R. v. Alexander

2025 BCSC 2596 R. v. Alexander

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Alexander, 2025 BCSC 2596 Date: 20251211 Docket: 90508-2 Registry: Nanaimo Rex v. Peter Anthony Alexander Before: The Honourable Justice Layton Oral Reasons for Sentence Counsel for the Crown: C.J. Gibson Counsel for the Accused: T.L. Spettigue Place and Date of Hearing: Nanaimo, B.C. December 11, 2025 Place and Date of Judgment: Nanaimo, B.C. December 11, 2025 [1] THE COURT: After a contested trial on September 25, 2025, I convicted Mr. Alexander of four counts of possessing a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking in Nanaimo on August 2, 2022, contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 [CDSA]. The controlled substances were fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and MDA. [2] Mr. Alexander is now before me for sentencing. The parties agree that he was engaged in the mid-level trafficking of fentanyl and that a sentence of incarceration is necessary, but they disagree as to the length of that sentence. [3] A main focus of dispute is the extent to which the principle of totality should lessen what would otherwise be the appropriate sentence given that Mr. Alexander is already serving a lengthy period of incarceration, imposed by Justice Bantourakis on September 16, 2025, for four counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking committed in Port Alberni in February 2022.

See R. v. Alexander, 2025 BCSC 1829. [4] I will address this dispute in due course, but I will begin these reasons by describing the circumstances of the Nanaimo offences and of Mr. Alexander. Circumstances of the Nanaimo Offences [5] The circumstances of the offences are set out in detail in my reasons for conviction: R. v. Alexander, 2025 BCSC 1910. I will provide a brief overview of those circumstances here. All aggravating facts described in this part of my reasons have been found on the criminal standard. [6] Mr. Alexander was selling drugs from a house in Nanaimo. On August 2, 2022, police executed a search warrant at that house. While the police located drugs at various places inside, Mr. Alexander only possessed the drugs on or near the coffee table in the living room for the purpose of trafficking. The amounts possessed for this purpose were about 284 grams of fentanyl or fentanyl mixed with benzodiazepine, 9.3 grams of cocaine, 2.5 grams of methamphetamine, and 11.4 grams of MDA. [7] Relying on the testimony of the Crown's drug expert, Corporal Mihai Ilioi, I find that the total value of these drugs was about $60,000 if they were sold in the smallest units typically offered for sale to drug users, and about $20,000 if sold as packaged at the time of the search. [8] Based on the text messages and photos located on Mr. Alexander's phone, and his own testimony at trial,

I find that he was spending between $4,000 and $6,000 each week to buy drugs for resale, and that his profit per week was about $1,000 in cash and another $1,000 in product for personal use. Mr. Alexander had $1,820 in his possession when arrested by police after exiting the house on the day of the search. [9] The text messages and scoresheets make clear that Mr. Alexander sold drugs directly to users from the house as do the short nighttime visits by multiple individuals recorded by a neighbour's CCTV camera. However, I find that Mr. Alexander also had a worker who sold drugs on his behalf, as mentioned in a text message sent to his supplier. Accordingly, I would describe him as engaging in both street-level and mid level trafficking as those terms are defined in recent caselaw. [10] There were a number of weapons located at the house which I find that Mr. Alexander possessed in connection with his drug operation. These weapons included an extendible baton, a metal bar with a rubber handle, a small wooden bat, an imitation firearm containing a clip, a butcher's cleaver, what Mr. Alexander described in his testimony as a "stab-proof" vest, brass knuckles, and a homemade taser. Mr. Alexander's Circumstances [11] In sentencing Mr. Alexander, Justice Bantourakis considered much of the information about him that I have before me today, including the same presentence report, letters

of support, and background information provided by Mr. Alexander's counsel. [12] The following description of Mr. Alexander's circumstances provided by Justice Bantourakis in her reasons for sentence therefore remains applicable in sentencing him for the offences committed in Nanaimo in August 2022: [11] I turn now to Mr. Alexander's circumstances. This information comes largely from a pre-sentence report, a pre-sentence psychological report by a registered psychologist with Forensic Psychiatric Services, various letters of support, Mr. Alexander's counsel's submissions, and Mr. Alexander himself, who both wrote a letter to the Court and made comments on sentencing explaining the difficult circumstances he has found himself in as he has struggled with addiction issues that have plagued his entire adult life. [12] Mr. Alexander is currently 41 years old. His childhood and adolescence were sadly marred by the kind of instability, emotional neglect, and exposure to both violence and substance abuse that are all too common in cases like these. Mr. Alexander has been diagnosed with ADHD, has a history of behavioural and other problems in school, did not complete high school and was homeless by the age of 17. [13] Despite this, and to his credit, Mr. Alexander has obtained his GED and has also completed a welding course. Additionally, during his recent pre-trial detention, Mr.

Alexander has completed one Grade 11 course and is progressing well through two Grade 12 courses with the intention of obtaining his Adult Dogwood Diploma. Also during his pre-trial detention, Mr. Alexander was chosen to attend a Criminology course delivered through professors from Vancouver Island University, graduated from that program, and was again chosen to participate in another course next semester. [14] Mr. Alexander has worked as a welder, as well as in construction and drywalling, among other things. It appears that he has had difficulty sustaining long-term employment, however. [15] Mr. Alexander has an extensive criminal record, consisting of 38 convictions, starting at age 19, with an apparent gap in offending between about 2008 and 2015. His convictions include violent offences such as robbery and assault causing bodily harm, firearms offences, and five previous convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking. The most recent of those involved fentanyl. The remainder of Mr. Alexander's substantive convictions arise from an array of offences such as possession of property obtained by crime, possession of break-in instruments, theft, and break and enter. Additionally, Mr. Alexander has had significant difficulty complying with court orders, with numerous convictions for offences such as breach, failure to appear, and one conviction for flight from a peace

officer. [16] Sadly, and as I have already alluded to, Mr. Alexander is a drug addict. He has been diagnosed as exhibiting Stimulant, Alcohol and Cannabis Use Disorders. He began smoking cannabis in grade 9 and drinking thereafter. Though he admits to having consumed a variety of illicit substances, and to having been a heavy drinker and cannabis user, his drug of choice is crystal methamphetamine. He has struggled with addiction to that substance since he was 20 years old. Before his current incarceration, he has twice been enrolled in substance recovery programs but failed to complete them. [17] That said, Mr. Alexander has maintained his sobriety while incarcerated and appears to have been actively and meaningfully involved in treatment. He has been enrolled in the Guthrie House residential treatment program since March of this year. He has successfully completed the first two phases of that program and is currently in phase three. He has distinguished himself enough that he has been given a leadership position overseeing a team of kitchen staff and also acts as a mentor for three residents within the community. He has completed at least 100 hours of clinical group therapy and attends all programs regularly, including optional ones. He has also completed the Peer Connect program, earning certification as a peer support worker. [18] A letter from an addictions counselor

involved with the Guthrie House suggests that Mr. Alexander appears to be gaining insight into his life history and addiction and has expressed motivation to continue to work towards greater wellness and a drug and crime-free lifestyle in the future. The pre-sentence psychological report I have before me suggests that while Mr. Alexander's substance use disorders are currently in remission in the controlled prison environment, the road ahead for him in terms of maintaining that success in the community will not be easy. [19] I have before me a letter from Mr. Alexander's mother in which she speaks of his difficult growing up experience and the progress she believes he has made since his arrest. She believes that he has turned a corner. I also have other letters of support from fellow detainees who attest to the positive influence Mr. Alexander has been for them. [20] On sentencing, Mr. Alexander submitted two letters he had authored and also made spontaneous comments at the sentencing hearing. The first letter I have from Mr. Alexander is written to the police officers who arrested him. In it, he thanks them for saving his life, as he believes he would likely have died from a drug overdose if he had not been arrested. The second letter I have from Mr. Alexander is written to the Court. In it he acknowledges he was wrong in his choices, says he wishes to make amends and that he

is looking forward to a drug-free future. In his comments during the sentencing hearing, Mr. Alexander explained some of the very difficult circumstances he believes led him to this point and expressed gratitude for being drug-free and alive. [13] The conviction list filed by the Crown at the sentencing hearing before me shows that Mr. Alexander has about 50 convictions, including the four convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking on which he was sentenced by Justice Bantourakis. His other five convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking were committed in 2004, 2005 and 2020. The 2020 conviction involved fentanyl and resulted in a sentence of 33 months' incarceration before 10 months' credit for presentence custody. [14] Justice Bantourakis imposed concurrent sentences on the counts before her. The sentence was five years and six months on the two most serious counts, which together involved a total of 903 grams of fentanyl or fentanyl mixed with a benzodiazepine. After deducting a credit of 627 days for 418 days of presentence custody, Mr. Alexander's effective sentence was 45 months. As of today's hearing, he has 42 months remaining on that sentence. [15] Mr. Alexander addressed the court at the sentencing hearing today, describing the severity of his entrenched substance use disorder and the progress he has made, understandably not always

linear, since his arrest on the Nanaimo charges. He is looking forward to entering into a high-intensity program in federal custody that can give him further insight into his addictions and better prepare him for the challenge of remaining drug-free on release. Crown and Defence Positions [16] The Crown submits that the appropriate sentence for Mr. Alexander would be six years' incarceration, but for the application of the totality principle in light of the unexpired portion of the sentence imposed by Justice Bantourakis. The Crown says the totality principle justifies reducing the sentence for the Nanaimo offences to 48 months' incarceration, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences on the Port Alberni offences. [17] In support of its position, the Crown emphasizes that denunciation and deterrence are the primary objectives when sentencing an offender for trafficking fentanyl. The Crown notes that the general range for mid level fentanyl trafficking is four to seven years, and argues that Mr. Alexander's sentence should be at the upper end of this range given his significant and recent criminal record. [18] The defence submits that the appropriate sentence for the Nanaimo offences is four years' incarceration, given that Justice Bantourakis sentenced Mr. Alexander to five-and-a-half years' imprisonment in circumstances where he possessed

over three times as much fentanyl. The defence further argues that, in light of the principle of totality, Mr. Alexander's sentence on the Nanaimo offences should be served concurrently to the unexpired portion of the sentence for the Port Alberni offences. This would result in an additional six months' incarceration. [19] In support of its position, the defence contends that Justice Bantourakis' sentence fully serves the purpose of specific deterrence because Mr. Alexander's substance use disorder meant that he could not have stopped engaging in criminal activities after being arrested for the Port Alberni offences. The defence further notes that Mr. Alexander is doing well in custody, and given that in the past he went about eight years without committing an offence, there is little or no risk that he will reoffend when the Port Alberni sentence is completed. [20] Finally, the defence argues that general deterrence and denunciation are of reduced importance because Mr. Alexander was in the throes of addiction when he committed the Port Alberni and Nanaimo offences. As no rational person would willingly put themselves in this position, his moral blameworthiness is significantly reduced, and general deterrence and denunciation are largely addressed by Justice Bantourakis' sentence. Discussion [21] The purpose of sentencing is set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985,

c. C-46 as follows: 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [22] The fundamental principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. Proportionality is the organizing principle in achieving the goal of a fair, fit, and principled sanction. It is determined both on an individual basis in relation to the accused and their offence, and also by comparison with sentences imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. See R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 at paras. 10-12. [23] Other sentencing principles are set out in s. 718.2 of the

Criminal Code. They include that the sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender. They also include the principles of parity and restraint, and the need to ensure that the global sentence is not unduly long or harsh where consecutive sentences are imposed. This latter principle is often called the totality principle. [24] I should also mention s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code, which permits a court to take into account any time spent in custody by the offender as a result of the offence. I agree with the parties that s. 719(3) is engaged because Mr. Alexander was detained pending sentencing in relation to the Nanaimo charges, even though he was simultaneously detained pending sentencing in relation to the Port Alberni charges. See R. v. Barnett, 2017 ONCA 897 at paras. 27-30, and R. v. Haq, 2024 BCCA 85 at paras. 11-12. [25] However, in circumstances such as this, it will generally not be appropriate to credit the offender for the same periods of presentence custody in relation to both sets of charges: Barnett at para.

47. To do so would give the offender double the usual credit for that period - that is, credit at a ratio of 3 to 1, instead of 1.5 to 1 - without any principled basis for doing so. Examples of pretrial credit not being double counted this way include Haq at paras. 1-5 and 13, and R. v. Dergez, 2025 BCCA 87 at paras. 37 and 41. [26] Moving on from the topic of presentence custody, I agree with the parties that the sentences on the four counts before me should be served concurrently, and that the driver of the overall effective sentence will be the period of incarceration imposed for the count involving fentanyl, given that it is the most serious count. [27] In this respect, I agree with and rely on the following comments by Justice Bantourakis regarding the devastation wrought in our communities by fentanyl and its analogues: [8] In terms of the impacts of the offence, the trafficking of extremely harmful drugs such as the ones in issue here is a blight upon the community. The widespread and severe harm that flows from these dangerous substances is canvassed extensively in the relevant jurisprudence and is reflected in the sentences imposed for trafficking, and that is particularly the case insofar as fentanyl is concerned. [9] A public health emergency was declared in this province some years ago with respect to the opioid crisis and that public health crisis is ongoing. On

sentencing, the Crown has tendered information from the B.C. Coroner's service regarding unregulated drug deaths in this province, which sadly paints a picture of seemingly unmitigated misery and senseless loss. [10] In addition to the tragedies visited upon addicts themselves, the related harms are far‑reaching, deeply impacting families, increasing other forms of crime associated with the drug trade and addicts' own resort to crime in an attempt to fund their addictions. The situation as it currently stands is both heart-rending and exceedingly dangerous. [28] At the hearing before me, the Crown filed updated information from the BC Coroners Service, which not surprisingly painted the same tragic picture. [29] The grave societal harms caused by fentanyl have also been acknowledged in recent decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada, including Parranto at paras. 88-97 and R. v. Campbell, 2024 SCC 42 at para.

132. The moral culpability of offenders who traffic in fentanyl is undeniably very high: R. v. Mann, 2018 BCCA 265 at para. 98. [30] It is for this reason that denunciation and deterrence are the main principles to consider when sentencing an offender for possessing fentanyl or its analogues for the purpose of trafficking. As recently described in R. v. Bird, 2025 BCCA 300 at para. 28: Denunciation "requires that a sentence express society's condemnation of the offence". The principle of deterrence has two aspects to it--general and specific. General deterrence is at the forefront in fentanyl-related cases and "intended to discourage members of the public who might be tempted to engage in the criminal activity for which the offender has been convicted". In those cases, the offender is "punished more harshly in order to send a message to the public or, in other words, to serve as an example". The Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged that the effectiveness of general deterrence is a subject of ongoing academic and societal debate; however, it remains a principle Canadian trial and appellate courts are legally bound to apply: R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23 at paras. 46-47. [31] The pre-eminence of denunciation and deterrence does not, however, completely overwhelm other considerations. The principles of rehabilitation and restraint remain relevant in determining a

proportionate sentence. [32] Bird at paras. 29-30 confirms that the range of sentence for street-level trafficking in fentanyl, by which is meant direct sales to drug users, is 18 months to three years' imprisonment or higher depending on the circumstances. [33] Bird at paras. 39-55 establishes a range of four to seven years' imprisonment for mid-level trafficking in fentanyl. In this context, mid-level trafficking refers to the wholesale trade, where one trafficker supplies another trafficker lower down the chain of distribution, which means that this subset of drug trafficking commonly has many layers of entrepreneurs: Bird at para.

39. The upper end of the range will constitute a fit sentence for cases involving particularly aggravating facts, significant moral culpability and/or one or more related convictions: Bird at para. 47. [34] Where a particular case falls within one of the ranges (or outside of it) depends on the circumstances of the offence, the circumstances of the offender and the relevant common law and statutorily codified principles of sentencing: Bird at para.

51. In this respect, it must be remembered that ranges for particular types of crimes are guidelines, not hard and fast rules, and because of the fundamental obligation to impose a proportionate sentence, outcomes will necessarily move within a range or below or above it, depending on the circumstances: Bird at paras. 11 and 54. [35] In this case, the parties agree that Mr. Alexander's drug operation involved mid-level trafficking within the meaning of the definition adopted in Bird. I agree, but I would add that Mr. Alexander also sold directly to users and, on the evidence before me, I am unable to conclude on the criminal standard that his mid level trafficking rose above the lowest end of the chain of wholesale distribution. [36] There is also no dispute that, as reflected in the range established in Bird, possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking in the amounts in issue in this case is an aggravating feature for a conviction under s. 5(2) of the CDSA. I have no doubt that Mr. Alexander was aware of the potentially lethal consequences of trafficking fentanyl. [37] I also note that, while Mr. Alexander's operation does not appear to have been sophisticated, it was organized to some degree as evidenced by the amount and variety of drugs, the text messages exchanged with purchasers and his supplier, the presence of scoresheets and paraphernalia indicating the

production of crack from powdered cocaine, and efforts to increase profits by adding adulterants like caffeine to fentanyl. [38] Other aggravating features are the presence of the weapons that Mr. Alexander had in his possession in relation to his drug-trafficking operation and the fact that Mr. Alexander was on probation when he committed the offence. [39] A significant aggravating feature is Mr. Alexander's extensive criminal record which, as noted, contains previous convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking, including for fentanyl in 2020: See ss. 2(1) and 10(2)(b) of the CDSA. [40] However, the Crown agrees that Mr. Alexander's convictions on the counts for which he was sentenced by Justice Bantourakis are not previous convictions and therefore do not justify application of the "step-up" principle, because they occurred after he committed the offences for which I am now sentencing him. [41] The Port Alberni offences nonetheless shed light on Mr. Alexander's character and, in this fashion, accentuate the need to protect the public and cast some shade on his prospects for rehabilitation: See Ruby, Sentencing, 10th ed. at ss. 8.71 to 8.73; R. v. Johnston, [1989] B.C.J. No. 1542 (C.A.), quoted with approval in R. v. Khosravi, 2019 BCSC 509 at para.

19. The Port Alberni offences may also accentuate the need for deterrence and denunciation in the particular circumstances of this case, as conceded in the defence submissions: See R. v. Learning, 2019 BCCA 332 at para. 14. [42] In terms of mitigating factors, Mr. Alexander had a difficult childhood and was an addict who turned to selling drugs to feed that addiction. That said, he did not merely sell to finance his own addiction; he also sold to accumulate profit in cash. This mitigating factor is therefore tempered somewhat. [43] Another mitigating consideration is Mr. Alexander's efforts at rehabilitation since coming into custody in November 2023. He has done very well in treatment and demonstrated a commitment to recovery such that he was given a position of trust and is a mentor to others. Making progress in custody does not ensure success after release, but the substantial gap in Mr. Alexander's criminal record between 2008 and 2015 shows that he has the ability to change when motivated and given the proper supports. [44] I also note that Mr. Alexander has the support of his family, his mother having attended much of the trial and also the sentencing hearing today. The presentence report indicates that Mr. Alexander's mother has provided him with assistance in terms of housing and emotional support, which has inured to his benefit. [45] Although Mr. Alexander did not

plead guilty and therefore cannot rely on this as a mitigating factor, he has expressed regret for his actions. [46] Given these circumstances, I have concluded that the appropriate sentence for the Nanaimo count involving fentanyl is five years' imprisonment. [47] This sentence is below that imposed by Justice Bantourakis for the Port Alberni offences, because the amount of fentanyl was significantly lower. The difference would have been more pronounced but for the fact that Mr. Alexander committed the Nanaimo offences after being charged with the offences that occurred in Port Alberni, and had multiple weapons in the house that he used in his trafficking operation. [48] The question becomes, to what extent should Mr. Alexander's sentence of five years' imprisonment be reduced to account for the principle of totality given that he is currently serving the sentence imposed by Justice Bantourakis? [49] This question arises because the totality principle applies not only where an offender is being sentenced consecutively for more than one offence at the same time, but also where the offender is already serving a sentence for another offence at the time the sentence is imposed. On this latter scenario, the totality principle operates only in relation to the unexpired portion of the preexisting sentence. This is because the principle's application is a forward-looking exercise that

requires a judge to determine whether the aggregate length of the future incarceration would be unduly long or harsh in the circumstances. See Dergez at para. 45. [50] Accordingly, I must apply the totality principle only in relation to unexpired portion of Mr. Alexander's sentence on the Port Alberni offences which, as noted, is about 42 months. [51] In my view, the appropriate consecutive sentence for the Nanaimo offences, after taking the totality principle into account, is 30 months' imprisonment. [52] In coming to this conclusion, I do not accept the defence submission that it was essentially impossible for Mr. Alexander to stop mid-level trafficking in fentanyl after the Port Alberni offences occurred, nor do I accept that his drug addiction at that time reduces the need for general deterrence and denunciation to the extent argued for by the defence. Individuals who are charged in relation to mid-level fentanyl trafficking must know that resuming that activity shortly afterwards will result in significant additional jail time. [53] At the same time, 30 months' imprisonment on top of the 42 months remaining with respect to the Port Alberni offences takes into account the impressive efforts made by Mr. Alexander to turn his life around while in custody, and guards against undermining those efforts by putting his release date too far off into the future. Primarily for this

reason, I have a real concern that anything more would be unduly harsh in the circumstances. [54] An additional 30 months' incarceration on top of the unexpired portion of the Port Alberni sentences thus strikes the appropriate balance between the principles at play. Sentence and Disposition [55] Mr. Alexander, would you please stand up? [56] For the reasons I have given, I sentence you to 30 months' imprisonment calculated as follows, with a sentence on each count to be served concurrently with that on each of the other counts, but to be served consecutively to the sentence you are currently serving on the Port Alberni Supreme Court File 40777-2: a) Count 1, possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking: 30 months; b) Count 2, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking: 15 months; c) Count 3, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking: 15 months; and d) Count 4, possession of MDA for the purpose of trafficking: 15 months. [57] You can have a seat. [58] The Crown is also seeking a variety of ancillary orders against Mr. Alexander. [59] The first is a mandatory lifetime firearms prohibition and I will make that order. [60] The Crown also seeks a discretionary DNA order pursuant to s. 487.051(3)(b) of the Criminal Code. Considering Mr. Alexander's criminal record, the nature of the offence in issue and surrounding circumstances, and the impact

a DNA order would have on Mr. Alexander's privacy and security of the person, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice that I make such an order. I will therefore make the DNA order as requested. [61] The Crown also seeks a forfeiture order in relation to those items seized. Other than the controlled substances, which are to be destroyed pursuant to the CDSA. I am satisfied that the requested forfeiture order should be made. [62] Mr. Alexander, you have worked hard while in custody to overcome the challenges of your childhood and your substance use disorders, and you feel proud of your accomplishments in this regard. I hope you will continue on this path during the remainder of your time in custody and on your release. I share Justice Bantourakis' view that, if you remain drug-free, you have something positive to offer your friends, family and community, and I wish you the best. "D. Layton J."