The Supreme Court held that termination for alleged suppression of criminal antecedents was illegal because the appellant proved bona fide ignorance and the employer acted mechanically.
The Supreme Court held that Section 47 of the PwD Act applied when the respondent was invalidated in 1998, rejected waiver and prospective-notification arguments, and awarded monetary relief.
Section 47 of the persons with disabilities (equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation) act, 1995
The High Court exceeded the permissible limits of judicial review by re-assessing the merits of the municipal corporation's policy decision to revise property tax; the petitioner lacked locus to file a PIL on behalf of the city and statutory remedies existed; absent material showing the procedure adopted was ex facie arbitrary, perverse or in blatant derogation of statutory provisions, the High Court should not have quashed the Corporation's resolution; accordingly the High Court judgment and order were set aside and the appeals allowed.
Because the respondent-advocate had no professional relationship with the complainant and the Judge-Advocate's order referring the complaint to the Disciplinary Committee failed to record any reasons to believe misconduct as required by Section 35(1), the referral was invalid; further, mere identification/attestation by an advocate does not constitute misconduct under Section 35, and therefore the complaint and all proceedings were quashed.
A claim for correction of date of birth after a delay of 25 years ought not to be entertained; where the date was self-declared and recorded in the service book, where the service book records and dependents' ages are inconsistent with the belated claimed date, where the certificate relied on was issued decades after leaving school and no evidence of clerical or third-party negligence is shown, correction cannot be allowed; the Division Bench erred in restoring the tribunal award and the Single Judge's order setting aside the CGIT award was correct.
The competent authority validly granted an ex parte certificate of deemed conveyance in respect of the larger plot subject to the condition that the transferee execute a permanent lease in favour of the appellant in terms of the deed of dissolution and the earlier lease deed; proceedings under Section 11(3)-(4) are summary and do not finally determine title, registration officers under Section 11(5) have limited scope confined to procedural/statutory requirements, and the writ court should not interfere absent manifest illegality.
Source excerpt
Deemed conveyance
Scope of power of competent authority under s.11
Scope of power of registration officer under s.11(5)
Where a beneficial policy prescribes a clear time limit to exercise an option, a person who fails to act within that stipulated period does not acquire a legally enforceable right to the benefit thereafter; absent denial of a legal right or arbitrariness in decision-making, writ relief (mandamus) is not available and the refusal to entertain a belated option was lawful.
The Division Bench erred in re-appreciating evidence and applying criminal standards to departmental proceedings; the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority rightly applied the preponderance of probabilities standard, properly considered the respondent's representation and evidence (including trap officer testimony), and the Division Bench's judgment setting aside dismissal was unsustainable and therefore set aside, restoring the Single Judge's decision upholding dismissal.
Source excerpt
Dismissal from service
Disciplinary enquiry
Standard of proof
Intra-court writ appeal
Deemed suspension
Admissibility of confessional statements in disciplinary proceedings
The Division Bench held that Muthoot Finance Ltd., a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and operating as a non-banking finance company, is not a 'State' within Article 12 and its functions are not governmental or of public nature; RBI regulatory guidelines do not render it an instrumentality of the State, and therefore writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not available against it in this matter.
The High Court's declaration that the acquisition had lapsed under Section 24(2) was quashed because the record showed possession had been taken over and handed to the acquiring body/beneficiary on the date of the award, and the petitioners were subsequent purchasers and/or encroachers who cannot challenge the acquisition or claim benefit under Section 24(2); therefore the writ petition by subsequent purchasers was not maintainable and is dismissed.