GAKWAYA v MICHEL

GAKWAYA v MICHEL

- Source: Amategeko - Section: Decisions (Judgements) - Date: 2014-04-11 - Case/document no.: RCOM AA 0048/12/CS - Collection: Supreme Court

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GAKWAYA v MICHEL [Rwanda SUPREME COURT–RCOM AA 0048/12/CS (Havugiyaremye, P.J., Kayitesi R. and Mukandamage, J.)April 11, 2014] Commercial Law––Contract of sale– whether the seller is responsible for the bank’s refusal to grant a loan to the buyer–The sale is an agreement in which one party accepts to deliver property and the other party accepts to pay the agreed price–Description of the Contract of Sale– If the buyer fails to pay the price, the seller may request the termination of the contract – There are no grounds for insisting on a provisional contract while a definitive contract has been concluded–The law of July 30,1888, instituting the third book of civil law relating to contracts and contractual obligations, Articles 263,265 and 332. Jurisdiction–Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court–based on the value in which the agreement is based –Organic law n°01/2004 of January 29, 2004, regulating organisation, functioning and competence of the Supreme Court, Article 43 paragraphs 2, and point7. Commercial Procedure– Status to begin an action– Whether the one who receives the mandate to sell has the capacity to commence an action– When the one who receives the mandate to sell signs a contract of sale with the buyer, which contains obligations that should be fulfilled, no one can file a claim in connection with those obligations except the one who was given the mandate to

sell. Commercial Procedure–Determining damages when they are exorbitant–Obligation of the Appellant to provide explanations on the grounds of appeal in order to obtain what he is requesting– Law N° 21/2012 of 14/06/2012 relating to the civil, commercial, labour and administrative procedure, Article 142 paragraph 2. Facts: The Defendant, received mandate from his father to sell Hotel Ibis on his behalf. In this regard, he entered into a provisional contract of sale with the Appellant. Thereafter, he concluded a definitive contract of sale and agreed that the first instalment will be paid with a loan obtained from the bank and with the hotel being used as a security for the transaction. It was further agreed that the transfer would be made upon payment of the total amount agreed in the contract of sale as the purchase price for the hotel. Finally, the loan was not granted by the bank and the Defendant wrote a letter to the Appellant requesting that the contract be terminated. The Defendant further filed a claim at the Intermediate Court of Huye requesting the dissolution of the contract of sale. The Appellant also filed a claim at the same court requesting that the contract be implemented. The court resolved that the contract be dissolved due to the inability of the Appellant to fulfil his obligations under the contract. The Appellant appealed against this ruling at the

Commercial High Court which upheld the ruling of the Intermediate Court and held that the contract be dissolved due to the inability of the Appellant to fulfil his obligations under the contract. Not satisfied with the ruling of the abovementioned courts, the Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court alleging that the previous courts did not take into consideration the fact that the Defendant did not have the capacity to bring an action because his powers were limited on the

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mandate to sell Hotel Ibis and that he was also responsible for the failure relating to the execution of the contract. The Appellant further alleged that the Defendant even prevented the bank from granting him a loan which would have allowed him purchase the hotel. The Defendant also raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by stating that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the claim as the subject matter of the dispute was the dissolution of the contract and not the value of the claim in the amount of 20.000.000Rwfrs. Held: 1. The subject matter of the dispute is the dissolution of sales contract valued at 200.000.000 Rwfrs, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and which has even the power to determine cases decided by the Commercial High Court, when the subject matter is valuated at 20.000.000 Rwfrs or more.

2. When the objection to lack of jurisdiction is related to public order, nothing shall prevent it from being heard at any instance of the case.

3. The fact that the Appellant had the mandate to sell and thereafter signed a contract of sale with the Defendant, which contained obligations which each of the parties had to fulfil (payment of the price and the transfer of the property), implies that there is no one who could file a claim in connection with these obligations, except the one that was given the mandate to sell.

4. There are no grounds for insisting on a provisional contract, while a definitive contract had been concluded as both cannot be used simultaneously. Furthermore the one lastly concluded was the definitive contract which provided in its Article 9 that it will be effective upon the bank’s acceptance to pay the first instalment of the price. Article 263 of the third book of civil law, states that ‘sale is an agreement in which one party accepts to deliver property and the other party accepts to pay the agreed price.’ Article 265 describes the process of purchasing while Article 331reads as follows ‘If the buyer fails to pay the price, the seller may request the termination of the contract’. The bank did not grant the requested loan for the seller to purchase the property being Hotel Ibis. Also the mortgage could not be handed out without the loan being granted. As a result, the agreement between the seller and the buyer could not be executed.

5. By attributing that the Defendant is the reason for the bank’s refusal to grant a loan is not true and there is no evidence in proving this fact. Also the fact that the Defendant had requested that the contract be terminated because it was never implemented, implies that there is no way the Appellant can seek its implementation in an appeal and thereafter being granted a period to apply for a loan .

6. To further allege in the contract that there was an amount of money paid by the buyer is not sufficient, if the buyer does not provide any evidence of payment of that amount. Also it is not possible to pay such an amount of money without obtaining a “receipt.” If a cheque was issued, he should have still been in possession of “an official receipt” of that payment and be obliged to provide same or provide any other evidence to show that he paid such an amount of money. To allege merely that he paid a certain amount of money and the documents were kept by the seller cannot be considered as it is normal in the ordinary course of business for the payer to keep the necessary documents relating to any payments.

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7. When procedural fees and attorney fees are exorbitant at the instance of an appeal, even if the request has merits, the court decides on fees that are reasonable . Objections and appeal are without merit; Cross appeal has merit; The court fees charged to the Appellant. Statutes and statutory instruments referred to: The law of July 30, 1888 instituting the third book of civil law relating to contracts and contractual obligations, Articles 263,265,332; Organic law n°01/2004 of January 29, 2004 regulating organization, functioning and competence of the Supreme Court, Article 43 paragraph 2, point7; Law N° 21/2012 of 14/06/2012 relating to the civil, commercial, labour and administrative procedure, Article 142 paragraph 2. Provisional contract of sale of 06/01/1999; Definitive contract of sale of 20/01/1999, Articles 2, 6, 9. No Cases referred to: Judgment I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE [1] On 21/10/1998, Lucien Auguste Campion gave mandate to his son Michel Campion to sell his hotel, Hotel Ibis constructed on plots Nº 30, 92, 98 and 913 situated at Butare Town. A provisional contract of sale1 was concluded between Michel and Gakwaya Emmanuel, a former accountant, for the sum of 200.000.000 Rwfrs. In another contract concluded between Michel and Gakwaya2 (definitive contract of sale) and which replaced the provisional contract, the price of Hotel Ibis remained unchanged. In terms of

this last contract, Gakwaya had to pay the first instalment of 135.000.000 Rwfrs from a loan obtained from the bank, and thereafter provide the hotel as security for the deal. Furthermore,the implementation of the terms of the contract was required to follow as soon as payment was made. Michel Campion remained as shareholder for the remaining sum of 65.000.000 Rwfrs. The transfer of the document was agreed to be done 15 days upon payment of the remaining instalment. [2] Hotel Ibis remained in the hands of Michael Campion while Gakwaya Emmanuel searched for a loan from BK, BCR and BRD. Unfortunately, none of these banks granted him credit to enable him pay for the property. Thus, on 17/10/2000, Michel Campion sent a letter to Gakwaya asking him to terminate the contract as he was not able to obtain a loan from the bank to enable him pay for the property. 1 Provisional contract of sale of 06/01/1999 2 Definitive contract of sale of 20/01/1999.

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[3] Michel Campion filed a claim at the Intermediate Court of Huye requesting that the contract of sale he concluded with Gakwaya on 20/01/1999 be terminated. Gakwaya as well filed a complaint requesting the implementation of the contract of sale. The court ruled on 16/10/2006, in respect of the termination of the contract of sale because Gakwaya Emmanuel failed to respect the terms of the contract and ordered him to pay Michel Campion 200.000 Rwfrs relating to attorney fees. [4] Gakwaya sought for an appeal to this ruling at the High Court Resort of Nyanza, The court decided to refer the case to the Commercial High Court in accordance with Article 4 of the Law Nº 04/2009 of 29/09/2008, modifying and completing Law N° 51/2008 of 09/09/2008, Organic Law determining the organisation, functioning and jurisdiction of Courts. [5] The Commercial High Court ruled on 09/02/2012 and decided that the decision of the appealed case remains unchanged and ordered Gakwaya Emmanuel to pay Michel Campion moral damages amounting to 3.000.000 Rwfrs and a further 2.000.000 Rwfrs, in respect of attorney fees, prorated fees and court fees. In delivering its ruling, the court focused on the non execution of the contract since Gakwaya Emmanuel was not able to obtain a loan from the bank. [6] Gakwaya appealed against the ruling at the Supreme Court alleging that the previous courts ignored the fact

that the Defendant did not have the capacity to commence an action because the power he had was limited to a mandate to sell and that he was further responsible for the failure relating to the execution of the contract. Gakwaya further argued that the Defendant had even prevented the bank from granting him a loan, which could have enabled him to purchase the hotel. [7] Michel Campion also raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by stating that the value of the subject matter of the claim is less than 20.000.000 Rwfrs. [8] The case was held in public on 04/03/2014. Gakwaya Emmanuel was represented by Counsel Me Mutembe Protais and Counsel Me Mbonyimpaye Elias, while Michel Campion was represented by Counsel Me Mugeni Anita. II. THE LEGAL ISSUES TO BE EXAMINED IN THE CASE

AND ITS ANALYSIS 1. Concerning the Objections Raised: i. To determine whether the appeal filed by Michel Campion falls under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. [9] Campion’s Counsel alleged that this case does not fall under the jurisdiction of the this court because the initial subject matter of the case was the dissolution of the contract on Michel Campion’s side and the refusal of performing the contract on Gakwaya Emmanuel’s side. Campion’s Counsel further alleged that no where in this case was the value of the subject matter mentioned and that the judge did not decide on anything relating to damages amounting to 20.000.000. Rwfrs. Thus Campion’s Counsel argued that the appeal filed was not in accordance with Article 47-7º that determined the organisation, functioning and jurisdiction of Courts upon which the Appellant relied on.

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[10] The Counsels for Gakwaya Emmanuel alleged that the case is under the jurisdiction of this court because the subject matter is the dissolution of a contract of sale based on an object which is worth more than 20.000.000 Rwfrs due to the fact that the agreed price in the contract is 200.000.000 Rwfrs. THE VIEW OF THE COURT. [11] Article 43 paragraph 2, point 7 of law n°01/2004 of January 29 2004, regulating organization, functioning and competence of the Supreme Court, in force at the time this appeal was filed states that ``The supreme court has jurisdiction over cases decided by the commercial high court, when the subject matter has a value of 20.000.000, submitted in a document that is filed in a claim or determined by the judge. [12] The file showed that the subject matter of the case on appeal was the ``dissolution of the contract to sell Hotel Ibis and in that contract`` both parties agreed on a purchase price of 200.000.000 Rwfrs, with 65.000.000 Rwfrs to be paid as the first instalment. [13] The court found that the value on which the contract was based exceeds the value of 20.000.000 Rwfrs. Therefore, this case fell under the jurisdiction of this court in accordance with provision of 43-7º of the law mentioned above. ii. To determine whether Michel Campion did not have the status to bring an action. [14] The Counsels for Gakwaya alleged that no status of filing a

claim was given to Michel Campion since his father, Lucien Campion allocated to him merely the mandate to sell Hotel Ibis on his behalf. As a result, the Counsel for Gakwaya alleged that Campion could not file a claim requesting the dissolution of the contract. The Counsel of Gakwaya further stated that Michel Campion did not further advise the court whether he was advocating for Campion Lucien’ succession. [15] Michel Campion Counsel argued that this objection should not be analysed as the claim brought before this court was an appeal in respect of the case R.Com A 0089/10/HCC. In that case no pleading was made in the Commercial High Court on the fact that Michel Campion had no status to commence an action in the first instance at the Intermediate Court of Huye. Thus this ground came as a new claim in the appeal as it was not related with the case under appeal. If this objection was analysed as argued by Campion’s Counsel, the court would see that it did not have any merit as Gakwaya also sued Michel Campion. Therefore, one cannot sue a person and thereafter argue that he did not have the status of filing a claim. In enhancing this argument, Campion’s Counsel further stated that Michel Campion was Campion Lucien’s only child and the one who would inherit from him. THE VIEW OF THE COURT. [16] Concerning the objection for lack of jurisdiction, Article 142 paragraph two of Law N° 21/2012 of 14/06/2012 relating to the civil, commercial, labour and administrative procedure says ``request for inadmissibility of a claim shall be raised by the court on its own initiative if its

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reasons are of the nature of public law and order such as exceeding the time limit within which to appeal or lack of status, capacity or interest to sue.’ [17] Based on what is provided in this article, the court found the objection for lack of jurisdiction a matter of public order and that there was nothing preventing it to be heard at any level in which the case was situated. [18] Concerning the status of filing a claim by Michel Campion’s as alleged by the Counsels for Gakwaya, the court found that he had received mandate (mandat) to sell the his father's hotel. Thereafter, he proceeded to sign the contract of sale (contrat de vente) with Gakwaya Emmanuel containing obligations that each parties should have respected(paiement du prix et transfert de propriété)(payment of the price and transfer of the property). In this regard, no one could bring a claim in relation to these obligations except the one that received the mandate to sell the property. Therefore, Michel Campion had all the powers to file a claim and request the dissolution of the contract.

2. To determine whether the non-execution of the contract can be attributed to Gakwaya Emmanuel’s failure to obtain a loan in order to pay the purchase price of the hotel and whether he is entitled to pay damages as a result. [19] The Counsels for Gakwaya alleged that in the contract concluded by both parties,it was agreed that Gakwaya would pay the sum of 65.000.000 Rwfrs and apply for a loan from the bank in order to pay the outstanding balance of 135.000.000 Rwfrs using the hotel as a mortgage.Thus Gakwaya fulfilled what was agreed under the contract by paying the first installment and further applied for a loan from the bank in order to pay the outstanding instalment. [20] They further alleged that it was Michel Campion who did not respect the terms of the agreement because while Gakwaya Emmanuel was waiting for an answer from the bank in respect of his loan application, Campion recanted and wrote a letter informing Gakwaya that he would no longer sell the property and that he had cancelled the contract. He also stated that he had refused to provide the mortgage and even filed a complaint to the court requesting the termination of the contract. Counsels for Gakwaya further alleged that Campion also informed the bank that he was on trial with Gakwaya and requested the bank not to grant him the loan. Accordingly,the bank was prevented from granting Gakwaya the Loan of

70.000.000 Rwfrw which would have been added to the sum of 65.000.000 Rwfrw paid as advance, in respect of the purchase price of the hotel. This implies that he would have paid the sum of 135.000.000 Rwfrw as agreed in the provisional contract. The Counsel for Gakwaya further alleged that it was within this period that the Bank of Kigali wrote to Gakwaya and advised that the loan would only be granted when his trial hearing with Michel Campion had been terminated. [21] Concerning the payment of 65.000.000 Rwfrs, the Counsels of Gakwaya Emmanuel alleged that Michel Campion did not refuse the fact that money had been paid to him with the proof being the contract of 06/01/1999 concluded by both parties. They argued that it was the first judge who was confused with mercantile terms when he said that Gakwaya acknowledged the debt (reconnaissance de dette) and further recognised that he was paid (payments and recognition of payment) (versements et reconnaissance de paiement).The moment Michel Campion confirmed that he was not paid, the burden of proof shifted to him, and the judge had ruled that the contract of 20/01/1999 replaced the one of 06/01/1999 and that these contracts

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were complementaries and any interpretation of the provision of one should not jeopardised the sale as provided in 279 CCLIII. [22] The Counsels for Gakwaya Emmanuel requested that Michel Campion be ordered to respect the terms of the agreement and that Gakwaya Emmanuel be given a reasonable period of time to seek for a loan in repseect of the outstanding amount of 70.000.000 Rwfrs needed to purchase the hotel and be allocated damages for expected interest(manqué à gagner) amounting to 90% of interest per month x 7.618.496 Rwfrw x 127 [Months] = 870.794.093 Rwfrw. [23] They further argued that in the case where the contract of sale was not implemented, Gakwaya shoiuld be refunded the sum of 65.000.000 Rwfrs and 38.691424 Rwfrs paid to Michel Campion, totalling 103.691.424 Rwfrs with interest, moral damages in the amount of 50.000.000 Rwfrs, attorney’s fees in the amount of 40.679.8589 Rwfrs, court fees amounting to 447.486.446 Rwfrs added to a ``depreciation`` of 30% amounting to 134.245. 934 Rwfrs. [24] Michel Campion’s Counsel alleged that Gakwaya confused the debt he asked, in respect of purchasing the Hotel with other loans previously applied for in banks in relation with others business transactions. An example is the 70.000.000 Rwfrs refused by the Bank of Kigali. In this regard, Campion’s Counsel argued that Gakwaya should not continue to insist on a contract for the

sale of Hotel Ibis concluded on 06/01/1999, which was provisional, whilst there was a definitive contract of 20/01/1999, which replaced the former. [25] On the fact that, it is Michel Campion who was responsible for the non execution of the contract, his Counsel, Mugeni Anita argued that Gakwaya had stated that he was not granted a loan because Michel Campion refused to release the hotel to him as mortgage, but did not provide any evidence showing that he did not get the loan because of the mortgage that was not released to him. In this regard, Campions Counsel denied the allegation and stated that same was not true as the loan was not related to Hotel Ibis and that Gakwaya even applied for the loan before the contract of sale of the hotel was concluded on 20/1/1999. Furthermore, Campion’s Counsel argued that Gakwaya could not request a loan of 70.000.000 Rwfrs while in the contract it was agreed that he should pay the sum of 135.000.000 Rwfrs, which was going to be requested from the bank as evidenced in his several letters to the bank. [26] Concerning the fact that it was Michel Campion who prevented the bank from providing a loan to Gakwaya, Me Anita denied the allegation and argued that same was not true as nothing was mentioned in the letter which the Bank of Kigali wrote to Gakwaya Emmanuel suspending the loan, that Michel Campion prevented the bank from granting Gakwaya

a loan in contrast to the letter of 14/09/1998 which Gakwaya Emmanuel wrote to the Bank of Kigali requesting a loan of 200.000.000 Rwfrs to buy Hoteli Ibis, to which the hotel would be given as a security and in which Michel Campion even signed as an "under cover". [27] Concerning the payment of 65.000.000 Rwfrs, Michel Campion’s Counsel alleged that Gakwaya had given as proof that he paid the sum of 65.000.000 Rwfrs by refering to the fact that this was written in the contract. Campion’s Counsel argued that this argument did not have any merit because he did not show any receipt in respect of the payment as it impossible to pay 65.000.000 Rwfrs without obtaining a ‘receipt’ and had a cheque been issued, he should have still been in possession of “an official receipt” of that payment or provide any other evidence

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proving that he paid. To allege merely that he paid the sum of 65.000.000 Rwfrs and that the documents relating to the payments were kept by Michel Campion should not be considered because it was normal in the ordinary course of business for the payer to keep the necessary documents relating to any payment. [28] Concerning what Gakwaya Emmanuel was requesting including an order that the contract should be executed, Michel Campion should be given time to request a loan from the bank, damages should be awarded for expected interests in respect of termination of the contract, reimbursment of the sum of 65.000.000 Rwrws, moral damages and several other damages and procedural fees and attorney’s fees, Me Mugeni Anita argued that Gakwaya Emmanuel’s appeal should not be granted any merit as these requests were baseless. THE VIEW OF THE COURT. [29] Concerning the non execution of the Contract, Article 263 of the books of the Civil Code, states that a sale is an agreement in which one party accepts to deliver the property and the other party accepts to pay the agreed price `` and Article 265 states that:``the sale can be made in ordinary course or in the course of cancelling the contract or in the course of resolving the contract ``. [30] Article 331 of the books of Civil code reads as follows : `` If the buyer fails to pay the price, the seller may request the termination of the

contract.` [31] The court found that it was obvious in the arguments of Gakwaya Emmanuel that, he was insisting on a provisional contract of sale signed with Michel Campion on 06/01/1999 while this contract had been replaced with a definitive contract signed on 20/01/1999. Both contracts could not be used simultaneously as he pleads. It was evidenced that the contract lastly signed was the definitive contract that provides in Article 9 that it will be effective upon the bank’s acceptance to pay the first instalment of 135.000.000 Rwfrws as provided in Article 2 of the contract, whilst the provisional contract was only a “temporary act of sale” and did not make provision for a period to commence its execution. [32] Concerning the grounds that led to the non execution of the contract, the court found that both parties failed to fulfilled their respective obligations under contract commencing with the the buyer, Gakwaya Emmanuel, as he was not granted a loan from the bank to pay for the property as provided in Article 2 of the contract. The seller on his part could not fulfil his obligations of giving the hotel as a mortgage(Article 2), when the buyer failed to obtain a loan from the bank as provided in Article 6 of the contract. Therefore, Michel Campion as the seller did not commit any fault in requesting the court to terminate the contract of sale as Article 331 of CCLIII

states that, ``If the buyer fail to pay the price, the seller may request the termination of the contract.`` [33] Concerning the role of Michel Campion in preventing the bank from granting a loan to Gakwaya, the Court found that Gakwaya had not provided any evidence to show that he failed to obtain a loan because Michel Campion refused to release to him the hotel as a mortgage. The Court further stated that it was not reasonable to state that Michel Campion refused to release the mortgage as the Bank of Kigali had stopped to analyse the loan’s file and requested Gakwaya

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Emmanuel to provide explanations on his ‘status’ as ‘ the Promoter of Hotel Ibis’ which is evidenced in the bank’s correspondence dated 09/01/2004 (subject :suspension of your file) ( dont object : suspension de votre dossier). This implied that Michel Campion did not even get the chance of reaching the level of being requested to release a mortgage for which it is alleged that he refused. Furthermore, Campion signed as an under cover in the correspondence dated 14/09/1998 that Gakwaya Emmanuel wrote to the Bank of Kigali requesting a loan of 200.000.000 Rwfrs to buy Hotel Ibis. Accordingly, no proof was shown that Michel Campion refused to release or exercised bad faith in releasing the mortgage. [34] Concerning the fact that Michel Campion prevented the Bank of Kigali from granting a loan to Gakwaya, the Court found that no evidence was provided by Gakwaya to proof this fact. [35] According to the laws and explanations furnished above, the court found that Michel Campion could not be held responsible for Gakwaya Emmanuel’s failure to obtain a loan to pay the agreed price. The fact that Michel Campion requested that the contract be dissolved as ruled by the previous courts, provided no room for Gakwaya to lodge an appeal requesting the implementation of the contract and to be granted an extension of time to request for another loan. [36] Concerning the sum of 65.000.000 Rwfrs

which Gakwaya alleged that he paid to Michel Campion under the provisional contract and further requested that the money be refunded, the Court found that the payment of that amount was in respect of the provisional contract of sale which was replaced by the definitive contract of sale. Also the Court found that under the definitive contract, both parties agreed that the sum of 135.000.000 Rwfrs would be paid as the first instalment with a loan obtained from the bank meaning that the sum of 65.000.000Rwfrs initially agreed as the first instalment had changed. The court also found that Gakwaya Emmanuel provided no evidence to show that he paid the sum of 65.000.000Rwfrs as he only stated that he paid the aforesaid sum under the contract. Accordingly, the Court stated that that there was no proof that he paid to Campion the sum of 65.000.000Rwfrs and as such he could not be granted the interest requested in connection with the above sum of money. [37] Concerning the sum of 38.691424 Rwfrs that Gakwaya Emmanuel alleged that he paid to Michel Campion, the Court found that he did not provide any explanation or evidence to support this claim and as such he could be granted the aforesaid sum of money with interest. [38] Concering moral damages of 50.000.000 Rwfrs requested by Gakwaya Emmanuel, the Court found that he could not be granted the aforesaid sum of money since no fault was shown on the part of Michel Campion. [39] Concerning attorney’s fees and court’s fees of 8.000 Rwfrs, requested by Gakwaya Emmanuel, the Court found this claim to be baseless since his appeal was without merit.

3. Cross appeal lodged by Michel Campion. [40] Michel Campion’s Counsel stated that he was requesting for procedural fees evaluated at 50.000.000Rwfrs, and 10.000.000 Rwfrs, in respect of attorney’s fees to be added also to what was decided at the Court of first instance.

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[41] The Counsels of Gakwaya Emmanuel argued that Michel Campion did not deserve those damages. [42] Concerning damages for being involved in trials without any substantial grounds amounting to 50.000.000 Rwfrs and 10.000.000 Rwfrs, in respect of attorney’s fees at the level of appeal, the Court found merit in what the counsel of Michel Campion was requesting, but advised that the amounts requested are excessive. Accordingly, the Court decided that Campion should be granted only 3.000.000 Rwfrs as moral damages and 2.000.000 Rwfrs, in respect of attorney’s fees as decided by the Commercial High Court because these sums were reasonable. III. DECISION OF THE COURT [43] Decided on the objection raised for lack of jurisdiction of the appellant by Gakwaya Emmanuel; [44] Ruled that the objection for lack of jurisdiction of the appellant was without merit; ; [45] Ruled that the appeal on the merits of the case lodged by Gakwaya was without merit; [46] Ruled that the cross appeal lodged by Michel Campion had merit; [47] Ordered Gakwaya Emmanuel to pay Michel Campion moral damages of 3.000.000 Rwfrs with attorney’s fees and procedural fees as decided by the Commercial High Court; [48] Ordered Gakwaya Emmanuel to pay court fees of 50.500 Rwfrs and failure to do so within eight days, the money would be raised from his properties using government forces.