The appeal is dismissed because the constitutionality of section 36(2) of the EOCCA was already determined in Gedion Wasonga & 3 Others, making the present petition res judicata under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, which applies to constitutional and public interest litigation. The appellant, as a member of the public, is bound by the previous decision and cannot relitigate the same issue.
The court held that Sections 4(2), 4(3), 4(4), and 4(5) of BRADEA as amended are constitutional. The provisions are procedural, intended to filter frivolous petitions, ensure bona fide claims, and do not violate the Constitution. The requirement for affidavits, exhaustion of remedies, and suing the Attorney General instead of heads of state organs are justified, non-discriminatory, and consistent with the Constitution and international standards. The petitioner failed to prove unconstitutionality beyond reasonable doubt.
Failure to serve the notice of appeal on the respondents within 14 days as mandated by Rule 84(1) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules is a fatal procedural defect that renders the appeal incompetent and incapable of being salvaged by the overriding objective principle or by invoking Rule 4(1).
The Court of Appeal struck out the DPP’s criminal appeal as incompetent, holding that the DPP’s right to appeal interlocutory orders had been annulled in Steven Gwaza.
The High Court dismissed a constitutional petition as res judicata, holding that the challenge to bail-related detention had already been decided in earlier proceedings.
The DPP certificate objecting bail was invalid due to citation of a non-existent law (National Security Act, RE 2019), rendering it incompetent and expunged; thus, denial of bail was unlawful and the appellants' bail application must be reconsidered.
Section 148(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act, while lacking a prescribed procedure for denial of bail in certain offences, is not unconstitutional because it is saved by Article 30(2) of the Constitution as a reasonable and proportionate limitation on personal liberty in the interest of public safety, order, and justice. The provision does not oust the judicial process, and the offences listed justify the restriction. The High Court erred in declaring the provision unconstitutional and in disregarding binding precedent.
The doctrine of res-judicata applies equally to public interest litigation as to ordinary civil cases. Since the constitutionality of Section 36(2) of the Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act was conclusively determined in prior public interest litigation, the present petition is barred as res-judicata. Petitioners, as privies to the public interest, are bound by the earlier decision.
The High Court struck out a constitutional application as incompetent, holding that status quo, injunction, and restorative orders were not tenable against an assented law.