whether the supervision terms under the CSO were sufficient; and (d) the overall adequacy of the proposed sentence. [23] The Sentencing Hearing did not conclude within the time allotted, and an additional day was secured for October 3, 2025. At the resumption of the Sentencing Hearing, I invited Counsel to directly address the concerns which I had raised previously. They did so, by: (a) submitting an Agreed Statement of Facts and providing further submissions on the evidence; (b) obtaining an email from Dr. Bartel addressing my concerns related to his report; (c) modifying some of the terms under the CSO to make them clearer; and (d) providing additional submissions to support the appropriateness of the sentence. [24] I turn now to the circumstances of the offence to which Mr. Purewal has plead guilty. B. Circumstances of the Offence [25] Mr. Purewal admitted various facts which are set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts filed pursuant to s. 655 of the Criminal

Code ("Admissions"). I have edited the Admissions for conciseness and relevance and set them out below. I have also made additional findings of fact where there are gaps in the Admissions. [26] Mr. Purewal is presently 34 years old. The Offence occurred on March 17, 2018, when Mr. Purewal was 26. [27] Prior to March 17, 2018, C.R.'s friend, A.M., communicated with an individual by the name of Karn Bhullar via Tinder. A.M. arranged to meet Mr. Bhullar at the River Rock Casino, located in Richmond, British Columbia, in the early morning hours of March 18, 2018. [28] Mr. Purewal drove Mr. Bhullar to the River Rock Casino, where they picked up C.R. and A.M. at approximately 2:00 AM on March 18, 2018. [29] Mr. Purewal drove the four of them to a house in Richmond (the "First Residence"). During the drive, Mr. Bhullar and A.M. were consuming alcohol in the back seat of Mr. Purewal's vehicle. I pause here to note that in the Admissions, Mr. Purewal stated that it was C.R. who was consuming alcohol in the back seat with Mr. Bhullar. However, this appears to be a mistake, as the uncontroverted evidence at trial was that it was A.M. who was in the back seat. This is also corroborated by the surveillance evidence. [30] Mr. Purewal, C.R. and A.M. remained at the First Residence for several hours. During this time, C.R. consumed a single 'shot' of alcohol and Mr. Purewal did not consume any

alcohol. A.M. continued to consume alcohol and became progressively more intoxicated during their time at the First Residence. [31] C.R. asked Mr. Purewal for a ride home, to which he agreed. Mr. Purewal first drove C.R. and A.M. to his residence (the "Purewal Residence"), saying that Mr. Bhullar would be arriving shortly. A.M. requested to stay at the Purewal Residence to wait for Mr. Bhullar. [32] Mr. Purewal, C.R. and A.M. went inside the Purewal Residence. At this stage, A.M. was intoxicated and required assistance to walk. Upon entering the Purewal Residence, A.M. passed out on a couch. [33] Mr. Purewal led C.R. down a hallway and guided her into a bedroom. Upon entering the bedroom, Mr. Purewal admits that he engaged in the following forms of sexual touching: a) kissing C.R.; and b) touching C.R.'s breasts over her bra. [34] C.R. did not consent to engage in sexual activity with Mr. Purewal. She physically resisted Mr. Purewal throughout the encounter, and Mr. Purewal continued to attempt to kiss and touch her in the face of her resistance. [35] At one point during the encounter, C.R. told Ms. Purewal that she was on her period (in an attempt to dissuade him), and Mr. Purewal responded by suggesting getting a towel. [36] C.R. was able to extricate herself from this situation by persuading Mr. Purewal to get A.M. some water, at which point she put her top back on and left

the room [37] C.R. returned to A.M. and attempted to get A.M. to leave but was unable to do so (because A.M. was semi-conscious and was 'dead weight'). [38] C.R. briefly left the Purewal Residence, then returned several minutes later. C.R. had a brief verbal altercation with Mr. Purewal, during which A.M. regained consciousness, and Mr. Bhullar arrived at the Purewal Residence [39] The encounter ended with Mr. Purewal driving C.R. and A.M. to a location a short distance away from the Purewal Residence and calling a taxi for them. [40] I pause here to note that while Mr. Purewal has admitted to kissing and touching C.R. without her consent and in the face of her resistance, he does not accept C.R.'s entire version of events. C.R. also testified that while in the bedroom, Mr. Purewal pushed her onto the bed, took off her top, put his hand down her pants and touched her vagina from on top of her underwear, exposed his penis to her, and placed his erect penis in front of her face. Further, she testified to repeatedly saying no to Mr. Purewal. [41] In his interview with Dr. Bartel, Mr. Purewal denied doing these additional acts and also denied that C.R. verbally said no. [42] Section 724(3) of the Criminal Code sets out the procedure and applicable burden of proof where there is a dispute with respect to any fact that is relevant to determining a sentence. It provides as

follows: (a) the court shall request that evidence be adduced as to the existence of the fact unless the court is satisfied that sufficient evidence was adduced at the trial; (b) the party wishing to rely on a relevant fact, including a fact contained in a presentence report, has the burden of proving it; (c) either party may cross-examine any witness called by the other party; (d) subject to paragraph (e), the court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities of the existence of the disputed fact before relying on it in determining the sentence; and (e) the prosecutor must establish, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of any aggravating fact or any previous conviction by the offender. [43] In light of the admission already made by Mr. Purewal that he persisted with the sexual assault in the face of C.R.'s resistance, the Crown does not suggest that the disputed facts as described by C.R. are an aggravating factor. Consequently, pursuant to subsections (b) and (d) the Defence must establish Mr. Purewal's version of events as reported to Dr. Bartel, on a balance of probability. Mr. Purewal did not take the stand and did not provide any other evidence to support his version of events as contained in the Risk Assessment Report. [44] I am satisfied that C.R.'s version of events as summarized at paragraph 40 above, has been proven on a balance of

probabilities. [45] With that background in mind, I now turn to applying the public interest test, beginning with the basis for the joint submission. C. Basis for Joint Submission [46] Both the Crown and Defence concede that the proposed sentence is on the lower end of the range for similar offences. However, they argue that it is appropriate in the circumstances of this particular case, such that the sentence would not be contrary to the public interest and would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [47] There is no dispute that it was the Crown that initiated the discussions regarding joint submissions midway through the trial. Thus, any concerns about the timing of the guilty plea should not fall at Mr. Purewal's feet, as this option was simply not available to Mr. Purewal prior to the third day of trial. [48] The Crown provided a number of reasons for supporting the joint submission. These include the potential weaknesses in the Crown's case, certainty of outcome, and systemic benefits. [49] The Crown noted that its case remained uncertain even after the two Complainants had testified. This is because both their evidence would need to be assessed in the face of Mr. Purewal's evidence. Aside from a few extraneous facts, Mr. Purewal and A.M., and Mr. Purewal and C.R., were the only witnesses to the events that were the subject of Counts 1 and 2

respectively. Mr. Purewal had not yet taken the stand and there was a great deal of uncertainty of what he would say. A.M. had virtually no memory of the incident or the allegations forming the basis of Count 1. [50] The Court's ultimate assessment would turn on the credibility and reliability of Mr. Purewal and C.R. In that analysis, the burden on the Crown remained high as Mr. Purewal was entitled to a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, by securing a guilty plea on Count 2, the Crown was able to obtain finality for the Complainants and certainty of outcome in a situation where the Crown's case was vulnerable to Mr. Purewal testifying. [51] The Crown also noted that while the guilty plea was not entered until the morning of the third day of the trial, there were still systemic benefits that flowed from the guilty plea. The four remaining days of court time were no longer required, which meant a savings in valuable time, resources and expenses from an administrative perspective. [52] In addition, the Complainants were spared having to hear about Mr. Purewal's testimony and the Defence Counsel's closing submissions which would have highlighted the problems with the Complainant's evidence. The Victim Impact Statement from C.R. made it clear that the process of testifying was extremely difficult for her and there is little doubt that these remaining features of the trial would have

been very emotionally taxing on her. D. Proposed Sentence and Concerns [53] The second aspect of the public interest analysis focuses on whether there is something apart from the length of the sentence that engages the public interest or repute of the justice system. [54] The Crown and Defence propose a 2-year-less a day conditional sentence order to be served by Mr. Purewal in the community. The salient features of the CSO terms are as follows: a) Mr. Purewal would be under house arrest for the first 12 months, during which he would be permitted to leave his residence for specified purposes such as work, education, medical care, or worship. b) For the remainder of his conditional sentence, Mr. Purewal would be required to obey a daily curfew between the hours of 9:00 pm and 6:00 am. c) During the entire period of the CSO, Mr. Purewal would be prohibited from using any intoxicating substances. He would also be required to attend counselling as directed by the conditional sentence supervisor. d) Mr. Purewal would be prohibited from having any contact with C.R. or A.M. or attend at any place where they happen to be. [55] This conditional sentence order would be followed by two years probation with the usual reporting conditions. [56] The ancillary orders sought are as follows: a) DNA Order: Sexual Assault is a primary designated offence pursuant to section 487.04(1) of the

Criminal Code. As a result, a DNA Order is mandatory pursuant to section 487.051(1). b) Firearms Prohibition: an order pursuant to s. 109(1) of the Criminal Code, prohibiting Mr. Purewal from possessing any firearm, other than a prohibited or restricted firearm, and any cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition, or explosive substance for a period of ten years, and from possessing any prohibited or restricted firearm, prohibited device, and prohibited ammunition for life. This order is mandatory pursuant to s. 109(1)(a), as Mr. Purewal has been found guilty of an indictable offence, where violence was used, with a maximum sentence of ten years or more. [57] The joint proposal for a CSO in the face of a sexual assault conviction engages the public interest and repute of the justice system. [58] I have addressed these below.

1. Availability of CSO [59] As a result of the 2022 amendments to the Criminal Code, conditional sentences are available for adult sexual assault offences which are prosecuted by indictment, provided that certain criteria in s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code are met. These are: a) The offence does not carry a minimum term of imprisonment. b) A trial judge determines appropriately that a sentence of less than two years' imprisonment will be imposed. c) Serving the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community. d) A conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing in ss. 718-718.2 of the Criminal Code. (R. v. Maslehati, 2024 BCCA 207 at paras. 1-2). [60] Thus, even with the upward sentencing trend for sexual assault offences endorsed by the Court's decision in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, CSOs remain a viable sentencing option in some cases. Indeed, there are many examples of B.C. Courts imposing a CSO in sexual assault cases in recent years, such as: R. v. T.H., 2024 BCCA 123; R. v. M.K.M., 2024 BCSC 575; and R. v. Carlson, 2022 BCPC 315. [61] In Maslehati the Court of Appeal affirmed its earlier rulings that "conditional sentences will 'rarely' be appropriate for sexual assaults with aggravating circumstances, such as penile penetration": Maslehati at para. 9, citing R. v. T.H., 2024 BCCA 123 at paras. 6,

60; and R. v. Henry, 2024 BCCA 132 at para. 32. [62] In R. v. G.M., 2015 BCCA 165, the Court noted a range of two to six years' jail for sexual assaults involving intercourse on adult victims. This reference to penetration is for sentencing purposes and is not intended to minimize or trivialize the harm that flows from sexual assaults that fall short of penetration. [63] As noted in Maslehati at para. 72, all sexual assaults are serious regardless of the nature of the physical acts involved. They involve a violation of the victim's sexual integrity. To distinguish between cases for sentencing purposes, it is helpful to focus on the circumstances surrounding the offence, such as "the nature of the sexual contact, its duration, the context in which it occurred, and the actual and reasonably foreseeable harms that flowed from it." The Court also held that the "more aggravating the circumstances, the objectively graver the offence". [64] The Court in Maslehati went on to list some of the aggravating circumstances "that may be found to elevate the already-inherent seriousness of a sexual assault": Maslehati at para.

74. These include: · highly invasive, violative and/or demeaning sexual conduct; · prolonged duration and/or repeated occurrences; · additional physical violence and/or physical injury; · administering drugs or alcohol to incapacitate the victim, or taking advantage of incapacity; · threats and/or the use of a weapon; · persistence in the face of communicated non-consent, or acts intended to overcome resistance; · more than one offender involved; · sexual assault in the presence of children; · the violation occurs in the victim's home; · planning and/or steps taken to facilitate the offence; · attempts to prevent disclosure or avoid detection; · age of the victim; · a particularly vulnerable victim; · actual and reasonably foreseeable harms that flowed from the offence, including significant impact on the victim; and, · breach of trust. [65] Mr. Purewal acknowledges that the following aggravating factors are applicable: a) Mr. Purewal continued to touch C.R., despite her resistance; and b) The significant impact on C.R. as a result of the offence. [66] In T.H. the Court of Appeal upheld the CSO imposed by the trial judge of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation despite the presence of numerous aggravating factors. T.H. involved a case of forced vaginal intercourse by a close friend of the complainant. The offender was extremely intoxicated during the

offence and continued despite the complainant crying and shaking throughout. [67] Though there are some similarities between Mr. Purewal and the offender in T.H., Mr. Purewal's circumstances differ in that he: a) has pled guilty, albeit after trial had commenced and C.R. had testified; b) was not intoxicated at the time of the offence; and c) has not been described as "controlling," and "pissy after being told no [to sexual activity]" by past intimate partners. [68] As noted in R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, at para. 4, sentencing remains a "highly individualized process," which requires the Court to consider and balance the various principles of sentencing. [69] Considering the parity principle, requiring similar sentences for similar offenders and offences, and the Court's comment that T.H. was a borderline case, a CSO on terms less onerous than those imposed on T.H. is not so far out of line as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute or otherwise go contrary to the public interest. [70] The punitive nature of conditional sentences was explained by Justice Paciocco in R. v. R.S., 2023 ONCA 608: [71] It is important to appreciate that a conditional sentence is a sentence of imprisonment, albeit one that may be served entirely in the community. It is described as a sentence of imprisonment in s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code: Proulx, at para. 29.[3] The punitive impact of

a conditional sentence should not be understated, even though an offender may not experience institutional incarceration where a conditional sentence is imposed. Conditional sentences carry significant consequences, and they are punitive, not lenient, and can be as harsh in application as sentences of incarceration: Proulx, at para. 41. ... [Emphasis in original] [71] In Maslehati, the Court also held that "a carefully crafted conditional sentence with punitive conditions can give meaningful effect to the principles of denunciation and deterrence": Maslehati at para. 110, citing R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10 at para. 35; R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 at para. 41; and T.H. at para. 62. [72] Such is the case here. While the CSO and related terms are on the low end of the sentencing range for offences of this type, this proposed sentence is not so out of line that imposing it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or would otherwise be contrary to the public interest.

2. Other Concerns [73] The parties have satisfactorily addressed the other concerns raised by me during the course of the sentencing hearing. [74] The Agreed Statement of Facts has obviated the need for me to make factual findings about key events which could have an impact on the sentence. Counsels' further submissions on the evidence also assisted me in resolving some of the disputes in the facts. While I have accepted C.R.'s version over that of Mr. Purewal's, I do not consider that Mr. Purewal was actively trying to deceive Dr. Bartel or the Court, or minimize his moral culpability when he provided a differing version of events. Rather, I conclude that this difference is due to the passage of time and the human tendency to re-cast historical events in a favourable light. It was evident from Dr. Bartel's summary of Mr. Purewal's interview, that Mr. Purewal made numerous statements that are not flattering to himself. [75] In the July 22, 2025, email, Dr. Bartel directly addressed my concerns about the reliability of his opinion. The substantive part of his email reads as follows: This email is to clarify the question of how reliable my risk assessment is (report date June 24, 2025) given Mr. Purewal's defensive response style on the Personality Assessment Inventory which was administered as part of that assessment. The defensiveness, as indicated by the PAI, was taken into

consideration in my formulation of risk. By and large, the defensiveness suggested in the personality test results pertains more to mental health problems and stress as opposed to risk. Defensiveness and outright denial is also common among many sexual offenders, whether they have been accused or even convicted. For this reason, denial of offending has no statistical correlation with sex offence recidivism. The risk assessment conducted in this assessment relies almost exclusively on consideration of salient risk factors, the majority of which are objective and historical. Even with his defensiveness, there is no objective or collateral source indication of additional sexual offending, sexual deviance, mental illness, etc. Thus, his risk is considered to be low. [76] This, coupled with the fact that Dr. Bartel had considered the differing versions of events in arriving at his opinion, supports Counsels' submissions that Dr. Bartel's opinion is reliable. [77] My concerns about the supervision terms for the CSO have also been alleviated by Counsel. The terms are clear and enforceable. I do not find them to be contrary to the public interest. Nor will they bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

3. SOIRA [78] I turn finally to the SOIRA issue. Mr. Purewal seeks an exemption to the presumptive SOIRA order. [79] Where the Crown proceeds by indictment on a sexual assault charge, as it did in Mr. Purewal's case, the mandatory SOIRA order lasts for 20 years from the day it was made (per s. 490.013(2)(b)). The 20-year duration of the order is also mandatory. [80] A SOIRA order requires the offender to comply with SOIRA. Under SOIRA, the offender must report to a reporting centre (usually a police station) and reveal extensive personal information, which is then placed on Canada's national sex offender registry. There are also ongoing reporting requirements, such as: a. reporting in person to a registration centre every year; b. reporting in person at a registration centre to advise of any changes to their personal information, such as a change of residential or employment address or change of name; c. reporting in person at a registration centre to advise if they receive a driver's licence or passport; d. notifying the police within seven days of any change of employment or volunteer information; e. notifying the police if they intend to be away from their primary or secondary residence for a period of more than seven days, and providing the police with advanced notice of every address or location where they expect to stay, whether in or outside of Canada, during their time

away from their residence; and f. being subject to random compliance checks by the police at a rate of at least one compliance check per year. [81] These ongoing reporting requirements have been found to be "numerous, invasive and extensive": R. v. Ndhlovu, 2022 SCC 38 at para. 5. [82] The failure to comply with any aspect of SOIRA carries significant consequences, including a criminal conviction, fine, and up to two years' imprisonment (per s. 490.031(1) of the Criminal Code). [83] The purpose of the SOIRA was explained in Ndhlovu. Through s. 490.012, "Parliament sought to capture information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sexual offences": Ndhlovu at para. 6; see also para. 73. [84] The Court noted that while this is a laudable objective, mandatory registration of offenders who are not at an increased risk of reoffending sexually does not assist the police in preventing and investigating sexual offences. As a result, the mandatory inclusion of these offenders in the registry has no rational connection to Parliament's objective. This makes the provision overbroad, and therefore a violation of s. 7: Ndhlovu at para. 79. [85] The conclusion of the Court in Ndhlovu is that where the objectives of SOIRA are not advanced, imposing a SOIRA order amounts to a breach of the offender's s. 7 Charter rights. [86] This brings me to the exemption sought by

Mr. Purewal. [87] An exemption to the presumptive SOIRA order is available under s. 490.012(3), if the court is satisfied that: (a) there would be no connection between making the order and the purpose of helping police services prevent or investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act; or (b) the impact of the order on the person, including on their privacy or liberty, would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society through the effective prevention or investigation of crimes of a sexual nature, to be achieved by the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act. [88] Mr. Purewal seeks an exemption to the presumptive SOIRA order on both grounds. [89] Mr. Purewal submits that his mandatory registration under SOIRA would not advance the objective of assisting police in preventing and investigating sex crimes. Further, the evidence in this case, along with the applicant's personal circumstances, establish that he is not at an increased risk of reoffending. Mr. Purewal submits that his registration under SOIRA would therefore not advance the objectives of s. 490.012: Ndhlovu at paras. 91-92. In addition, the substantial interference that SOIRA registration would have on his liberty violates his rights under s. 7 given the unique circumstances of this

case. [90] The Crown agrees that such an exemption is appropriate in the circumstances of this case, having regard to the factors set out in s. 490.012(4). [91] I have considered those factors and note the following: a) Nature and seriousness of the offence: As noted, sexual assault is an inherently serious and violent offence. However, Mr. Purewal's offending conduct does not involve the aggravating features outlined in Maslehati such that the circumstances suggest risk to the community. Compared to many such offences, Mr. Purewal's conduct was relatively brief, did not involve extraneous violence (i.e. beyond the inherent violence of non-consensual touching); and did not involve the most intrusive forms of sexual contact. b) Victim's age and personal circumstances: At the time of the offence, C.R. was 22 years old. She was somewhat vulnerable as she was a visitor to B.C. and did not have her own data plan. Therefore, she had limited options to get herself out of the situation she found herself in with Mr. Purewal. However, this vulnerability was comparatively minor as she was with a friend during most of the evening. c) Nature and circumstances of the relationship between Mr. Purewal and C.R.: There was no prior relationship between C.R. and Mr. Purewal. They had met just that night through mutual friends in the course of a Tinder date. There was no breach of trust

involved. d) Personal characteristics and circumstances of Mr. Purewal: At the time of the offence, Mr. Purewal was 26 years old. He otherwise led a pro-social life. He is in a committed monogamous relationship with his girlfriend of four years. He works as a self-employed electrician, and has never been fired from a job. e) Mr. Purewal's criminal history: Mr. Purewal does not have a prior criminal record. He is also not alleged to have committed any subsequent criminal offences. f) Opinion of Experts: The Risk Assessment Report authored by Dr. Bartel concludes that Mr. Purewal is at low risk to sexually reoffend. He also notes that Mr. Purewal "presents as prosocial in orientation with no indications of antisocial personality traits such as repeated criminality, lack of remorse, pervasive aggression, irresponsibility, impulsivity or deceitfulness" (at para. 29). [92] I agree with the Crown and the Defence that imposing a SOIRA order in this case would not bear any connection to the purpose of SOIRA. I also find that the SOIRA order will have a grossly disproportionate impact on Mr. Purewal, including on his privacy or liberty, when compared to the public interest in protecting society. [93] This case involves an allegation of a single incident that occurred over seven years ago. There is no evidence before this Court that Mr. Purewal ever perpetrated other sexual misconduct

against the complainant or anyone else. [94] Given Mr. Purewal's negligible risk of reoffending, there is no basis upon which to find that his inclusion in the sex offender registry would advance the objective of preventing or investigating sex crimes. Yet a SOIRA order would have a significant detrimental impact on the applicant's liberty and privacy. It would subject him to continuous state monitoring, onerous conditions, and the risk of prosecution and incarceration into his 50's. III. Conclusion [95] The deferential approach to joint submissions recognizes that "Crown and defence counsel have a high degree of knowledge of the circumstances of the offender and the offence and the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions. Accordingly, counsel are well-placed to arrive at a joint submission that reflects the interests of the accused and the general public at large": R. v. Cheema, 2019 BCCA 268 at para. 23, citing Anthony-Cook at paras. 32, 44, 48. [96] In my view, the Crown and the Defence have managed to arrive at a proposed sentence that does not offend the public interest considerations. [97] In particular, I agree with the Crown and Defence that: a) the proposed joint submission of a 2-year-less a day CSO (followed by two years probation, and accompanied by the mandatory ancillary orders sought by Crown and Defence) is not contrary to the public interest and

should therefore be accepted by this court; and b) in the circumstances of this case, a SOIRA Order is not required. [98] Further, I find that: a) All the prerequisites for a conditional sentence order are met. b) The conditional sentence is sufficiently restrictive to appropriately reflect the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, and in any event, the joint submission is not so unhinged as to warrant intervention. c) The sentence is, while on the low end, acknowledged to be within the range of sentences available for this offence. [99] After careful consideration, I am satisfied that the proposed sentence will not bring the administration of justice into disrepute or otherwise undermine public interest, if it is known to members of the public who know all the facts that were before this Court. [100] While some members of the public may question the proposed sentence, this is not enough to cause this Court to interfere with the joint submission: [101] As noted by the Court in R. v. McKnight, 2021 BCSC 2542: [29] a sentencing judge cannot simply do what she wants or accede to public sentiment. She must operate within fairly circumscribed parameters. A joint submission - arrived at through negotiations between senior and responsible counsel, who are thoroughly familiar with all the issues in the case and have considered the implications of the guilty plea and the

impact of the sentencing, including its impact on the repute of the administration of justice - is entitled to considerable deference and is not to be lightly rejected: R. v. Russell, 2013 BCSC 697 at para. 4. [102] In my view, the proposed sentence appropriately reflects the purposes and principles of sentencing, and is fair, fit, and proportionate in the totality of the circumstances. IV. Sentence [103] Mr. Purewal, as a result of your guilty plea, you have been found to have sexually assaulted C.R. on March 18, 2018, contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code. I therefore impose the following sentence on you. [104] You must comply with a conditional sentence order for a term of 24 months less 1 day. The conditions are as follows.

1. You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

2. You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court.

3. You must notify the court or your conditional sentence supervisor in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or supervisor of any change in employment or occupation.

4. You must remain in British Columbia unless you have prior written permission from the Court or your conditional sentence supervisor to leave the province.

5. You must report in person to a conditional sentence supervisor at Langley Community Corrections, located in Langley, B.C., by 3:00 PM on Thursday, November 20, 2025, and after that, you must report as directed by your conditional sentence supervisor.

6. When you first report to your conditional sentence supervisor, you must provide them with your phone number and the address of your residence (which is the place where you live and regularly sleep). You must not change your address or phone number without notifying your conditional sentence supervisor before making the change.

7. For the first 12 months of your conditional sentence, you must obey house arrest by being inside your residence 24 hours a day, every day. For the remainder of your conditional sentence, you must obey a curfew by being inside your residence between 9:00 PM and 6:00 AM, every day.

8. You must present yourself immediately at the door to your residence, or answer the phone, when any peace officer or conditional sentence supervisor attends or calls to check on you during the house arrest and/or curfew period.

9. You may be away from your residence during the house arrest and/or curfew period in the following circumstances: a) If you have the prior written permission of your conditional sentence supervisor. This permission is to be given only for employment, attendance at a place of worship, education facility, or other reasonable purposes. b) When you are going directly to, or returning directly from, lawful employment. You must provide your conditional sentence supervisor with the location and schedule of your employment in advance, and promptly notify your conditional sentence supervisor of any changes. c) When you are going directly to, or returning directly from, reporting to your conditional sentence supervisor. d) When you are going directly to, or returning directly from, a healthcare facility because of a medical emergency. You have consented in court to providing proof of your attendance at the healthcare facility if requested by your conditional sentence supervisor. e) On Sundays between 1:00 PM to 4:00 PM to attend to personal needs. f) If you remain in the common areas of the building of your residence or within 15 meters of the front door of your residence where you can immediately be located. You cannot be in a living unit other than your own.

10. If your conditional sentence supervisor gives you permission to be away from your residence, you must carry it with you in paper or electronic format at all times when you are away.

11. If a peace officer finds you outside your residence during the curfew or house arrest hours and requests to see the permission, you must show it to the officer.

12. You must not possess or consume alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances, except with a medical prescription.

13. You must attend, participate in and complete any intake, assessment, counselling, or education program as directed by your conditional sentence supervisor. This may include but is not limited to counselling or programming for sexual offence prevention.

14. You must not contact or communicate directly or indirectly with C.R. or A.M.

15. You must not go to any place where C.R. or A.M. live, work, attend school, worship, or happen to be. If you see either of them, you must leave their presence immediately without any words or gestures. [105] You must comply with the probation order for a term of 24 months. The conditions are: 1. You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

2. You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court.

3. You must notify the court or your probation officer in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or the probation officer of any change in employment or occupation.

4. You must report in person to a probation officer at Langley Community Corrections, located in Langley, B.C., within two days after completing your conditional sentence. The only exception is if, before you have completed your conditional sentence, you receive written permission from a probation officer to report elsewhere or within a different time frame. After that, you must report as directed by your probation officer.

5. Your reporting ends when you have satisfied your probation officer that you have completed all your counselling and treatment (or that it is not required), and your officer has told you that you are no longer required to report.

6. You must attend, participate in and complete any intake, assessment, counselling, or education program as directed by your probation officer. This may include but is not limited to counselling or programming for sexual offence prevention.

7. You must have no contact or communication directly or indirectly with C.R. or A.M.

8. You must not go to any place where C.R. or A.M. live, work, attend school, worship, or happen to be. If you see either of them, you must leave their presence immediately without any words or gestures. [106] I also make the following ancillary orders: a) Pursuant to s. 487.051, I make an order in Form 5.03 authorizing the taking from you for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis, any number of samples of one or more bodily substances that are reasonably required for that purpose by means of the investigative procedures described in s. 487.06(1). b) Pursuant to s. 109(1) you are prohibited from possessing any firearm, other than a prohibited or restricted firearm, and any cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition, or explosive substance for a period of ten years, and from possessing any prohibited or restricted firearm, prohibited device, and prohibited ammunition for life. [107] A prohibition order will be prepared by the appropriate authority and served upon Mr. Purewal. I delegate to that appropriate authority the duty to inform Mr. Purewal of the consequences of violating my prohibition order. [108] You must provide the DNA samples within 30 days of this Sentence, by attending at the Langley RCMP Detachment located in Langley, B.C. [109] Pursuant to the submissions of Crown Counsel, Count 1 of the Indictment is stayed. "Shergill J."