Supreme Court held that heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act take as tenants-in-common with separate shares, so karta-based legal necessity did not apply.
Because notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act was not served on the actual possessors (the appellants), de facto possession was not transferred to the State by any of the statutory methods before the Repealing Act came into force; consequently proceedings under the ULC Act relating to transfer of possession abated under Section 4 of the Repealing Act and the appellants are entitled to consequential reliefs; the High Court's contrary findings were set aside.
Agreement to sell, General Power of Attorney, affidavit and receipt did not transfer title because no registered sale deed was executed as required by Section 54; the General Power of Attorney did not effect conveyance; the registered Will was not properly proved and was surrounded by suspicious circumstances and therefore did not confer title; plaintiff was not in possession and so could not avail Section 53A; accordingly the judgments below upholding plaintiff's title were set aside and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed.
The respondent's prolonged defaults, lackadaisical and indifferent conduct in complying with payment and judicial orders, coupled with the Board's duty as custodian of public property and resulting loss to the public exchequer, justified interfering with the High Court's direction to execute the sale deed; the respondent's right to make payment pursuant to that order stands conclusively closed, he must vacate within four months, and in default the Board may dislodge him and recover the specified balance with interest and re-auction the plot.
Where a plaintiff establishing title under a prior instrument is not an executant of a subsequent instrument relied on by a defendant, the plaintiff is not obliged to seek cancellation under Section 31; Section 34 permits a declaratory decree and the proviso to s.34 requires claiming further relief only where such relief directly and necessarily flows from the declaration and is within the plaintiff's ability to seek; the High Court erred in dismissing the suit solely because the plaintiff did not pray for cancellation of the subsequent sale deed, and the trial court decree in favour of the p…
The High Court erred in re-appreciating evidence and framing a non-substantial question of law under Section 100/103 CPC; the First Appellate Court had considered the evidence and plausibly concluded that Defendant No.1 purchased the suit property in 1989 with funds including a loan from DW3, and plaintiffs failed to prove a joint family nucleus or that the purchase was from joint family funds; consequently the suit property is self-acquired and the sale to Defendant No.2 is valid.
The High Court's condonation of the 1537-day delay is upheld because the dispute concerns title to land claimed by the State as government land and in the State's possession, a matter that requires adjudication on merits; accordingly the Second Appeal should be heard on merits, subject to the respondent paying costs of Rs.50,000 to the appellant within one month, failing which the Second Appeal shall be dismissed.
The High Court was correct in holding that an ancillary prayer effectively seeking partition could not be granted when the principal suit for administration of the estate was held non-maintainable for non-joinder of necessary parties; accordingly the Trial Court's decree for possession could not stand. Vishnu's sale to the 2nd defendant is valid only to the extent of Vishnu's undivided share in the suit property (held to be 1/5th), and the plaintiff's possession cannot be disturbed until the property is partitioned in accordance with law.
The earlier suit (O.S.No.80/1978) between the appellant and the State for permanent injunction was decided on the merits and attained finality; the State is therefore bound by that decree and the plaintiffs in the subsequent representative suit, who were not parties and had knowledge of the earlier litigation but did not seek to be impleaded, have no locus standi to maintain a suit in representative capacity to obtain declaratory reliefs on behalf of the State; accordingly the representative suit is not maintainable and must be dismissed.