The Supreme Court of Canada restored B.F.’s attempted-murder conviction for her mother and upheld the convictions involving the child, finding no instructional error.
The appeal is allowed and a new trial ordered because the trial judge failed to adequately explain why after-the-fact conduct supported a finding of murder rather than manslaughter and also referred to an unconstitutional objective fault standard in s.229(c) of the Criminal Code; these legal and reasoning errors require setting aside the conviction and ordering a new trial.
The Supreme Court restored Daniel Hodgson’s acquittal, holding the Court of Appeal had not identified a question of law alone and the trial judge made no legal error.
Applied the air of reality test to the evidence: the extreme nature and number of stab wounds and lack of evidential foundation for reduced culpability precluded leaving manslaughter to the jury for Sparks; by contrast the evidence could support a finding that Ritch aided an unlawful act without the requisite intent for murder, so manslaughter had an air of reality and must be left to the jury.
Trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that the appellant’s age and level of maturity were required considerations before applying the common-sense inference to establish subjective knowledge under s.229(c); the judge also erred in excluding the appellant’s 26-day statement to his father insofar as it could rebut an implicit allegation of recent fabrication and erred in failing to give a sufficiently strong corrective instruction regarding the Crown’s improper closing; errors required quashing the conviction and ordering a new trial.
The appeal of McLellan is dismissed because the evidence supported first degree murder (unlawful confinement and exploitation of domination) and the post-offence conduct instructions were adequate; Mullen's conviction is set aside because the jury charge repeatedly misstated s.21(2) by failing consistently to require that the party foresee that the principal would probably commit murder with the requisite intent, creating a real possibility of juror confusion and necessitating a new trial.
The trial judge’s instructions, read as a whole and including model language and re-emphasis during the jury’s first recharge, were sufficient; no further rolled-up charge was required on these facts and the judge’s response to the jury’s question—referring them to the written instructions and leaving the door open for further questions—did not produce a material misdirection. Appeal dismissed.
Sentencing for second degree murder. The court imposed life imprisonment with the ten-year minimum parole ineligibility period, declining to extend it under s. 745.4.
Where evidence permits an inference that the accused lacked the specific intent for murder but could have committed an objectively dangerous unlawful act with objectively foreseeable risk of bodily harm, manslaughter must be left to the jury; the jury should consider in order causation, unlawfulness (including self-defence), mens rea for murder (s.229(a)) and then planned and deliberate (s.231(2)) for first-degree murder determination.
Sentencing reasons in R. v. Russell, where the court accepted a joint submission, imposed 12 years concurrent, and granted double-time pre-trial custody credit.