The application for a publication ban was dismissed because the Crown produced only limited evidence (that some alleged accomplices might face jury trials) which did not meet the Dagenais/Phillips threshold of demonstrating a high probability of prejudice and the absence of reasonable alternatives; the openâcourts principle and Charter freedoms outweigh the speculative risk asserted by the prosecution.
The Youth Court judge lacks jurisdiction to grant a publication ban to protect the fair trial rights of adult accused who will be tried in the Supreme Court; such applications must be made to the trial judge or a judge at the level where the adult trial will be held, while the Youth Court retains jurisdiction only over the youth accused's fair trial rights.
The court ordered limited publication bans to protect juror privacy and the fairness of jury selection in R. v. Pickton, relying on inherent jurisdiction.
Member denied closure of the hearing but granted an interim publication ban because the disclosure of evidence posed a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the inquiry and would cause undue hardship to persons involved; on balance, the need to prevent disclosure under s.52(1)(b) and (c) outweighed the societal interest in a public hearing in the circumstances, applying the Dagenais proportionality framework; the ban is revocable and does not prevent access to rulings or the final decision.