Judicial review of a WCAT survivor-benefits decision was allowed because the tribunal misread the effect of an earlier Board decision and relied on an unclear medical opinion.
The Tribunal found the Minister's calculations complied with the Canada Pension Plan and, applying s.53(1) DESD Act and the summary dismissal standard, concluded the appeal had no reasonable chance of success and therefore had to be summarily dismissed.
The Court held that federally regulated pensions should be valuated by applying the PBA valuation methodology required by FLA s.10.1(2) with only necessary modifications; the PSSA functional equivalent of 'normal retirement date' is age 60 for both parties, contingent survivor benefits are includable under the standard approach, the respondent's contingent survivor benefit need not be included given it terminates on divorce and no necessary modification justified inclusion, and the matter is remitted to the trial judge to recalculate equalization based on age 60 valuations.
The court allocated pension survivor benefits equally between the claimant and the respondent spouse, held the deceased member’s pension was family property, and made ancillary orders on maintenance and property.
Appeal allowed in part. The Court remitted the pension survivor-benefits issue for reconsideration, but upheld the double-costs order against the appellant.
The Appeal is dismissed because the General Division made no error under the DESD Act: it did not fail to observe a principle of natural justice, did not err in law, and did not base its decision on an erroneous finding of fact in a perverse or capricious manner; the General Division correctly applied the law in calculating benefits.
Court held that the HWT distributions must be characterized by reference to the specific charging provisions. For Mary Ellis and Susan Kennedy the specific rule for group term life (s.6(4) and Part XXVII ITR) did not capture the 2011 corpus distributions and paragraph 6(1)(a) could not be used to fill that gap to tax those particular distributions; accordingly the assessments for Ellis ($1,371) and Kennedy ($9,011.88) were referred back for reassessment on basis those amounts are not to be included in 2011 income. For survivor benefits the statutory phrase 'in lieu of' in s.56(1)(a)(iii) cove…
The Court held that the legislation’s exclusion of former spouses from survivor benefits does not infringe s.15(1) because the distinction is between former and current relationships rather than a marital-status distinction recognized as analogous under Charter jurisprudence; alternatively, viewed contextually the impugned provisions do not perpetuate disadvantage or stereotyping because the workers’ compensation scheme is a limited plan, divorce law and corollary relief (including ordered life insurance) address post-divorce dependency, and the Tribunal’s contextual substantive equality anal…
The Separation Agreement unambiguously entitled the appellant to be treated as the sole surviving spouse and to receive all surviving spouse benefits if the husband died before his pension came into pay (paragraph 16.5); that contractual right prevails under s.48(13) of the Pension Benefits Act; the beneficiary change to the children was ineffective without the required written spousal waiver; the motion judge erred by failing to distinguish provisions applicable where the pension was in pay from those applicable on death before pay, so the appeal must be allowed.