The appellate court, on re-trial of the evidence, found the prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had the requisite subjective intent to cause fear when he sent the short, partly hypothetical voice message; given the recent quarrel, volume of calls and potential emotional agitation, the statement could have been an impulsive outburst rather than a deliberate threat, so conviction was unsafe.
Bail pending appeal refused because the applicant failed to demonstrate the requisite exceptional circumstances: his proposed appeals do not have a reasonable (let alone extremely high) prospect of success and the sentence is not manifestly excessive; the trial judge lawfully rejected the applicant's account and was entitled to infer mens rea from the overwhelming transactional evidence.
The Court of Appeal granted bail pending appeal after finding arguable merit in claims that the trial judge may have reversed the burden of proof in a money laundering conviction.
The court accepted the uncontested evidence of the applicant's previous counsel and contemporaneous signed meeting records showing the applicant was properly and repeatedly advised of the charges and the element that the goods were dangerous drugs; the applicant's later inconsistent allegations of believing the goods were dog food and of police coercion were not credible, amounted to fabrication, were raised belatedly, and therefore did not justify permitting withdrawal of the guilty plea.
Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal against convictions for riot and conspiracy to wound with intent, holding the trial judge applied the law correctly and the grounds were not arguable.
The court held there was a sufficient nexus among the three money‑laundering charges (overlapping timeframes, accounts held/operated by the defendant, similar laundering features, interlinked sequence of events and arrests, and common relevance of defendant's knowledge and conduct) and that consolidation would avoid duplication without causing unfair prejudice because each count will be considered separately; accordingly consolidation was granted under Cap.221 s18(1) and Cap.221C r7.
The court found a sufficient nexus among the three laundering charges—common nature, overlapping time periods, same account operator, typical laundering features and relevant sequence that bears on mens rea—and concluded consolidation would not cause unfair prejudice because each count will be considered separately; efficiency and overlapping evidence justify consolidation under Cap.221 s18(1) and Cap.221C r7.
On a full rehearing of the evidence the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that (1) the person who met PW1 and PW2 was the appellant; (2) PW2 was acting as an agent of the deceased for funeral‑related matters by virtue of the P3 instrument and conduct; (3) the appellant made an offer of HK$3,000 as a rebate/commission connected to the deceased's funeral arrangements; and (4) the appellant intended the benefit to influence PW2 in her role as agent—therefore the conviction under s9(2)(a) Cap.201 is safe and the appeal is dismissed.
On a full re‑hearing the judge was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant possessed the requisite intent to cause fear; the single hypothetical threatening sentence, considered with the surrounding facts (high emotion, lack of assaultive movement despite holding a golf club, ongoing contractual relationship), left reasonable doubt as to mens rea and therefore the conviction could not stand.