The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding unfairness from improperly ending a witness’s cross-examination and from overreliance on demeanour evidence.
Where inadmissible opinion and hearsay evidence was elicited near the close of a trial, the trial judge did not err in dismissing a mistrial application because she gave immediate, forceful corrective instructions and repeated them in charge, properly evaluated the impugned evidence in the context of an otherwise overwhelming Crown case on identity, and exercised her discretion within legal bounds; appellate intervention was not warranted absent clear error or error in principle.
Midtrial ruling that NCRMD had not yet been raised; mental-disturbance evidence could still be used on mens rea, but a later first-branch s. 16 claim could not relitigate intent.
Detective Constable Doucette was properly confined to describing what he observed (i.e. "red stains") and could not opine that the stains were blood or that they originated from the complainant because he lacked the necessary foundational facts; the jury may, based on the totality of admissible evidence and common sense, draw limited inferences about origin and nature of stains but complex or source‑specific conclusions require expert evidence.
Mid-trial ruling allowing the Crown to call rebuttal evidence from Hugh Edmundson on intoxication, how the parties met, and related credibility issues.
The Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed a mistrial application after a juror note raised concerns about premature jury discussions, opting for a stronger mid-trial instruction.
The trial judge erred by broadly excluding and disregarding all evidence touching on the complainant's involvement in the sex trade after evidence and closing submissions without inviting or receiving submissions on admissibility; that procedural unfairness deprived the appellant of a fair trial and amounted to a miscarriage of justice that cannot be cured by the curative proviso, therefore the appeal is allowed and a new trial ordered.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal from a sexual assault conviction, finding material errors in the judge’s use of Browne v. Dunn and a misapprehension of evidence.
The court partially allowed a Corbett application, editing some prior convictions and excluding four imitation-firearm convictions to reduce prejudice at trial.