R. v. V.H.V.R.

2025 BCSC 2231 R. v. V.H.V.R.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. V.H.V.R., 2025 BCSC 2231 Date: 20251105 Docket: 33321-2 Registry: Vancouver Rex v. V.H.V.R. Restriction on publication: A publication ban has been mandatorily imposed pursuant to s. 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada, restricting the publication, broadcasting, or transmission in any way of the evidence that could identify the complainants, C., A., M. and N. This Publication ban applies indefinitely unless otherwise ordered by the court. Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Duncan Oral Reasons for Sentence Counsel for the Crown: D.J. Pruim Counsel for the Accused: D.L. Karp D.W.F. Chiu Place and Date of Trial/Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. October 6, 2025 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. November 5, 2025 Introduction [1] THE COURT: These are my reasons for sentence in this matter. I remind everyone that there is a ban on publication and I am going to refer to [redacted the name of the accused] as V.H.V.R., which is consistent with how I referred to him in the reasons at conviction. The only change I have made is to insert the intended length of s. 161 prohibition of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Code], which I omitted in my oral reasons. [2] On April 25, 2025, I convicted the accused, V.H.V.R., of one count of sexual assault of his stepdaughter, C., contrary to s. 271, Count 1, and one count of sexual assault of his stepdaughter A., Count 3. Counts 2 and 4 involving the same complainants were based on the same conduct, but contrary to s.

151. I indicated in my reasons for judgment, indexed at 2025 BCSC 897, that convictions should be entered on Counts 1 and 3, and judicial stays would be entered on Counts 2 and 4 pursuant to the Kienapple principle. [3] V.H.V.R. is before me today for the imposition of sentence. I will start with the circumstances of the offence. Circumstances of the Offences [4] The circumstances of the offences are set out in my reasons for judgment. I will summarize them here. [5] V.H.V.R. was the stepfather of C. and her younger sister, A. He came into their lives when they were young children, in A.'s case when she was about two years of age. V.H.V.R. married their mother, Ms. A., in 2006. In 2008, Ms. A. underwent a traumatic incident at work. Thereafter, she suffered from significant mental health issues and was, from time to time, hospitalized. [6] V.H.V.R. and Ms. A. had four more children together after they were married. V.H.V.R. took responsibility for parenting the children when Ms. A. was hospitalized. He was also an active parent to his stepdaughters when Ms. A. was in the home. It was clear from the evidence of Ms. A. and her daughters that V.H.V.R. had firm rules in place about such things as housework and what the older daughters could wear when they went out. He was a stricter parent than Ms. A. [7] I found that V.H.V.R. created a sexualized atmosphere in the home by making

comments that his stepdaughters looked sexy, staring at their breasts, and commenting on their clothing. His comments made C. and A. self‑conscious. I also found that V.H.V.R. asked C. questions about masturbation, gave her a book in Spanish about a man who had a sexually‑transmitted disease from having sex with multiple partners, and showed her pornography, specifically cartoon characters having sex. Another sister, M., was present when V.H.V.R. showed C. pornography. [8] In this sexualized context, V.H.V.R. engaged in smacking and squeezing C.'s and A.'s buttocks. It is difficult to assess how often this occurred, but I infer from C. and A. that it happened with depressing regularity. Complaints to V.H.V.R. or their mother that it should stop were brushed off. [9] The conduct started when C. was 10 and lasted until she moved to South America to live with her father when she was about 14. In addition, I found that V.H.V.R. massaged C.'s breasts after she complained of discomfort and lumps. He engaged in this conduct at the suggestion of Ms. A., and initially in her presence. I found he also engaged in the conduct when Ms. A. was not present. [10] I found that V.H.V.R. grabbed or slapped or squeezed A.'s buttocks on a regular basis, starting when she was around 10. This conduct continued until she was 18 and left the family home. When she was 13 or 14, he began calling her

"sexy" if she wore form‑fitting clothing. She opted for baggy clothing to avoid being sexualized by V.H.V.R., but he told her to wear tighter things because of how good her body looked. A. developed the habit of crouching down to pick things up rather than bending over, in order to avoid giving V.H.V.R. a target to grab and squeeze. Circumstances of the Offender [11] A presentence report ("PSR") was prepared which provided background information about V.H.V.R. and supplemented his counsel's submissions. [12] V.H.V.R. is 54 years of age. He was born in Mexico City. He has two adult sons from a previous relationship, A. who is 28 and P. who is 21. He came to Canada 22 years ago and is a permanent resident. He has never applied for Canadian citizenship. [13] V.H.V.R. acknowledged that he was very strict with his stepdaughters and maintained that Ms. A. lacked discipline as a parent. He told his stepdaughters how to dress and enforced their responsibilities to do chores. He thought his relationship with his stepdaughters was very good until they became adolescents and began to push back on his rules. [14] V.H.V.R. and Ms. A. separated in 2022 when he was arrested for the matters before me. They continue to coparent but have no intention to reconcile. V.H.V.R. had supervised visits with his four youngest children who live with Ms. A., but shortly before sentencing submissions were

heard on October 6, he learned that the Ministry of Children and Family Development ("MCFD") no longer supported the supervised visits. V.H.V.R. was saddened by this. [15] The MCFD has been involved with the family since 2021 due to concerns of V.H.V.R. displaying coercive behaviour in the home, such as financial control and the use of surveillance cameras, as well as concerns about the use of physical discipline. [16] V.H.V.R. has been industrious since he came to Canada, working in a variety of ventures from pool cleaning to owning a restaurant. He pays child support to Ms. A., and she testified at trial that she is financially reliant on him. [17] V.H.V.R. reports that he has been diagnosed with cardiovascular disease and may need surgery in the future. He also has Type 2 diabetes. [18] Mr. Karp tendered some documentation from V.H.V.R.'s doctor about his heart issues. While the documents were not a report in the usual sense of the word, it is clear that he is under a doctor's care for heart issues. Ms. A. testified about this at trial and the Crown does not dispute that this is a concern for him. [19] V.H.V.R. took parenting counselling from 2022 to 2024 arranged by the MCFD. He said counselling taught him that he erred in treating his stepdaughters as his own children. Not surprisingly, program notes indicate his progress in gaining insight was slow. [20] The PSR author

observed that V.H.V.R. appeared to lack insight into his actions and expressed little remorse or understanding of the impact his actions have had. I remind myself, however, that lack of remorse is not an aggravating factor on sentence. [21] A psychological report was also prepared. V.H.V.R. told the assessor that he did not know at the time of the events complained of by C. and A. that his behaviour was wrong. He saw it as a compliment or like teammates slapping each other's buttocks in sport. He thought his stepdaughters were exaggerating things because they wanted their mother to divorce him. He believed his actions were wrong because the girls were his stepdaughters, not his own daughters. Later in the interview, however, he affirmed he was supportive of participating in the Forensic Sexual Offence Program ("FSOP"), demonstrating that there is some hope he will gain insight into his offending behaviour. [22] The psychologist administered Version 2 of the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol ("RSVP‑V2"). The test is comprised of 23 risk factors. V.H.V.R. was rated as having 14 of 23, which put him at a moderate to high risk of future sexual violence, suggesting an urgent need for treatment if family reunification is under consideration. However, with supervised visits, the risk is relatively low. The psychologist also noted that V.H.V.R.'s behaviour did not escalate to

penetrative offences, which suggested some degree of behavioural control. [23] Finally, the psychologist noted that risk estimates are contextual, dynamic, and time limited. Risk fluctuates over time. [24] The psychologist was aware that V.H.V.R. had entered a guilty plea to sexual assault of M., one of his other stepdaughters, in 2012. That resulted in a conditional discharge, so V.H.V.R. is before the court as a first offender. What is troubling, however, is that notwithstanding the acknowledgment of guilt of similar offences in relation to M., V.H.V.R. continued after 2012 to engage in the same type of behaviour towards C. and A. [25] V.H.V.R. addressed me. He explained that he thought he did the best he could with his stepdaughters, treating them as if they were his own. He tearfully recalled when one of them, A., asked if he would be her father. V.H.V.R. says he never stopped loving his children and he feels regret and remorse. He has lost his business, his health, and his family. He says he never intended to hurt or abuse his children and he wants a chance to repair the relationships. Victim Impact [26] The Crown read C.'s victim impact statement. V.H.V.R.'s conduct continues to cause her emotional distress and panic attacks. C. left her siblings when she was 14 to live with her father in another country. V.H.V.R. sexualized her from a young age and she was brainwashed

into thinking everything about her could provoke men. She had difficulties breastfeeding her children, because it triggered thoughts of the abuse. [27] A. read her victim impact statement in court. She describes social anxiety, disassociation, depersonalization, and paranoia in her day‑to‑day life. She spent much of her time at home defending her personal boundaries from V.H.V.R. When A. moved out in 2020, she worked on healing herself. She struggles to trust people, especially men, but she has a support system in her life and she is working towards a Red Seal certification in landscaping. The Positions of Counsel The Crown [28] Mr. Pruim for the Crown maintains that a sentence of 3.5 years on Count 1 and 3 years consecutive on Count 3, reduced through the principle of totality to a sentence of 5 years, is required to address the seriousness of the offences and the harms caused. Mr. Pruim also sought the following ancillary orders: · a DNA order pursuant to s. 485.051(1); · a SOIRA order pursuant to ss. 490.01(1), 490.011(1), and 490.013(2)(b) for 20 years' duration; · an order pursuant to s. 161(b) and (c) prohibiting V.H.V.R. from working in a position of trust with anyone under 16, and a prohibition on having contact with anyone under 16 without a designated supervisor present; · a 10‑year firearms prohibition pursuant to s. 109(1)(a) of the Code; and · a non‑communication

order during any custodial period of the sentence with C. and A., pursuant to 743.21(1). The Defence [29] Mr. Karp seeks a conditional sentence of imprisonment ("CSO")of two years less a day, with the first two‑thirds under house arrest and the last one‑third under a curfew. He relies on a number of authorities from Ontario and Nova Scotia, where CSOs were imposed in roughly analogous circumstances. He also notes several authorities from Ontario and one from British Columbia which reflect sentences of less than two years for similar conduct. [30] Mr. Karp maintains that there are exceptional circumstances in V.H.V.R.'s case which would make a conditional sentence an appropriate outcome: his cultural upbringing; his personal difficulties; the brevity and nature of the sexual assaults; his poor health; and his successful performance on bail to date. In addition, there are collateral consequences to V.H.V.R.'s status in Canada because he faces deportation if he receives a jail sentence, because he is not a Canadian citizen. [31] Mr. Karp is not opposed to the ancillary orders sought by the Crown. [32] I will list all cases relied on by counsel at the end of my reasons as "Appendix A" when they are transcribed. [33] Purpose and Principles of Sentencing Applicable to Sexual Abuse of Children Section 718.01 requires a sentencing judge, when sentencing an offender for the abuse of a

person under the age of 18 years, to give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct. [34] Section 718.2(a) requires a sentencing judge to increase or reduce a sentence to account for aggravating and mitigating factors. Section 718.2(a)(ii.1) deems the abuse of a person under 18 an aggravating factor. Section 718.2(a)(iii) deems it an aggravating factor if the offender abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim. Section 718.2(a)(iii) deems it an aggravating factor if the offence had a significant impact on the victim considering their age and other circumstances. [35] I am satisfied that all of the foregoing aggravating factors are amply made out in this case. Both C. and A. were under the age of 18 when their stepfather perpetrated the abuse on them from a position of trust and authority. [36] The application of the statutory principles specifically relevant to sentencing individuals convicted of sexual offences against children was examined in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9. The court made it abundantly clear that the methodology of sentencing individuals for sexually abusing children had to change. The court said: [5] we send a strong message that sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children's vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities.

Sentences for these crimes must increase. Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament's sentencing initiatives and by society's deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children. Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large. [37] The court in Friesen said that to effectively respond to sexual violence against children, sentencing judges need to properly understand the wrongfulness of such offences and the profound harm they cause (at para. 50). The legislative scheme of sexual offences against children is focused on their personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity, dignity, and equality (at para. 51). [38] Courts must focus their attention on emotional and psychological harm caused by sexual violence, not simply physical harm, because emotional and psychological harm may often be more pervasive and permanent than physical harm (at para. 56). Sexual violence can interfere with a child's development to adulthood and even a single instance of sexual violence can permanently alter the course of a child's life (at para. 58). The ripple effects can cause

children to be reluctant to meet new people or join new communities (at para. 61). [39] Sexual violence can damage a child's relationship with their families and caregivers (at para. 60), and it can cause children to shut their parents out of their lives (at paras. 60 to 63). This appears to have been the case concerning C. and A.'s relationship with their mother, Ms. A. [40] When applying the principles of proportionality, sentencing judges must take into account the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual offences against children, which impact both the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender (at para. 75). Sentencing judges must also impose sentences that are actually commensurate with the gravity of sexual offences against children, rather than simply stating the offences are serious (at para. 76). [41] The degree of responsibility of the offender must not be discounted by relying on outdated stereotypes that minimize the harmfulness or wrongfulness of sexual violence against children. I quote from para. 88 of Friesen: [88] Intentionally applying force of a sexual nature to a child is highly morally blameworthy because the offender is or ought to be aware that this action can profoundly harm the child. In assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender, courts must take into account the harm the offender intended or was reckless or

wilfully blind to (Arcand, at para. 58; see also M. (C.A.), at para. 80; Morrisey, at para. 48). For sexual offences against children, we agree with Iacobucci J. that, save for possibly certain rare cases, offenders will usually have at least some awareness of the profound physical, psychological, and emotional harm that their actions may cause the child (Scalera, at paras. 120 and 123-24). [42] V.H.V.R. must have known the impact his actions had on both C. and A. C. testified that when she complained to him about his behaviour at one point, he called her a "grinch", indicating she should just grin and bear it, and completely overriding her right to bodily autonomy. A. altered her manner of dress to avoid comments from him and to avoid providing him a target for the unwanted conduct. And V.H.V.R. must have known in 2012, as a result of the proceedings involved M., that his conduct was wrong, yet he continued to act the same way towards C. and A. [43] At the same time, a sentencing judge must not overlook factors that may reduce an offender's moral culpability, as in the case of cognitive limitations or where there are factors that mitigate the offender's moral blameworthiness. [44] Mr. Karp maintains that V.H.V.R.'s cultural background should mitigate in favour of a less‑severe sentence. However, children do not choose their parents or their culture of origin, and the law

cannot be seen to treat the sexual abuse of children differently depending on the cultural background of the offending parent. [45] Furthermore, I have no evidence about cultural practices and norms relevant to V.H.V.R.'s background. I would not expect that sexualizing the atmosphere in the family home and overriding children's bodily autonomy with unwanted physical touching, as I found V.H.V.R. did, would be excused in any culture. [46] In Friesen, the court listed a number of factors for consideration in arriving at a fit sentence for the sexual abuse of children. (a) Likelihood to Reoffend (paras. 122-124 of Friesen) [47] An increased likelihood of reoffending increases the need for emphasis on the sentencing objectives of separating the offender from society and s. 718(c). At the same time, sentencing judges should encourage efforts at rehabilitation which may also weigh in favour of a reduced term of incarceration followed by probation. In some cases, the only way to achieve both short‑term and long‑term protection of children may thus be to impose a lengthy sentence. [48] V.H.V.R. is currently at a medium to high risk to reoffend, although the assessing psychologist says his risk factors may change and his offending did not escalate to penetrative behaviour. V.H.V.R. seems willing to take courses as directed, including FSOP. In addition, supervision of V.H.V.R. with his

younger children would tend to prevent the risk of reoffending. I find the likelihood to reoffend is a neutral factor in this case. (b) Abuse of a Position of Trust or Authority (paras. 125-130) [49] The abuse of a position of trust increases the harm to the victim and the gravity of the offence. It may inhibit children from reporting abuse, especially where the perpetrator lives with the victim and is a parent or caregiver. The abuse of a position of trust increases the offender's degree of responsibility and enhances moral blameworthiness. All things being equal, the abuse of a position of trust to commit a sexual offence against a child should result in a lengthier sentence than where an offender is a stranger to the child. [50] V.H.V.R. was a father figure to C. and A. The position of trust a parent occupies in relation to a child is a foundational element for a happy and secure childhood. The breach of that trust is a highly aggravating factor. What is tragic about this case is that C. and A. complained to their mother, but their concerns were brushed aside. Again, V.H.V.R.'s moral blameworthiness is high and it is heightened by the fact that he acknowledged the wrongfulness of the same conduct in relation to M. in 2012, but continued to act in the same way towards C. and A. (c) Duration and Frequency (paras. 131-133) [51] The frequency and duration of sexual violence can

significantly increase the harm to the victim. Immediate harm is multiplied by the number of assaults, and long‑term emotional and psychological harm can also become more pronounced where the sexual violence is repeated and prolonged. This factor further increases an offender's moral blameworthiness because additional harm to the victim is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of multiple assaults. [52] As I noted earlier in these reasons, V.H.V.R.'s offending seemed to occur with depressing regularity over a number of years in relation to both C. and A. (d) Age of the Victim (paras. 134-136) [53] The court observed in Friesen that the power imbalance between children and adults is even more pronounced for younger children whose dependency is total, and cautioned against disproportionately low sentences for the abuse of adolescent girls. [54] C. and A. both suffered at the hands of V.H.V.R. during their formative years and it has had repercussions on them as young adults. Both felt they had to move away from their mother and other siblings, who should have been a source of support and comfort, to get away from V.H.V.R.'s conduct. (e) Degree of Physical Interference (paras. 137-147) [55] While the degree of physical interference is a recognized aggravating factor, the court in Friesen cautioned against placing undue emphasis on the type of physical interference at the expense of

the psychological harm caused by less physically‑invasive acts. The modern understanding of sexual offences requires greater emphasis on psychological and emotional harm, rather than only on bodily integrity. [56] V.H.V.R.'s predilection for slapping and squeezing the buttocks of C. and A. is much less physically invasive than other acts. The massaging of C.'s breasts is more invasive. The slapping and squeezing happened in front of other family members and was often accompanied by the sexualized language I referred to earlier in these reasons, and embarrassed and upset C. and A., and it caused both of them emotional harm which they still grapple with. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances [57] The aggravating circumstances in this case include V.H.V.R.'s abuse of a position of trust, the ages of the complainants, the span of time over which the offences occurred, and the impact the offending has had on the complainants as they have grown into adulthood. [58] I cannot identify any significant mitigating factors. V.H.V.R. was otherwise a contributing member of society and has supported Ms. A. and their children since he moved out, but those are obligations expected of everyone. [59] Similarly, age and health circumstances may mitigate a sentence in appropriate cases, per R. v. Swope, 2015 BCCA 167, but correctional authorities must provide inmates with appropriate care, and I

have nothing before me to suggest that V.H.V.R. will not receive medical attention for his heart problems while in a custodial facility. V.H.V.R.'s health concerns do not operate to mitigate the seriousness of the circumstances in this case. [60] The collateral immigration consequences are regrettable, but this is not a case where a small adjustment in sentence would be merited to bring it within the scope of a CSO, and in any event I am not satisfied a CSO would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing, in particular those that apply to offences against young and vulnerable victims. To arrive at a sentence of less than two years and impose a CSO would constitute an exercise in reverse engineering that places the accused's personal circumstances ahead of the determination of a fit sentence in a case involving vulnerable victims to whom he was in a position of trust. Roughly Analogous Precedents [61] Sentencing is an individualized process. There are differences between the type of conduct V.H.V.R. engaged in and many of the authorities counsel have provided me, but several of the authorities tendered by the Crown and one tendered by the defence are of assistance in arriving at a general range for this type of conduct, by which I mean sexual acts short of penile or digital penetration. [62] In R. v. F.M., 2020 BCSC 1884, Justice Verhoeven imposed a

sentence of two years' imprisonment on one of two counts with similar circumstances to the case before me. The accused was the victim I.M.'s father. He was convicted of squeezing her buttocks inside her pants but outside her underwear. She asked him to stop, but the conduct continued often, once or twice a week. It began when I.M. was four or five and continued until she was about 10. [63] In R. v. Gerrard, 2021 BCSC 1219, Justice Shergill imposed a sentence of 20 months on an accused who was convicted of tickling and kissing a young child in her bed, rubbing her breast over the top of her shirt, and then putting his hands inside her underwear to try to push her legs open. It was a single event which had occurred over 20 years before the trial. [64] In R. v. C.G.D., 2021 BCSC 2400, Justice Milman imposed a sentence of three and a half years' imprisonment on an accused who, on three occasions, squeezed his stepdaughter's breasts and touched her thighs and hair in a sexualized manner when she was between 12 and 14. He had a prior conviction for similar conduct. [65] In R. v. Dias, 2024 BCSC 431, Madam Justice MacNaughton, as she then was, imposed a sentence of two years on an individual with significant health problems and he was also of an advanced age, for sexual interference with a young child in whom he was in a relationship of trust. [66] At the other end of the spectrum is

R. v. Chen, 2017 BCCA 426, tendered by the defence, where the Court of Appeal dismissed a Crown appeal against a CSO and short jail sentence for a piano teacher who touched and kissed his students in an unwanted and sexualized manner. I note, however, that this case was decided before Friesen. [67] With these sentencing precedents and the decision in Friesen in mind, in terms of the sentence on Count 1, the sexual assault of C., a sentence of two years' imprisonment is a fit sentence. This reflects the wrongfulness of the conduct over a number of years. [68] On Count 3, the sexual assault of A., I impose a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment consecutive to Count 1. While a longer sentence could have been imposed for the continuing wrongful conduct, A. was not subjected to the spectrum of indignities that C. was and the shorter consecutive sentence reflects that. [69] The total sentence is three years. While the sentences are consecutive, they do not amount to a crushing or excessive sentence for the conduct proven by the Crown, and accordingly I make no reduction. [70] I impose the following ancillary orders sought by the Crown: · a DNA order pursuant to s. 487.05(1); · a SOIRA order pursuant to ss. 490.01(1), 490.011(1), and 490.013(2)(b) for 20 years' duration; · an order pursuant to ss. 161(1)(b) and (c), prohibiting V.H.V.R. from working in a position of trust with anyone

under 16, and a prohibition on having contact with anyone under 16 without a designated supervisor present, both for a 10 year duration; · a 10‑year firearms prohibition order pursuant to s. 109(1)(a); and · a non‑communication order during any custodial period of the sentence with C. and A., pursuant to s. 743.21(1). [71] I did not hear submissions on the victim fine surcharge, and I will invite those at this point. It seems to me that, given the period of incarceration and the financial responsibilities that V.H.V.R. otherwise has, waiving the victim fine surcharge is likely the appropriate outcome in this case. Mr. ­­ [72] CNSL D. KARP: That would be my submission, Justice, thank you. [73] THE COURT: Mr. Karp? [74] CNSL D. KARP: Yes. [75] THE COURT: Mr. Pruim? [76] CNSL D. PRUIM: I don't think it's the position of the Crown to weigh in on this particular point, so ­­ [77] THE COURT: Very well. In the circumstances, because of V.H.V.R.'s financial responsibilities in relation to his family and the fact that his job status has been impacted recently, I waive the victim fine surcharge on Counts 1 and 3. [78] I will direct a copy of my reasons be transmitted to the Correctional Service of Canada. It is my expectation that V.H.V.R. will receive the type of programming identified in the presentence report. [79] I also want to know if V.H.V.R. has any medications with him today and

an assurance by the sheriffs that his medication will be transported with him to the correctional intake facility. Mr. Karp? [80] CNSL D. KARP: He does not have that with him currently, no. [81] THE COURT: Okay, and if there are any prescriptions or anything, they need to be conveyed to the correctional intake facility that he goes to. [82] CNSL D. KARP: Yes. [83] THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, anything else? [84] CNSL D. PRUIM: Two things. I just wanted to make sure that Madam Registrar had recorded the conditional stays. [85] THE COURT: On 2 and 4? [86] CNSL D. PRUIM: Yes. There's one other count, is there not? The sexual exploitation. [87] THE COURT: That was either an acquittal or there should be a conditional stay on that one as well. [88] CNSL D. PRUIM: And then only one other comment not directly related to you, Madam Justice, but related to this case. I am not specifically seeking it, but now that the case is concluded, if the Associate Chief Justice chooses to publish her decision in this with regards to the severance, I would just highlight the point I did at the beginning when you came on, which is the way they are current ­­ the way the victims are currently identified in that would tend to identify them, and I would ask that it be done in the same style that this court has done it, but not specifically seeking it, just want to highlight that point. Nothing with regard

to today's judgment from the Crown perspective. [89] THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Karp? [90] CNSL D. KARP: No, thank you, Justice. [91] THE COURT: So just before we conclude then, we will ensure that the proper verdicts have been entered. Guilty on Counts 1 and 3, acquittal on 5, and stays on Counts 2 and 4. [92] CNSL D. PRUIM: So acquittals on Counts 6 and 7. [93] THE COURT: Yes. [94] CNSL D. PRUIM: There should be ­­ there were convictions on 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, so there should ­­ 1 being ­­ 1 and 2 relating to C., and with regard to A., 3 was a sexual assault that spanned the entire timeframe, and Counts 4 and 5 were sexual interference when she was under 16 and a sexual exploitation. [95] THE COURT: The same complainant, correct? [96] CNSL D. PRUIM: Yes, after she turned 16, but before she was 18 ­­ [97] THE COURT: Okay. [98] CNSL D. PRUIM: ‑‑ so there should be a conditional stay on Count 5, as well. [99] THE COURT: Yes. Thanks for drawing that to my attention. So a conditional stay on Count 5 as well. So the reflection should be convictions only on 1 and 3. The balance are either acquittals or conditional stays. [100] CNSL D. PRUIM: Yes. [101] CNSL D. KARP: Thank you, Justice. [102] THE COURT: Okay. Okay, thank you, Counsel. V.H.V.R., good luck. [103] THE ACCUSED: Thank you. [104] THE COURT: Thank you. "Duncan J." Appendix A The Crown 1. R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9; 2. R.

v. Swope, 2015 BCCA 167; 3. R. v. F.M., 2020 BCSC 1884; 4. R. v. Gerrard, 2021 BCSC 1219; 5. R. v. C.G.D., 2021 BCSC 2400; and 6. R. v. Dias, 2024 BCSC 431. The Defence 1. R. v. Proulx, 200 SCC 5; 2. R. v. Lavergne, 2023 ONCA 592; 3. R. v. R.H., 2023 ONSC 5291; 4. R. v. Beduya, O.J. No. 2770 (ONSC); 5. R. v. P.S., 2021 ONSC 5091; 6. R. v. Faroughi, 2024 ONCA 178; 7. R. v. Carson, 2021 NSPC 1; 8. R. v. L.F.W., 2000 SCC 6; 9. R. v. K.L., 2004 BCSC 797; and 10. R. v. Chen, 2017 BCCA 426.