Section 3(2) of the Homicide Ordinance does not engage or derogate from the presumption of innocence because diminished responsibility is a partial defence that only arises after the prosecution has proved the actus reus and mens rea of murder beyond reasonable doubt; alternatively, even if the presumption were engaged, the imposition of a legal burden on the accused is a proportionate and justified limitation given the practical impossibility for the prosecution to disprove the accused's mental state beyond reasonable doubt, therefore s.3(2) stands and the appeal is dismissed.
The Court of Appeal granted an out-of-time certificate on one hearsay/medical evidence question, but refused certification on a suicide-pact interpretation issue.
Court of Appeal refused leave on two complaints: there was no evidential basis to leave suicide pact to the jury, and the judge correctly treated the accused’s statements to psychiatrists as hearsay.
The Court of Appeal held that psychiatric evidence should have been directed to the jury on provocation, quashed the murder conviction, and by majority ordered a retrial.
The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal against a murder conviction, holding that evidence of a prior relationship breakdown was admissible and the jury directions were fair.
The Court of Appeal refused to certify a provocation question, holding that the challenged jury direction was not a misdirection when read in full context.
The Court of Appeal imposed life imprisonment with a minimum term of 12 years after substituting manslaughter, finding the appellant remained a serious danger.
Court of Appeal upheld Sham Ying Kit’s manslaughter conviction, finding a rational basis for the jury’s differing verdicts on intent, joint enterprise, and causation.
The Court of First Instance rejected a constitutional challenge to the common law definition of murder, including implied intention and mandatory life sentencing.