La Cour suprême reconnaît le délit d’intimate partner violence fondé sur le contrôle coercitif dans une relation intime et confirme 100 000 $ en dommages compensatoires.
The Supreme Court of Canada recognized a new tort of intimate partner violence, holding that coercive control in a marital relationship can create a distinct civil wrong.
The Federal Court found the Respondent liable for trademark infringement, passing off and depreciation of goodwill, and granted injunctions, delivery up, domain transfer, damages and costs.
Plaintiff did not consent to entry or removal of the tree; the trespass was committed by third parties at the direction and for the benefit of the defendant and her partner; defendant knowingly assisted by seeking an arborist and paying the cutter and thus acted in furtherance of a common design, making her a joint tortfeasor. Compensatory damages awarded for restoration ($41,776) and loss of amenity ($10,000); special damages for air conditioning rejected for lack of mitigation and evidentiary support; punitive damages awarded ($10,000) for deterrence and denunciation.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal over economic tort, fiduciary duty, non-competition and bonus disputes, and upheld costs awards to the respondents.
The trial judge's contextual interpretation of the easement — reading 'all related purposes' in light of the circumstances at the time it was granted — reasonably allowed stopping, loading, unloading and limited short-term parking (five minutes or less) and exceptional longer parking during construction; the appellate court found no palpable and overriding error in that interpretation, in the trespass factual findings or in the nuisance and encroachment awards, and therefore dismissed the appeal.
Trial judge found plaintiff's accounts internally inconsistent and inherently implausible, and materially contradicted by credible third‑party witnesses (particularly Mendel and Boyetchko) who described prolonged consensual interactions; on balance of probabilities first touching was consensual and second violent battery was not proven; further, even assuming liability, medical evidence did not establish on a balance of probabilities that the alleged second battery caused the claimed concussion/epilepsy; claim therefore dismissed.
On the balance of probabilities the plaintiff failed to prove that leakage from the PCID caused additional non‑natural water to flood the Page Property; the plaintiff's hearsay evidence lacked reliability and the Golder hydrogeological analysis was undermined by unreliable control piezometer data and omission of relevant flow measurements, whereas the defendants' expert evidence was preferred, so the nuisance claim fails.
The jury's awards, including zero past income loss alongside substantial awards for other heads, were reconcilable on the evidence; Rule 12-6(7) was therefore not engaged and no retrial was ordered; judgment is to be entered in accordance with the jury verdict, subject to a possible s.83 Insurance (Vehicle) Act application by the defendants within 30 days.
The Court dismissed both the appeal and cross‑appeal because the central questions identified by the parties were predominantly mixed questions of fact and law arising from the arbitrator's factual findings and application of legal tests; the arbitrator reasonably concluded the PHO Order did not apply to the respondent given his unique factual arrangement and did not err in law in his interpretation; the cross‑appellant failed to identify an extricable question of law arising from the remedy award.