The court held that a post-trial order piercing the corporate veil under the Small Claims Act was not appealable under s. 5 and must be challenged by judicial review.
The motion to adjourn discoveries is dismissed because, on balance, the prejudice of postponing agreed out-of-country discoveries scheduled months earlier outweighs Newmont's asserted prejudice from late productions; Newmont's production issues arose late in a long-running case and do not justify upsetting the consent schedule; instead Newmont is ordered to make best efforts to produce remaining documents by November 28, 2025 and ancillary remedies (undertakings, interrogatories, further discoveries) remain available.
The injunction was denied because, although the court found a strong prima facie case of misconduct by both parties, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm that could not be compensated by damages and did not show that the balance of convenience favoured granting the intrusive mandatory relief; preserving the status quo pending trial was the prudent course.
The court dismissed the application for an emergency/inter partes expedited hearing under CPR 28 because the applicant failed to establish the required CPR 28.02(1) criteria. The delay and unexplained failure to act earlier indicated a self-created or inexcusable urgency; there was insufficient evidence that the default judgments and lis pendens would necessarily prevent refinancing or that an extension would be granted; there was inadequate evidence that Valerie had authority to act for Kindred; and credibility and good-faith concerns undermined the applicant's position. Accordingly, an expe…
Source excerpt
Derivative action (leave under third schedule, companies act)
The court dismissed most of a strike and limitation application in a family-company dispute, but struck proprietary in rem relief over the lands as a collateral attack on liquidation orders.
The June 26, 2019 text message was undisputed and contained sufficient knowledge of material facts to permit a plausible inference of liability; therefore Wright discovered his claim on that date, the two‑year limitation had expired when the action was commenced, and the motion judge correctly granted summary judgment under Rule 13.04.
The motion for summary judgment was dismissed because material facts exist as to what Ryan and the Defendant Employees knew or ought to have known about the Agent Agreement and Betts’ authority, raising the s.30 exception and creating genuine issues of fact and mixed questions of law that preclude determination without trial or further evidentiary resolution.
BC Hydro sought to strike a civil claim as an abuse of process, arguing the litigation funding and control arrangements were champertous. The court dismissed the application.
Heffler Forest Products was a business name, not a legal person; MacAdam, as owner of the name, had assigned the right to use the name to 4325842 which actually contracted with the claimant, and MacAdam did not itself carry on the business — therefore MacAdam and its director Saberi are not liable and the claims against Heffler and Saberi are dismissed.
The appeal was dismissed because the appellant failed to comply with valid security for costs orders that had been affirmed on panel review, provided no compelling reasons to avoid dismissal, and the merits of the appeal were weak; consequently dismissal under rule 61.06(2) was an appropriate exercise of discretion.