Canada Judgment

Supreme Court of British Columbia

R. v. Baghaii

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Professional case brief

Research organized from the available case record

Source document

01

Holding and result

The alleged errors were not material and did not impact the sentence: the timing of the receipt relative to the theft was not determinative, the distinction in the appellant's explanation about forgetting was immaterial to the judge's decision, and mitigating factors were considered notwithstanding lack of explicit labels; given the proximity of the breach to the conditional discharge and similarities to the original offence, specific deterrence and public interest justified a suspended sentence rather than another conditional discharge, so the appeal is dismissed.

Court disposition

Appeal dismissed; suspended sentence and 18 months probation upheld

Orders

  • Appeal dismissed
  • Suspended sentence and 18 months probation affirmed
  • No substitution of a conditional discharge

02

Material facts

Parties

Mehrdad Baghaii

Appellant Counsel: A.A. Goldin

Regina

Respondent Counsel: J.L. Horneland

Amounts and remedies

  • Probation Months: 18
  • Original Offence Value Greater Than: CAD 5,000
  • Days After Probation to Acquire Chainsaw: 28

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Criminal Sentence Appeal / Judgment (sentence Appeal Heard and Decided)

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The appellant argued the sentencing judge made material errors: drawing an adverse inference from a receipt dated November 2018 based on a mistaken understanding of the theft date; over-emphasizing an apparent inconsistency in his statement that he 'forgot' the chainsaw was in his car without giving effect to his clarification; and failing to adequately consider mitigating factors. He asked the court to set aside the suspended sentence and replace it with a conditional discharge and probation.
Respondent
The Crown argued any passing comment about the timing of the receipt was immaterial, the judge did not over-emphasize the appellant's explanation, mitigating factors were effectively considered despite not being labeled explicitly, and specific deterrence and public interest required a sentence different from a conditional discharge; the appeal should be dismissed.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    R. v. Agin, 2018 BCCA 133; R. v. Eakins, 2016 BCCA 194; Lacasse

    An appellate court should intervene in sentencing only if the trial judge made an error that was material and had an impact on the sentence imposed

  2. 02

    General sentencing principles; discussed in reasons

    Sentencing judges must consider mitigating and aggravating factors but need not explicitly list every factor or use the specific labels 'mitigating' or 'aggravating'

  3. 03

    Sentencing jurisprudence as applied by the sentencing judge in these reasons

    Specific deterrence and the public interest can justify a sentence more onerous than a conditional discharge where the breach or conduct resembles the original offence

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The alleged errors were not material and did not impact the sentence: the timing of the receipt relative to the theft was not determinative, the distinction in the appellant's explanation about forgetting was immaterial to the judge's decision, and mitigating factors were considered notwithstanding lack of explicit labels; given the proximity of the breach to the conditional discharge and similarities to the original offence, specific deterrence and public interest justified a suspended sentence rather than another conditional discharge, so the appeal is dismissed.

Obiter and limits

  • A sentencing judge need not explicitly recite every mitigating or aggravating factor or use particular labels to show consideration
  • Passing factual inexactitudes (eg. comments about sequencing of dates) that do not affect the core reasoning are a 'red herring' and insufficient to warrant appellate intervention

Court disposition

Appeal dismissed; suspended sentence and 18 months probation upheld

  • Appeal dismissed
  • Suspended sentence and 18 months probation affirmed
  • No substitution of a conditional discharge

Source and reliance status

Supreme Court of British Columbia · 4 March 2020

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Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

Supreme Court of British Columbia

Judgment· 4 March 2020

2020 BCSC 537

2020 BCSC 537 R. v. Baghaii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Baghaii, 2020 BCSC 537 Date: 20200304 Docket: 29427-1 Registry: Vancouver Regina v. Mehrdad Baghaii Before: The Honourable Associate Chief Justice H. Holmes On appeal from the Provincial Court of British Columbia, North Vancouver Registry 64527-2-B, Reasons for Sentence of October 3, 2019 Oral Reasons for Judgment In Chambers Counsel for Appellant: A.A. Goldin Counsel for Respondent: J.L. Horneland Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. March 4, 2020 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. March 4, 2020 [1] THE COURT: This is a sentence appeal from a suspended sentence, with further probation for 18 months, imposed after Mr. Baghaii pleaded guilty to breaching a probation order by possessing tools on April 6, 2019 in violation of a condition of that order. [2] The probation order had been imposed by His Honour Judge Milne on November 1, 2018, along with a conditional discharge for an offence of possession of stolen property with a value greater than $5,000, said to have taken place on October 26, 2016. The probation order's terms included that Mr. Baghaii was to have no access to any online vending service, including specifically Craigslist (condition 9), and that he must not possess tools outside his residence (condition 11). Those conditions were imposed because the possession of stolen property charge arose

from buying and selling stolen tools by way of online vending. [3] In this appeal, Mr. Baghaii submits that the sentencing judge made material errors that formed part of the basis for the sentence she imposed and had an impact on the sentence, such that this Court is justified in intervening. He asks that the suspended sentence be set aside and replaced by a conditional discharge, again with probation. [4] The errors Mr. Baghaii asserts are three. [5] The first alleged error is that the judge drew an adverse inference concerning a receipt that Mr. Baghaii produced (during the sentencing proceedings) for the chainsaw in question, based on the judge's misapprehension that the receipt, dated November 2018, predated the theft of the chainsaw. [6] The judge was advised in the sentencing proceedings that the theft was reported in December of 2018. However, Mr. Baghaii submits that the chainsaw was not necessarily stolen at that time - it could have been stolen earlier, on the evidence placed before the judge. Mr. Baghaii submits that the judge drew an inference adverse to him from the fact that the receipt he produced for the purchase of the chainsaw predated what the judge improperly took to be the date of the theft. [7] The second alleged error is that the judge over-emphasized an apparent inconsistency in a statement Mr. Baghaii made during the sentencing hearing, to the effect

that he had forgotten that the chainsaw was in his car (Transcript, October 3, 2019, p. 9, ll. 25-9). [8] The circumstances were that the owner from whom the chainsaw had been stolen noticed the chainsaw advertised on Craigslist, and contacted the police. The police then arranged a meet for an intended purchase, with, as it turned out, Mr. Baghaii, and met him in Squamish, where Mr. Baghaii and his wife and children arrived with the chainsaw in the back of the car. In her reasons, the sentencing judge noted that "the whole point of the meet with the RCMP who were undercover as purchasers, was to provide the chainsaw" (Reasons for Judgment, October 3, 2019, at para. 9). [9] Mr. Baghaii submits, in relation to this second alleged error, that the judge paid no heed to Mr. Baghaii's corrective or clarifying comments in the sentencing hearing that he meant, in his earlier comment, that he had forgotten that the chainsaw was not permitted to be in his car (see Transcript, p. 9, ll. 31-4). [10] The third alleged error is that the judge failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors that applied in Mr. Baghaii's circumstances. [11] There is no real dispute that there were a number of mitigating factors to be taken into account in sentencing, including that Mr. Baghaii had entered an early guilty plea and had readily admitted the breach. Indeed, he was cooperative from the start,

once the police identified themselves as such at the Squamish meet. Mr. Baghaii's family circumstances also gave rise to mitigating circumstances, as did some of his own personal circumstances. [12] The Crown and the defence agree that the legal framework for this appeal is as described in R. v. Agin, 2018 BCCA 133: [52] In our view, the question is whether the error was material in that it had an impact on the sentence imposed and the sentence would have been different had there been no error. In other words, did the error impact the judge's analysis in imposing the sentence: R. v. Eakins, 2016 BCCA 194, at para.

21. This accords with the rationale, outlined at para. 43 of Lacasse, that requiring an impact aims to prevent appellate courts from intervening where an error cannot be said to have impacted the sentence, as to do so would undermine the deference owed to sentencing judges as well as public policy goals animating appellate review, including finality. [13] Addressing the first alleged error, I recognize that the trial judge did indeed allude to the date of the receipt predating the date of what she understood to be the date of the theft. However, there is no indication in the judge's reasons that she placed particular emphasis on what at one point in the hearing may have seemed to her like an incongruous sequence. Indeed, in coming back to that matter at one point in her brief reasons, she corrected herself to note, effectively, that the sequence of events was unclear. She also noted, in her reasons, that "[o]nly 28 days after the order of Judge Milne was imposed, Mr. Baghaii went to a pawn shop and bought a chain saw" (para. 2). [14] The judge's reasons as a whole make clear that the sequence of, specifically, the theft and the receipt was not material to the judge's decision. The matter of the receipt came up only in submissions by Mr. Baghaii's counsel (who is not counsel in this appeal) when addressing how it came to pass that Mr. Baghaii came into possession of the

chainsaw. Counsel was emphasizing that this was different from the manner in which Mr. Baghaii had come into possession of the property that was the subject of the original possession of stolen property charge. [15] The material point concerning the timing of events, which did form part of the basis for the judge's sentence, was that Mr. Baghaii had acquired the chainsaw in violation of the probation order very shortly after having been granted a conditional discharge and placed on probation terms. He also then attempted to sell the chainsaw in violation of the probation order, and did so by using Craigslist, in violation of yet another term. [16] I agree with Crown counsel that the accuracy of the judge's passing comments about the timing of the receipt and the theft amounts to a red herring. [17] As to the second alleged error, I find no indication of overemphasis on the first explanation Mr. Baghaii gave for the chainsaw being in his car at the time of the meeting in Squamish. What was clear was that he was admitting his offence during the sentencing proceedings, and apologizing for it, his emphasis being on having forgotten. Whether it was that he had forgotten that the chainsaw was in his car, or, rather, that he had forgotten that the probation order did not allow him to place the chainsaw in the car, was not material in the circumstances. The distinction could not have

played a part in the judge's reasoning. [18] As to the third alleged error, it is true that the trial judge at no time expressly used the term "mitigating factor" (or indeed "aggravating factor"), but neither did Crown or defence counsel. Crown and defence counsel made their submissions addressing the standard topics addressed in sentencing proceedings, including mitigating and aggravating factors, even though they did not use those terms. The sentencing judge is a very experienced trial judge, and would have been well aware that the submissions were addressing factors she was being asked to consider as either aggravating or mitigating. [19] It is not necessary for a sentencing judge to spell out explicitly everything she has taken into account. The submissions were made very shortly before the judge issued her reasons, and there is no reason to believe that she would not have had them clearly in mind, along with the other legal principles relating to sentencing. [20] Even if I were persuaded that one or more of the alleged errors had taken place, I would not intervene to substitute for the suspended sentence another conditional discharge, as Mr. Baghaii asks. Mr. Baghaii was granted a conditional discharge very shortly before the present offence, when he was placed on the terms of probation he then breached. The circumstances of his breach had some features similar to those of

the original offence for which he had been granted a conditional discharge. [21] The sentencing judge evidently acceded to the Crown's submission that specific deterrence was required in Mr. Baghaii's circumstances, and that it required a sentence different from the conditional discharge Mr. Baghaii had been granted not long before he committed the breach offence. [22] The sentencing judge was clearly of the view that a conditional discharge would have been contrary to the public interest, and I agree. [23] For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. "The Honourable Associate Chief Justice H. Holmes"

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

R. v. Agin, 2018 BCCA 133

Case cited

R. v. Eakins, 2016 BCCA 194

Case cited

Lacasse (referenced)

Case cited

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