The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a conviction appeal in a sexual interference case, finding the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt and no further limiting instruction was required.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside convictions for sexual offences, and ordered a new trial after finding an error in the collusion instruction.
The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed Michael Morris’s conviction appeal and sentence appeal, holding the jury charge on motive was adequate and the sentencing judge did not rely on lack of remorse.
The trial judge's instructions misdescribed the fact-finding process by directing jurors to treat disputed facts established on a balance of probabilities and by suggesting a discrete two-step deliberative process, creating a real risk the jury convicted on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered; the Crown's sealing request was dismissed as unnecessary given the publication ban and record access policy.
Where inadmissible opinion and hearsay evidence was elicited near the close of a trial, the trial judge did not err in dismissing a mistrial application because she gave immediate, forceful corrective instructions and repeated them in charge, properly evaluated the impugned evidence in the context of an otherwise overwhelming Crown case on identity, and exercised her discretion within legal bounds; appellate intervention was not warranted absent clear error or error in principle.
The court refused to draw an adverse inference from the Crown’s failure to call a counsellor, but gave a brief midtrial instruction to disregard the defence suggestion.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal from a second degree murder conviction, holding that the jury was misdirected on intoxication and a new trial was required.
The judge exercised discretion to give a limited adverse inference instruction because the Crown, in argument, invited the jury to adopt narratives about non-called witnesses without having called them and with knowledge that those witnesses would not have supported the Crown’s narrative; therefore the jury must be told they may, but are not required to, infer that the Crown did not call those witnesses because their evidence would have been unhelpful, while also being reminded that other explanations are possible and that inference must be grounded in evidence rather than speculation. The ci…
The Court held the trial judge did not err in admitting the phone recordings as party admissions because the captured utterances were intelligible, contextually linked to the allegations, and capable of being properly contextualized by other evidence; the probative value exceeded any prejudicial effect; and the trial judge’s instructions sufficiently cautioned the jury about incompleteness and use of the recordings, warranting deference and dismissal of the conviction appeal.