M2 never had parental responsibility for RF and AF as the statutory criteria under section 42 HFEA were not met due to natural insemination; granting PR to M2 would not be in the children's best interests given her inability to accept court findings and risk of emotional harm. F is granted PR for RF and AF based on commitment and relationship. M2's contact with RF and AF must be supervised due to risk of emotional harm. FA lives with M1 and has no contact with M2. Section 91(14) order is made to restrict further applications for two years. Applications for baptism, travel, passports, and adop…
The threshold for care orders is met due to the mother's inability, despite significant effort and support, to meet the children's basic needs and protect them from harm. A final care order for C and a placement order for A are necessary and proportionate to safeguard their welfare, as no less intrusive alternatives are available.
Adoption is the only option that meets both the children’s need for permanence and ongoing sibling contact; long-term foster care cannot provide the same degree of security and belonging. The welfare of D and E requires dispensing with parental consent and making care and placement orders, with sibling contact prioritized in the care plan.
The Court of Appeal allowed a local authority appeal, substituting a placement order for a care order and directing sibling contact to preserve family ties.
M (A Child: Adoption: Duty of Disclosure) [2026] EWCA Civ 568 (11 May 2026)
Court of Appeal set aside an adoption order after finding the adopters withheld material facts about their separation and the adoptive mother’s relationship.
The judge did not err in refusing the placement order for adoption because, despite not setting out a formal balance sheet, he adequately considered and weighed the relevant factors, including the child’s settled status with current foster carers, the realistic prospects of adoption with meaningful contact, and the best interests of the child. The evidence supported the conclusion that long-term foster care with the current carers was in S’s welfare interests and that her welfare did not require dispensing with parental consent for adoption.
The court found that, despite some progress, the parents were unable to provide consistent, safe, and adequate care for V due to ongoing deficits in insight, acceptance of past harm, and inability to work with or accept support. The threshold for care and placement orders was met, and adoption was necessary and proportionate to secure V's welfare. Further assessment was not justified given the extensive history and lack of meaningful change. The parents' consent to adoption was dispensed with as required by V's welfare.