AG v Speck [2004] JRC 100 (07 June 2004)
- Citation
- [2004] JRC 100
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- Jersey
- Posture
- Criminal / Sentencing
More details
- Posture
- Criminal / Sentencing
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
Despite powerful mitigation, including remorse, cooperation, and family hardship, the offence involved a significant breach of trust and substantial sums, requiring a custodial sentence to uphold public confidence in the finance sector. No exceptional circumstances were found to justify a non-custodial sentence.
Court disposition
convicted and sentenced
Orders
- Imprisonment for 3.5 years on each count, to run concurrently
- Disqualification from holding directorships for 7 years
02
Material facts
Parties
J. P. Morgan Chase and Co
Complainant[Defendant Name Not Provided]
Defendant Counsel: Mr GollopAmounts and remedies
- Total Amount Defrauded: GBP 346,000
- Actual Loss to Bank: GBP 298,000
- Imprisonment Term (years): 3.5
- Director Disqualification (years): 7
03
Procedural history
Posture
Criminal / Sentencing
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Appropriate sentence for employee fraud involving breach of trust and substantial sums
- 02
Whether exceptional circumstances justify a non-custodial sentence
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The Crown argued that the use of three different methods of fraud indicated an active criminal mind and sought a custodial sentence of four years, referencing comparable cases and the need for deterrence in the finance sector.
- Respondent
- The defence, led by Mr Gollop, argued for mitigation based on psychological and social reports, the defendant's guilty plea, full cooperation, previous good character, remorse, and the hardship to his family, suggesting exceptional circumstances and seeking a non-custodial sentence.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Barrick [1985] Cr. App. R(S)142
Offences of breach of trust involving substantial sums generally require custodial sentences unless exceptional circumstances exist.
- 02
A. G. -v- Donnelly [2000/199] and other cited Jersey cases
Sentencing should consider aggravating and mitigating factors, not solely the amount defrauded.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
Despite powerful mitigation, including remorse, cooperation, and family hardship, the offence involved a significant breach of trust and substantial sums, requiring a custodial sentence to uphold public confidence in the finance sector. No exceptional circumstances were found to justify a non-custodial sentence.
Obiter and limits
- Loss of reputation and employability, and family hardship, are common consequences in such cases and do not usually justify non-custodial sentences.
- The exercise of fixing a sentencing starting point is artificial in highly variable breach of trust cases.
Court disposition
convicted and sentenced
- Imprisonment for 3.5 years on each count, to run concurrently
- Disqualification from holding directorships for 7 years
Source and reliance status
Official court record
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Court record
Judgment
JUDGMENT THE DEPUTY BAILIFF: 1. Over some 2½ years you defrauded J. P. Morgan Chase and Co, your employer, of some £346,000 although the loss to the Bank is approximately £298,000 because you did not cash the final cheque.
2. You were the Company Secretary; everyone trusted you; and because they believed you, when you presented invoices for payment - even though they were false and had been drawn up by you on your computer - they were paid. There were two other methods you also used to defraud the bank, namely, listing fictitious shareholders in companies which had been wound up, and forging hotel invoices concerning expenses which you had incurred above and beyond those you were permitted to incur.
3. The Crown has suggested that, because there were three different methods, this suggests an active criminal mind and that the methodology was not relatively simple. We do not accept that. We think your advocate was right to submit that this was a relatively straightforward defrauding of your employer, not dissimilar to those which the Court has on many occasions seen before.
4. Mr Gollop put forward a powerful case in mitigation on your behalf. He spoke of the reports, the Psychological Report and the Social Enquiry Report, which set out the background as to how this started. Your wife had a miscarriage; you were finding it difficult to manage in Jersey; and she and your children went back to England in anticipation of a move back to England; you were on your own; you became depressed; you started spending money and you started stealing.
5. We accept that the moneys were not used for extravagant living, but they were used to enable you and your family to live in a lifestyle that you could not afford on your salary.
6. We have read carefully the Psychological Report and the Social Enquiry Report and we note their comments on how all this may have begun and what may have motivated you.
7. We have taken into account also your guilty plea, and your full co-operation. This stands you in good stead, and you are entitled to a full discount. We, of course, take into account your previous good character. We have read carefully the many references which have been provided by a wide variety of people and they show that, apart from this offence, you have an excellent character and have done much good work.
8. We take into account the loss of reputation and your loss of employability in the future, your remorse, which we accept is full and genuine, and we also take into account the devastating effect that this is going to have on your family. We have read what can only be described as a heart-rending letter from your wife and you are fortunate indeed to have someone who loves you so much and supports you. It is clear that you feel extreme guilt about the fact that you are perhaps not going to be there with your children for a while.
9. Some of the references suggest that a non-custodial penalty would be appropriate in view of the powerful mitigation and indeed Mr Gollop has asked us to find exceptional circumstances. The difficulty is that in so many cases of this nature defendants are in a not dissimilar position. We can do no better than quote from Barrick [1985] Cr. App. R(S)142 at page 145 when the Court said this: "He (meaning the defendant) will usually, (as in this case) be a person of hitherto of impeccable character. It is practically certain that he will never offend again and in the nature of things he will never again in his life be able to secure similar employment with all that that means in the shape of disgrace for himself and hardship for himself and also his family." 10. We accept in this case there is particular hardship because of your wife's illness, but both in England and here the Courts have said that offences of this nature, in other words offences of breach of trust involving substantial sums of money, have to be dealt with by way of a custodial sentence save in exceptional circumstances. That, of course, is particularly so in Jersey with its dependence on the integrity of those in the finance sector. We cannot, therefore, regard this case as being exceptional, and we cannot proceed by way of a non-custodial sentence.
11. The Crown has accurately summarised the various factors listed in Barrick as they apply to this case and we have been referred to a number of cases of a similar type. The case of A. G. -v- Barnes (12 th February) Jersey Unreported [2002]40, where £110,000 was taken; A. G.-v- Nelson (18 th October, 2002) [2002/199] we regard as being quite different because it was a not guilty plea and the funds were not stolen; A. G. -v- Donnelly (13 th October, 2000) [2000/199], £650,000; A. G.-v- Hay (10 th July, 1995) Jersey Unreported [1995/133]; £839,000; A. G. -v- Delaney (13 th May, 1993) Jersey Unreported; [1993/62]: £960,000; A. G.-v-Smith [2004]JRC074, £1 million; A. G. -v- Stilwell (19 th January, 1998 Jersey Unreported; [1998/11] £1.3 million; A. G. -v- Hanley [1993]JLR N.9 14 th October, 1993) Jersey Unreported; [1993/134] £4.75 million and A. G. -v- Bellows (8 th February, 1999) Jersey Unreported; [1999/28], £5.1 million.
12. Now, the amount is clearly an important factor but it is not the sole factor. We have to take account of all the circumstances of the offending but clearly the amount is a significant factor. We note, in particular, the case of Donnelly where sentence of 4 years was passed on a woman of good character where £650,000 had been stolen. The Crown has moved for 4 years. The Crown has raised the issue of starting points and has attempted in a table to try to work out what the starting points would have been in these other cases. Unfortunately, they have miscalculated in respect of the mitigation and have been inconsistent and therefore we do not derive a great deal of assistance from the exercise. In any event, cases of breach of trust are so variable in the circumstances of the offending that we find it very difficult to fix upon a starting point.
13. Mr Gollop has asked that we should not fix upon a starting point and we really cannot usefully fix a starting point in a case such as this, notwithstanding what the Court said in the previous case, merely that it would try, where it could, to fix a starting point. This is one of those cases where we think the whole exercise would be too difficult and too artificial and therefore we will continue to do what we have always done, which is to have regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors, have regard to the appropriate bracket and where within that bracket the correct sentence lies.
14. Taking account of all the circumstances of the offence and the powerful mitigation which has been put forward we think we can reduce the conclusions slightly. We think the correct sentence is one of 3½ years and that is therefore the sentence to be passed concurrently on each of the counts, with a 7 years' disqualification from holding directorships. Authorities A. G. -v- Picot [1990]JLR N.19. Kirkland -v- A. G . (24 th September, 2001) Jersey Unreported; [2001/200]. A. G. -v- Hanley [1993]JLR N.9; (14th October, 1993) Jersey Unreported; [1993/134]. Young -v- A. G. [1998] JLR N.16. Barrick [1985] Cr. App. R. (S) 142. Whelan: Aspects of Sentencing in the Superior Courts of Jersey (3 rd Ed'n): pp.170-80; 214-5; 218-25; 229-31. A. G. -v- Marsh (25 th January 2002) Jersey Unreported; [2002/22]. A. G. -v- Harris [2004]JRC020. Trevor Clark [1998] 2 Cr. App. R. (S) 137. Companies (Jersey) Law 1991: Article 78. A. G. -v- Barnes (12 February 2002) Jersey Unreported; [2002/40]. A. G. -v- Nelson (18 th October, 2002) Jersey Unreported; [2002/199]. A. G. -v- Donnelly (13 th October, 2000) Jersey Unreported; [2000/199]. A. G. -v- Hay (10 th July, 1995) Jersey Unreported; [1995/133]. A. G. -v- Delaney (13 th May, 1993) Jersey Unreported; [1993/62]. A. G. -v-Smith [2004]JRC074. A. G. -v- Stilwell (19 th January, 1998) Jersey Unreported; [1998/11]. A. G. -v- Bellows (8 th February, 1999) Jersey Unreported; [1999/28]. Page Last Updated: 24 Jun 2016 BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
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