Halabi v Farrow and Ors (Royal Court : Hearing (Civil) : Thompson : Trust) [2026] JRC 023 (21 January 2026)

judgment the commissioner: Introduction 1. This judgment contains the reasons for my decisions on costs, leave to appeal and a stay of execution following on from the substantive judgment dated 8 December 2025, reported at [2025] JRC 326 ("the Main Judgment"). In the Main Judgment, I dismissed an appeal by the Plaintiff against a decision of Master Cadin striking out the Plaintiff's Order of Justice and Reply in its entirety and, in the alternative, granting summary judgment. Costs of the Appeal 2. In relation to the costs of the appeal, by way of indication, I informed the parties orally when releasing a draft of the Main Judgment for comments that, in my view, the First to Third and Fifth to Seventh Defendants represented by Ogier ("the Defendants") should have their costs payable on the standard basis. This was because while I had dismissed the appeal, I had not upheld all of the Master's conclusions that the Plaintiff's claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action because of the Multinational decision (see paragraphs 176 to 181 of the Main Judgment). The Defendants accepted this indication and therefore sought costs on the standard basis.

3. Advocate Mistry, for the Plaintiff, in his Skeleton Argument, agreed to a costs order being made against his client on the standard basis, but only the basis that execution of the same was stayed.

4. In the oral hearing, I indicated that the question of any stay was separate to the question of whether or not a costs order should be made. Advocate Mistry realistically was unable to advance any arguments to resist a costs order being made. In my judgment, he was right not to do so. In this case, although I did not agree with the Master on one aspect of his reasoning, ultimately it was clear to me that the Defendants were the clear winners and therefore I made an order for standard costs of the appeal in their favour.

5. I also ordered a payment on account of these costs in a costs schedule filed by the Defendants (see Caselines bundle AE144 to AE149). The schedule provided a breakdown of the lawyers involved, their PQE and a Factor A and Factor B rate. The total amount claimed was £48,512.25 for Ogier's costs, plus counsels' fees of £12,102.50.

6. I had no issue with the Factor A and B rates. However, because of the involvement of counsel, I was concerned that there was duplication between counsel and fee earners. I was also concerned that there was some duplication between the four fee earners at Ogier, including the partner.

7. The amount sought by Ogier was a payment of £30,307.38 which was 50% of the total costs incurred of £60,614.74 including counsel's fees. Both advocates were agreed on the applicable legal principles which were set out in Crociani v Crociani [2014] JCA 095 at paragraphs 16 to 18.

8. The conclusion I reached was that the Plaintiff should pay the Defendants a payment on account of £25,000 rather than the amount sought to reflect my concerns about duplication, both between the fee earners at Ogier and because of the involvement of counsel.

9. I also gave the Plaintiff seven days to pay these costs, failing which the amount awarded could be enforced as a judgment. I made this order because for reasons set out later, I refused the Plaintiff's application for a stay pending appeal. The costs of the proceedings 10. The Defendants also sought a payment on account of the costs of the proceedings. However, the costs of the proceedings are being dealt with by Master Cadin who is also dealing with applications that he make third party costs orders against the father of the Plaintiff (Mr Simon Halabi) and against Advocate Ingram who represented the Plaintiff in the hearing before the Master.

11. Royal Court Rule 12/2(3) provides that: "Where the Court has ordered a person to pay any costs of any party, it may at any time order that person to pay such amount as it sees fit as an interim payment on account of costs before the costs are assessed." 12. Accordingly, as Master Cadin is seized with who should pay the costs of the proceedings, I concluded that it would be wrong for me to order a payment on account of such costs because I did not possess any jurisdiction to make a payment on account of costs when no order for the costs of the proceedings had been made. Such an order is therefore also a matter for Master Cadin. I further concluded that it was appropriate for Master Cadin to deal with the costs of the proceedings because he had sat on a number of interlocutory applications and had a much better grasp of what was an appropriate costs order to make.

13. I wish to add for the sake of completeness that in relation to any third-party costs orders of the appeal, I issued various directions to set out whether any such application was being made by the Defendants similar to the applications before Master Cadin. I also directed that consideration of any such applications should only take place after Master Cadin has reached his conclusions on third party costs orders sought. This was because of the danger of overlap and inconsistent findings. I also reached the view that it was appropriate for any appeal against Master Cadin's decisions on third party costs orders and the costs of the proceedings to be heard at the same time as any application for third party costs orders in respect of the costs of the appeal. Leave to appeal 14. I next deal with the question of leave to appeal. The Plaintiff in his Skeleton set out the applicable tests which are well known and were set out in another of the Crociani decisions, reported at [2016] JCA 231 at paragraphs 17 and 18. The parties were also aware of the recent Court of Appeal authority of D v Geneva Trust Company SA [2025] JCA 058 , where the Court of Appeal set out that there were too many appeals to the Court of Appeal seeking to reverse interlocutory or essentially case management decisions.

15. It is right to note that in respect of decisions which had the effect of involving the final determination of any right, such as the striking out of a claim, an appeal may be more readily entertained (see paragraph 52 of the Court of Appeal's judgment in the Geneva Trust Company decision).

16. These are the principles that I applied.

17. Advocate Mistry in his written arguments set out six grounds as follows: (i) Ground 1; the application of the Yam Sang principles in the context of good faith would benefit from a review by the Court of Appeal. (ii) Ground 2 contended that I had fallen into error by my observations at paragraph 173 of the Main Judgment that the assignment of Sijar's rights was a chose en litige . The appeal ground was that because this issue was not raised expressly, that I erred by not allowing the Plaintiff an opportunity to address this issue. (iii) Ground 3 contended that I had conducted a mini trial in granting summary judgment. (iv) Ground 4 complained that I had not given a full citation of all the matters set out at paragraph 9 of the Plaintiff's Skeleton Argument. (v) Ground 5 contended that I had misapplied the Master's conclusions at paragraph 71 of his judgment and that the Defendants did not maintain a submission for summary judgment on prescription grounds. (vi) Ground 6 related to the observations in the Main Judgment at paragraphs 131 to 139, in particular paragraph 137, which Advocate Mistry contended were appropriate for consideration by the Court of Appeal.

18. In relation to Ground 1, the Court of Appeal, in its judgment in Hard Rock Ltd v HRCKY Ltd [2024] JCA 069 , did consider the Yam Sang principle in the context of dol. The conclusion I reached therefore on this ground is that it is a matter for the Court of Appeal as to whether they wish to consider the Yam Sang principle more generally. In addition, as Advocate Davies observed, Advocate Mistry was not challenging the principle itself but merely its application which was therefore an appeal against a case management decision.

19. In relation to Ground 2, the observations in paragraph 173 of the Main Judgment, in particular the first sentence, were obiter and were not the basis upon which I found against the Plaintiff. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to grant leave to appeal for an obiter remark.

20. In relation to Ground 3, I was not persuaded by Advocate Mistry that the test for leave to appeal was met by reference to the Okpabi principle. As Advocate Mistry himself accepted in his reply as noted in the judgment, he relied on this case by way of analogy. I was satisfied in the Main Judgment that the Master had correctly dealt with this case and accordingly this was not a basis to grant leave to appeal.

21. In relation to Ground 4, the Court of Appeal have remarked on previous occasions that a judgment is inevitably a summary of a party's submissions and that the Royal Court is not required to set out every point relied upon. The conclusion I reached is that it was for the Court of Appeal to consider whether these criticisms justify leave to appeal being given. In my judgment, putting them at their highest, even if there is something in them, I was not persuaded that this was sufficient for leave to appeal to be given.

22. In relation to Ground 5, the Master, at paragraph 71 of his judgment, quoted at paragraph 51 of the Main Judgment, while noting that the Court should be "wary of striking out" averments relating to empêchement , went on to note, however, that in this case, as set out in paragraphs 86 to 96 of his judgment, the Plaintiff has singularly failed to address in his affidavit either the assignment or the empêchement allegedly arising and, in his judgment, these averments fell to be struck out under Rule 6/13(1)(b) and (d). On this ground, I concluded that, even if the conclusions at paragraph 170 of my judgment in relation to empêchement were not correct, the Plaintiff's claim was struck out on the basis that it failed to meet the summary judgment test because it did not condescend to the necessary particulars required. This applies to arguments about empêchement if they apply, as much as to the other arguments which the Plaintiff had sought to raise.

23. In relation to Ground 6, this is a matter for the Court of Appeal to decide whether it wishes to review the applicable test. However, as Advocate Davies also observed, the Plaintiff had the benefit of the current, more favourable, test and did not succeed on the basis of that test. There was therefore nothing in this ground. I accepted that submission.

24. For all these reasons, leave to appeal was therefore refused. A stay pending appeal 25. Again, Advocate Mistry set out the applicable principles on a stay pending appeal which are also well known and were set out in Crociani v Crociani [2017] JCA 162 at paragraphs 30 to 32. I also reviewed this authority and another Court of Appeal authority, In the Matter of the Saisie Judiciaire of the Realisable Property of Robert Tantular [2019] JRC 222 , in Sheyko v Consolidated Minerals Ltd [2021] JRC 186 at paragraphs 61 to 64.

26. In seeking a stay, Advocate Mistry contended that the common-sense approach was to grant a stay to avoid the costs of having to unwind any orders made in favour of the Defendants.

27. In the alternative, he sought a stay pending an application for leave to appeal which he was instructed to bring.

28. In my judgment, the approach of Advocate Mistry that the common-sense approach was to stay matters is not consistent with the authorities to which I have referred. What the Plaintiff is required to do is to show some good reason or balance of advantage or exceptional circumstances which would justify a stay being granted.

29. The Plaintiff has failed to discharge this burden. If leave to appeal is granted by the Court of Appeal and if the appeal is successful, that would simply lead to the orders of Master Cadin and this Court being reversed to permit the Plaintiff to proceed to a trial. Such a possibility did not justify a stay.

30. The real issue concerns the ability to reverse any payment on account of costs made in the interim. In this case, it is significant that the Seventh Defendant is a regulated trust company and part of a regulated group. Should there be a successful appeal, the Defendants, including the Seventh Defendant, would be under a responsibility to repay any payment on account of costs. While this is the liability of all of the Defendants, in reality, as Advocate Davies confirmed, the costs of the Defendants will have been met by the Seventh Defendant and therefore the payment on account is simply the Seventh Defendant recouping part of the expenditure it has incurred. A successful appeal simply places the Seventh Defendant in a position where it would be under a liability to repay the monies it had received to recoup some of the costs it had incurred. A failure to discharge such a liability would create an obligation on its balance sheet and difficulties with the JFSC as its regulator. The risk therefore of the Seventh Defendant not repaying sums due, in my judgment, was a low risk.

31. This risk was also outweighed by the difficulty the Defendants have had in enforcing costs orders against the Plaintiff. Some of these difficulties were summarised in my judgment dated 11 November 2024 in the background section of the judgment at paragraphs 10 to 18. This history also weighs in the balance against the Plaintiff in granting the stay asked for.

32. In addition, Advocate Davies in his submissions referred to the Royal Court's decision in Minister for Infrastructure v Parish of St Helier [2016] JRC 220 at paragraph 16, where the Court ruled that the fact that the costs of taxation might be wasted if an appeal were to succeed was not a special reason to justify a stay. The same paragraph noted that there was no question as to the ability of the Minister to repay any sums received. In my judgment, the present case is indistinguishable from the approach in St Helier which I am bound by, unless I consider it plainly wrong, which I do not. The Seventh Defendant has the ability to pay because, as a regulated entity, it is required to maintain certain levels of solvency. I also agree that the fact that the costs of taxation might be wasted is not a special reason justifying a stay. In any event, the costs of taxation do not apply to a payment on account which has already been summarily assessed by me.

33. As noted above, the one qualification I need to make to my refusal of a stay was that I allowed the Plaintiff seven days to make payment of the payment on account ordered on a voluntary basis, failing which the Defendants were at liberty to enforce payment of the payment on account as a judgment. This was to give the Plaintiff a short opportunity to avoid having a judgment entered against him. Otherwise, the request for a stay was refused. Authorities Halabi v Farrow and Ors [2025] JRC 326 . Crociani v Crociani [2014] JCA 095 . Royal Court Rules. Crociani v BNP Paribas Jersey Trust Corp Ltd [2016] JCA 231 . D v Geneva Trust Company SA [2025] JCA 058 . Hard Rock Ltd v HRCKY Ltd [2024] JCA 069 . Crociani v Crociani [2017] JCA 162 . In the matter of the Saisie Judiciaire of the Realisable Property of Robert Tantular [2019] JRC 222 . Sheyko v Consolidated Minerals Ltd [2021] JRC 186 . Minister for Infrastructure v Parish of St Helier [2016] JRC 220 . Page Last Updated: 16 Feb 2026 BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII