The court struck the pleading’s Part 1, secondary market allegations, and vicarious liability claim, but let the primary market and negligence claims proceed for amendment.
The insureds materially misrepresented the nature of their financing by failing to disclose syndicated mortgages; that omission was material both objectively and subjectively to AIG's underwriting decision and triggered the representations and severability exclusion in the D&O policies, relieving AIG of any duty to advance defence costs and entitling it to recover the sums advanced.
The motion judge correctly applied the established stay-pending-appeal test, found the appellant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, and those findings are supported by the record and entitled to deference; therefore the motion to set aside or vary the order was dismissed.
The Court held the Excess Policy, as a follow-form policy, incorporated the Primary Policy’s Optional Extension Period because Condition 2 did not expressly exclude the OEP; Cronos validly exercised the OEP by complying with the option's requirements; and the appropriate OEP premium for the Excess Policy follows the 2:1 ratio between basic and OEP premiums in the Primary Policy, yielding an Excess OEP premium of US$486,000 (CDN$704,700). The appeal was dismissed and the declarations below were affirmed.
The Supreme Court of British Columbia granted an initial CCAA order for an integrated Nova Scotia pulp group, including stay relief and two $500,000 charges.
The court dismissed shareholders’ requests for interim defence advances, finding the USA displaced the bylaws and the company showed strong prima facie bad faith.
Leave to amend was properly denied because the proposed amendments failed to plead material facts sufficient to establish personal liability of the named individuals under the Mentmore test and failed to plead facts supporting joint and several liability; the Federal Court did not err in law and no palpable and overriding error was shown.
The court held that XL Specialty could not join the Harmac action or defend P&T Inc. through coverage counsel while reserving rights, because that would risk conflicts and non-neutral defence.
The ambiguity in Endorsement 3 (use of defined term 'Loss' instead of lower case 'loss') was resolved as a typographical error; the policy definition of 'Claim' is not time-limited and section 8 deems Loss arising from 2001 Conduct to originate in the 2001 Policy Period; accordingly Endorsement 3 applies to the Hybrid Proceedings and mandates that 90% of Defence Costs be allocated to covered Loss, obligating Chubb to pay 90% of those Defence Costs.
The follow form clause in the Lloyd's policy is limited to Insuring Agreement B and indemnity coverage only; it does not convert or eliminate the separate duty to defend set out elsewhere in the Lloyd's policy, so Lloyd's retained the duty to defend and was primary with respect to defence costs at issue.