The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal as abandoned after the appellants failed to comply with a security for costs order and offered no realistic plan to pay.
Court rejects a request to alter parenting authority over schooling, orders enrollment at the agreed school, fines a parent for breaching a conduct order, and grants limited disclosure.
The Supreme Court of British Columbia held that the Public Guardian and Trustee owed no duty of care, but found Claire-Laura Whitson liable for breach of trust.
The court found Ms. Murphy raised an arguable appeal and, applying the modified Fulton test, concluded the child’s interests required partial intervention of the status quo: the limitation on supervised visits, and the requirement that a psychological assessment be a precondition to seeking variation, and the Costs Order were stayed pending appeal because prolonged delay and impecuniosity impeded mother‑child contact; however, the court refused to order security for costs because special circumstances did not justify denying a good‑faith impecunious appellant the right to appeal. Costs were n…
The court partially varied earlier parenting orders, replacing a delayed s. 211 assessment with a limited s. 202 views of the child report, while preserving the trial date.
The court varied prior capacity-assessment orders and held that Dr. Rogers’ January 2019 evaluation satisfied them, dismissing a request for a further assessment.
The court declined to order an external audit or MRL, but required explanatory disclosure about PREC financial statements and dismissed the restraint application.
The court varied an entered strata order only to add liberty to apply, and dismissed all other requests to change the order or compel building-permit steps.
The court dismissed the leave application because the motion judge correctly concluded there was no basis to vary the final amending CCAA orders: notice complied with the Initial Order and s.23 CCAA via the Monitor's published materials and website, shareholders had knowledge but failed to act forthwith, there were no slips, fraud or newly discovered facts to invoke inherent jurisdiction or r.59.06(2), the DIP lender had relied in good faith and would be prejudiced, and the substantive claims were time‑barred; accordingly the proposed appeal lacked prima facie merit.