The Agreement was unambiguous and required Harbour to indemnify Brar and Realtus Law for liabilities arising from Brar's reliance on the discharge statements provided by Harbour; there was no need to convert the proceeding to an action because material facts were not genuinely in dispute; alternatively, respondents were entitled to restitution because they paid to discharge a lien that conferred benefit solely on Harbour; appeal dismissed.
The appeal is dismissed because the motion judge correctly concluded the 2023 action was an abuse of process and an impermissible collateral attack on the final 2013 judgment; the pleaded claims were barred by waiver of privacy and by the immunities enjoyed by witnesses and opposing counsel, and no amendment could cure the fundamental defects.
The court struck specified paragraphs identified in Schedule A as scandalous or non-compliant with pleading rules; held that conspiracy allegations in the consolidated Statement of Claim lack requisite particulars and are struck but granted leave to amend with a new separate section providing full particulars (identifying conspirators, dates, agreements, overt acts and particularized losses) without incorporation by reference; held that defamation allegations lack necessary particularity (exact words/publication particulars) and are struck but plaintiffs granted leave to amend; refused to str…
Affirmed striking of Dominion because pleadings disclosed no factual connection to the lender role and leave to amend would be futile; reversed as to Mr. Chhina because the pleadings, accepted as true for a Rule 21 motion, alleged involvement in removing trust funds and registering a collateral mortgage without consent, allegations that could ground liability (including for participation in fraud) and require evidence rather than dismissal on pleadings; res judicata did not apply on the record and costs were adjusted on appeal.
The Court awarded a lump sum of $7,500 because the adjournment one week before a three-day trial was caused by appellant counsel’s failure to confirm his expert witness’s availability and by his lack of candour, invoking Rule 147(3) factors to compensate thrown away costs and applying Rule 152 to require counsel to indemnify the client for the award.
The Second Excess Policy is a claims-made-and-reported follow-form excess policy whose clause D requires that claims be both made and reported during the policy period; reporting within the policy period is therefore a condition precedent to coverage and, because coverage was not triggered, relief from forfeiture under s.129 is unavailable; appeal dismissed.
The motion judge correctly applied the law and evidence, concluding the facts known by January 4, 2016 did not permit a plausible inference of liability and that expert advice was required to discover the claim, so the limitation period began later (February 22, 2016 or February 24, 2017); therefore the action was not time-barred and the appeal fails.
The appeal was dismissed under r. 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process because the statement of claim was barred by absolute privilege, disclosed no reasonable cause of action, prior rulings had already rejected the same legal theories, and there was no realistic prospect of establishing a novel duty of care against opposing counsel.
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the security for costs order and disqualified the judge because the trial judge erred in applying the tests under rule 21.01: he failed to consider the pleadings fully, drew unsupported inferences about appellants' legal knowledge, over-emphasized number and language of defendants without analyzing individual claims, and thus reached conclusions on credibility and merits inappropriate at the security stage; those expressed settled views created a reasonable apprehension of bias preventing further adjudication by that judge.