The court declined to strike defamation and privacy claims in a family law case, but allowed the respondent to withdraw an admission about the separation date.
The Court of Appeal held that the appellants met the generous s.137.1(3) publicâinterest threshold because the impugned statements addressed business labour practices affecting vulnerable workers, but on a fresh limited merits review the respondents satisfied s.137.1(4)(a) and (b): there were grounds to believe the defamation claim had substantial merit, the appellants' defences lacked a real prospect of success (malice/recklessness available from the record), and the likely and actual harm to the respondents outweighed the public interest in protecting the appellants' lowâquality, motiveâdriâŠ
The Court held that certification was proper in principle because the record provided some basis in fact that a single decision produced blanket strip searches without individual assessments, generating substantial common legal questions (including whether s.8 requires individual assessment and whether the tort of intrusion upon seclusion exists and its elements); the judgeâs preferability analysis was reasonable and entitled to deference; the Court allowed the appeal in part by refining and reducing the certified common issues and left residual individual issues and damages for individual asâŠ
The court assessed special costs after repeated litigation misconduct and reduced several billing items, awarding the defendant $86,475 in fees and disbursements.