Judicial review of a Parole Board appeal decision was dismissed. The Court held the Act did not require audio recording of hearings and no procedural unfairness was shown.
The court struck Ms. Wright’s petition but granted leave to amend, finding it failed to plead material facts for a section 7 Charter claim and judicial review.
The Minister's surrender order was reasonable: jurisprudence permits the Minister to issue a surrender order differing from the ATP, the Minister properly assessed foreign criminality, there was no air of reality to an abuse of process claim or unfairness from disclosure refusal, and the Record of the Case supported an inference of intent to kill.
The Supreme Court upheld the Minister’s surrender order, holding it was reasonable to leave fairness, delay, and evidentiary issues to the New Hampshire court.
The prosecutor’s decision to prove the s.727 notice did not infringe the respondent’s s.7 rights; trial judges may review prosecutorial conduct for breaches of fundamental justice (e.g. abuse of process, arbitrariness, gross disproportionality, or unfairness) but may not subject such decisions to a general reasonableness review as a freestanding principle of fundamental justice; mandatory minimum penalties applied and the Crown’s appeal was allowed.
Refusal to grant the adjournment and not to appoint counsel did not breach principles of fundamental justice because the extradition judge properly exercised his discretion by balancing the history of the proceeding, the lack of legal complexity, and the overwhelming evidence for committal, such that no unfairness resulted.
The court declined to exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction because the CCRA, together with the Federal Courts Act, establishes a complete, comprehensive and expert statutory regime for review of parole decisions (including appeal to the NPB Appeal Division and judicial review in Federal Court), and pursuant to Supreme Court authority in May v. Ferndale and subsequent appellate authority, provincial superior courts should decline habeas corpus in such circumstances; accordingly the application was dismissed.
The appeal was dismissed because the appellants produced no evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the policy deters calls for emergency services and thereby infringes life, liberty or security; further, s.7 does not protect purely economic interests and the province's recovery claims are ordinary civil claims that require proof of liability and permit defences, satisfying principles of fundamental justice.
The tribunal granted the postponement because the Minister identified potentially important new information from US authorities that could cause an injustice if the hearing proceeded without it; on balance of factors under rule 48 the need to assess and disclose that information outweighed the prejudice of delay, subject to limits and conditions (inform by end of December, submit document list, and fixed peremptory hearing dates).
The Supreme Court held that s. 32(1)(b) of the Extradition Act is constitutional under s. 7 of the Charter and returned the cases to the extradition judges.