The Court dismissed the APEM incentive and unjust enrichment claims, but upheld the RSJV liquidation incentive claim, awarding damages against Argo Ventures Inc.
The Court allowed the appeal and restored the arbitrator's award because the arbitrator acted within his jurisdiction by interpreting the condominium declaration; under s.46(1)3 a court may not set aside an award merely because it disagrees with or finds the arbitrator's interpretation unreasonable or incorrect, and the application judge erred by treating alleged interpretive flaws as jurisdictional excess.
Source excerpt
Judicial review of arbitral awards under s.46(1)3
Scope of arbitrator's jurisdiction
Interpretation of condominium declaration
Use of surrounding circumstances in contract interpretation
Condominium act access and common elements (s.116, s.132, s.109)
The claimant was injured while taking steps to enter the employer's vehicle (even though entry was not completed); that conduct falls within the Policy and Act definitions of "occupant," making the insurer of the employer's vehicle (Intact) primarily liable for payment of accident insurance benefits; the applications judge erred by applying an improper objective common sense test and ignoring the claimant's testimony of attempting to get into the vehicle.
The Court cancelled a statutory right of way over the petitioners’ property, finding the instrument invalid for uncertainty and unenforceable positive obligations.
The court held Article 27 of Oak Bay Marina Ltd.’s articles did not create a trust for the petitioners, so their claims to the preferred shares failed.
The deed's right-of-way language was clear and did not create an express easement to use all water, sewer and utility connections, but an equitable easement was established because the vendor promised completion of road/water/sewer, the purchaser of the dominant tenement relied and connected its building to those services, and 3195972 had notice of those arrangements; accordingly PATCO is entitled to an equitable easement as used and a permanent injunction preventing interference with services.
There was a valid written agreement, the contract unambiguously required a $5,000 deposit payable within 48 hours and expressly made time of the essence, the deposit was not paid before the defendant lawfully terminated, there was no proven unconscionability or waiver (defendant lacked knowledge of any waiver), and the plaintiff's failure to pay constituted a fundamental breach entitling the defendant to terminate; accordingly the plaintiff's action is dismissed.
The court held that “education costs” in an incorporated separation agreement was broad enough to include private school fees, so the motion could proceed.