The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from firearm convictions, upholding a late Leaney application, the s. 11(b) delay analysis, and the identity findings.
The court dismissed Jasman Singh Basran’s s. 11(b) Charter stay application, finding the multi-accused murder case was particularly complex and the delay reasonable.
The court dismissed a second s. 11(b) application, holding that post-mistrial delay remained deductible because the Crown could not reasonably remedy the witness-related disruption.
The Court held the transitional exceptional circumstance applies because the delay largely reflected reasonable reliance on pre-Jordan practices and institutional constraints; after reallocation of delays the institutional/Crown delay fell within Morin guidelines and the total circumstances did not justify a stay under s.11(b), so the convictions were upheld.
The gap between the December 18, 2012 withdrawal and the April 8, 2016 information is excluded from the s.11(b) computation because Mr. Buckley was not subject to the judicial process nor imminent further charges during the gap; excluding the gap yields total post‑charge delay of 31 months 20 days, from which defence delay/waiver of 5.5 months is deducted leaving 26 months, which is below the 30‑month Jordan ceiling; accordingly there is no s.11(b) breach and the s.24(1) stay is dismissed.
Any computational error in calculating delay in the first Morin-era s.11(b) application was harmless because the application judge considered all relevant Morin factors including prejudice and reasonably found the delay acceptable; under Jordan's transitional doctrine a delay found reasonable under Morin will generally satisfy Jordan, therefore both s.11(b) applications were properly dismissed and the appeal fails.
Leave to appeal was granted in this summary conviction matter over costs, after the judge below applied the wrong statute and failed to consider delay and disclosure issues.
Leave to appeal was refused because the trial and summary conviction judges reasonably attributed the delay (treating the overbooking delay as institutional) and the demonstrated prejudice of additional legal fees was insufficient, on balance under s.11(b), to justify a stay; therefore the appeal lacked strong merits sufficient to grant leave.
Although the trial judge made errors in applying s.11(b) guidelines for a youth accused, his factual assessment that there was no sufficient actual prejudice and that any inferred prejudice did not outweigh the societal interest in trying a serious charge was reasonable and not to be disturbed; therefore the appeal fails.