R. v. Wallace
- Citation
- 2026 ONCA 105
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Court
- Court of Appeal for Ontario
- Decision
- 13 February 2026
- Posture
- Criminal / Appeal From Sentence
- Language
- English
More details
- Court
- Court of Appeal for Ontario
- Decision
- 13 February 2026
- Posture
- Criminal / Appeal From Sentence
- Language
- English
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The appeal was dismissed because the sentencing judge permissibly departed from the jump principle given the appellant's extensive history of 18 breach convictions, evidence of lack of meaningful rehabilitation and previous sanctions' ineffectiveness; specific deterrence and public safety justified a 12 month custodial sentence (less credit) and two years probation and the sentence was within the applicable appellate range and not demonstrably unfit.
Court disposition
appeal dismissed
Orders
- Sentence of 12 months custody confirmed; pre-sentence credit of 5 months applied leaving 7 months to serve
- Two years probation ordered
02
Material facts
Parties
His Majesty the King
Respondent Counsel: Jacob MillnsJason Wallace
Appellant Counsel: acting in person; duty counsel Geoff HaskellAmounts and remedies
- Custodial Sentence Months: 12
- Pre Sentence Credit Months: 5
- Months Remaining to Serve: 7
- Probation Months: 24
03
Procedural history
Posture
Criminal / Appeal From Sentence
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the sentencing judge improperly applied the jump principle
- 02
Whether the 12 month custodial sentence was demonstrably unfit
- 03
Whether specific deterrence and public safety justified an increased custodial term given prior ineffective sanctions
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The appellant argued the sentencing judge failed to respect the jump principle and that a 12 month custodial sentence was unwarranted because he had never previously received a sentence longer than 90 days for similar breaches; he contended the sentence was unfit.
- Respondent
- The Crown argued the jump principle is not absolute and a substantially higher sentence is justified where rehabilitation is not significant, the offender has a lengthy record and prior sanctions have been ineffective; relied on the appellant's 18 prior breach convictions, the psychologist's report, victim impact and sentencing authorities to justify the 12 month sentence and two year probation order.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
R. v. Simeunovich, 2023 ONCA 562, para. 22; leave to appeal refused [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 48
The jump principle is not iron-clad; courts may impose a significantly more onerous sanction where rehabilitation is not a significant factor, the offender has a lengthy record, or prior sanctions were ineffective.
- 02
R. v. Duivenvoorde, 2018 ONCA 158; R. v. Exell, 2015 ONCA 704; R. v. Jacobson, 2006 CanLII 12412 (ON CA)
Custodial sentences for non-technical breaches of court orders fall within an established range; prior cases provide guidance on fitness of sentence.
- 03
Common law sentencing principles and appellate reasoning in this decision
Sentencing objectives of specific deterrence and public safety can justify custody where breach conduct causes significant distress to a victim and prior sanctions failed to deter.
- 04
Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 12, Sched. 2
Orders issued under the Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking Act, 2017 can prohibit contact and proximity to complainants and breaches attract criminal sanction.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The appeal was dismissed because the sentencing judge permissibly departed from the jump principle given the appellant's extensive history of 18 breach convictions, evidence of lack of meaningful rehabilitation and previous sanctions' ineffectiveness; specific deterrence and public safety justified a 12 month custodial sentence (less credit) and two years probation and the sentence was within the applicable appellate range and not demonstrably unfit.
Obiter and limits
- An offender with multiple breach convictions should not be surprised if sentencing results in a leap rather than a step when incremental increases have failed to produce awareness of seriousness.
- Psychological evidence that the offender rigidly defends his conduct and enjoys challenging laws supports the conclusion that rehabilitation is not a significant factor.
- Victim impact describing significant emotional distress and fear supports the emphasis on specific deterrence and public safety.
Court disposition
appeal dismissed
- Sentence of 12 months custody confirmed; pre-sentence credit of 5 months applied leaving 7 months to serve
- Two years probation ordered
Source and reliance status
Court of Appeal for Ontario · 13 February 2026
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Court of Appeal for Ontario
Judgment· 13 February 2026
R. v. Wallace Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2026-02-13 Neutral citation 2026 ONCA 105 Docket numbers COA-25-CR-1501 Judges van Rensburg, Katherine; Thorburn, Julie; Gomery, Sally A. Subject Criminal Decision Content
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. Wallace, 2026 ONCA 105 DATE: 20260213 DOCKET: COA-25-CR-1501 van Rensburg, Thorburn and Gomery JJ.A.
BETWEEN His Majesty the King Respondent and Jason Wallace Appellant Jason Wallace, acting in person Geoff Haskell, appearing as duty counsel Jacob Millns, for the respondent Heard: February 2, 2026 On appeal from the sentence imposed by Justice Fergus C. ODonnell of the Ontario Court of Justice, on November 7, 2025, with reasons reported at 2025 ONCJ 663.
REASONS FOR DECISION [1] Jason Wallace appeals from his sentence of 12 months in custody, less pre-sentence credit of 5 months, leaving 7 months to serve. He was also ordered to serve two years of probation. [2] The appellant pled guilty to disobeying a court order issued under the Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 12, Sched.
2. That order prohibited him from contacting or communicating with, or being within 500 metres of, the complainant. The appellant admitted that, upon seeing the complainant in a casino, he approached her, tapped her on the shoulder, and asked her if she was winning. He remained standing behind the complainant for ten minutes before walking away. [3] The appellant contends that the sentencing judge failed to respect the jump principle. He argues that, since he had never received a sentence longer than 90 days for past breaches of court orders, a 12-month custodial sentence was unwarranted. [4] We disagree. As the sentencing judge correctly observed, the jump principle is not iron-clad. In certain circumstances, it is appropriate to impose a significantly more onerous sanction for an offence than an offender has previously received for the same or similar offences. Departure from the jump principle may be merited where rehabilitation is not a significant factor; where the offender has a lengthy criminal record; or where previous sanctions have been ineffective in deterring the offender: R. v. Simeunovich, 2023 ONCA 562, 168 O.R. (3d) 632, at para. 22, leave to appeal refused, [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 48. [5] All three circumstances arise here. The appellant has a lengthy criminal record that includes 18 convictions for disobeying court orders, including orders with respect to the
complainant. According to a psychologist who has counselled the appellant, although the appellant exhibited some insight into his behaviour, “he rigidly defended his actions and beliefs” and “appeared to enjoy challenging social policies and laws and living a lifestyle that may often straddle the law.”[1] [6] We endorse the sentencing judge’s observation that: At a certain point, an offender with multiple breach convictions ought not to be surprised if a subsequent sentencing leads to a leap rather than a step. Such a leap represents a realization that for some offenders incremental increases (or even sentences matching previous sentences for similar offences) are incapable of bringing out any awareness on the offender’s part of the seriousness of his or her pattern of disregard for court orders. This is such a case. [7] The appellant contends that the sentence is unfit. We again disagree. The sentence falls within the range of sentences that may be imposed for a non-technical breach of a court order: see e.g., R. v. Duivenvoorde, 2018 ONCA 158; R. v. Exell, 2015 ONCA 704; and R. v. Jacobson, 2006 CanLII 12412 (ON CA). [8] Specific deterrence and public safety are important sentencing objectives in this case. In a victim impact statement, the complainant described how the appellant’s actions and behaviour had caused her “significant emotional distress, financial hardship, and a
pervasive sense of fear.” [9] We find no basis to interfere with the sentencing judge’s decision. He made no errors in law or principle, and the sentence imposed is not demonstrably unfit. [10] The appeal is dismissed. “K. van Rensburg J.A.” “Thorburn J.A.” “S. Gomery J.A.” [1] This is an extract of a letter submitted by Mr. Wallace’s forensic psychologist, cited in para. 13 of the sentencing reasons.
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