The Supreme Court held that a stay of criminal proceedings does not end all forfeiture jurisdiction. Trial-linked provisions did not apply, but s. 490(9) could still govern disposition of seized property.
The Court of Appeal upheld a forfeiture order over cash seized from Marcel Breton’s garage, rejecting issue estoppel and allowing a fresh s. 24(2) analysis.
The court accepted a joint sentencing submission and imposed a 10-year global sentence for drug trafficking and firearms offences, with credit for pretrial custody and ancillary orders.
Disclosure application dismissed in MLA forfeiture proceedings. The Court held Stinchcombe-style criminal disclosure does not apply to s. 9.4 and s. 462.42 relief from forfeiture.
The motion for an extension of time to appeal is dismissed because the applicant failed to provide an adequate explanation for the delay or affidavit evidence of timely intent to appeal, the alleged new evidence and counsel misconduct are unsupported and contradicted by the record, and the proposed appeal lacks apparent merit; therefore the discretionary factors do not favor extending time.
The Federal Court dismissed Nicholas Evans’s judicial review of a forfeiture decision under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.
Section 18.1 must be read to permit judicial approval only of settlements that relate to the in rem property interests being litigated in the forfeiture proceedings; to affect third parties' in rem rights by settlement, the court must first determine that the subject property is proceeds or an instrument of unlawful activity (and that forfeiture is not clearly contrary to the interests of justice), otherwise a purported s.18.1 settlement is not within the Act and cannot be approved.
Source excerpt
Civil remedies act s.18.1
In rem proceedings
Forfeiture of proceeds and instruments of unlawful activity
The Court held the searches of the Liberty Village condominium and the vehicle were lawful; the warrantless entry and safety sweep of the Etobicoke condominium were authorized by s.11(7) CDSA because the police had probable cause and exigent circumstances; Hobeika's s.10(b) right to counsel was breached by an unreasonable delay but, on a Grant s.24(2) analysis, the evidence obtained in the searches was admissible; convictions, sentences and forfeiture orders were upheld and appeals dismissed.
The trial judge correctly applied circumstantial evidence law and reasonably concluded, from the totality of objective evidence, that knowledge was the only reasonable inference; the Day & Ross witness gave factual experience‑based evidence not expert opinion; the cell phone texts were admissible and reliable in context; and the truck was personal property used in the commission of the offences and thus subject to mandatory forfeiture under s.16 CDSA.
The appeal is dismissed. The trial judge did not err in her s.24(2) Grant analysis: she properly considered and balanced the three Grant factors in the context of a s.490(9) forfeiture application, gave appropriate weight to the absence of any finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the cash were proceeds of crime, and reasonably considered consequential effects under the second Grant factor; deference is owed to her factual findings and exercise of discretion.