The Appeal Division found no reversible error: the General Division considered the evidence (including past work history), accepted that the presumption of unavailability was rebutted but reasonably found the Claimant nonetheless limited his availability by personal conditions (in‑person class commitments) and did not find his evidence credible that he would have left or rescheduled studies for full‑time work; any minor error about tuition loss would not have changed the outcome; appeal dismissed.
The parental window is defined by s.23(2) of the Employment Insurance Act as starting the week after birth and ending 52 weeks later; the statutory parental window here ended May 16, 2020, and because benefits can only be paid within that window the claimant cannot be paid the additional shared parental weeks after that date despite any misleading information.
Leave to appeal was refused because the appeal had no reasonable chance of success: the issues raised by the applicant (benefits for parents of critically ill children) were not before the General Division, the decision under review dealt with absence from Canada and penalty matters, and the applicant had not obtained the required reconsideration decision from the Respondent as required by the Employment Insurance Act.
Leave to appeal granted because the Commission raised arguable questions of law and fact—including possible statutory and reasoning deficiencies in the Board of Referees' treatment of sections 29 and 30 of the EI Act and the adequacy of reasons under s.54(a) DESD Act—that could justify setting aside the decision on the merits.
Leave to appeal was granted because the Applicant identified reasons that fall within the statutory grounds of appeal and satisfied the Appeal Division that at least one ground has a reasonable chance of success at appeal.
The Tax Court correctly applied the Wiebe Door multifactorial test and, on the evidence, legitimately found that Mr. Devos was an employee; the Federal Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error and dismissed the appeal.
Because the applicant failed to file notices of appeal within the 90-day statutory periods and failed to apply for an extension within the subsequent 90-day window, the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals; the statutory wording is clear and mandatory and precludes equitable extension.
On the uncontested record the shared common understanding of the parties that the dancers were independent contractors must be weighed alongside the Wiebe Door/Sagaz factors; in this factual context the objective factors are consistent with independent contractor status and the Tax Court's finding of employment was incorrect, so the appeal is allowed and the Minister's determination that the three dancers were employees is set aside.
The appeal was dismissed because the Board of Referees' ambiguous decision and the Umpire's terse confirmation created uncertainty that justified the Federal Court's cancellation of the Commission's garnishment; although the Board was incorrect insofar as the Commission could rely on s.43(1), the Commission did not appeal and the ambiguity entitled the respondent to relief.