Roman Arkadyevich Abramovich v Chief Minister of Jersey and Ors

Costs [2025]JRC300 Royal Court (Samedi) 6 October 2025 Before : Advocate David Michael Cadin, Master of the Royal Court Between Roman Arkadyevich Abramovich Plaintiff And (1) Chief Minister of Jersey (2) Minister for Treasury and Resources (3) Minister of Sustainable Economic Development (4) The Minister for External Relations (5) Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police (6) Comptroller of Revenue Defendants Advocate H. Sharp KC for the Plaintiff Advocates M. S. O’Connell and M. P. Boothman for the First to Fourth and Sixth Defendants Advocate S. C. Thomas for the Fifth Defendant judgment the MASTER: Introduction 1. On 1 October 2025, for reasons which were to follow, I ordered that the GOJ Defendants pay the Plaintiff’s costs, of and incidental to the hearings on 15 November 2024 and 1 July 2025, to be taxed on an indemnity basis, if not agreed. This judgment sets out my reasons for those decisions. Background 2. The background to the hearing on 15 November 2024 was set out in a judgment dated 20 November 2024. In short, I gave directions in July 2024 requiring the parties to use reasonable endeavours to agree their respective discovery protocols by 22 August 2024. Thereafter, events had the following chronology: “9. On 6 August 2024, Advocate Sharp KC, the Plaintiff's Advocate, wrote to the Defendants' advocates in relation to discovery, and a week later provided a copy of his client's proposed discovery protocol. The GOJ Defendants did not respond. The Plaintiff's Advocate wrote further on 16 August 2024 and the GOJ Defendants again did not respond.

10. On 19 August 2024, 3 days before the end of the period requiring "reasonable endeavours", Advocate Boothman for the GOJ Defendants issued a summons seeking to set aside the orders made on 25 July 2024 and to stay the proceedings "pending the outcome of the ongoing criminal investigation and any subsequent criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff".

11. Given limited Court availability to deal with this on 10 September 2024, I vacated the hearing, noted that the orders made on 25 July 2024 remained in force and gave further directions requiring amongst other things, "Advocate Boothman [to] provide to the other parties and to the Court, by 4pm on 4 September 2024, full particulars as to the basis of his application (whether by Skeleton Argument or otherwise) together with all evidence that he proposes to rely upon". Although a Skeleton Argument has been provided, no evidence was filed.

12. On 16 September 2024, the Plaintiff issued a summons seeking an order that the GOJ Defendants comply with their discovery obligations in accordance with the Directions given on 25 July 2024 and do so in accordance with a discovery protocol created by the Plaintiff.” 3. The GOJ Defendant’s summons was not the subject of any prior correspondence and came, as it were, out of clear blue sky. It was also singularly unsuccessful in that each of the grounds relied upon by the GOJ Defendants was rejected: (i) the Court held that the GOJ Defendants did not have standing to invoke the maxim le criminel tient le civil en état, nor were the various sets of proceedings concurrent such as might have allowed the maxim to be invoked (paragraphs 20 and 23 of the judgment); (ii) the GOJ Defendants submitted that prejudice might be caused to the criminal investigation were they to disclose personal data as the Plaintiff had an ulterior purpose in seeking that data. The Court held that the Plaintiff’s intentions were irrelevant (paragraph 28 of the judgment); (iii) the GOJ Defendants submitted that they were prevented from disclosing personal data because of tipping off yet they had failed to provide any evidence of having explored the relevant statutory gateways and the Court found that the GOJ Defendants’ concerns were “more imagined than real” (paragraph 36 of the judgment).

4. I further held that: “43. The failures of the GOJ Defendants to provide information about the material they hold in accordance with the requirements of Practice Direction RC 17/08, and their failure to engage with the order of the Court requiring them to use "reasonable endeavours to agree their respective discovery protocols and timescales" is serious and directly impacts on the progress of the litigation and on the ability of the Court to manage it actively and in accordance with the Overriding Objective. These failures are inconsistent and incompatible with the apparent desire of the GOJ Defendants, as set out in their Answer, to defend the proceedings.

44. No proper explanation has been offered by the GOJ Defendants for their failings.” 5. In February 2025, I directed that the Defendants provide: "affidavits of discovery… exhibiting…[the personal data released to the Plaintiff] and [the personal data withheld from the Plaintiff].” 6. Pursuant to that direction, the GOJ Defendants filed an affidavit from Mr Bradbury, sworn on 12 May 2025, exhibiting a number of lists of documents which Advocate Sharp, for the Plaintiff regarded as inadequate. He therefore issued a summons requiring that the “GOJ Defendants produce an amended discovery protocol to identify the personal data held by them, perform searches in accordance with that protocol and provide a further affidavit of discovery verifying the same”.

7. That summons came before the Court in July 2025, and in its judgment the Court noted with ever-increasing concern that: (i) there was an “obvious lack of compliance with the provisions of the DPJL, [which] together with the methodology used, undermines the bare assertion, implicit in Advocate Boothman's letter of 31 January 2025, that the GOJ Defendants have discharged their obligations.” (paragraph 26 of the judgment) (ii) “The sense that all is not as it seems is further heightened by the exhibits to Mr Bradbury's second affidavit” (paragraph 27 of the judgment); (iii) “The sense that something has gone awry is compounded by Mr Bradbury's third affidavit, sworn on 20 June 2025 in response to this application.” (paragraph 28 of the judgment); (iv) “If that were not enough, that sense of unease on the part of the Court was further compounded by Advocate Boothman's submissions that the GOJ Defendants had carried out a "reasonable and proportionate" search for personal data” (paragraph 29 of the judgment).” 8. The Court concluded that: “30. For the reasons set out above, I think it plain and obvious that there are deficiencies in the GOJ Defendants' purported compliance with the DSARs which extend far beyond the fact that data was purged from the cryoserver. Indeed, the fact that data was purged from the cryoserver is not necessarily relevant to the response to the DSAR. The

obligation under Article 28 of the DPJL relates to data that is "being processed"; if personal data has been deleted such that it is no longer "being processed" the provisions of Article 28 do not apply. However, in my judgment, the issue of the data purge becomes highly material where, as in this case, the GOJ Defendants have asserted that they have complied with their obligations under the DPJL yet that assertion is founded on a limited search, of a specific database, which the GOJ Defendants know is incomplete as a result of the purge… 32. In my judgment, the appropriate and proportionate response to the issues identified is to give the GOJ Defendants a final opportunity to comply with the DSARs. If issues remain thereafter, an application could be made for summary judgment or the matter referred to the Royal Court for determination of a preliminary issue.” 9. Thereafter the proceedings came before Commissioner Binnington on an appeal against my decision refusing the Plaintiff permission to amend to allege unlawful means conspiracies. In allowing the appeal, the Royal Court cited much of my July 2025 judgment. It held that: “72. As has already been noted the Master referred in his February judgment to the behaviour of the GOJ Defendants in the following terms: "failing to engage proactively in correspondence and/or refusing to answer correspondence and/or sending correspondence that does little more than "to kick the can down the road" and/or doing little more than the bare minimum in proceedings are not unusual behaviours on the part of litigants, especially defendants".

73. A defendant is of course entitled to deal with a claim in such manner as it thinks fit and the Court can mark its disapproval of what it regards as reprehensible behaviour by way of costs orders, striking out of a defence or, in the case of failure to comply with court orders, proceedings for contempt.

74. At this stage in the proceedings, the Court is in no position to judge whether the Plaintiff's allegations of bad faith and misfeasance in public office will be substantiated by evidence at trial. However, the GOJ Defendants are holders of public office and have the resources of the government behind them. Furthermore, they are defending a claim for the enforcement of a right given to the Plaintiff by legislation. The history of this litigation suggests a reluctance on their part to engage in a reasonable manner with the Plaintiff or, indeed, to assist the Court. Were the GOJ Defendants private individuals then, taken individually, the instances of behaviour advanced by the Plaintiff might well be regarded as "kicking the can down the road" and not unusual behaviour on the part of a litigant. However, a delay of almost two years in providing what turned out to be a seriously deficient response to the DSARs is difficult to accept given the resources available to the GOJ Defendants and their governmental status… 76. The GOJ Defendants are not ordinary litigants but public office holders…” (Emphasis Added) Relevant Principles 10. The principles on which the Court awards costs are well known and set out in Watkins v Egglishaw [2002] JLR 1 and applied in Flynn v Reid [2012] (2) JLR 226: “12 By way of preface I note, as is common ground, that the award of costs indeed involves

the exercise of a discretion pursuant to the Civil Proceedings (Jersey) Law 1956, art. 2, which provides: "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Part and to rules of court made under the Royal Court (Jersey) Law 1948, the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the Royal Court shall be in the discretion of the Court, and the Court shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid." 13 In Watkins v. Egglishaw (17) ("Watkins"), Page, Commr, set out the principles which, in his view, ought to guide the court in the exercise of its discretion when considering the issue of costs (2002 JLR 1, at paras, 7-9): "7 The principles that should guide the court in the exercise of its discretion in this area appear to me, therefore, to be as follows, stating them as shortly and simply as possible: (a) The court's overriding objective in considering costs is, as in everything else, to do justice between the parties. (b) In many cases, that objective will be fulfilled by making an award of costs in favour of the 'winning' party, where a 'winner' is readily apparent. In any event, the "follow the event" rule can still be a useful starting point. (c) It is a mistake, however, to strain overmuch to try to label one party as the 'winner' and one as the 'loser' when the complexity or other circumstances of the litigation do not readily lend themselves to

analysis in these terms. (d) The discretion as laid down in art. 2 of the Civil Proceedings (Jersey) Law 1956 is a wide one and ought not to be treated as fettered by any particular supposed rule or practice, other than that the discretion should be exercised judicially and broadly in accordance with the guiding principles referred to in In re Elgindata (No. 2) ... and A.E.I. v. Phonographic Performance ... (e) It is, accordingly, open to the court to have regard to any and all considerations that may have any bearing on the overriding objective of doing justice. Its task is to take an overview of the case as a whole (Bank of Credit & Commerce Intl. v. Ali (No. 4) . . . per Lightman, J.). The new Civil Procedure Rules governing civil litigation in the English courts provide that the court 'must have regard to all the circumstances' and then go on to spell out certain matters that such circumstances include, the 'conduct of all the parties' being one and 'whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been wholly successful' another (Civil Procedure Rules, para. 44.3(4)). To a large extent, however, the particular matters mentioned do no more than state the obvious and it is unnecessary to import them verbatim, in any formal way, into the practice of the Royal Court. (f) It is implicit in this that, even though a party would otherwise be regarded as having

been 'successful,' justice may require that costs should not automatically follow the event.” 11. As to the basis for awarding indemnity costs, the law is clear: “…in order for an indemnity award to be made there must be something to take the case out of the ordinary and a degree of unreasonableness (of which abuse of process is but an example) but recognizing that there is an "infinite variety" of circumstances where it may be right and proper for the court to make such an award.” (C v PS [2010] JLR 645, paragraph 12).” 12. Indemnity costs are not however punitive. As Commissioner Page noted in Pell Frischmann Engineering Limited v Bow Valley [2007] JLR 479 an award of costs on an indemnity basis is: “…to achieve a fairer result for the party in whose favour it is made than would be the case if he were only able to recover costs on the standard basis; in the end, it is a question of what would be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.” Discussion 13. These proceedings are unusual in that they are for the enforcement of a statutory right granted to the Plaintiff under the Data Protection (Jersey) Law (“DPJL”), which, pursuant to Articles 27(1) and (2) require personal data to be disclosed in no more than 12 weeks. The Plaintiff filed data subject access requests in April 2023. Some two and a half years later, the GOJ Defendants have still not provided him with his personal data.

14. The Royal Court held that the “GOJ Defendants are not ordinary litigants but public office holders” and in my judgment, in so finding, it was indicating that it expected higher standards from them.

15. Advocate O’Connell submitted that the Government of Jersey is small in stature and expertise, that data protection matters are rare and legal advice on data protection issues is not readily accessible in the island. Having spent 20 years in private practice in Jersey, I disagree. Data protection is a basic and required discipline for regulatory lawyers and law firms. If necessary, specialist external assistance could and should have been accessed, given what Commissioner Binnington held were “the resources available to the GOJ Defendants and their governmental status”. In my judgment, the subject matter of the dispute does not excuse the application made in November 2024 or the plain and obvious failings identified in July 2025.

16. Advocate O’Connell and Advocate Boothman also submitted that the Court could and/or should not make an order for indemnity costs as the GOJ Defendants’ litigation conduct was one element of the unlawful means conspiracies and to make any finding would be to stray into the realms of the trial court. In my judgment: (i) such a submission is a submission to do nothing and to say nothing and to leave all matters for the trial court; (ii) such a submission is not in accordance with the Overriding Objective; (iii) it is appropriate for the Court seized of the application to identify, if so minded, unreasonable litigation conduct and to make such behaviour, contemporaneously, by orders for costs on an indemnity basis. As to what weight, if any, the Royal Court attaches to such findings in due course at trial, is a matter for the Royal Court.

17. In my judgment, in relation to the November 2024 hearing: (i) the GOJ Defendants’ application for a stay was wholly misconceived; (ii) making that application at the eleventh hour, without any prior correspondence and/or without exploring the issues relied upon for the purposes of that application, properly or at all, was wholly unreasonable; (iii) the Royal Court subsequently described this application as part of the material which suggested to it, a “reluctance on their part to engage in a reasonable manner with the Plaintiff or, indeed, to assist the Court”; (iv) the GOJ Defendants are “office holders”, already subject to a statutory duty to provide the personal data and the application was a wholly inappropriate attempt to avoid that statutory obligation; (v) the GOJ Defendants’ conduct was out of the ordinary for any litigant let alone an “office holder”, and unreasonable; (vi) it is appropriate for the GOJ Defendants to pay the costs of and incidental to the hearing to be taxed on an indemnity basis if not agreed.

18. In my judgment, the GOJ Defendants’ behaviour in relation to the July 2025 was even more extreme than their behaviour in November 2024: (i) the GOJ Defendants purportedly complied with the orders of the Court requiring disclosure of the Plaintiff’s personal data and did so on the basis of an affidavit from Mr Bradbury dated 12 May 2025; (ii) in correspondence with Advocate Sharp, they maintained their position that they had discharged their duty; (iii) however, Advocate Sharp was not satisfied and issued a summons; it was not until the freeze date for the Court bundle that Mr Bradbury finally filed an affidavit deposing that the GOJ Defendants’ records had been purged, a matter which could and should have been drawn to the attention of the Plaintiff, and the Court, far sooner if not in the 4 weeks following receipt of the Plaintiff’s DSARs; (iv) the Royal Court subsequently described this application as part of the material which suggested to it, a “reluctance on their part to engage in a reasonable manner with the Plaintiff or, indeed, to assist the Court”; (v) notwithstanding the time that had elapsed, the resources deployed, and the fact that the GOJ Defendants are “office holders” and subject to higher duties than ordinary litigants, it was “plain and obvious” to the Court that the GOJ Defendants had failed to provide the Plaintiff with his personal data; (vi) no

explanation for this failure has been provided but given the recent communications from English solicitors instructed by the GOJ Defendants, it would appear that the GOJ Defendants accept that they have singularly failed to do that which they are obliged to do under the terms of the DPJL; (vii) the GOJ Defendants’ conduct was out of the ordinary for any litigant let alone an “office holder”, and unreasonable; (viii) it is appropriate for the GOJ Defendants to pay the costs of and incidental to the hearing to be taxed on an indemnity basis if not agreed.

19. Accordingly, I ordered that the GOJ Defendants pay the Plaintiff’s costs, of and incidental to the hearings on 15 November 2024 and 1 July 2025, to be taxed on an indemnity basis, if not agreed. Authorities Watkins v Egglishaw [2002] JLR 1. Flynn v Reid [2012] (2) JLR 226. Pell Frischmann Engineering Limited v Bow Valley [2007] JLR 479. Data Protection (Jersey) Law