Abramovich v Chief Minister of Jersey and Ors

Directions in relation to provision of personal data [2026]JRC094 Royal Court (Samedi) 13 April 2026 Before : Advocate David Michael Cadin, Master of the Royal Court. Between Roman Arkadyevich Abramovich Plaintiff And (1) Chief Minister of Jersey (2) Minister for Treasury and Resources (3) Minister of Sustainable Economic Development (4) The Minister for External Relations (5) Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police (6) Comptroller of Revenue Defendants Advocate H. Sharp KC for the Plaintiff Advocate M. O’Connell for the First to Fourth and Sixth Defendants (the “GOJ Defendants”) Advocate S. C. Thomas, for the Fifth Defendant, excused attendance judgment the master: Introduction 1. This is my judgment in relation to the Plaintiff’s summons seeking orders that the GOJ Defendants revisit their Tranche 1 provision of personal data and provide metadata relating to Tranches 1 and 2. The Current Position 2. The background to these proceedings is set out in my judgment dated 21 November 2025, reported at [2025] JRC 308. Since then: (i) for the reasons set out in the File and Parties’ Judgment dated 2 December 2025, the parties have fixed a preliminary hearing before the Royal Court for 27 May 2026 with a time estimate of 3 days to determine, amongst other things: "a. whether the Royal Court will follow the procedure adopted by the High Court in X v Transcription Agency LLP [2023]

EWHC 1092 (KB), and if not, to determine how the Royal Court will proceed; and b. whether there should be a single trial or a split trial or whether the Court wishes to proceed in relation to specific issues." (ii) the parties and the Court have all engaged significantly, and on an informal basis, to progress the various technical aspects of these proceedings such that whatever order the Court might make in May 2026, the Court and the parties should be in a relatively advanced state of preparedness to facilitate the substantive hearing. The current state of preparedness is set out in a “Memorandum about the Technical Workstream” dated 27 March 2026 from DWF Law LLP (“DWF”), the GOJ Defendants’ English solicitors. (iii) the Plaintiff issued a further DSAR on 17 March 2026 directed to the Government of Jersey’s London Office for the period 1 January 2016 to 16 March 2026 (as against the existing DSARs which were dated 11 April 2023 and relate to the period 1 January 2016 to 11 April 2023). (iv) the GOJ Defendants have: (a) provided Tranches 1 and 2 of the Plaintiff’s personal data (on 28 November 2025 and 27 February 2026 respectively), with Tranche 3 (the final tranche) due by 29 May 2026; (b) provided schedules in relation to those tranches - Schedule 1, listing the personal data provided, and Schedule 2 listing the personal data withheld together with the basis for so

doing; (c) provided an Annex to paragraph 36A of their Re-Re-Amended Answer “setting out with such particularity as they will rely upon in open court the basis of claim for privilege claimed in para 36A” or other exemptions; that Annex has been updated to reflect the delivery of Tranche 2 and the Plaintiff has filed a Reply to the updated Annex which identifies the issues of principle between the parties in relation to exemptions, but not the granular detail on a document by document basis; (d) progressed Tranche 3 of personal data which has reduced from more than a terabyte of data to some 30,000 responsive documents; (e) been working towards the provision of a discovery protocol by 12 June 2026; and (f) requested an adjournment of the preliminary issue listed before the Royal Court (such application to be heard on 20 April 2026). (v) the Chief Officer has: (a) provided an updated, and extended, discovery protocol, which was not challenged by the Plaintiff; (b) applied that protocol, and served his affidavit of discovery on 20 March 2026, followed by a supplemental affidavit on 25 March 2026; (c) agreed to the Plaintiff’s request that he amend his Answer and Second Schedule of personal data (identifying the personal data withheld and the basis for the same) to provide additional particulars of the claim to legal professional privilege. Drafts of the amended documents have been

recently provided to the Plaintiff. (vi) an issue has arisen between the Plaintiff and the GOJ Defendants in that, according to the Plaintiff, documents containing personal data withheld by the GOJ Defendants on the grounds of privilege were disclosed to the Plaintiff by the Attorney General in other proceedings. The Plaintiff submits that this would undermine the GOJ Defendants’ claim to privilege. The GOJ Defendants do not apparently know what documents were disclosed. The parties have not been able to resolve this issue either between themselves or with the Attorney General. Accordingly, the Plaintiff intends to issue a Representation this month to be released from his implied undertaking in the other proceedings to facilitate the use of those documents in the current proceedings.

3. On 11 March 2026, the Plaintiff issued a summons, without any supporting affidavit evidence, seeking orders that the GOJ Defendants: “1. Pursuant to Article 68(2)(d) of the Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2018, the GOJ Defendants shall perform a second and full review of the material relevant to Tranche One.

2. Without prejudice to the generality of the Order sought at paragraph 1, the GOJ Defendants shall: 2.1 use Al/machine learning tools to search for all relevant personal data 2.2 perform searches of the mobile telephones of Ministers a senior civil servants that were used pursuant to the GOJ Defendants' “Bring Your Own Device' policy, and which the GOJ Defendants have to date refused to search. 2.3 provide all of the Plaintiff's non-exempt personal data in an intelligible format such that the Plaintiff is able to understand how his personal data has been processed by the GOJ Defendants. 2.4 produce a new and/or updated Schedules 1 and 2 in respect of Tranche One and listing with full particulars the personal data disclosed and/or withheld. 3…provide the Plaintiff with the metadata relevant to Tranches One and Two, in the form of a DAT load file in order to enable the Plaintiff to upload the data to an electronic review platform efficiently and at proportionate cost...” The Procedural Background 4. Before addressing the parties’ submissions, I think it necessary to revisit some of the milestones in this litigation: (i) On 7 July 2025, in a judgment reported at [2025] JRC 299, the Court found that the GOJ Defendants’ purported compliance with the DSARs was deficient and ordered the GOJ Defendants to provide the Plaintiff with his personal data by 7 October 2025 and that before

so doing, they should use reasonable endeavours to agree the methodology with the Plaintiff. (ii) Methodologies were agreed between the parties in August 2025 but on 1 October 2025, shortly before a hearing and less than a week before expiry of the deadline, the GOJ Defendants informed the Plaintiff that they would not be complying with the 7 July 2025 Orders, and subsequently provided a letter from DWF stating that: “It quickly became apparent to us that the methodologies overlooked some of the critical elements that are needed to address the substance and spirit of the directions… Across each of these platforms and environments, an appropriate methodology will need to include logical steps for (a) the identification of data, (b) data acquisition and retrieval, (c) migration of data to review platforms, (d) data analysis and review and (e) data treatment. These exercises need to address issues of (i) data integrity, (ii) completeness of processes and (iii) assurance of the previous points. The performance of these activities requires strong and robust methodologies, the development of which needs expert support, time and care. Strong and robust methodologies will need to consider and address issues related to technical and process feasibility, including the roles and responsibilities for actions; the technical tooling required; the need to adhere to and comply with wider legal

principles related to data management, such as the maintenance of security and confidentiality at all stages and the respect for any associated data protection and privacy rights, including those of third parties, that arise as a result of the execution of the methodologies; and, of course, the specific components of compliance with a DSAR concerning the scope of personal data, the application of statutory exemptions and the format of production of information. Clearly, the agreed methodologies do not address, or come close to addressing, these essential requirements. While it will be noted that they do identify search terms, search time frames, platforms to be searched, parties to communications and rationales for the searches, but they do not address the substance of the issues that I have outlined in the paragraphs immediately above.” (Emphasis added) (iii) At that hearing on 1 October 2025, Advocate O’Connell for the GOJ Defendants stated in response to a question from the Court: “MASTER:… The Government of Jersey and Mr Abramovich identified a methodology, identified the particular areas of concern that were going to be mined. Having agreed that, why is that inappropriate? ADVOCATE O'CONNELL: Well all I can do, Sir, is to repeat the submission that I have made and to point you to the advice that is contained within the letter from DWF, which is that both parties appear to

have been in error in believing that the methodology that they had agreed was going to be fit for purpose. When it was scrutinised properly by DWF they identified that it was unfit for purpose, and perhaps one reason that the parties themselves, and I do not wish to point the finger of blame at the Plaintiff and I am not doing so, I am accepting that the Government of Jersey Defendants are in a very difficult position, but perhaps both parties have fallen into error, as revealed by a submission that my learned friend made concerning this being a straightforward disclosure or discovery exercise. It is not, and that is, in my submission, a fundamental misunderstanding.” (Emphasis added) (iv) On 2 October 2025, the GOJ Defendants issued an application to vary the 7 July 2025 Orders and that application was the subject of the 21 November 2025 judgment. Various affidavits were sworn in advance of that hearing, and in an affidavit sworn on 3 November 2025, Mr May-Drew on behalf of the GOJ Defendants stated, for the first time, that: “4.2. The production of the Plaintiff's personal data, subject to the application by the GOJ Defendants of any appropriate exemptions under the Law, will be fulfilled in three tranches. 4.3. The first tranche will be fulfilled before 5pm on 28 November 2025.” (v) At the hearing on 13 November 2025, Advocate O’Connell stated that: “[if what is

being suggested is that] the reason for DWF being hired was so that, GOJ Defendants could resile from the agreed methodologies…that is not so, and…whilst we submit that the methodologies as agreed in August are far too wide… there is a commitment to comply with the agreed methodologies…” (vi) The judgment of 21 November 2025 was a watershed moment in that summary judgment was granted against the GOJ Defendants and in so doing, the Court held that: “63… Whilst pre-judgment compliance with a DSAR is a matter for the data controller under Articles 27 and 28 of the DPJL, post-judgment compliance is a matter for the Court under Article 68(2) of the DPJL and to that extent, the Court is empowered to make "such order as it considers appropriate" which could include the appointment of one or more third parties.” (vii) The Act of Court dated 21 November 2025 recorded that: “3. the GOJ Defendants shall provide the Plaintiff with his personal data in 3 tranches: a. the first tranche will comprise the Employment, Social Security and Housing customer relationship management data, mobile phone data and the live mailbox and cryoserver data currently held by DWF for the period 1 January 2016 to 31 January 2022, excluding data from the Treasury and Exchequer; b. the second tranche will comprise the live mailboxes and the cryoserver for the period 1 February 2022 to 11 April 2023 and Treasury

and Exchequer disclosure for personal data found within the live mailboxes and the cryoserver for the full date range; and c. the third tranche will comprise the balance of the Plaintiff's personal data held by the GOJ Defendants.” (viii) Tranche 1 of the Plaintiff’s personal data was provided on 28 November 2025, under cover of a detailed letter running to some 12 pages, together with Schedule 1 (listing personal data disclosed), Schedule 2 (listing personal data withheld) and various other attachments including a methodology from FTI Consulting which stated that: “An expanded set of search terms will apply to all unstructured data sources except for mobile devices. Unstructured data sources consist of email, file shares and other document sources whereby each document type can contain a wide variety of data. Structured data sources are databases or similar whereby the data within follows a specific schema. The expanded terms are designed to capture potential data relating to the Plaintiff. These search terms were expanded from those in the Agreed Methodologies in order to apply a consistent set of criteria across all departments and sources, and to ensure that a known misspelling is captured, as well as other potential misspellings.” (ix) Tranche 3 was further refined in the Act of Court dated 17 December 2025 which provided that: “a. Tranche 3 shall comprise the material set

out in the letter from DWF Law LLP dated 15 December 2025 sent to Kobre and Kim…” (x) That letter from DWF to Kobre & Kim, the Plaintiff’s English Solicitors, stated that Tranche 3 would be keyword-responsive documents, from a variety of data sources and controllers, and it would also include: “Documents retrieved (if not covered by any of the above [specific datasets]) from the Live Mailbox and Cryoserver platforms relating to the Agreed Methodology Additional Tasks document and the discrepancies referenced in section 4 above, for the date range 1st January 2016 to 11th April 2023: - Employment, Social Security and Housing (data controller no. 61749). - Office of the Chief Executive (data controller no 57259). - Department for the Economy (data controller no. 70865). - Department for External Relations (data controller no 100803). - Treasury and Exchequer (data controller no. 17472). - Comptroller of Revenue (data controller no. 15627).” (Emphasis added) (xi) Tranche 2 of the Plaintiff’s personal data was provided on 27 February 2026, under cover of a detailed letter from DWF, together with schedules and other documents. That letter stated that: “6. The context covered by Tranche 2 is largely concerned with the period following the designation of the Plaintiff for sanctions purposes, thus it is fundamentally different to Tranche 1, which is largely concerned with the

Plaintiff's application for residency in Jersey. The period following the Plaintiff's designation resulted in data processing for various crime related purposes, such as those within Sanction and Asset Freezing (Jersey) Law 2019 ("SAFL") and relating to the Saisie and the criminal investigation. Therefore, the Crime and Taxation exemption in Article 45 of the Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2018 ("DP(J)L") has been applied, in addition to the Legal Professional Privilege exemption in Article 57 and other withholdings to protect Third Party Data and Non-Personal Data. Furthermore, the National Security exemption in Article 41 may be applied in due course.” The Parties’ Submissions 5. The parties filed extensive Skeleton Arguments and in addition made detailed oral submissions.

6. Advocate Sharp, for the Plaintiff, submitted that his main concern was that production of Tranche 1 of personal data was deficient. He had written to the GOJ Defendants in December 2025 raising queries about the exercise that had been undertaken and had not received a response until 19 February 2026, 6 days before Tranche 2 was to be provided. Those answers did not assuage his concerns in that: (i) By his calculations, only 17% of the documents reviewed contained the Plaintiff’s personal data yet notwithstanding this irrelevancy rate, DWF had not used the tools in Relativity, the document management platform, to search for personal data. When asked, DWF replied that “Neither Computer Assisted Learning nor Al was deployed. Your question package implies that computer review is preferable to human review. Particularly given the nature of a DSAR exercise, the GOJ Defendants do not agree.” (ii) Emails containing personal data were disclosed and these emails referred to other documents which had not been disclosed. Advocate Sharp said that he had raised these queries with the GOJ Defendants and their answers were “unhelpful”. (iii) Only limited searches had been carried out for mobile devices, in part because the Plaintiff had been told that mobile devices were not used. That assertion no longer appears to be correct, yet the GOJ Defendants were refusing to look further. (iv) Many of the documents provided had been subjected to such heavy redaction that they were difficult, if not impossible, to understand and this was contrary to basic principles.

7. From Advocate Sharp’s perspective, the appropriate course was for the Court to require the GOJ Defendants to redo Tranche 1, using AI or machine learning, and to provide the data without such heavy redaction.

8. In addition, Advocate Sharp sought a “DAT load file” in relation to the material provided so that it could be more efficiently loaded into a review platform and would provide the “helpful and necessary context” to the personal data disclosed. From his perspective, this was not intended to be a contentious request, and he would have expected it to be provided in the usual way.

9. Advocate O’Connell for the GOJ Defendants submitted that: (i) The Plaintiff’s approach was “extraordinary” in that he was asking the Court, at a case management hearing, to make a finding that the GOJ Defendants’ response to the Plaintiff’s DSAR was defective and unlawful such that they should redo the work. (ii) In substance, the Plaintiff was asking for summary judgment without issuing a summons and/or without providing any affidavit evidence and that was both inappropriate and not in accordance with the Royal Court Rules. (iii) The right place for all of these issues to be addressed is at trial when the Court will have before it detailed evidence, together with redacted and unredacted documents. That is all the more so since the process of providing the Plaintiff with his personal data is still ongoing and will not be completed until Tranche 3 has been provided. (iv) Acceding to the Plaintiff’s requests would be to open the floodgates in that every time the GOJ Defendants produced some personal data, there would be an attempt by the Plaintiff to get more. (v) Insofar as the Plaintiff wanted the GOJ Defendants to look at mobile phone data, this was simply a case of “buyer’s remorse”. The Plaintiff had agreed the methodologies, and he was stuck with them; it was too late to change the terms, and it would be a massive expansion of the task to require the devices to be

searched, and would be disproportionate. (vi) If the Plaintiff was really submitting that the personal data provided was “unintelligible” he would have to come to the trial court personally to explain how and why it was unintelligible given that it all related to his application for residency. It was not enough for the Plaintiff’s Counsel simply to make submissions that the personal data was unintelligible. (vii) As to the DAT Load file, not only had the Plaintiff not provided any evidence about this but he was not entitled to it. Whilst such a file might be provided on discovery, the current process is not discovery. Moreover, when the Plaintiff agreed the methodologies, he did not mention any DAT load file. Discussion Jurisdiction 10. The first point to consider is as to my jurisdiction, at an interlocutory case management hearing, to make orders about the personal data being provided by the GOJ Defendants: (i) Advocate Sharp submitted that the Court could and should intervene if it were “plain and obvious” that something had gone wrong. The orders which the GOJ Defendants were purportedly complying with were made by me, and I am therefore well-placed to ascertain whether there has been compliance, or at the very least, my expectations have been met. (ii) Conversely, Advocate O’Connell submitted forcefully that my task is simply to ensure that the case is fit for trial, and that none of the orders sought by Advocate Sharp addressed that limited issue.

11. In my 7 July 2025 judgment, I held (at paragraph 17) that: “(i) although the question of whether the GOJ Defendants have or have not complied with their obligations under the DPJL is the ultimate issue for the Royal Court to determine at trial, these proceedings have not yet been set down for hearing and there are a number of interlocutory stages that must be completed before the case will be ready for trial; (ii) Advocate Boothman has not suggested that his clients will not do more to comply with their obligations, and he invites the Court to direct them as to where they should look; (iii) in those circumstances, and to the extent that it is plain and obvious that there are issues with the GOJ Defendants' professed compliance, it is appropriate for me to exercise my case management powers in the first instance to try to resolve any such issues.” 12. I remain of that view. These proceedings are a long way from trial (the assumption at the Bar seemed to be a 4 week trial in 2027) and there are a significant number of interlocutory issues to be addressed before any such trial might take place. I would regard it as wholly unsatisfactory and outwith the provisions of the Overriding Objective for this Court to be unable to make any necessary course corrections ahead of that trial, if it is plain and obvious that such corrections be required. Clearly the Court must be circumspect and avoid trespassing on those areas which are properly reserved for trial, especially where, as in this case, no evidence has been filed.

13. I therefore reject the GOJ Defendants’ submission that having directed that the GOJ Defendants provide the Plaintiff’s personal data, this Court is powerless to intervene as and when it identifies issues. Irrelevancy 14. Having delivered Tranches 1 and 2, the Court now has empirical evidence about the exercise carried out by the GOJ Defendants: (i) DWF’s letter dated 15 December 2025, stated that there were “(approximately 1.7 TB for Tranche 3 in comparison to 69 GB for Tranches 1 & 2 combined…)”; (ii) applying a rule of thumb that 1 gigabyte of data can hold between 5,000 and 10,000 documents, the total amount of data referred to by DWF could amount to between 8.8 million and 17.6 million documents; (iii) DWF’s letter dated 19 February 2026 stated that the total number of key word responsive documents for Tranche 1 was 2,244, of which 362 were disclosed (albeit that were 316 originally listed on Schedule 1, and 62 on Schedule 2); (iv) 3,248 items of personal data were disclosed in Tranche 2 (the cumulative total of the items referred to in Schedule 1 (1,522 items) and Schedule 2 (1,726 items)); (v) in answer to a question from the Court at the hearing on 30 March 2026, Advocate O’Connell indicated that for Tranche 3, the GOJ Defendants were now dealing with some 30,000 responsive documents and that figure would reduce further on review.

15. On any view, these numbers illustrate a significant difference between the data given to DWF (possibly some 8.8 million documents) and that disclosed to the Plaintiff as comprising his personal data (less than 33,610 documents). Put another way, less than 0.38% of the documents provided to DWF contained personal data.

16. These figures are somewhat reminiscent of the comments in my 7 July 2025 judgment, which were subsequently cited and relied upon by the Royal Court (at paragraph 53) of its 22 September 2025 judgment: “27(v)…(b) only 1,828 relevant documents were identified which is less than 2% of the documents reviewed…In my judgment, and without any explanation having been provided: (1) the ratio of relevant to irrelevant documents (i.e. those containing personal data and those not containing personal data), is indicative of a lack of focus in the searches that were carried out and might suggest that the GOJ Defendants were looking in the wrong place for personal data…” 17. In my judgment, it is self-evident that these numbers will require explanation. However, no such explanation was provided in the covering letters to Tranches 1 or 2, and when Advocate Sharp asked DWF and/or Advocate O’Connell to confirm that they “intend to swear an affidavit and provide suitable confirmations in respect of this (and any future) production”, DWF requested that he “explain the basis upon which you consider that this is required by the Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2018. As already explained on multiple occasions, this is not document production.” 18. As I noted in the 21 November 2025 judgment, this case is no longer a simple question of whether a data controller has responded to a DSAR; the Court

has granted summary judgment and to that extent, it concerns post-judgment relief under Article 68(2) of the DPJL which provides that the Court may “make such order as it considers appropriate, including…(d) requiring the controller to give effect to the transparency and subject rights provisions.” 19. Whilst it will be a matter for the trial Court as to exactly how the Plaintiff’s rights will be vindicated, my role is to identify the issues, or the potential issues, at an early date and to give directions “to ensure that the trial of a case proceeds quickly and efficiently” (RCR 1/6(6)). The GOJ Defendants say that they are working to satisfy the Plaintiff’s rights; yet the work that has been carried out raises plain and obvious issues that will need to surface if the Royal Court is to proceed to a determination, and there seems to be a reluctance on the part of the GOJ Defendants to engage with those issues. Accordingly, I propose to make case management directions to address the issue of irrelevancy: (i) an explanation should be provided as to the irrelevancy rate for this data and the significance, if any, thereof, including without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, why it is so high, whether it is indicative of any missteps (such as looking in the wrong place for personal data, or a lack of focus), and whether any corrective measures might be required; (ii) DWF

hold an enormous amount of non-responsive data that may, or may not, have been reviewed. That non-responsive data should be subject to a quality control process to establish, to an appropriate degree of confidence, that it does not contain the Plaintiff’s personal data and a detailed explanation should be given as to the quality control exercise carried out; (iii) having carried out those exercises, the GOJ Defendants should verify the production of the Plaintiff’s personal data (they and only they, know where it might be stored), and should do so on affidavit. Missing Documents 20. Advocate Sharp’s Skeleton Argument refers to numerous instances of allegedly missing documents (paragraphs 7.6 to 7.16). By way of example, one of those documents is a report prepared by the Jersey Financial Services Commission: (i) Disclosure Bates 48 (Document TR1-P-394) is an email from Mr Bradbury to a gov.je email address and copied to a number of other .gov.je email addresses, with a subject of “FW: [Redacted] Limited” and an attachment. The email refers to “a short dossier from the JFSC in the same vein”. (ii) Disclosure Bates 73 (Document TR1-P-495) is an email from the Housing Control Manager to Mr Bradbury, with attachments, which states: “My report states that – ‘The JFSC confirms that it provided a detailed intelligence report collating open source information on Mr Abramovich for the

Population Office in 2016. That report was considered by Ministers during the determination of the 2(1)(e) applications relating to Messrs [Redacted], all of which were ultimately approved. [Redacted] [Redacted]. Similarly, I did not have sight of a copy of the JFSC Report. Presumably Mr A did feature as part of this intelligence in order for us to be satisfied that there no reputational risk existed?” (iii) Advocate Sharp queried with DWF why the JFSC report had not been provided in Tranche 1. The response from DWF on 19 February 2026 was that: “The DSAR Review has been performed against keyword-responsive documents. Where a keyword-responsive document is identified as relevant, it has been, or will be, disclosed in accordance with the Guidelines. Regarding Disclosure Bates 48, it refers to an attachment. That attachment is Disclosure Bates 39. Disclosure Bates 39 itself has attachments, which are 334 and 335. All of these documents are noted in the Schedules already disclosed.” (iv) The JFSC report is not to be found in Disclosure Bates 39, 334 or 335. (v) In answer to a question from the Court, Advocate O’Connell indicated that the JFSC report “may come up” in Tranche 3.

21. At this stage, the production of the Plaintiff’s personal data is still a work in progress, and as set out in paragraph 4(x) above, there is a sweep up provision in the methodology for Tranche 3 such that it is premature to consider whether personal data is, or might be, missing. Accordingly, I do not propose to make any orders in relation thereto, nor do I think it appropriate to require the GOJ Defendants to redo Tranche 1, pending the provision of Tranche 3.

22. If, however, the concerns remain after production of Tranche 3, the Court will expect the parties to engage constructively in relation to allegedly missing personal data, for the GOJ Defendants to adopt a curious rather than a dismissive or defensive stance, and for the Plaintiff to reflect on the responses and the proportionality of the request. If the parties cannot resolve the issues between themselves, the Plaintiff should bring an application on affidavit evidence and in so doing, should explain why it is necessary and proportionate, and why it is appropriate for that application to be determined ahead of trial.

23. Insofar as the GOJ Defendants appeared to suggest in submissions that the answer to any such application would be that they had carried out a “reasonable and proportionate search” and that this is a matter clearly for trial, I would respectfully remind them of paragraph 29(ii) and (iii) of the July 2025 Judgment: “29… (ii) yet nowhere in the Re-Amended Answer, Advocate Boothman's letter of 31 January 2025 or in any of Mr Bradbury's affidavits is there any assertion that the GOJ Defendants' response to the DSARs has been circumscribed by limiting the searches to what they regard as a "reasonable and proportionate" search, nor have they ever previously identified the criteria applied to make such a determination. To the contrary, the positive averment at paragraph 34 of the Re-Amended Answer is that "any personal data to which the Plaintiff is entitled being provided as soon as reasonably practicable." (iii) nor, in my judgment, is it obvious how it might be "reasonable and proportionate" only to search a huge pile of some 92,000 documents, 98% of which are irrelevant and do not contain personal data…” 24. As to that latter point, the numbers are now even more stark – 8.8 million documents of which over 99% are irrelevant and do not contain personal data. Mobile Devices 25. Ahead of the parties agreeing methodologies in August 2025, Advocate Sharp asked the GOJ Defendants

“Why are no searches being proposed of the relevant GOJ Ministers’ and civil servants’ electronic devices, given it is widely known that they routinely use messenger apps and mobile telephones to conduct important Government business?” Advocate Boothman replied for the GOJ Defendants by email dated 24 July 2025 stating that: “Whilst the possibility that there may be personal data on individual devices cannot be wholly excluded, it is considered unlikely that such data would exist. Accordingly, to conduct searches of multiple devices (given the timeframe of the DSAR), for multiple individuals is not considered reasonable or proportionate. The efforts required to conduct such a search would be extensive and it is not known to what extent these devices even still exist for the period in question. The Government of Jersey does not routinely review individual Minsters’ or civil servants’ personal devices when responding to a DSAR.” (Emphasis added) 26. The parties agreed to disagree and to carry out limited searches only, as reflected in an email from Advocate Sharp to my secretary dated 8 August 2025: “6. As to mobile devices and messaging applications, the GOJ Defendants will search the devices of current relevant Ministers for the period 2016 - 2023, using the search terms "Roman A" and "Abramovich". The Plaintiff reserves his position as to the adequacy of these searches and the

need for any additional searches, and therefore once the searches have been undertaken, the GOJ Defendants will inform the Plaintiff of the results and the parties may agree, depending on those results, for further broader searches of mobile devices and messenger applications to be undertaken. If agreement cannot be reached as to any further searches to be undertaken, the Plaintiff reserves the right to apply to Court for directions. At the same time as providing the search results, the GOJ Defendants will provide copies of and/or confirm to the Plaintiff their internal policies for the use of mobile devices and messenger applications for work purposes.” (Emphasis added) 27. The internal policy was subsequently clarified by Mr May-Drew in his second affidavit sworn on 17 October 2025 in which he stated that: “3.7 GOJ operates a Bring Your Own Device ("BYOD") Policy for GOJ users who access GOJ information and systems from their personally owned mobile devices, including mobile telephones. I now exhibit that Policy at pages 15 to 17 of CMD1. Mobile devices that are to be used to store or access GOJ information must have Mobile Device Management (MDM) software installed and be able to support all additional required security features. This effectively creates a partition on a user's personally owned device, between their personal data and applications, and GOJ data and

applications. The MDM system allows the GOJ information to be remotely wiped in the event that a personally owned device is lost or stolen. Under the policy, GOJ information held on personally owned devices is subject to the requirements of Freedom of Information and Subject Access Requests.” (Emphasis added) 28. In correspondence, Advocate Sharp stated that Mr May-Drew’s evidence was inconsistent with Advocate Boothman’s email and sought the GOJ Defendants’ comments. DWF replied (on 19 February 2026) that: “The parameters of the searches of the mobile devices were agreed by the Plaintiff. This is an unreasonable and disproportionate approach and we do not agree that it is required.” 29. In submissions, Advocate O’Connell stressed that this was an inappropriate case of “buyer’s remorse” and that having agreed the methodologies, it was no longer open to the Plaintiff to request additional searches. In terms, he submitted that the Plaintiff was “stuck with the methodology”.

30. In my judgment, that is a difficult submission to maintain in that: (i) on the basis of the correspondence, it seems to me to be unlikely that there was full and frank disclosure ahead of the agreement of the methodologies such that the Plaintiff’s consent to any agreement might be described as being “informed”; (ii) whatever information was provided, Advocate Sharp’s email to my secretary was clear that “[t]he Plaintiff reserves his position as to the adequacy of these searches and the need for any additional searches” and despite being copied into the email, the GOJ Defendants did not object to that reservation; (iii) as noted at paragraph 18 above, we are now post-judgment and the GOJ Defendants can no longer dictate the extent of compliance with the Plaintiff’s DSARs.

31. Nevertheless, I am conscious that I have no evidence before me in relation to the matters set out in paragraph 22 above which, in my judgment, apply equally to these mobile devices and it would not therefore be appropriate for me to make any orders in relation thereto. Redactions 32. Advocate Sharp submits that the Plaintiff is entitled to know how his data has been processed and to that extent, the GOJ Defendants should provide it in an intelligible form. He submits that the redactions carried out have been too heavy handed: “9.3. The GOJ Defendants have applied such a liberal approach to the use of redactions that on many occasions the relevant document produced contains little more than the Plaintiff's name. See, for example [references to various documents from Tranche 1 and Tranche 2]. This entirely decontextualised information does not assist the Plaintiff in understanding how or why his data was processed by the GOJ Defendants, and therefore the provision of it does not discharge their DPJL obligations. Indeed, that was precisely the type of behaviour in Ashley (there, on the part of His Majesty's Revenue and Customs) which the High Court rejected as being inappropriate in response to a DSAR.” 33. I have set out details of the documents referenced by Advocate Sharp in that paragraph of his Skeleton Argument in a Schedule to this judgment, which, although it forms part of this judgment, is for the File and Parties only.

34. Advocate O’Connell submits that intelligibility is a matter for trial and oral evidence and is not something that could or should be assessed at a case management hearing. His position, in terms, is that it is not appropriate for me to “mark his homework” in terms of redactions and that submissions from Advocate Sharp about documents being unintelligible are no substitute for proper evidence. He did, however, accept that when this matter is considered by the trial court with both redacted and unredacted documents before it, it is highly likely that some redactions will be removed.

35. Having reviewed the documents about which complaint is made, I have no hesitation in finding that the redaction has been at the maximalist end of the scale in that any information which is not personal data has been redacted. As a stark example, Bates Disclosure 201 from Tranche 1 is a document that has been redacted entirely apart from 19 words in the middle. Without the details contained in Schedule 1, there is no way of knowing that this document is an email as the header has been redacted entirely. Whilst I accept that the header is unlikely to contain the Plaintiff’s personal data, this level of redaction appears unnecessary, and indeed, is inconsistent with the information provided in Schedule 1.

36. In my judgment, such an approach does not appear to accord with the guidance I gave to the parties in November 2024 or the decision in Ashley v The Commissioners for His Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2025] EWHC 134 (KB), as noted in the July judgment: “(ii) in the guidance that I previously offered the parties in the November 2024 judgment, I noted that: "51. I am, however, conscious of the fact that personal data is not solely limited to documents, and it may be that the parties need to work together to identify how personal data could, and should, be described and/or produced, and how it sits with discovery. Some assistance might be found in F.F. v Österreichische Datenschutzbehorde (C-487/21) EU:C:2023:369 (04 May 2023), where the Court of Justice of the European Union held at paragraph 45 that: “... the right to obtain from the controller a copy of the personal data undergoing processing means that the data subject must be given a faithful and intelligible reproduction of all those data. That right entails the right to obtain copies of extracts from documents or even entire documents or extracts from databases which contain, inter alia, those data, if the provision of such a copy is essential in order to enable the data subject to exercise effectively the rights conferred on him or her by that regulation, bearing in mind that account must be taken, in that regard, of

the rights and freedoms of others." (iii) that decision in F.F. v Osterreichische Datenschutzbehorde has recently been followed by the English High Court, in relation to a statute similarly worded to the DPJL, in the case of Ashley v The Commissioners for His Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2025] EWHC 134 (KB). In so doing, Heather Williams J held that: "205. As I noted at para 126 above, FF is not binding upon this Court. However, I consider that the CJEU's reasoning (which I have discussed at paras 128 - 132 above) is persuasive and that this Court should follow it ... It is also in keeping with the entitlements conferred by Article 15(1), which gives the data subject the right to access their personal data that is being processed, in order to (amongst other things) assess whether to exercise rights regarding rectification or erasure or to object to the processing. If the data subject is only provided with a decontextualised snippet of data, such as their name, they may well not be able to assess the lawfulness of the processing or exercise their rights in a meaningful way (depending on the particular circumstances) ... It is also in keeping with the over-arching importance placed on transparency, which stems from the understanding that, without transparent information as to how their personal data is being processed, data subjects cannot enforce the rights afforded to them to have their personal data protected (para 65 above)." 37. However, thinking that redactions might have been heavy handed does not assist in determining whether the redactions are wrong or what level of redactions might be appropriate. In my judgment, that exercise can only be carried out by someone sighted on both the redacted, and the unredacted, documents.

38. The GOJ Defendants’ position is that redactions are a matter for trial. However, given both the granular nature of that exercise and the likely further applications that will follow each time a layer of redaction is removed, I do not necessarily think that that is an appropriate use of scarce Court resources, particularly as it will inevitably prolong the trial. The parties are likely to be at extreme opposites in terms of their attitudes to redaction, such that whatever the GOJ Defendants do, it is likely to be challenged. However, I would respectfully invite the GOJ Defendants to consider whether they need to fight every battle, particularly where that will impact on Court scheduling and resources. For example, I can readily accept that redactions for LPP will be maintained, in full, absent evidence that any claim for privilege has been undermined and that LPP will inevitably be an issue for trial. Non-personal data redactions might be far less critical such that a more minimalist approach (for example, redacting only that information falling within an exemption), could be adopted, especially if done within a confidentiality arrangement. Accordingly, pursuant to the Overriding Objective, I will give the GOJ Defendants an opportunity prior to the production of Tranche 3 to reflect on the current level of redactions for Tranches 1 and 2, and if so minded, to file less-redacted documents.

39. If the GOJ Defendants maintain the current level of redactions, the Court may well consider referring the issue of redaction for non-personal data and/or third-party data to the Royal Court pursuant to RCR 6/24, ahead of trial and following determination of the current preliminary issue in relation to the procedure to be followed, in order to reduce the extent of the issues at trial. Were it to do so, costs would be a live issue, especially given the GOJ Defendants’ acceptance (noted at paragraph 34 above) that the trial Court is unlikely to agree with all of the redactions made. DAT Load File 40. The DAT Load file is an integral part of any eDiscovery exercise. It provides an index to the documents and saves the recipient the time and cost of manually coding a large number of documents. It is usually provided as a matter of course and in my experience, is not something that would, or should, trouble the Court. Providing a load file is part and parcel of the cooperation expected between the parties pursuant to the Overriding Objective and is one of the matters to be considered in advance of discovery. Although the load file is not referred to in Practice Direction RC 17/08, it is referred to in Practice Direction 57AD of the English CPR in terms which simply encourage parties to agree the fields: “6. Agreeing aspects of methodology To the extent that this has not already

been agreed between the parties or determined by the court, the parties should seek to agree the following as early in the process as possible…(11) Format for electronic exchange—parties are encouraged to agree database load file format and details to be included in load file/document index. All documents to be produced should be assigned a Disclosure Identification/Number. There is no need to produce a typed list of documents in the traditional sense, unless that will be of assistance to the parties.” 41. By email dated 29 January 2026, Kobre & Kim, the Plaintiff’s English solicitors, wrote to DWF stating that: “Please could you provide us with a DAT load file or an Excel index of files, which should include standard metadata fields such as Document ID, File Name, Document Date(s), From/To/CC/BCC, Email Subject, Custodian, and page ranges (Bates Numbers) for each document? This is necessary to facilitate the review of the data on our client's document review platform (for example to allow for unitisation, which allows large, multi-page files (for example a scanned PDF) to be broken down into individual, logical documents), and to ensure that this review can be undertaken at proportionate cost…Please also confirm that all future data tranches will be provided in native format.” 42. DWF replied on 5 February 2026, stating that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the material in

native format and raising a number of points about delay, the fact that this was a response to a DSAR and not discovery, that the request was disproportionate, not in the agreed methodologies and would undermine the redactions to justify their position that “we see no need to provide the documentation (or data) in any other format.” 43. Advocate Sharp replied on 23 February 2026 noting that the request had not been intended to be contentious. He noted that “such metadata will need to be provided in due course in any event when your clients provide discovery and inspection” and in terms of the redactions stated that DWF had failed to explain why “providing metadata would require a wholesale supplemental redaction exercise.” 44. DWF replied on 9 March 2026 noting that in their view, the Plaintiff had not provided any “convincing explanation” as to why native documents should be provided and stating that: “In accordance with Article 27(3) of DPJL proper consideration has been given to the production format. We provided the information in a PDF format with appropriate metadata, namely dates and names of the documents (as far as was appropriate taking into account the applicable exemptions). In a DSAR disclosure, this is considered a "commonly used format"… …the GOJ Defendants are not obliged to provide additional metadata at this stage. We agree that this will likely be considered

again during disclosure, in due course…” 45. They concluded with the following: “5) Integrity of redactions Your comments are noted but our position remains the same. To protect the integrity of the redactions previously applied to all documents and their metadata in the first tranche, further work would be needed to ensure that any new deliverable complies with all of the rules previously applied to the documents and their metadata, which is a considerable exercise. Given that this is not required at this stage, we do not consider that it would be proportionate or reasonable to provide Tranche 1 (and subsequent tranches) in the format of a DAT load file or an Excel index of files and/or to carry out further redactions as necessary, for the reasons which are set out above.” 46. The Summons seeks provision of a DAT Load file only. The reason given in the Summons is “to enable the Plaintiff to upload the data to an electronic review platform efficiently and at proportionate cost.” However: (i) in his Skeleton Argument, Advocate Sharp stated that: “13. The Plaintiff has requested that the GOJ Defendants produce the metadata associated with Tranches 1, 2 and 3, in the form of a DAT load file… This should not be a contentious request. 13.1 The metadata is of significant importance in understanding key information about the processing of personal data, including but not limited to

the author, the parties who edited documents, their recipients and the date and time of creation and editing. Such information can have a significant impact in clarifying for the data subject the nature and purpose of processing, which the mere decontextualised content of a document (for example a PDF containing text, with no indication of its author or purpose) would not. Accordingly, the metadata forms contextual data… 13.6 Without the DAT load file, the Plaintiff could still upload the documents to an electronic review platform, but this would cause him to incur significant and unnecessary expense, because the documents would need to be manually coded on the basis of the schedules produced by the GOJ Defendants. Moreover given those schedules do not contain important metadata fields such as (in respect of emails) from/to/cc/bcc, the PDFs will need to first be OCRd (so they are searchable) and then the relevant metadata fields would need to be entered into the review platform for each individual document (i.e. for every email, it would first need to be identified who the sender and recipients were (etc.) and this would then need to be entered into the review platform). Again, this would cause the Plaintiff to incur substantial costs which could be avoided simply by providing metadata. This in circumstances where (a) the GOJ Defendants are themselves using an electronic review platform, and could therefore presumably provide the DAT load file almost instantaneously, and (b) as noted above, the DAT load file would need to be provided to the Plaintiff in due course in any event.” (Emphasis added) (ii) in submissions, he stated that he was seeking the documents in native format, and wanted to receive “all fields” of metadata.

47. Advocate O’Connell’s response was to the effect that this is a DSAR exercise, not eDiscovery and there is a difference between the two. He accepted that the metadata “will come out on discovery” but submitted that, at this stage, there was no basis for it to be provided.

48. Provision of a DAT Load file, per se, should not be contentious. It is effectively provision of documents with a digital index and in my experience: (i) provision of a DAT Load file in relation to redacted pdfs should not be an issue for the GOJ Defendants in that it is for them to choose which fields from the document review platform’s index are exported and, in this case, it should be possible to export the redacted pdfs together with the material set out in Schedules 1 and 2; (ii) conversely, it should also not be an issue for the Plaintiff, as recipient, to upload to his review platform the individual pdfs disclosed and the information in the live Excel Schedules 1 and 2 without having to manually code each document. This was, in fact, the alternative request made by Kobre & Kim in their email of 29 January 2026, referred to in paragraph 41 above.

49. I have no evidence from any party as to the real issues presented by this request and in those circumstances, I decline to make any order in relation to this aspect of the summons. I would, however, note that: (i) Notwithstanding the limited focus of the Summons, by his Skeleton Argument and the submissions made, the Plaintiff’s position appears to be that provision of personal data under the DPJL can only be satisfied by provision of native documents with all of their available metadata; and that provision of static pdfs does not discharge that obligation. If that is indeed the case the Plaintiff wishes to advance, then it should be the subject of a proper summons, evidence and substantive argument rather than a mere passing mention in a request for a DAT Load file. (ii) Whilst the GOJ Defendants are yet to provide their discovery protocol and the Court may have to resolve any issues relating thereto, I would respectfully query the parties’ assumption that documents containing the Plaintiff’s personal data will be disclosed in the usual way such that their metadata will inevitably be provided. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the approach adopted in relation to the Chief Officer’s discovery where the date range for discovery ran forwards from the date of the DSAR. Disposal 50. For the reasons set out above, I dismiss the Plaintiff’s summons dated 11 March 2026

and further order that: (i) if so minded, the GOJ Defendants may produce by 4pm on 8 May 2026 a set of less-redacted documents from Tranches 1 and 2, with such amendments to Schedules 1 and 2 as may be necessary, and if they choose so to do, they shall provide an explanation to the Plaintiff as to any changes made by the same date; (ii) on or before 4pm on 12 June 2026, the GOJ Defendants shall provide, on affidavit: (a) such particulars as they will rely upon at trial to explain the irrelevancy rate between the data provided to DWF in relation to Tranches 1, 2 and 3 and that provided to the Plaintiff, and the significance, if any, thereof; (b) full particulars of the quality control process they have been ordered to carry out to establish, to an appropriate degree of confidence, that the non-responsive data provided to DWF by the GOJ Defendants does not contain the Plaintiff’s personal data; (c) confirmation that they have produced all of the Plaintiff’s personal data in accordance with their obligations under the DPJL and/or their averment in paragraph 34 of their Re-Re-Amended Answer dated 24 October 2025. (iii) Costs shall be reserved to the hearing on 20 April 2026, unless otherwise agreed. Authorities Abramovich v Chief Minister of Jersey and Ors [2025] JRC 308. File and Parties 02 December 2025 (unpublished). Abramovich v Chief Minister of Jersey and Ors [2025] JRC 299. Ashley v The Commissioners for His Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2025] EWHC 134 (KB). Royal Court Rules.