The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal in a legal malpractice action, finding the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.
The Federal Court did not err in finding Levey to be the sole true inventor and that Secure holds title to the invention; declaratory relief under Rule 64 was properly characterized as public/declaratory (not remedial) and therefore not barred by limitations or discharged by the 2007 release; although the Federal Court incorrectly treated chain of title as res judicata from Secure FC 2021, Secure nonetheless proved chain of title from Genesis to Secure via corporate succession and the 2012 Asset Purchase Agreement; accordingly the appeal is dismissed.
The court held that Kin Wa Chan’s second mortgage claim was barred by limitation legislation and could not be revived by a later court-ordered payment.
An application under s.56(4) FLA to set aside a marriage contract is a proceeding for a declaration and falls within s.16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act so no limitation period applies to the declaration itself; consequential relief remains subject to the limitation periods that govern those remedies — equalization is governed by FLA s.7(3)(b) (six years from separation) and spousal support is not subject to a limitation period (s.16(1)(c) of the Limitations Act) — therefore the motion judge erred in applying the two‑year general limitation and the appeal is allowed.
The 1973 subdivision agreement unambiguously superseded the 1972 agreement regarding the Parkette and conveyed an unconditional beneficial interest to the Town; the Town performed required obligations and had actual notice, so the later administrative Land Titles conversion did not extinguish the Town's equitable interest; continuous, uninterrupted possession and use by the Town/public prevented limitation under s.5 RPLA from running; alternatively, the doctrine of dedication and acceptance vested ownership in the Town.
Clause 14 of the policy, mirroring the statutory condition, is clear and unambiguous and constitutes a contractual one-year limitation; the Limitations Act, 2002 permits variation of its limitation where the agreement is a "business agreement" and this policy was entered into for business purposes so s.22(5) applies; the motion judge erred by imposing additional content and signature requirements and by treating the contract as non-business, therefore the one-year limitation governs and the action based on the policy is dismissed.
Extension of time was denied because the appellant had no bona fide intention to appeal given her counsel's concession at trial, provided no reasonable excuse for the long delay, the proposed appeal lacked merit (she had already obtained the sole remedy available under the Limitations Act), and no exceptional circumstances existed to justify reopening abandoned claims.
The court found an ad hoc fiduciary relationship between John Rusin and Jenny Sledin, held he breached it, and awarded damages, tracing, accounting, and an injunction.
The court dismissed a property-damage negligence claim as statute-barred, finding the two-year limitation period expired even after postponement under the Limitation Act.