Sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm was suspended and replaced with three years’ probation, a three-year driving ban, community work, treatment, and a DNA order.
The court sentenced Dustin Dennis Zinter to six years less time served for dangerous driving causing death, failing to remain, and refusal to provide a breath sample.
The court found the November 14, 2017 driving offences serious but morally mitigated by panic and substance intoxication, recognised strong prospects for rehabilitation, gave weight to non‑custodial sentences imposed in Halifax and Truro for related conduct and applied proportionality, parity and totality principles; accordingly the judge suspended passing of sentence and imposed a 12‑month probation order with strict conditions and a 24‑month driving prohibition rather than imprisonment.
The court set aside a 24-hour driving prohibition, holding the officer lacked evidence that recent marijuana use affected the petitioner’s ability to drive.
The court upheld a 24-hour driving prohibition, finding the officer’s conclusion that the petitioner had care or control of the vehicle was reasonable on the record.
In the context of distracted driving legislation s.100D(1) of the Nova Scotia Motor Vehicle Act, 'use' does not extend to a driver holding a hand-held cellular device and speaking to a voice-activated navigation system when doing so does not require looking at the screen and is directly related to safe operation; therefore the respondent was not 'using' a cellular telephone and the acquittal stands.
A British Columbia judge imposed an 18-month conditional sentence for impaired driving, citing the offender’s health, addiction history, and supervised residence.
Given the very high BAC (329 mg/100ml), the remote prior impaired driving conviction (applying the gap principle), absence of a s.727(1) notice to invoke enhanced mandatory minima, and balancing significant mitigating factors (guilty plea, military service, rehabilitation efforts) against the need for general deterrence and protection of the public, the court imposed a custodial sentence and ancillary orders proportionate to the aggravated nature of the offence.
The trial judge misapprehended critical evidence by attributing unsteadiness and definitive opinions of impairment that were not supported by the testimony; viewed as a whole the circumstantial evidence was reasonably susceptible to an innocent explanation (fatigue) and was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired; therefore the conviction was unreasonable and must be quashed and an acquittal entered.