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The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in a commercial suit must file a reply to a counter-claim within the Order VIII Rule 1 time limits, and upheld dismissal of the belated reply.
Where the parties expressly designated Srinagar as the seat of arbitration and the surrounding circumstances (contracts executed in Jammu & Kashmir, works to be carried out in the State, initiation of proceedings and appointment of arbitrator in Srinagar) anchor the arbitration to Srinagar, courts at Srinagar alone have supervisory jurisdiction; convenience-based venue or conduct of hearings or signing of the award at New Delhi does not alter the juridical seat fixed by agreement and cannot confer jurisdiction on courts at New Delhi.
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Clause 8.3(b) is an enabling provision that permits recourse to the Secretary General of ICSID only upon a party's request after 30 days; it did not extinguish the co-arbitrators' power to appoint the presiding arbitrator. The tribunal's interpretation of the clause was a plausible view and there was no patent illegality. Further, MCGM's conduct — participating in proceedings, agreeing to abeyance for conciliation, and failing to object on multiple occasions while co-arbitrators appointed three different presiding arbitrators — evidenced acquiescence, so the award could not be set aside.
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Where an arbitrator was appointed pursuant to a Section 11 order made before the 2015 Amendment under the SBP & Co. regime, the Section 11 court was required to decide existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and that decision, unchallenged, is binding between the parties (operates as res judicata) and cannot be reopened by the arbitral tribunal or by the Section 34 court; accordingly the Commercial Court and High Court erred in holding Clause 23 was not an arbitration clause and setting aside the award.
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An application under Section 29A(5) for extension of the arbitrator's mandate is maintainable even after expiry of the statutory periods under Sections 29A(1) and (3) and even after an award has been rendered during that time; an award rendered without mandate is ineffective/unenforceable but does not oust the Court's power to extend the mandate, and the Court must examine sufficient cause and may impose terms including substitution, fee reduction and costs.
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Because there existed substantial and cogent prima facie material casting serious doubt on the genuineness of the Admission Deed and the arbitration clause was embedded in that disputed document, the dispute went to the root of the arbitration agreement and was non-arbitrable at this stage; accordingly the High Court order referring the suit to arbitration was quashed and the High Court order declining appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 was affirmed.
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The commencement of arbitral proceedings is determined by Section 21 as the date on which the respondent receives a request invoking arbitration; the appellant served such a notice within the 90-day period (reply from respondent received 23.04.2024), hence arbitration commenced within the statutory timeframe and the High Court erred in treating the filing date of the Section 11 petition as the date of commencement; consequently the automatic vacation under Rule 9(4) did not apply and the impugned orders setting aside the ad-interim injunction were unsustainable.
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The Division Bench erred in law by reinterpreting and disturbing the Arbitral Tribunal's award in respect of Claim No.7 under Section 37, because the Tribunal's interpretation of the License Agreement (that Clause 51.1 permitted idling compensation for equipment including the Backhoe Dredger) was a plausible and reasoned view which had been upheld by the Single Judge under Section 34; appellate interference under Section 37 is limited to the scope of Section 34 and cannot reappraise merits or adopt an alternative view absent patent illegality or conflict with public policy.
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High Court's setting aside of the award was incorrect; the respondent's conduct precluded reliance on contractual procedural bars, Section 21 is procedural and not mandatory for jurisdiction, the arbitration clause was wide enough to cover all four disputes, and therefore the Arbitral Tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction; the award dated 29.06.2006 is upheld in entirety.
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The High Court's referral was set aside because the respondent (BCL) failed even the prima facie test of being a veritable party to the arbitration agreement between HPCL and AGC; there was no privity between HPCL and BCL, the back-to-back documents were between AGC and BCL and did not prima facie show an intention to bind BCL to HPCL's contract, and clause(s) of the tender required prior written consent for assignment/sub-letting which was not shown; therefore no arbitration agreement existed between HPCL and BCL and the Section 11 petition was dismissed.
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